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TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS  
 
 
Transcription conventions largely follow GAT I & II (Selting et al.; 1998, 2009). 
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[   ] Overlappings, simultaneous talk 
[   ]  
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(1.5) Measured pause 
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er, erm, um So-called filled pauses 
 
Laughter 
he(h)llo(h) Speech laugh particles 
hehe huhu Syllabic laughter 
@@, @@, @@@ (Canned) audience laughter according to duration 
((laughs)) Description of laughter 
 
Acknowledgment tokens 
x, xx, xxx Audience clapping according to duration 
xXXXx Increased intensity in audience clapping 
@x@x Audience clapping and laughing 
 
Stress 
accenTUAtion Main stress 
Accent!TUA!tion Extra stress 
 
Intonation contour towards end of TCU 
? High rise 
, Medium rise 
- Plateau 
; Medium fall 
. Fall  
 
Noticeable changes in pitch 
 Rise  
 Fall 
 
Intralineal notation of changes in pitch accent 
`SO Falling 
´SO Rising 
^SO Rising-falling 
¯SO Level 
ˇSO Falling-rising 
 
Changes in loudness and tempo 
<<f>   > Forte, loud 
<<ff>  > Fortissimo, very loud 
<<p>   > Piano, quiet 
<<pp>  > Pianissimo, very quiet 
<<all> > Allegro, fast 
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<<len> > Lento, slow 
<<cresc> > Crescendo, increasing loudness 
<<dim> > Diminuendo, decreasing loudness 
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<<rall> > Rallentando, decreasing speed 
 
Additional symbols 
((coughs)) Para- and extralinguistic activities and events 
<<coughing> > Para- and extralinguistic activities and events accompanying speech; indicating 
duration 
<<smiling> > Interpretative comments indicating duration 
(   ) Passage could not be transcribed 
(such) Assumed word  
(such/much) Possible alternatives 
((…)) Omissions in transcript 
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@> End of impersonation 
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CHAPTER 1: LANGUAGE, COGNITION, INTERACTION. CONCEPTUAL 
BLENDING IN A SOCIAL-INTERACTIONAL COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Cognitive Linguistics (CL) as a research enterprise began to emerge in the late 1970s 
as a reaction to the then-prevailing formal approaches attempting to discern the 
internal structures of language. In perceiving “language as reflecting human 
experience” (Harder, 2010:14), CL can be regarded as a counter-movement to 
generative (Chomskyan) linguistics and logical Semantics with their focus on core 
language, syntax, and symbol manipulation. Rather than seeing language as a 
separate faculty of the human mind, cognitive linguists started to view language as 
reliant on the same general cognitive principles as other features of human cognition, 
such as perception and categorisation, and emphasised its experiential grounding.  
With its variety of foci (from the multifarious construction grammars to 
cognitive semantic1 approaches) that share a fundamental interest in meaning and the 
processes that underlie the linking of form to meaning, CL has thus evolved into an 
attractive alternative to generative linguistics. Defying the central principles of formal 
approaches to language and the mind, cognitive linguists place special emphasis on 
embodiment. By way of example, CL argues that the bodily nature of language becomes 
evident in pre-linguistic image schemas, such as the container schema underlying our 
conceptualisation of the prepositions ‘in’ and ‘out’ (cf., e.g., Lakoff, 1987). Pre-
linguistic bodily experience therefore constitutes the basis for the structuring of 
language and reasoning.  
Whilst Cognitive Linguistics and Semantics widen the perspective and 
acknowledge the bodily dimension of all language use, the research enterprise has 
been accused of neglecting the social nature of language. For this reason, scholars 
such as Croft (2009), Harder (2010) and Geeraerts (2005) argue that a ‘social turn’, or 
a second-generation Cognitive Linguistics, is required if the research enterprise is to 
overcome “the long-standing separation of the social and psychological dimensions in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Within the greater CL enterprise, Cognitive Semantics inquires after “the nature of meaning” 
(Williams, 2004:2). Meaning is assumed to result from localised and dynamic processes 
(conceptualisation), which recruit mental simulation and are grounded in embodiment. 
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the study of human behavior” (Croft, 2009:395). Language is, after all, first and 
foremost a means of communication and interaction,  and is thus inherently social. 
While a select number of authors, such as Chafe, Clark, and Givón, have tackled the 
issue prior to this ‘social turn’ and provided important suggestions regarding how the 
‘pragmatic’ relates to the ‘semantic’, the vast majority of research into Cognitive 
Linguistics still avoids focusing on the predominantly social nature of language and, 
for this reason, remains somewhat “incomplete” (Croft, 2009:395). Yet CL’s guiding 
philosophy, namely experientialism (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), is conducive to 
integrating not only the bodily, but also the social grounding of meaning (Harder, 
2010). Accordingly, questions as to the “anchoring of meaning in feedback from the 
environment, outside the individual’s body” (ibid:3) should be addressed in order to 
advance the research enterprise. 
With the present study, I aim to further contribute to the development of a 
social-interactional Cognitive Linguistics and Semantics. As a case in point, I 
concentrate on the highly influential Mental Spaces and Conceptual Blending Theory 
(MSCI). This cognitive-semantic theory, which claims to lay bare the human “heart of 
imagination” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002:89), has proven to be highly attractive for 
the humanities, and has been utilised in literary studies, linguistics, religious studies 
and anthropology to account for the ways in which meaning is constructed. The 
theory posits that a new meaningful structure, the blend, emerges from the integration 
of two distinct semantic scenarios (so-called ‘input spaces’) via a generic space that 
subsumes semantic structure shared by both inputs. In MSCI, compounds such as land 
yacht (denoting large sedans) and phenomena as diverse as the narrative structures of 
novels, the development of mathematics, performative rituals, metaphors and symbols 
are described as employing one and the same cognitive process.  
As the great number of applications in varied fields show, the theory has been 
proven to be extremely productive and intuitively attractive. Nevertheless, it has been 
criticised for two reasons. This is first of all due to for the veritable dearth of 
convincing experimental and empirical evidence that support the theory’s claims;  
secondly, it has been accused of neglecting the social dimension of in-situ cognition 
and meaning-making. In most MSCI literature, ‘blends’ are discussed as 
decontextualised cognitive ‘products’ from a post-hoc perspective.  
However, the question of when and where all these processes are supposed to 
occur, of whether the authors are discussing the phylogeny or ontogeny of the 
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expression, is left unanswered. In addition, the etymology and cultural historicity of 
such ‘products’ of conceptual integration are neglected in first-generation blending 
literature. How are novel constructions introduced into discourse? What motivates 
their construction? In other words: which processes are recruited in a) the 
introduction of novel blends into discourse, and b) in the parsing of such products of 
blending? How is conceptual blending coordinated in interaction? 
This project endeavours to contribute to answering these questions by focusing 
on two interrelated aspects. The first research question (RQ1) concerns the ‘bigger’ 
issue, investigating the ways in which conceptual blending is coordinated in 
interaction. Rather than starting with the end result and working in reverse to trace 
the manner in which an ideal cogniser might have arrived at a given construal, my 
interest lies in the way in which processes of conceptual blending are negotiated in 
interaction. How are distinct Mental Spaces set up over time? How are the mappings 
understood to occur between the input spaces signalled? How do interactants arrive at 
shared construals, i.e. intersubjectively negotiated meaning?  
My second research interest (RQ2) concerns the micro-level, and examines the 
degree to which conceptual blending becomes visible in interaction. To this end, I 
focus on a theory-internal aspect, namely blending typology, and test the extent to 
which interactants rely on discrete interactional methods when coordinating the 
different blending types suggested by Fauconnier & Tuner (2002). This typology is 
arranged on a continuum from less complex to highly complex blends. The latter, so-
called ‘double-scope blends’, bring together semantically highly incompatible frames 
and, in the blended space, integrate elements that are found in both input spaces; 
conversely, they also show structure found in none of the inputs. The authors suggest 
that computer desktops (ibid:131) constitute such double-scope blends, as the concept 
contains elements from both the ‘office’ input space (e.g. folders, recycle bin) and the 
‘computer’ input (e.g. save and print commands) without leading to clashes, or rather 
irritations. It is argued that our ability to integrate such apparently incompatible 
semantic structures into new scenarios that appear intuitively appropriate lies at the 
very heart of all human cognising. The highly advanced double-scope blending is 
contrasted with less complex frame integration, such as verb inflection or colour 
integration. If double-scope blending is different from less advanced blending and 
underlies human cognising, then the question arises as to whether this crucial 
cognitive ability becomes discernable in our daily interactions and whether it 
  LANGUAGE, COGNITION, INTERACTION !
! -4-!
constitutes a discursive practice2 in its own right. By analysing the interactional 
processes employed to coordinate blending-in-interaction (cf. RQ1), I examine the 
extent to which interactants recruit different methods when coordinating highly 
advanced double-scope blending than when negotiating less complex frame 
integration. Figure 1 provides a visualisation of the two interrelated research 
questions. 
!
Figure 1: Research Questions 
 
In my analysis, I focus on the discourse level, as this allows attention to be paid to the 
interactional coordination of creative, dissonant language usage, which involves 
processes of conceptual blending. This concentration on novel constructions rather 
than established expressions is important, as it first of all addresses the ‘ubiquity 
problem’ which MSCI has been accused of. Whether or not phenomena such as 
colour integration or verb inflection should be described in the powerful terminology 
provided by MSCI has been subject to debate. Constructions that are experienced as 
novel on the discourse level, on the other hand, more clearly exhibit the simultaneous 
maintenance of distinct inputs which MSCI suggests. Secondly, a focus on the 
discourse level allows for the interactional methods used to coordinate processes of 
interactional blending to be discerned. My emphasis lies on the ad-hoc ontogenesis of 
dissonant language use. With the latter, I refer to the production and processing of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 My use of the term ‘discursive practice’ differs from the one proposed in research projects conducted 
in the traditions of Foucault, Bourdieu and social-constructivism. Rather than analysing the 
construction of “social realities though actions that invoke identity, ideology, belief and power” 
(Young, 2008:1), I use the term to refer to interactional, discursive ‘doings’. These ‘doings’ are joint 
projects (such as negotiating the price of goods or joking), which require coordination, and are 
informed by abstractions of previous experiences. The term ‘practice’ therefore refers to the 
interactional negotiation of meaning and the notion that meaning-making is an interactional 
achievement. In doing so, the term emphasises the cooperative nature of language use, and reflects 
the fact that meaning is not something ingrained in words (cf. compositional semantics), but is jointly 
negotiated on the discourse level and thus woven into joint actions. 
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novel metaphors, similes or other forms of figurative speech that result in ‘irritations’ 
on the discourse level. Whereas fully conventionalised metaphors such as ‘table leg’ 
will not be experienced as exhibiting dissonance in most circumstances, in others they 
might be subject to semantic analysis and consequent ‘re-animation’ (Friedrich, 2012); 
an example would be an utterance such as ‘My table broke its upper leg’. Using fully 
conventionalised expressions in scenarios with which they are normally not associated 
constitutes another form of ‘re-animation’, i.e. dissonance on the discourse level. A 
case in point would be referring to a ‘blackbird’ as an ‘eagle’. Such incongruities 
require the cogniser to juggle the inputs (i.e. blackbird – eagle) and draw inferences as 
to the motivation – and hence meaning – of the use of non-conventional language.  
For the analysis to yield comparable results, I examine impersonation humour, 
an interactional phenomenon that not only relies on discursive dissonance, but also 
exhibits frame integration of varying complexity. While mocking one’s interlocutor is, 
in the MSCI conception, less complex, embodying an entity such as a horse or a 
machine requires the integration of semantically distinct frames, and is hence more 
advanced. By employing the methodological standards set forth in Conversation 
Analysis (CA), I – in answer to RQ2 – compare the methods used in setting-up, 
performing and exiting these various impersonation blends in order to describe the 
extent to which highly advanced double-scope blending constitutes a discursive 
practice.  
Based on the results, I propose a reconfigured model of MSCI that is 
discursively and interactionally grounded, and – in answer to RQ1 – therefore 
provides a means of analysing those social and contextual aspects governing in-situ 
online cognition which recruits conceptual blending.  
 
 
1.2. Conceptual blending as discursive practice: Preview 
 
 
This project aims to contribute to an advancement of both the methodological 
portfolio of MSCI and its theoretical conceptualisation within a social-interactional 
Cognitive Linguistics. To this end, a critical discussion of the theory will be presented 
prior to the suggestion of methodological and conceptual reconfigurations that will 
allow for the integration of social-interactional dimensions of meaning-making into 
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Cognitive Semantics. Building on these hypotheses, a detailed analysis of blending-in-
interaction will not only serve to reassess the blending typology put forward by 
Fauconnier & Turner (2002), but will pave the way for a discursively grounded model 
of MSCI which transgresses the semantic-pragmatic distinction and provides 
suggestions regarding how socially shared knowledge and beliefs about intentions 
impact on meaning construction.  
As a reflection of this overall structure, the study comprises six chapters in 
total. Chapter two provides an introduction to Mental Spaces and Conceptual 
Integration (MSCI) theory, and assesses the theory’s potential and limitations with 
regard to a social-interactional Cognitive Linguistics. Summarising the debates that 
have surrounded MSCI for the past ten years, I go on to discuss the theory’s ‘ubiquity 
problem’ and lack of solid empirical grounding. Particular emphasis is placed on the 
blending typology proposed by Fauconnier & Turner (2002), as the systematics is 
crucial to RQ2, and informs the analyses conducted in chapter five of the project. 
Elaborating upon the results of this critical discussion, chapter three suggests a 
methodological and conceptual framework for testing MSCI in interaction. After 
providing a state-of-the-art account of empirical and experiential research in MSCI 
(with a special focus on discursive approaches) I propose to study the interactional 
coordination of meaning and the cognitive processes underlying said coordination 
with the help of the methodology presented in Conversation Analysis (CA). Having 
introduced the methodology, I provide hypotheses regarding the reconfigurations 
required when ‘marrying’ a cognitive-semantic theory to a methodology which 
considers meaning to be intrinsically linked to social action. By way of example, 
discussion therefore centres on the way in which notions such as Mental Spaces can 
be successfully aligned with interactional approaches through the consideration of 
common ground. Finally, this chapter introduces the domain studied, namely 
impersonation humour. By delineating the phenomenon and introducing the corpus, 
this section provides a transition to the social-interactional cognitive analysis that 
follow in chapters four and five. 
Chapter four offers case studies that primarily shed light on both research 
questions. In addition to tracing how impersonation blends of varying frame 
integration complexity temporally unfold during interaction, the studies also provide 
initial evidence that it is not the blending typology suggested by Fauconnier & Turner 
(2002) that determines the varying interactional methods recruited, but the greater 
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social action that is negotiated in the performance. Furthermore, the case studies serve 
to provide an overview of the interactional analyses conducted in chapter five, as they 
present the individual methods identified in an integrated manner. 
Chapter five closely examines the methods identified in the case studies. It 
provides detailed analyses of the interactional resources employed in coordination 
impersonation blends, such as prefacing sequences, quotatives, postural orientation 
and exiting methods, and compares them across blending types in order to determine 
the extent to which the frame integration complexity is oriented towards the 
interactional coordination of meaning. This chapter concludes with the assertion that 
double-scope blending is not a discursive practice in its own right, and emphasises the 
important role recursive beliefs on the social action currently coordinated have on the 
co-construction of meaning. 
Chapter six utilises the findings gathered as a basis for further discussion, and 
integrates them into a discursively grounded model of in-situ meaning coordination 
which recruits MSCI. This model is capable of highlighting the effect that recursive 
beliefs on joint action and shared knowledge have on the emergence of meaning, and, 
in doing so, accounts for the issues raised in RQ1 and 2. The final sections provide a 
summary of the project and suggest points for further research. !!!
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CHAPTER 2: MENTAL SPACES AND CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATION 
THEORIES 
 
 
Visible language is only the tip of the iceberg  
of invisible meaning construction 
that goes on as we think and talk. 
Gilles Fauconnier (1997:1) 
 
Where does meaning emerge? Other than formal, composite approaches in semantics, 
Cognitive Semantics argues that conceptualisation is central to meaning-making. In 
accordance with the encyclopaedic view of meaning representation, language is 
understood to provide clues that prompt processes of meaning construction in the 
form of cognitive representations, to purely provide fragmentary specifications for the 
construction of ephemeral cognitive representations that are fundamentally perceptual 
in nature, and can recruit mental simulations. As such, meaning does not result from 
the compositional content of individual sentences, nor is it a matter of relating 
linguistic entities to the external world; rather, it is essentially conceptual in nature, 
and results from dynamic mental processes of meaning construction, i.e. 
conceptualisations.  
For purposes of meaning construction, cognisers are assumed to set up 
temporary conceptual domains in CL; these are so-called Mental Spaces which are 
connected to one another in various ways as discourse unfolds. Assuming mechanisms 
of conceptual projection also evident in Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff, 1986; 
Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) and schema induction (knowledge structures such as 
Idealised Cognitive Models, see Lakoff (1987)), Mental Spaces Theory as primarily 
developed by Gilles Fauconnier (1984, 1994, 1997) presents a detailed account of how 
language used in its social and cultural contexts provides instructions for local and 
dynamic meaning construction in discourse. As Mental Spaces Theory (MST) forms 
the basis upon which Conceptual Integration Theory (CIT) is built, the following will 
briefly illustrate the key assumptions of the first theory before discussing in detail the 
central ideas which constitute CIT. 
 
  LANGUAGE, COGNITION, INTERACTION 
   
 -9- 
2.1. Mental Spaces Theory 
 
 
Central logical problems in the philosophy of language represented the starting point 
for the development of what was to become Mental Spaces Theory. In the late 1970s, 
Fauconnier proposed solutions for a number of longstanding puzzles in semantics, 
such as indirect reference, presupposition and counterfactuals, by showing that 
thought and ultimately language is dependent on our manipulating of “webs of 
mappings between Mental Spaces” (Fauconnier, 1997:149). In MST, two aspects 
essentially comprise meaning construction. Mental Spaces are set up first of all, while 
the second aspect is to establish mappings between these Mental Spaces. The 
mappings are situated and governed by the local context.1 In more detail, Mental 
Spaces are, according to Fauconnier’s (1997:11) definition, “partial structures that 
proliferate when we think and talk, allowing a fine-grained partitioning of our 
discourse and knowledge structures.” These Mental Spaces contain elements which 
designate discourse entities, and are considered to be structured by Idealised 
Cognitive Models (ICMs) as proposed by Lakoff (1987). They therefore depend on the 
more stable domains from which they recruit information for ‘on-line’ meaning 
construction. ‘Meaning’ is consequently divided into discrete, temporary conceptual 
‘packets’ that are built ‘on-line’ for purposes of local understanding of narratives, 
metaphors, speech acts and “general reasoning” (Fauconnier, 1997:5), and contain 
specific aspects of information that provide the “cognitive substrate” (ibid:34) for 
meaning-making. They are largely ephemeral, and rely on more stabilised forms of 
background knowledge and the discourse context, which includes local framing, genre 
and setting.  
                                                
1 Mental Spaces Theory refrains from formally separating the pragmatic from the semantic, and 
acknowledges (albeit theoretically) the power pragmatic aspects exercise upon on-line meaning 
construction processes. Other than research conducted in cognitive pragmatics (e.g. Carston, 2002; 
Schmid, 2012), however, MST does not place explicit emphasis on identifying those general cognitive 
principles and processes that form “pragmatic competence” and allow for context-dependent 
meanings to emerge. 
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As discourse unfolds, the different conceptual packets are built up and linked 
through mappings. Space building, the chunking of information into ‘objectively’ different 
types (locations, beliefs, time periods, hypothetical situations, counterfactuals, time 
periods etc), and/or the establishment of new spaces or the shifting of focus to spaces 
already built, is achieved through space builders. Space builders come in various 
shapes and forms, and impose mapping conditions upon spaces by constraining the 
number of possible interpretations. Grammatical expressions, such as prepositional 
phrases (“In London…”, “In 2002…”), adverbials (“In actuality…”, “Literally…”), 
subject-verb complexes (“Mary thinks…”) or conjunctions-cum-clauses (“Should the 
President agree…”), are one type of space builder that configure the number of 
possible interpretations available.  
In Mental Spaces Theory, the spaces established as discourse unfolds are 
assembled in a Mental Spaces lattice, as illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Mental Space Lattice (cf. Fauconnier (1997:39) 
 
In the lattice, one space acts as the base, and another (or the same one in certain cases) 
is in focus. Focus Spaces are those spaces that are currently internally elaborated, 
whereas the Base Space is the starting point of a given construction and can always be 
returned to throughout the discourse. Further spaces set up will either relate to Base 
Space or Focus Space. In meaning construction, one of the spaces in the lattice acts as 
the viewpoint. Viewpoint Spaces are those spaces from which the others are accessed. 
Throughout the process of meaning construction, cognisers navigate the space lattice, 
shifting focus and viewpoint from space to space with the help of the language’s tense 
and mood system. The spaces set up by space builders and grouped in the lattice are 
linked to one another via connectors and other structures. Copula or ‘copulative’ verbs, 
such as “become”, can, for example, act as trans-spatial connectors. Of special 
importance here is the Access Principle (also called Identification or the ID principle), which 
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asserts that “if two elements a and b are linked by a connector F (b = F(a)), then 
element b can be identified by naming, describing, or pointing to its counterpart a” 
(Fauconnier, 1997:41)2. In less formal terms, the access principle maintains that 
expressions which identify or detail a given element in one mental space (so-called 
triggers) can be employed to access its match (so-called targets) in another mental space. 
When building up the lattice, default structuring processes apply in order to 
yield structure that is not explicitly referred to in the utterances themselves. First of all, 
some structure of Mental Spaces is presupposed, and spreads by default through the 
lattice. This allows structure to be added to Mental Spaces without explicit reference 
to these aspects. This phenomenon is known as the Presupposition Float, and is 
formalised in Fauconnier (1997:61) as follows: “A presupposed structure Π in mental 
space M will propagate to the next higher space N, unless structure already in M or N 
is incompatible with Π, or entails Π.” In short, the Presupposition Float contends that 
structure will advance through higher spaces in the lattice until it encounters identical 
or opposing structure. Mental Spaces higher up in the lattice can consequently inherit 
structure from lower spaces;  these are so-called ‘semantic entailments’. Consider the 
following example adapted from Fauconnier (1997:62): 
 
Sarah wishes Anna’s children would visit her. 
 
Here, the presupposition <HAS CHILDREN> will float from the newly built space M 
(set up through the space builder “Sarah wishes”) to the base space B. Consequently, 
the speaker is assuming that Anna has children and that Sarah is assuming that Anna 
has children. Naturally, the Presupposition Float can be cancelled in discourse when 
new information becomes available (e.g. that Anna actually does not have children). 
Secondly, optimisation is a mechanism that supplies structure not explicitly mentioned 
in the utterance itself from a ‘parent space’ to a ‘child space’. Aside from the 
Presupposition Float, then, optimisation is  a form of downward spreading in the 
lattice.  
                                                
2 It becomes evident here that Fauconnier himself – despite insisting on a focus on ‘natural’ language – 
makes use of invented and construed sentences to discuss traditional problems in the philosophy of 
language. He also largely relies on traditional logics and mathematical notations that are reminiscent 
of formal approaches. A clear separation from formal semantics is therefore not fully evident, 
especially given that Fauconnier is  rooted in formal discourse and prone to ‘mathematisation’ (at 
least in his early work (1994, 1997)).  
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The establishment of mappings between the Mental Spaces that are built up as 
discourse unfolds occurs in micro and macro-meaning-making processes. “A 
mapping, in the most general mathematical sense,” Fauconnier writes, “is a 
correspondence between two sets that assigns to each element in the first a 
counterpart in the second” (Fauconnier, 1997:1). Mappings, he goes on to explain, 
“are at the heart of the unique human cognitive faculty of producing, transferring, 
and processing meaning” (ibid). Mappings consequently enable meaning construction. 
Here, Fauconnier distinguishes between different sorts of mappings; wish to briefly 
introduce several key types here.  
As the name suggests, projection mappings project parts of the structure of a 
source domain onto the structure of a target domain, as is the case in metaphors. 
These mappings are either culturally shared and, such as the English TIME AS 
SPACE conceptual metaphor, lexically entrenched (as in Easter is approaching) and 
hence opaque, or are set up in local contexts and are then experienced as novel and 
creative expressions (or “alive” metaphors, to use Ricoeur’s (1975) terminology). 
Fauconnier, unlike Ricoeur, refrains from differentiating these mappings formally, 
instead arguing that many of the expressions experienced as ‘creative’ are purely 
extensions of conventionalised (lexicalised and grammaticalised) mappings.  
In a roughly similar fashion, analogical mappings induce schemas to produce 
analogies, such as the infamous computer virus that integrates abstract generic features of 
biological viruses with certain computer programmes. Analogical mappings might, in 
a second step, guide processes of categorisation when, for example, a number of 
computer programmes are categorised as viruses. The analogical mapping then 
becomes lexicalised and grammaticalised, and is readily available for further 
reasoning and elaboration. 
Pragmatic function mappings, on the other hand, connect two locally established 
domains by virtue of two corresponding categories of objects mapped onto one 
another by a pragmatic function. This would, for example, be the case when 
matching patients with their illnesses, as in The discectomy in four.3 Consequently, 
metonymy and synecdoche in Fauconnier (1997) constitute pragmatic function 
mappings.  
                                                
3 Fauconnier does not, however, elucidate further on how such pragmatic mappings occur. Why is it 
that in this example, the term ‘discectomy’ is interpreted as referring to the patient rather than, say, 
surgical instruments? 
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Furthermore, schema mappings are employed when schemas, frames or models 
structure a “situation in context” (ibid:11), such as is the case in grammatical and 
lexical constructions that prompt meaning schemas. This would, for example, apply to 
the buying and selling-frame described by Fillmore (1982), which identifies roles in a 
given frame. Many of these mappings are discussed in later works as involving frame-
blending and emergent structure. 
To illustrate the central ideas, concepts and notations of MST in further detail, 
I would like to briefly present Fauconnier’s (1997:120ff) The Naked Lie example, as this 
is one of the few examples he utilises that contains ‘actual’ interaction and, 
consequently, “negotiated space building” (Fauconnier, 1997:121). Furthermore, it 
shows the way in which frame blending effects can occur in the interaction of Mental 
Spaces. The Naked Lie is a film in which the following dialogue takes place: 
 
Victoria: What if it were your sister? 
Webster: I don’t have a sister, but if I did, she wouldn’t be a hooker. 
 
In the first sentence, Victoria tries to prompt Webster to show sympathy for a 
murdered prostitute by proposing a counterfactual model. However, this is in turn 
answered by Webster with another counterfactual model that thwarts the inference 
intended by Victoria. 
 
Figure 3: The Naked Lie (cf. Fauconnier, 1997:121) 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the space configuration set up by Victoria in her first utterance: A 
counterfactual space M is constructed through the grammatical space builder “what 
if”. Elements c and c1 are linked via the analogy connector 프, as Victoria is not 
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proposing identity; by asking “What if it were your sister?” rather than “What if she 
was your sister?”, Victoria is setting up an analogy rather than construing a 
counterfactual that would maintain the ‘same’ girl in Space M whilst simultaneously 
being framed as Webster’s sister. Still, her use of “your sister” can be read as her 
presupposing that Webster had a sister. For the mental space configuration, this 
would mean that element c1 in space M would be connected by identity connector ℑ 
back to element c’ (Webster’s sisters) in the base space. Element a, on the other hand, is 
linked to a1 via the identity connector ℑ, as Webster ‘remains’ the same in space M 
(see figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: The Naked Lie II (cf. Fauconnier, 1997:123) 
 
The counterfactual now allows for inferences to be generated that draw on cultural 
models such as sympathy for the death of family members. These inferences in turn 
float upwards to the base space, as illustrated in Figure 4. Furthermore, a frame 
blending effect is achieved, as element c1 tallies with both domains: in the base space 
B, it fits c, the hooker, and in the counterfactual space M, it fits c’, Webster’s sister. As 
a result, pertinent qualities of c1 can be derived. One example may be that Webster 
should feel sympathy for the murdered prostitute. Webster, however, rejects the 
inferences intended by the blend Victoria set up. The exchange at this point develops 
into a contest of attacking inferences and construing alternative inferences, as Webster 
intends to spoil Victoria’s construction in two ways. First of all, he states that he has 
no sister, consequently ‘removing’ c’ from the base space, which in turn leads to the 
role s (Webster’s sister) no longer having a value. This additionally results in the 
transfer of the ‘family frame’ (feeling close to one’s sister) to c1 being prevented. 
Webster consequently has no need to feel sympathy for the murdered woman. In a 
second step, Webster blocks another potential construal in which he, in theory, could 
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have a sister working as a prostitute; he does this by preventing the condition 
HOOKER from being linked to the role of his sister. This is specifically accomplished 
by Webster setting up his own counterfactual space, N, in which an imaginary sister s 
could, under no circumstances, be a prostitute, as illustrated in figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Webster's counterfactual (cf. Fauconnier, 1997:124) 
 
In all, Fauconnier’s analysis of The Naked Lie, illustrates the key elements of Mental 
Spaces Theory: Mental Spaces are built as discourse unfolds through pragmatic or 
grammatical space builders. The spaces themselves contain elements that can be 
connected to their counterparts in other spaces via connectors, such as the Identity 
connector. Spaces are furthermore structured by induced frames that can provide 
further roles and values. In the interaction of spaces, inferences might arise which can 
be attributed to frame blending effects. This will be discussed in further detail below.  
With his model, Fauconnier manages to account for counterfactual reasoning 
and other long-unsolved puzzles in the philosophy of language. He shows that 
grammar only directs meaning construction to a certain degree, and further decisions 
as to the ‘meaning’ of utterances have to be made on a construction level, namely the 
detailing of the mappings, and on a pragmatic level, namely the detailing of the 
implications of the interpretation. Thought and reasoning are thus fundamentally 
creative processes, as essentially new connections and conceptualisations are set up at 
every moment of the unfolding discourse.  
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2.2. Conceptual Integration Theory 
 
 
Conceptual blending is first introduced (Fauconnier, 1997; Fauconnier & Turner, 
1994, 1996, 1998) as a cognitive operation integrating partial structures from distinct 
input domains which share generic structure and are connected analogically; 
however, they yield emergent properties that are found in neither of the input spaces 
in a fourth domain, the so-called blended space. Blending, the theory’s founding 
fathers claim, is the basic and fundamental cognitive operation that underlies all forms 
of creativity and thought, be they linguistic (metaphor, narrative, grammatical 
constructions) or non-linguistic (art, mathematics, religion) cognitive phenomena. 
Consequently, blending is at work on micro and macro-levels of meaning-making 
processes, enabling grammatical constructions as well as complex mental explorations 
to occur. The success of Mental Spaces and Conceptual Integration Theory (MSCI) is 
largely due to its ability to elegantly unite disparaged approaches in metaphor theory, 
transcending traditional dichotomies, such as the literal-poetic or alive-dead metaphor 
binary oppositions, and being able to account for metaphors in a more flexible 
manner than Conceptual Metaphor Theory4 (Kok & Bublitz, 2011). Combining the 
mapping element that is central to Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff, 1987; 
Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) with ideas of emergent structure as proposed in interaction 
theories of metaphor (e.g. Black, 1962; Ricoeur, 1975) and the tertium comparationis 
structure evident in early metaphor theories (e.g. Aristotle; Lakoff & Turner, 1989) led 
to MSCI being enthusiastically received in linguistic and literary research on meaning 
construction in figurative language use (see Fludernik, Freeman, & Freeman, 1999 for 
an overview of the reception of MSCI).5  
Nevertheless, emergence and blended structure are not entirely novel 
concepts. The notion behind ‘emergence’ has been in use in philosophy at least since 
                                                
4 In a forthcoming publication, Fauconnier & Lakoff (fthc) argue that both Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory (CMT) and Mental Spaces and Conceptual Integration Theory (MSCI) are to be understood 
within the Neural Theory of Language (NTL) largely devised by Lakoff (2008) and Feldman (2006). 
However, as NTL remains somewhat contested within Cognitive Linguistic (cf. Harder, 2007) and – 
despite its name – thus far relies on computational modeling rather than investigating actual human 
cognising and its neurobiological grounding, I refrain from discussing MSCI in relation to NTL. 
5 Fauconnier and Turner (2002) acknowledge Koestler’s (1964) influence, yet do not refer to other 
theories which may have impacted on their model. Nevertheless, established ideas on metaphor and 
rhetoric are evident in their thinking. 
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the time of Aristotle, and in systems theory and science to describe the ways in which 
novel structures emerge from the interaction of established patterns. Aristotle’s 
conception in particular closely resembles the notion advocated in MSCI. While not 
using the term emergence, Aristotle writes in part 6 of his Metaphysics (τὰ μετὰ τὰ 
φυσικά) that “In the case of all things which have several parts and in which the 
totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something beside the parts”. 
As such, this already points to the characteristics ascribed to the emergent structure of 
a blended space in MSCI. The first person to use the term emergence to describe the 
concept outlined by Aristotle was physiologist George Henry Lewes (1875:413), who 
defined the term as follows:  
 
“It is otherwise with emergents, when, instead of adding measurable motion to 
measurable motion, or things of one kind to other individuals of their kind, 
there is a co-operation of things of unlike kinds. The emergent is unlike its 
components insofar as these are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to 
their sum or their difference.”  
 
While Lewes refers to the question as to how consciousness may emerge from nerve 
activity, his treatment can nonetheless be read as analogous to concepts used in 
MSCI, namely the interaction of semantically incompatible frames and the emergent 
structure that arises from said interaction. The parallels in terminology are striking, 
too, as even at this early stage Lewes (1875:93) talks of ‘blending’ in relation to 
emergent structure when he writes that “the difference between an aggregate and a 
product is that in the first case the component parts are simply grouped together, 
added; in the second, the constituent elements are blended, multiplied into each 
other.” 
To illustrate how blending is intended to work in MSCI, I would like to focus 
on the following example which has been the subject of much discussion in blending 
literature (e.g. Fauconnier, 1997:155ff): in 1993, the catamaran Great America II sailed 
from San Francisco to Boston, a route also followed by the clipper Northern Light in 
1853. Yachting magazines observing the catamaran’s trip in the 1990s compared it to 
that of the clipper, using statements such as 
 
As we went to press, Rich Wilson and Bill Biewenga, [the crew of the catamaran] were  
barely maintaining a 4.5 lead over the ghost of the clipper Northern Light […]. 
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In accounts such as this one, the two boats are portrayed as being in direct 
competition with one another. Both boats are understood to be sailing the same route 
in the same year, with the events of 1853 and 1993 being blended into a single event. 
The blended space in which the boats are racing against each other in the 1990s 
inherits partial structure from both input spaces. From 1993, the blended space takes 
the weather conditions, date and one vessel, while from 1853 it recruits the other 
vessel, but discounts any additional information. The emerging structure now 
facilitates a direct comparison of the two boats and an analysis thereof in regatta 
terms. This also adds an element of excitement  despite the fact that almost nobody 
would believe that the 19th century clipper had made a magical reappearance, and 
that the catamaran was actually racing a ghost ship. Yet the mental “dynamic 
simulation” (Coulson & Oakley, 2000:176) of the scenario yields novel information. 
Through this emergent structure, inferences that reflect back onto the input spaces 
can arise. In the example, this would concern conclusions with regard to the speed of 
the two boats.  
How is this ordinary cognitive operation achieved? In the most general and 
abstract terms, conceptual integration involves the following aspects: cross-space 
mapping between the input spaces, the setting up of a generic space, and the 
projection of partial structure from the input spaces into a fourth blended space that 
subsequently yields emergent structure. The schematic diagram in figure 6 illustrates 
this process.  
 
Figure 6: Schematic blending diagram (cf. Fauconnier, 1997:151) 
 
As MSCI is a highly complex theory, the following is intended to shed more light onto 
the constitutive as well as the governing principles of conceptual blending before 
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summarising the blending taxonomy proposed by Fauconnier & Turner (2002) and 
offering a critical discussion of the theory. 
 
2.2.1. Constitutive principles 
 
As the example above has shown, conceptual blending relies on the setting up of 
Mental Spaces and the mappings that connect them. As in the original Mental Spaces 
theory devised by Fauconnier (1994), Mental Spaces in conceptual blending are 
largely ephemeral conceptual units that are set up for online meaning construction, 
but which rely on more established and stable domains of knowledge. Although 
frames structure Mental Spaces internally, they can be modified as discourse develops. 
External links to other Mental Spaces, namely matchings, are built up in meaning 
construction, during the course of which cognisers can also move freely around the 
space lattice. These matchings, also called counterpart connections, link roles and frames 
within and between input spaces. Mappings occur when matches across spaces can be 
identified, such as the captains of the two boats in the boat race example above (see 
vital relations). In neural terms, Fauconnier & Turner (2002:40) claim that Mental 
Spaces correspond to “sets of activated neuronal assemblies”. Mappings between 
spaces, they continue, are “coactivation-bindings of a certain kind” (ibid). As research 
into the neurosciences has thus far not been able to prove this neural theory of 
conceptual blending, at this point it can only be regarded as the substitution of the 
terminology of one theory with that of another without yielding any further insight 
into the mechanisms discussed. It remains to be seen whether future work in the 
neurosciences field will provide further evidence in favour of MSCI. 
Three types of Mental Spaces are assumed in a blending network: input 
spaces, a generic space and a blended space. The input spaces submit knowledge 
relating to the domains introduced to the network, such as the scenarios of 1853 and 
1993 in the example above. The generic space subsumes those features the input spaces  
have in common, and is thus reminiscent of the tertium comparationis structure found in 
earlier theories of metaphor (cf. Aristotle), but also in Lakoff and Turner (1989) where 
this structure was referred to as generic-level.  
The crucial element of blending theory is, however, the blended space that 
denotes the emergent, novel structure arising from the interaction between the two 
input spaces. The emergent structure of figurative language is not new per se (see 
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interaction theories of metaphor such as Black (1962) or Richards (1936)), but 
Fauconnier & Turner describe it in unprecedented detail. In their account, blending 
yields emergent structure over the course of three interrelated steps. Composition brings 
together elements from the input spaces and allows for correspondences to surface 
that do not exist in the input spaces. In the regatta example above, the blend contains 
two ships racing against each other, while both inputs only contain one ship. Through 
selective projection, only select aspects are transferred into the blended space. In the 
regatta example, the weather conditions of the respective years are, for example, 
discounted. Completion adds further structure to the blend, such as the regatta-frame 
that is added to the processing of the example discussed above by virtue of the 
expression “maintaining a lead”. Pattern completion, which is understood to be the 
recruitment of additional frame features by virtue of having parts of an established 
frame available, is extremely common in blending. Completion leads to the blend 
being ‘integrated’, as it has become “an instance of a particular familiar frame” 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002:44), which a prerequisite for the final step in the blending 
process, elaboration. Elaboration is also referred to as a ‘running of the blend’, and 
denotes the imaginative simulations and creative modifications which are possible. 
Cognisers can now ‘live in the blend’ and further exploit its structure; one instance 
would be when cognisers profile other aspects of the regatta-frame induced in the 
example above, such as a tight finish. While ‘running the blend’, the input spaces 
remain active and present in ‘the backstage of our minds’, so that ‘backward 
projection’ – creating inferences relating to the input spaces – is possible. That which 
is ‘visible’ or ‘onstage’ to the cogniser, Fauconnier & Turner claim, is only that 
blended space, the mental simulation, the scenario that is run, while the mappings 
occurring between the input spaces and the generic space remain subconscious. In 
other words, we automatically run a mental simulation of the two ships racing each 
other, yet are unaware of the processes that enable this moment of epiphany, or 
“global insight” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002:323). 
Not all blends are novel, however, as some may become ‘entrenched’ through 
extensive usage. Fauconnier & Turner claim here, for example, that complex numbers 
are blends which now provide the cognitive scaffolding for a wider community. This 
also illustrates the fact that blends are employed for a variety of purposes: they may, 
for example, be used to yield emotional reactions in moral and political debates (cf. 
Coulson’s (2000) discussion of framing in abortion discourse). Blends are further used 
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in counterfactual reasoning to arrive at novel results in science by altering the 
conceptual scaffolding (such as the introduction of complex numbers), or to integrate 
actions which allow for novel processes to make sense (such as in the introduction of a 
desktop interface on computers and other processes of remediation as described by 
McLuhan (1964) and Bolter & Grusin (1999)).  
Finally, blending allows for compression to take place. Compression as a central 
feature of human cognition packs the complexity and multidimensionality inherent in 
aspects of such vital relations (akin to the connectors in the original Mental Spaces Theory) 
as time, place and identity into smaller packets to reduce them to ‘human scale’; this 
encompasses “direct action and perception inside familiar frames, typically involving 
few participants and direct intentionality” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002:322). This is 
evident, for example, in images reducing millions of years of evolution into three 
figures that ‘read’ from left to right, with each metonymically representing one step in 
the process. Here, outer-space relations (links connecting input spaces) of identity, 
time, space, cause-effect, change, representation and uniqueness are compressed into 
inner-space links in the emergent blend. Changes that occurred over a time span of 
millions of years are represented by individual animals. A variety of locations is 
compressed into one, as figure 7 illustrates.6 
 
 
Figure 7: Compression of vital relations (cf. Fauconnier & Turner, 2002:94) 
 
In the regatta example discussed above, the vital relation of time becomes compressed. 
A time span of 140 years separates the two journeys, yet the blended space compresses 
them into one scenario in which the boats compete directly against one other. 
Compression is what helps us to grasp complex scenarios more easily. Yet for 
compression to yield such insights, the blended space needs to be decompressed and 
                                                
6 Hougaard (2004, 2005) discusses the ways in which conceptual blending not only facilitates a 
reduction to human scale, but also leads to an ‘expansion’ to human scale via conceptual 
disintegration. 
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disintegrated. The input spaces need to be simultaneously identified and kept in mind 
for backward projection to be possible. Returning once again to the regatta example, 
the cogniser will have to break down the blended scenario and identify the separate 
input spaces in order for the cognitive effect that the integrated blend hopes to achieve 
to surface.  
On the constitutive layer, then, conceptual blending relies on the setting up of 
Mental Spaces and the matchings occurring between them by means of selective 
projection; these matchings yield novel, emergent insights that are not found in the 
respective inputs through selective projection via vital relations. Compression allows 
for global insight on a human scale to emerge in the blends, which often unite 
complex and semantically distant scenarios. Of course, blending is not only 
determined by selective projection and vital relations, but is also subject to constraints. 
 
2.2.2. Governing principles 
 
Does conceptual blending occur watonly? Is everything ‘blendable’? Early MSCI 
research was often accused of being too ‘unconstrained’, of advocating an ‘anything 
goes’ theory (cf. Gibbs, 2000), as it could not provide an adequate explanation for 
constraints on conceptual blending. Fauconnier & Turner’s 1998 and 2002 
publications consequently saw the introduction of so-called optimality constraints or 
governing principles as a means of bringing order to the seemingly unpredictable and 
ubiquitous nature of blending. Conceptual integration, the authors claim, is on the 
one hand already heavily determined by the constitutive principles outlined above. 
Unfortunately, without further elucidation on the extent to which the constitutive 
principles of blending actually constrain conceptual integration, the authors suggest 
that certain governing principles additionally provide “strategies for optimizing 
emergent structure” (2002:311).  
Governing principles primarily regard compression, but also concern 
“topology, pattern completion, integration, heightening of relations, maintenance of 
connections in networks, perspicuity of the blend, and relevance of structure in the 
blend for the entire network” (ibid:312). It quickly becomes evident that the majority 
of the authors’ governing principles are concerned with the ‘interior’ dimension of the 
blend rather than the ‘external’ world in which the blend is embedded. 
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For compression, the main blending constraint is to “achieve human scale” 
(ibid:312). Complex scenarios can thus be grasped in the blend, as it compresses such 
vital relations as time, space or identity. We are suddenly able to reduce evolution to a 
few individual figures and can make boats race against each other despite the fact that 
decades lie between their respective journeys. To maximise this ‘eureka’ effect of 
compression, blending for compression is subject to a number of governing principles. 
They first of all concern borrowing for compression. Here, inputs which are already tightly 
compressed to human scale are integrated with less compressed spaces. The 
compression of the first input is then projected into the blend, reducing the complexity 
of the second input. Fauconnier & Turner (2002) provide examples such as ‘digesting 
books’, in which the tightly integrated concept of digestion is integrated with the 
process of reading and interpreting a piece of literature.  
Secondly, compressions are governed by the scaling of vital relations in the 
blend, “shortening the causal chain from many steps to few” (ibid:313), as well as by 
the syncopation of dispersed, ‘irrelevant’ structure. Compression further achieves its goal 
of global insight and the reduction of relations to human scale via creation, or the 
adding of a vital relation in the blend that is not present in the inputs (such as 
‘intention’ in diagrams of evolutionary processes), and the highlighting of entire stories 
by means of the presentation of one central scenario, as with the Grim Reaper. The 
principles for compression are not absolute, as Fauconnier & Turner (2002) see them 
in competition with each other; as such, they cannot be witnessed to the same extent 
in every network.  
Blending as a whole is also subject to constraints which Fauconnier & Turner 
(2002) present as follows: 
 
• The Topology Principle aims at preserving the organisational structure of the 
inputs whilst at the same time enabling optimal compression. As human scale 
is not achievable when too much of the original frame structure of the inputs is 
transferred to the blend, the topology principle is at odds with the overall goal 
of compression. Balance between the two needs to be achieved for the blend to 
be successful.  
• The Pattern Completion Principle asserts that elements in the blend should be 
completed by integrating established compressed frames whose relations are 
compatible with the inputs. The principle introduces familiar frame structure 
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as additional inputs to the blended space as a means of achieving global 
insight. This was, for example, evident in the 2009/2010 US Health Care 
Debate during which opponents recruited the ‘Obama’s death panel’ 
narrative, claiming that seniors would be asked to end their lives in order to 
spare the system. Here, the tightly integrated, familiar frame of ‘death panels’ 
was drawn on to create a scenario in which innocent elderly citizens are 
effectively murdered by the government for cost-saving purposes. 
• The Integration Principle maintains that the overall goal of blending should be to 
achieve an ‘integrated blend’, in which potential clashes between inputs are 
resolved and a new structure that can itself be manipulated has been created. 
This then leads to structure that might potentially disturb the blend being 
omitted. 
• The Maximisation of Vital Relations Principle contends that while blends develop 
internal vital relations, they should also reflect the outer-space vital relations to 
achieve the best-possible ‘eureka’ effect. Fauconnier & Turner (2002:330) 
briefly mention that “purpose” may play a role here, but otherwise do not 
touch upon ‘blending external’ aspects of meaning-making in further detail. 
• In a similar vein, the Intensification of Vital Relations Principle hopes to intensify the 
vital relations that are already present in the input spaces rather than the ones 
that develop in the blend. This applies when cause-effect chains are simplified 
and profiled in the blend, as happens frequently in political discourse. 
Consider once more the debate surrounding US Health Care System 
Overhaul, where opponents also used the ‘killing granny’ narrative to frame 
their argument. A predecessor to the ‘death panel’ discussed above, the ‘killing 
granny’ narrative stated that the new Health Care system would encourage 
your grandmother to die. Leaving other aspects aside, this blend compresses 
hundreds of thousands of seniors into a single familiar person. 
• The Web Principle subsumes the idea that “manipulating the blend as a unit” 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002:331) must be possible without the blend losing its 
connections to the input spaces. As such, all spaces in the network are always 
subconsciously present. 
• The Unpacking Principle states that the blend alone should enable the 
reconstruction of all inputs contributing to the blend. This, the authors claim, 
is often due to incongruities. These incongruities in the product of blending 
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prompt ‘receivers’ to reconstruct the inputs (as would be the case in the many 
advertising examples discussed in the literature). Fauconnier & Turner 
(2002:333) also briefly allude to the role that the “discourse environment” 
plays in setting up inputs, but do not delve into the matter further. 
• The Relevance Principle is the most pragmatic principle found among the 
governing principles, yet aside from its blending-‘external’ dimension – the 
relevance to communication – the authors focus predominantly on “Network 
Relevance”. This blending ‘internal’ aspect is satisfied when elements act as 
successful prompts for unpacking the blend. Thus, “[t]he Relevance Principle 
pressures networks to have relationships in the blend that are compressions of 
important outer-space relations between the inputs” (Fauconnier & Turner, 
2002:334). As with the other principles, this principle also focuses largely on 
network-internal aspects rather than taking into account the discourse context 
in which all communicative signals are embedded. 
 
The blending constraints proposed by Fauconnier and Turner (1998, 2002) were 
introduced to account for criticism voiced towards the theory’s apparent 
‘randomness’. Although the constraints proposed indeed allow for a better 
understanding of the power of conceptual blending, they still fail to account for the 
‘worldly’ dimension of cognition, as they neglect the impact which contextual factors 
have on the shaping of cognitive processes and the power they exceed on determining 
the ‘content’ and, in consequence, the meaning of an emerging blended scenario.  
 
2.2.3. Blending typology 
 
In canonical blending theory, four different kinds of network are proposed that 
account for “the variety and creativity in the way we think” (Fauconnier & Turner, 
2002:121): Simplex networks, mirror networks, single-scope and double-scope 
networks. These blending operations are thought of as occurring on a continuum of 
increasing complexity, with double-scope networks being the most advanced.  
Simplex networks are the most basic type, and denote integrations in which one 
input provides a familiar frame and the other the values. To consider an example, the 
culturally entrenched ‘family frame’ can be blended with unframed values such as 
‘Peter’ or ‘Mary’. The blended space would then contain a family with the value of 
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‘Peter’ filling the role of ‘Mary’s husband’. The family frame now provides structure 
to the formerly unframed values. As such, the mapping occurring between the input 
spaces is a “Frame-to-values connection” (ibid:120). No clashes between inputs occur, 
as they are both compatible. Simplex blends consequently do not feel like ‘proper’ 
blends, as they are reminiscent of compositional and truth-functional theories of 
meaning-making. However, Fauconnier & Turner claim that simplex networks are a 
type of blending, as they integrate a frame that provides roles with a space containing 
elements lacking a frame. The emergent properties of the simplex blend give rise to 
new roles, such as that of ‘Mary’s husband’, thereby compressing the vital relation of 
role-value.  
Next on the blending continuum from simplicity to complexity are so-called 
mirror networks. In this blending type, all spaces share the same organising structure, i.e. 
the frame that sets out the “nature of the relevant activity, events, and participants” 
(ibid:123). The organising structure, however, needs to be cognitively ‘representable’ 
(though no further information on the nature of this cognitive representation is given). 
The regatta example discussed above is a mirror network blend. Here, both input 
spaces as well as the generic and blended space share the structure of two boats sailing 
a course. The blended space, however, provides more information than its inputs. Its 
structure is richer, as we now not only have two yachts sailing a course, but in fact 
conceptualise them as racing on that course in a regatta. Mirror networks 
consequently share space topology on a frame-structuring level, which facilitates 
mappings. The only clashings that occur in these networks take place at the below-
frame level. In the yacht example, clashing could be represented by different purposes 
of travel or different types of boats. 
Other than simplex and mirror networks, single-scope networks integrate input 
spaces with conflicting frame structure. Only one of the organising frames is projected 
into the blended space, whereas the organising frame of the other input is neglected. 
To illustrate this network type, consider the boxing CEOs example discussed in 
Fauconnier & Turner (2002): it might well be possible to conceptualise two CEOs in a 
business competition as being engaged in a boxing match. The CEOs might receive 
blows, be knocked out, or recover in their day-to-day business lives. Understanding 
business in terms of boxing involves a single-scope network, as we are faced with 
clashing organising frames, namely that of business and that of boxing. Yet only one 
organising frame, the boxing, is transferred to the blend and provides its topology. 
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Single-scope blends are thus believed to lie at the root of many conventionalised 
conceptual metaphors (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Here, the ‘source domain’ 
provides the topology in which the ‘target domain’ is understood in the emergent 
blended space.  
Fauconnier & Turner (2002) differentiate further between two types of single-
scope networks. The first type is not rooted in a larger historical discourse. In other 
words, there is no tradition in conceptualising CEOs as boxers, and no vital relations 
link the inputs directly. The other type of single-scope networks  is embedded in a 
diachronic dimension, meaning that the inputs are directly relevant to one another and 
connected via vital relations. The emergent inferences which they yield are 
consequently much richer than the ones offered by the ‘ahistorical’ first type.  
This differentiation notwithstanding, single-scope blends surmise asymmetrical 
frame clashes in which the frame structure of one input is used to ‘understand’ the 
other. Nevertheless, single-scope blends do not feel disruptive, as the analogies yielded 
seem to provide ‘eureka’ effects. This is due to the inner space relations in the 
organising frame already being tightly compressed and transferred onto the ‘messier’ 
ones of the other input space. In the boxing CEO example, the boxing frame is 
already tightly compressed. Causality, temporality, spatiality and identity are clear. 
Despite this, the CEO input is more diffuse and much harder to grasp. Blending it 
with the boxing space achieves a reduction to the human scale, as it facilitates 
apprehension of (certain aspects of) the business world. 
At the heart of MSCI are double-scope integration networks. These, Fauconnier & 
Turner claim, are what make humans unique, and lie at the root of cultural 
achievements. Like single-scope networks, the inputs show clashing frames. Unlike 
single-scope networks, however, the blended space does not recruit the structure of 
only one of the inputs. Rather, it includes partial structure of both inputs, and yields 
emergent structure found in neither of the input spaces (multi-scope blends have more 
than two inputs). Double-scope blending is thus at the very heart of human creativity 
and imagination, making mathematics, arts and religion possible. To illustrate this 
point, Fauconnier & Turner suggest that “the history of mathematics shows that the 
concept of number has been repeatedly revised by creating blends in which we have 
two (or more) inputs – one with numbers of some kind, the other with elements of 
some kind” (2002:242). Following this basic idea, complex numbers, fractions or 
negative numbers can be discussed as double-scope blends. This idea is also pursued 
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by Lakoff & Núñez when they claim that “many of the most important ideas in 
mathematics are metaphorical conceptual blends” (2000:48). As blending is regarded 
as central to human imagination, rituals and magic can, in a similar manner to make-
believe play, be described in blending terms. The Catholic Eucharistic rite of 
Transubstantiation, for example, blends the signifying (the bread) with the signified 
(Christ’s body). In the emerging structure of the double-scope Transubstantiation 
blend, the host becomes the Body of Christ, drawing on properties of both inputs: like 
bread, the host is broken and shared, but it is also Christ (cf. Sweetser, 2000). 
To discuss double-scope blending in further detail, consider the expression 
same-sex marriage (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002:134). As inputs, we find here the 
concepts of traditional marriage in input 1 and homosexual domestic partnerships in 
input 2. Through selective projection, the elements of wedding ceremonies and tax 
benefits are, for example, transported to the blended space from the traditional 
marriage input. From the homosexual domestic partnership space, biological sexes are 
projected. However, the authors claim that this blend has emergent structure. A novel 
social structure will be defined through the emergent structure of the blend, awarding 
homosexual couples the social recognition that they had formerly been denied. 
Whether or not this blend is actually double-scope or more single-scope in nature 
remains open for discussion (after all, the organising frame of the blend is firmly 
structured by the heteronormative concept of marriage alone), as are many of the 
examples put forward by Fauconnier & Turner (2002).  
Simplex networks, mirror networks, single-scope networks and double-scope 
networks constitute the types of blending identified by Fauconnier & Turner. These 
types range on a continuum from asymmetry in frame blending to both input frames 
contributing structure to the emergent blended space. MSCI thus provides a highly 
detailed and differentiated account of online meaning-making. 
 
 
2.3. Critical discussion 
 
 
Although MSCI has enjoyed tremendous success in disciplines as varied as linguistics, 
literary studies and ethnography, it has nevertheless been subject to a steady stream of 
criticism. Further to the problems concerning governing principles and blending 
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typology alluded to above, other aspects of the theory as championed by ‘first 
generation’ blending analyses have been extensively criticised. This section will 
summarise and reflect on the criticism levelled against MSCI. It is worth noting that 
although the section seems to take largely unfavourable stance against canonical 
blending theory, I would like to stress that the motivation for summarising the 
discourse is to ultimately further what I consider to be a highly promising approach to 
a theory of creative on-line meaning-making. 
 
2.3.1. Post-hoc vs. ad-hoc 
 
Like many other cognitive semantic theories – most prominently Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory (Lakoff, 1986; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) – MSCI has been accused 
of delivering post hoc analyses only, meaning that it is ostensibly unable to account for 
actual online meaning construction (Gibbs, 2000; Harder, 2003; Hougaard, 2004, 
2005). Starting with the ‘product’ of blending and then working backwards rather 
than following meaning construction ad hoc may lead to the data being tailored to fit 
the theory rather than the theory being derived from the data. It further leads to a 
failure in tracking the process of meaning-making as it unfolds in actual on-line 
cognising. However, advocates (e.g. Coulson & Oakley, 2000; Rohrer, 2005; Talmy, 
2000) of the post-hoc approach argue that products constitute the only data currently 
available to researchers, and that it is impossible to track the psychological steps taken 
in any particularly accurate manner. Yet this might only be true for approaches 
focussing exclusively on the individual mind. When considering the interactional 
dimension of meaning-making, too, as interactional approaches to Cognitive 
Semantics  have done (most notably Hougaard, 2004, 2005), evidence for step-by-step 
construction, essentially the processes of joint meaning-making over a number of 
turns, might be gathered (cf. chapter 3.3.). 
 
2.3.2. The Generic Space 
 
The question as to whether generic spaces are psychologically real and necessary for 
the faithful analysis of blends is suitable to be raised in conjunction with the first point 
addressed. In this regard, Hougaard (2004) points out that the generic structure 
proposed only adds abstracts from the input spaces to the network rather than further 
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semantics as well. Consequently, generic spaces are only required in the analyses of 
decontextualised, isolated examples that are not embedded in local contexts. In these 
cases, it is only the post-hoc constructed tertium comparationis structure that licenses 
blends, whereas in contextualised data it is local contexts that sanction, implement 
relevant blending operations, and guide the structure emerging from the blending 
process (cf. Brandt & Brandt, 2005). By way of example, imagine you and I are at a 
party where our friend Achilles, whom we both have not seen in a while, is sporting 
an impressive full blonde beard. If I now nod in the direction of Achilles and say to 
you “Oh wow, Achilles is a lion!” whilst perhaps gesturing towards my own face, you 
may not interpret this metaphor as relating to his bodily strength, but to his facial 
hair. The reason I devise this utterance is not ‘internal’ to the blend, but dependent on 
what is present in our shared perceptual field and discourse history. The features 
which both inputs have in common and that may now be depicted in the generic 
space (in this case facial hair) of this analogous metaphor are consequently dependent 
on the enunciative context.  
Further to this, there are a considerable number of blending operations in 
which the identification of a shared, generic structure is virtually impossible. With 
impersonation, for example, humans blend with inanimate entities such as machines. 
Such impersonations are made relevant by the interactional context rather by what 
humans and machines have in common. 
As such, generic space structure is only required to account for the motivation 
of conceptual integration in decontextualised analogies that are studied in isolation 
from a product and post-hoc perspective. However, when investigating non-analogous 
blends as they occur in their ‘natural’ contexts, it is evident that conceptual integration 
is motivated and made relevant by the interactional and cultural context in which it is 
embedded. 
 
2.3.3. Generalisation, terminology and falsifiability 
 
A key goal of Cognitive Linguistics in general and Cognitive Semantics in particular 
lies in identifying the general principles of human cognition that apply across a wide 
range of phenomena (cf. Fauconnier, 1999). It thus contrasts with approaches that 
assume separate facilities for different aspects of cognition, such as a “faculty of 
language” (cf. Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002). This leads to the attempt by 
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Cognitive Linguistics to attain ‘powerful generalisations’, such as those provided by 
MSCI. After all, conceptual blending is supposed to capture The (general) Way We 
Think, encompassing such diverse phenomena as constructions, metaphors, art and 
mathematics. Although carrying out research as a means of arriving at general 
conclusions regarding human cognition via the collection of “converging evidence” 
from a variety of fields is in itself laudable, generalisations also generate numerous 
complicated predicaments. This includes becoming banal, or rather being unable to 
provide enlightening insights into specific phenomena and actual human behaviour 
that is always contextualised (Bache, 2005; Hougaard, 2004), and using terminology 
that is so broadly conceived that it runs the risk of becoming little more than empty 
phrases (Brandt, 2010).  
With regard to the first predicament, the role of context in which the 
individual phenomenon is embedded is largely neglected due to MSCI’s subscription 
to central principles of Cognitive Linguistics; the historical, social and material 
dimension of cognition and its influence on meaning construction is similarly ignored 
(see also Harder, 2007; Sinha, 1999). Yet the ‘content’ of blending scenarios largely 
depends on the situation in which they are embedded, as has already been pointed out 
above. The emergent properties of a blend will subsequently differ depending on 
conversational salience, genre and situational relevance. Consider once again the 
example Achilles is a lion discussed above. The input spaces contain the Mental Spaces 
Achilles and lion, yet the features that are relevant and therefore guide meaning 
construction are highly dependent on discourse context. The properties of the 
emergent structure are consequently determined by interactional context. However, 
the importance of context in human behaviour is neglected in canonical analyses that 
hope to attain the most general results possible. 
Continuing on from this, such ambitious generalisations as those propagated 
in canonical blending theory render it difficult to test the theory’s claim of describing 
the central components of human cognition. Falsifiability will only be possible if 
MSCI is assessed in its local rather than global dimension (cf. Gibbs, 2000). Instead of 
discussing eclectic and varied examples in a top-down approach, whereby the data 
may be adjusted to fit the theory, one type of human behaviour that is assumed to 
involve conceptual blending should be analysed in situ and taking into account local 
peculiarities in order to provide a better understanding of how blending may – if at all 
– actually work.  
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2.3.4. Delineating Mental Spaces 
 
The notion of Mental Spaces is central to MSCI. However, this terminology leaves 
something to be desired. What exactly are Mental Spaces? What is it that they 
contain? Why are they ‘spatial’ in nature? Where are their boundaries? What is 
‘mental’ about them?7 Here as in other areas, Fauconnier & Turner provide little 
information, and delineating and determining the content of Mental Spaces in a 
univocal manner is virtually impossible. Some canonical MSCI analyses consider 
adjective-noun constructions to involve two Mental Spaces, such as Sweetser’s (1999) 
treatment of ‘red ball’, whereby she contends that the external colour and the shape 
both reside in different Mental Spaces. Indeed, according to Sweetser, this means that 
Mental Spaces are primarily perceptual, a claim which leads P.A. and Line Brandt 
(2005; 2010:280) to enquire about the ‘mappability’ of such spaces; their resulting 
suggestion is that purely visual spaces containing only colour and shape lack the 
counterparts required for mappings. In addition, ‘unpacking’ such alleged blends is 
virtually impossible – how (and why) should we imagine a colourless ball? It thus 
seems as though issues of qualia are accepted as being on par with semantic structure, 
once again leaving open the question as to what Mental Spaces really ‘contain’, and 
which benefits arise from employing a single term for phenomena as varied as colour 
perception and complex number.  
The same applies to simplex blends as proposed by Fauconnier & Turner 
(2002), which are thought of as bringing together unframed elements with framed 
spaces. How can elements lacking a frame constitute a fully-blown mental space? 
After all, other authors assume that Mental Spaces contain entire domains of 
knowledge, such as Dancygier’s (2008) story worlds. What is it, then, that all of these 
alleged Mental Spaces have in common? Is it the unframed elements of simplex 
blends, the colours, the grammatical constructions, the rich story worlds found in 
novels? All in all, it seems that first generation MSCI analysts largely follow their 
intuition alone when attempting to depict the content of Mental Spaces. Accordingly, 
the question as to what Mental Spaces contain and how they are delineated (their 
‘spatialness’) should definitely be of central importance to a refinement of blending 
analyses. 
                                                
7 See Hougaard (2004), P.A. Brandt (2005) and L. Brandt (2010:247ff) for a detailed discussion of this 
point.  
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2.3.5. Whose Mental Spaces? Whose blends?  
 
The notion of Mental Spaces is not only problematic when it comes to defining their 
‘boundaries’, but also when considering the cogniser. Whose Mental Spaces are 
blending analysts really depicting when offering a detailed diagram of meaning-
making processes in idioms such as the “grim reaper”? Is it the Mental Spaces of the 
original producers or those of today’s recipients? Alternatively, are they rather 
modelling their own cognising processes when interpreting a given artefact? It 
therefore seems as if many blending analyses assume an ideal cogniser and identical 
processes for the production and construal of cognitive artefacts, such as poems, jokes 
or metaphors (cf. Rohrer, 2005). Yet it is highly unlikely that the same mappings and 
blendings should have led, for example to the production of a novel and the various 
readings it generates among the audience. It should therefore be made explicit as to 
exactly what it is the analyst is depicting, or rather whose Mental Spaces and mapping 
processes are being investigated. 
  
2.3.6. Loci and levels of mappings and blending 
 
In connection with these prior points, further questions have been raised as to 
whether blending is really the feature at work in the majority of the examples 
discussed by canonical blending analysts – these examples range from sexual fantasies, 
phantom limbs, complex numbers, cultural rituals and personal identity to 
compounds, syntax and visual perception. Is it really the same cognitive process of 
conceptual integration that works across all of these different phenomena?  
First of all, ‘dead’ metaphors and idioms such as “to dig one’s own grave” or 
the “grim reaper” are discussed as being blends without any further explanation as to  
whether it is the original mappings that led to the establishment of the symbol or the 
still valid processes of meaning-making that are being discussed. In other words, the 
question is left open as to whether we unpack the “grim reaper” every time we 
encounter the expression. Should it really be assumed that cogniser unpack such 
‘tightly integrated’ phrases every time they encounter them, the authors seem to 
neglect both etymology and parsimony by claiming that idioms are semantically 
analysed when interpreted. This would constitute a severe neglect of the 
psycholinguistic discussion surrounding the semantic analysability of idioms (cf. 
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Dobrovol'skij, 2011 for a current treatment). Even if MSCI aimed only to account for 
the processes that led to these expressions becoming symbols, they failed to take into 
account the diachronic development which these expressions underwent in becoming 
fixed expressions or the cultural narratives on which they rely. In short, the question 
regarding whether the daily usage of such fixed expressions as the “grim reaper” 
requires the highly complex blending processes (cf. Gibbs, 2000) suggested by 
Fauconnier & Turner remains unclear. 
Secondly, blending may not actually play a major role in meaning 
construction on the grammatical level (so-called grammatical blends), such as in 
Goldberg’s (1995, 1999) much discussed “She sneezed the foam off the cappuccino”. 
Here, (in the blending analyses carried out by other researchers, not in Goldberg’s 
own work) the syntactic structure, a cause-motion construction, is thought to be 
blended with semantic structure, rendering it a caused-motion event (cf. Mandelblit, 
1997; Mandelblit & Fauconnier, 2000). However, research in language acquisition has 
shown that children up to the age of four are unable to simultaneously bear two 
different images in mind (Harder, 2003). Nevertheless, the juggling of distinct Mental 
Spaces lies at the heart of blending theory, and by the age of three children have 
generally mastered large portions of their mother tongue’s grammar. Why then, 
Harder (2003) convincingly asks, should we assume that conceptual blending, the 
entertaining and juggling of distinct Mental Spaces, is at work in the processing of 
linguistic constructions?8 He concludes that “space building [is] something 
sophisticated that occasionally interferes with the ordinary default assumption […]” 
(2003:93). Contrary to Fauconnier & Turner’s (2002:89) claim that “fundamental 
cognitive operations are the same across radically different phenomena”, Harder 
(2003) considers conceptual blending to function only when distinct epistemic 
domains whose relationships are not conventionalised are entertained simultaneously. 
This point is associated with questions ruminating on the nature and content of 
Mental Spaces that are largely missing in canonical blending theory.  
 
                                                
8 Cf. Brandt (2010) for a more theoretical discussion of problematic aspects in grammatical blends. 
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2.3.7. Homunculus entering through the stage door 
 
MSCI hopes to shed light on invisible ‘backstage’ cognition through ‘network’ 
analyses. The theory thus draws heavily on established philosophical metaphors of 
stages and net(work)s and leaves open the question regarding what exactly it is that 
differentiates ‘onstage’ from ‘backstage’. What is it that selects a given integration 
network from the many that are “attempted and explored in an individual’s backstage 
cognition” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002:309)? The authors deal with this question 
briefly, stating that “the nature of consciousness [is to give] us effects we can act on, 
and these effects are correlated with the unconscious processes” (ibid:56). In other 
words, “the moment of tangible, global understanding comes when a network has 
been elaborated in such a way that it contains a solution that is delivered to 
consciousness” (ibid:57; my emphasis, VS). But who/what is the agent delivering, and 
to whom is it being delivered? As consciousness and unconsciousness are not discussed 
in detail (only approximately a page is dedicated to the matter) and lack reference to 
philosophical or neurobiological discourse, one is left to wonder whether the notion of 
‘backstage’ cognition in MSCI might after all involve a Homunculus translating the 
‘backstage’ to the ‘onstage’, “selecting” Mental Spaces and blends from the “bubble 
chamber of Mental Spaces” (ibid:321) that is our brain. The question of what 
‘offstage’ and ‘onstage’ and the notion of the brain as a ‘bubble chamber’ really mean 
should consequently be dealt with explicitly in blending research in order to avoid the 
pitfalls posed by implying that there is a Homunculus acting as a ‘stage manager’. 
 
2.3.8. Blending in context, blending in interaction 
 
Ever since Wittgenstein (1953), it has been widely acknowledged in non-formal 
linguistics that all human cognising is situated in social, historical and material 
contexts. Meaning emerges in actual usage. If blending is “the way we think”, then it 
should be able to successfully account for or at least acknowledge situated cognition. 
In this respect, Fauconnier (1999:97) openly states that “introspection and intuition 
are woefully insufficient to tell us about general operations of meaning construction. 
[…] It is only in rich contexts that we see the full force of creative on-line meaning 
construction.” Yet despite Fauconnier’s own assessment and the ‘social turn’ in 
Cognitive Linguistics called for by Sinha (1999), Croft (2009) and Harder (2010), 
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canonical blending theory still largely neglects the interactional grounding and 
context-sensitive dimension of meaning-making, and instead largely focuses on 
seemingly isolated individuals experiencing seemingly isolated and eclectic artefacts, 
such as images, poetic narrative texts, or advertisements. These singular tokens are, in 
addition, analysed from a still somewhat subjectivist, atomistic and mentalist 
‘armchair’ perspective, relying predominantly on introspection alone rather than 
psycholinguistic or empirical (including phenomenological) approaches to linguistics. 
Canonical blending theory is therefore rooted in the methodology of analytic 
philosophy, focusing more on competence than on performance (cf. Brandt, 2010; 
Brandt, 2005). As such, blending analysts provide highly detailed descriptions of the 
mappings and projections occurring in conceptual integration processes, avoiding 
what Harder (2007:1257) calls “the question of what the actual processes are whereby 
complex linguistic utterances are assigned meaning in actual interaction.” In 
consequence, the issue regarding how the various operations described produce the 
different meanings that may arise from one and the same expression (as is evident, for 
example, in misunderstandings or varying interpretations of novel compounds, 
metaphors or jokes) is at best left implicit in their discussion of decontextualised 
examples. However, all cognising is situated and meaning construction based on 
shared epistemological and normative aspects of the discourse community.9  
Consider the Achilles example discussed above. Here, I would need to ensure 
that you knew what I was referring to by conceptualising our friend Achilles as a lion. 
I would consequently need to ensure that his beard is (perhaps perceptually) salient to 
both of us, and would probably also have to consider our respective attitudes towards 
his newly grown facial hair. I would then probably nod in his direction or point 
towards his or my face in order to further clarify what I was referring to, and, 
depending on my feelings on the beard, assume an ironic or impressed intonation 
pattern. In this fashion, I would provide cues, or ostentive stimuli (cf. Sperber & Wilson, 
1986), for you to make the relevant mappings, decompress the blend and ultimately 
generate pragmatic inferences that are based on your assumptions about my 
assumptions. As even Fauconnier (1997:160) en passant points out, this goes to show 
that blending in interaction first of all demands for coordination to facilitate 
                                                
9 Cf. the problem of Other Minds (‘Hume’s problem’) that topicalises the question of how ‘words as 
ideas’ can be intersubjectively shared (Sinha, 1999); it was originally devised to address problems 
evident in Locke’s ideational theory. MSCI faces a similar problem, as it has so far failed to account 
for the ways in which Mental Spaces and blends can be shared intersubjectively. 
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intersubjectively shared meanings. Secondly, the emergent meanings are not only 
determined by mappings alone, but also by our conceptualisation of the action 
underway, our joint beliefs and values. As Per Aage Brandt (2005:1584) succinctly 
puts it, in blending theory “[…] if a joke is analyzed, its mappings and blends can be 
modelled, but not the reason why it is funny.” Blending in interaction and the 
meanings emerging from blending processes are thus subject to negotiation and the 
consideration of shared values, knowledge and beliefs to arrive at roughly similar 
constructions; the mappings occurring in blending are an interactional achievement. 
The interactional business required to coordinate meaning construction and 
the role played by conceptualisations and co-constructions of context, is, however, not 
the focus of most canonical blending research, which in this regard seems to still be 
rooted in more formal approaches and tends to place almost exclusive focus on 
grammatical space builders blending-internal governing principles. Eve Sweetser 
(2007) has recently turned to the question regarding how gestures could indicate 
mental space configuration; however, she too has neglected the question as to how 
such signalling and the situation in which signals are embedded may impede on joint 
meaning construction. However, researchers such as Anders Hougaard (2004, 2005, 
2008), Esther Pascual (2002, 2009), Robert E. Williams (2004, 2008), Todd Oakley 
(1998; Oakley & Coulson, 2008; Oakley & Hougaard, 2008), Ed Hutchins (2005), Per 
Aage and Line Brandt (Brandt, 2010; Brandt & Brandt, 2005; Brandt, 2005) are 
hoping to shed new light on the interface of cognition and interaction, and provide 
promising insights into potential conceptual reconfigurations of MSCI. 
 
2.3.9. Blending typology 
 
Fauconnier & Turner (2002) differentiate between four types of blending, ranging on 
a continuum from simple to highly complex frame blendings. Yet the blending 
typology put forward by the authors is perplexing in a number of ways. Simplex 
networks are supposed to be the most basic type of blending, linking unframed roles to 
framed values in another frame. But what is it that input spaces contain if not frames? 
Why is it that a mental space can only contain unframed elements and the other 
nothing but frame structure? This is especially peculiar given that Fauconnier & 
Turner (2002:102) define Mental Spaces as “partial assemblies containing elements, 
structured by frames and cognitive models” (my emphasis, VS). How, then, can simplex 
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blends involve two Mental Spaces if one input does not show frame structure and 
cannot be regarded a mental space in the definition proposed by the authors 
themselves?10  
At the heart of blending theory are double-scope blends, which reside on the 
most complex end of the continuum from single- to double-scope frame blending. 
However, single and double-scope blending remains paradoxical in a number of ways 
too. Consider the computer desktop example that Fauconnier & Turner (2002:131) 
present as their first (and, as I therefore consider it, prototypical) illustration of double-
scope blending. Here, the familiar frame of office work with its folders, bins and files is 
blended with computer commands such as ‘save’ or ‘print’. The authors here claim 
that both frames contribute to the emergent structure of the desktop metaphor. I 
would, however, claim that the desktop metaphor is not a prototypical double-scope 
blend, as strong asymmetries can be witnessed.  
The desktop metaphor was first used in the 1960s and 1970s when the 
graphical user interface was developed at Xerox PARC. It was later popularised by 
Apple Macintosh in the 1980s as a means of facilitating the use of computers for the 
layperson. Rather than typing in complex and abstract commands, users could now 
perform routines they were already familiar with – filing forms in respective folders, 
disposing of documents by putting them in the bin, copying documents by printing 
etc. Consequently, the established office space structure exerts much more influence 
on the emergent properties of the blended ‘desktop’ space than the computer input. It 
is an analogy through which the complexity of computers is reduced to more familiar 
practices. In line with theories of remediation (Bolter & Grusin, 1999), the computer 
desktop interface pays homage to established work routines in order to facilitate 
understanding, and is, in my view, therefore more of a single-scope blend, in that a 
familiar and highly compressed frame is used to shed light on more complex and less 
familiar routines. With the introduction of the desktop metaphor, working with 
computers was made possible. We understand computers in terms of established work 
routines11, and the emergent space in this blend is consequently predominantly 
structured by the office input. It yields a sense of immediacy (cf. Bolter & Grusin, 
                                                
10 Cf. Brandt (2010:253ff) for an exhaustive discussion of this aspect. 
11 Once the basic desktop metaphor became established, it was able to be used to develop novel 
characteristics, such as having numerous windows open simultaneously. However, this is a step-by-
step process (the evolutionary dimension of meaning construction) that Fauconnier & Turner (2002) 
do not discuss in their analysis. 
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1999), and backgrounds the media it uses, the computer, to such an extent that it 
almost becomes invisible. The same is true for the same-sex marriage example 
discussed in detail above. This blend is also structured mainly by one of the two 
inputs. As such, it remains questionable as to whether the desktop interface and the 
same-sex marriage blends can thus faithfully be described as a fully-blown double-
scope network. It should be noted that Fauconnier & Turner (2002) point to a 
category of highly asymmetric double-scope networks, yet seem to fail to mention 
examples of non-asymmetric double-scope blends. 
Furthermore, Brandt (2010) points out that it is somewhat “perplexing” (251) 
that metaphors in Fauconnier & Turner are discussed within a variety of blending 
types: from XYZ-metaphors (such as the much discussed “vanity is the quicksand of 
reason”), which are thought of as simplex networks, to single-scope networks as 
epitomised by certain conceptual metaphors, and on again to double-scope networks 
such as the grave-digging idiom. Why, Brandt convincingly asks, should conceptual 
metaphors result in less advanced emergent structure than idioms such as “to dig 
one’s own grave” or the “grip reaper”, which are analysed as double-scope blends? 
The problem seems to me to be one of frame structure level. Depending on the level 
of detail and the aspects highlighted in the analysis, networks can either be classified 
as single or double-scope. When approaching this issue using a more interactionist 
theory of metaphor (Black, 1962; Ricoeur, 1975) instead of Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory (CMT), for example, metaphors can easily be interpreted as double-scope 
rather than single-scope in Fauconnier & Turner’s framework. Interactionist 
metaphor theories emphasise the pragmatic dimension of figurative language, and 
discusses metaphors in relation to the discourse they are set in, thereby focussing on 
the ever-contingent nature of meaning-making. The cognitive effort required to 
consciously make sense of non-conventional metaphors (i.e. language usage that poses 
some kind of dissonance or a violation of expectations in the current discourse setting) 
requires input spaces to be played with simultaneously, for one input space to be 
foregrounded and then another. Focussing on evolving processes of sense-making in 
non-conventional metaphors, then, foregrounds the double-scope nature of such 
expressions. CMT, on the other hand, involves a one-way mapping, as it regards 
metaphor as understanding one domain in terms of another. This theory is naturally 
prone to understanding metaphor as involving single-scope blending. The blending 
typology proposed is consequently top-down rather than bottom-up, and the 
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examples can easily be construed to fit either category of the classification. What is 
required, then, is a methodology that is able to empirically account for typological 
classifications. 
 
 
2.4. First conclusions 
 
 
MSCI has proven to be a highly attractive theory with which to model human 
cognising. Yet it suffers from a number of weaknesses, most notably ones of a 
methodological nature, including a certain disregard for philosophical grounding and 
the lack of consideration it shows for the contextual, social, historical, material and 
sometimes even psychological dimension of meaning-making. The following thus sets 
out to tackle these issues by discussing two main research questions: 
 
1) Is the blending typology presented by Fauconnier & Turner (2002) cognitively 
real? Can a distinction really be drawn along the lines of asymmetry and the 
amount of structure projected from the input spaces? If we blend at all, do we 
orient ourselves towards the continuum suggested by the founding fathers? Is 
there actual evidence for double-scope blending (i.e. the aspect determining 
our very humanity according to the founding fathers) in in-situ cognition? 
2) How do we, as both an animal socialis and animal cogitans, employ conceptual 
blending in our everyday interactions, in our localised, socially embedded 
reasoning, to arrive at construals that are experienced as meaningful? 
 
To address these two aspects, a revised approach that allows for the explicit treatment 
of interactional and contextual dimensions of meaning through conceptual blending 
will be necessary. This interactional approach will first of all require terminological 
clarifications in order to equip MSCI with the tools necessary to deal with ‘real-life’ 
phenomena. It will secondly necessitate clearly defined and socially contextualised 
data that is analysed according to rigorous methodological standards in order to allow 
the interactional processes of meaning-making to be focussed upon. To this end, only 
novel ad-hoc blends (i.e. those resulting in discursive dissonance) will be investigated 
in environments in which two clearly distinct scenarios, semiotically speaking, that 
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contain rich semantic structure are deliberately and hence consciously recruited. For this 
reason, I will concentrate on non-routinised and explicitly incongruous conceptual 
blends involving interactionally clearly signalled representational, encyclopaedic 
theatrical ‘worlds’ which are epitomised by impersonations. In impersonations, a 
speaker takes on the voice of another character. For this voice-change to be successful, 
the two scenarios, that of the impersonator and the impersonated, are explicitly 
indicated by the performer to be separate. In the performance, the ‘worlds’ are 
maintained simultaneously, yet are brought to a point of interaction in the integrated 
performance. When decompressing the performance, emergent properties arise, the 
nature of which is interactionally negotiated. 
With this in mind, the following will first of all propose a methodology which 
will allow the negotiation of conceptual blending in interaction to be studied 
accurately. It will secondly discuss the theoretical and terminological reconfigurations 
required when ‘marrying’ a largely ideational theory such as MSCI to a usage-based 
theory of meaning as proposed by most discourse analysts and followers of ordinary 
language philosophy.  
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CHAPTER 3: PUTTING THEORY TO THE TEST: TOWARDS A 
SOCIAL-INTERACTIONAL COGNITIVE SEMANTICS 
 
 
3.1. The State of the art of empirical and experimental research within 
MSCI 
 
 
Research in Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive Semantics is traditionally based on 
introspection accompanied by theoretical analysis (Talmy, 2007). However, this 
approach has come under attack for various reasons, most notably for primarily 
attending to the mind of the trained researcher, for being too “solipsistic” and “too 
much ‘inside the head’” and therefore remaining incomplete (Croft, 2009:396), and 
for lacking “solid empirical evidence” (Kok & Bublitz, 2011:291). Language is, after 
all, first and foremost a means of social interaction and not an exclusively cognitive 
ability that exists in isolated minds.12 Consequently, a great number of workshops 
(such as the Empirical Methods in Cognitive Linguistics (EMCL) series) and 
publications (e.g. Gonzalez-Marquez et al., 2006; Oakley & Hougaard, 2008) have 
recently attempted to further empirical research within Cognitive Semantics and find 
methodological alternatives to introspection, such corpus-based research, 
computational and algorithmic methods, audio and videographic analysis, and 
neurological or experimental studies in psycholinguistics; this has certainly enriched 
the portfolio of empirical methods in Cognitive Linguistics.  
Of the approaches proposed and largely on the basis of Hougaard (2004, 
2005, 2008), this project will investigate conceptual blending from the perspective of 
ethnomethodological Conversation Analysis, which allows for processes of ‘meaning-
making’ in naturally occurring talk-in-interaction to be systematically studied. This 
approach is favoured over other approaches for a number of reasons that I wish to 
elucidate on briefly in the following; in doing so, I will draw on the results of previous 
research.  
                                                
12 Cf. Wittgenstein’s (1953, §243-271) discussion of the impossibility of a “private language” that would 
lead to its signs becoming meaningless for both the originator and other humans. Language is social. 
There is no meaning without embedding signs in interaction. 
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First of all, while a quantitative study based on extensive corpora would to a 
certain degree be able to address the subjectivity problem encountered by 
introspective methods, major corpora, such as the International Corpus of English (ICE), 
are available in written, transcribed form only, and are hence not able to fully cover 
the multimodal expressive and emotive aspects of interaction. As a result, they are 
neither appropriate for providing insight into the multidimensional aspects of talk-in-
interaction nor its timing nor epistemic dimensions, elements which are of crucial 
importance when investigating processes of meaning construction in interaction. 
Furthermore, as I am not particularly interested in the frequency of a certain 
phenomenon, but more in the fine-grained mechanisms of interaction, a qualitative 
approach is in required. 
Computational approaches have been used in previous attempts to validate 
MSCI (e.g. Veale & O’Donoghue, 2000), testing the computational validity of 
blending theory with the help of algorithmic models. Although such approaches can 
show that blending is a “computationally tractable process” (ibid:254), they fail to take 
account the ‘human component’ in blending. If we wish to find out if and how social 
beings ‘blend’ in their everyday lives and interactions, our interest should lie on 
humans. 
In this regard, neurological studies employing ERPs (event-related brain 
potentials), PET (positron emission tomography), or fMRI (functional magnetic 
resonance imaging) scans and similar technology initially seem to be the obvious 
choice for empirically validating blending theory, especially as blending has been 
linked to neural binding processes.13 Here, changes in activity are monitored in 
different brain regions when carrying out certain tasks, such as manipulating linguistic 
representations; this therefore makes it possible to draw conclusions as to brain cell 
activity during specific tasks. Studies utilising ERPs have been used in metaphor and 
MSCI research to measure processing times (Coulson, 2007). Although this approach 
is certainly fascinating and can yield interesting results, it suffers from the fallacy of 
providing subjects with decontextualised, limited stimulus. It is therefore unable to 
account for the intricate interweaving at play in meaning construction processes in 
                                                
13 Neural binding theory (or: ‘the problem of neural binding’) refers to the mechanisms by which we are 
able to construct a single, coherent object from distinct neural representations (such as colour and 
shape of an object). These perceptual integration mechanisms, the theory assumes, are possible 
because of the “synchronized firing of distinct neural regions” (Grady, 2000:337). Although no 
consensus yet exists as to the particulars of neural binding, it seems uncontested that a certain type of 
integration process must be at work.  
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actual interaction. Furthermore, fMRI technology currently seems unable to provide 
images of the brain which are fine-grained enough to support the idea of blending as a 
process of neural binding.14  
In an approximately similar vein, experimental methods favoured by 
psycholinguistics and cognitive psychology are promoted in Cognitive Semantics. This 
approach relies on confronting subjects with pre-designed stimuli devoted to a specific 
cognitive factor. By monitoring responses, these studies hope to draw inferences as to 
the workings of this factor (Talmy, 2007). Although controlled experiments allow fine-
grained mechanisms to be focussed upon, isolated and extracted, these mechanisms 
are only rarely found in actually occurring, non-experimental settings. In addition to 
this, the extraction of decontextualised factors might lead to the inability to perceive 
the ways in which these factors interact with others. While psycholinguistic 
approaches garner fascinating insights into, for example, the conceptualisation of 
fictive motion, it is not suitable for investigating the much ‘messier’ (A. Hougaard, 
2008; Rohrer, 2005) contextualised and interactional sense-making processes found in 
naturalistic data.15  
When investigating blending-in-interaction, then, the most useful methodology 
will be the systematic study of audiovisual material, as it allows for the crucial, 
interwoven factors of talk-in-interaction, such as vocal dynamics, body language and 
gaze in meaning-making processes, to be focussed upon. Examining these factors to 
the maximum is only possible when interactants engage in actual, uncontrolled speech 
events (Talmy, 2007). In order to determine whether people in actual interaction 
orient to the blending typology advocated by Fauconnier and Turner (2002) and to 
successfully address crucial points of the criticism levelled against it, it is therefore 
necessary to employ a methodology that allows the structures of naturally occurring 
interaction to be studied whilst abstracting away from idiosyncratic behaviour.  
 
3.1.1. Discursive approaches to MSCI 
 
Discourse Analysis with its various sub-disciplines constitutes an approach which is 
able to account for the structures behind actual interaction. In the past, distinctly 
                                                
14 It should also be noted that the ‘neural’ approach recently favoured by Fauconnier and Lakoff (fthc.) 
and Lakoff (2008) is not related to neurolinguistic research, but based solely on computer modelling.  
15 See also Turner (2010) for ideas on experimental studies in MSCI. 
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discursive approaches have been employed by a small number of scholars conducting 
research within an MSCI framework. An excellent collection of papers employing this 
approach can be found in Oakley & Hougaard (2008). As well as providing insights 
into the ways that MSCI can successfully be applied to draw attention to the ways in 
which interactants understand discourse, this volume also highlights the revised 
theoretical configurations arising from the fine-grained analyses of situated 
interaction.  
These discursive approaches to MSCI have provided a number of important 
discussions concerning the theoretical reconfigurations of MSCI theory. Most 
prominently, they contribute the notion of a semiotic base space that serves as a basis for 
blending processes as proposed by Brandt & Brandt (2005). Brandt & Brandt’s 
influential base space is, however, not to be confused with Fauconnier & Turner’s 
(2002) notion of a base space, which denotes that the space serves as a basis for other 
spaces which are set up as ‘discourse’ unfolds. This original base space contains 
assumptions about ‘reality’, and all other spaces are understood in relation to this base 
space. In addressing this, Brandt & Brandt (2005) claim that Fauconnier & Turner’s 
base space is ontological while their base space is semiotic. Brandt & Brandt’s (2005:224) 
discourse base space consequently subsumes “the space in which utterances are 
uttered and come to mean whatever it is they are supposed to mean.” Akin to 
Langacker’s (2001) Current Discourse Space, it therefore subsumes the cogniser’s 
representation of the situation in which utterances occur, and consequently introduces 
issues of context into blending. Brandt & Brandt (2005) assume three spheres of the 
discourse base space: the expressive act (the actual utterance, such as “Achilles is a lion”), 
the relevant circumstances in which the utterance occurs and the way it is framed by the 
interactants (such as a party setting in which our friend Achilles wears a beard), and 
the human phenomenological life-world (the world that surrounds us as it is available to, and 
might become part of, human cognising). All spaces comprising a mental space or 
blending network are constructed on the basis of the discourse base space. Figure 8 
provides an illustration of Brandt & Brandt’s (2005:239) model. 
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Figure 8: Brandt & Brandt's (2005:239) discursively-grounded model 
 
Nevertheless, despite providing relevant conceptual reconfigurations, discursive 
approaches to MSCI have so far failed to provide solid empirical evidence that 
blending is really ‘what people do’ (Hougaard, personal communication). 
Accordingly, when wishing to determine the extent interactants to which display an 
orientation to blending processes in interaction, a research programme is required 
that focuses rigorously on the structures of interaction and the endogenous 
understandings displayed by interactants . Ethnomethodological Conversation 
Analysis (EMCA) is one such approach that allows for the detailed analysis of social 
interaction.  
 
3.1.2. EMCA-inspired approaches to MSCI 
 
An EMCA approach to studying processes of conceptual integration was previously 
most notably championed by scholars such as Anders Hougaard (2004, 2005, 2008) 
and, to a lesser extent, Robert Williams (2004, 2008). Williams deals with the 
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“relations between material structures and conceptual operations in the everyday 
activity of time-telling” (2004:xiii). Building on Hutchins’ (1995) concept of 
“distributed cognition”16 and using CA-inspired methodology and video analysis, he 
investigates how meaning is constructed in elementary school time-telling lessons 
through “guided conceptualisations” within the framework of MSCI. Williams (2004) 
here identifies “material anchors”, such as gestures, for conceptual blending 
operations (cf. also Hutchins, 2005) and develops a model of meaning construction in 
situated activities that combines the concept of distributed cognition with MSCI 
theory. Although he then provides interesting and relevant suggestions for the 
advancement of MSCI, Williams is not primarily concerned with the validity of MSCI 
theory or the question as to whether blending operations can be traced in actual 
interaction. Still, he proposes that cognitive ethnography could also be used to 
“investigate whether the conceptual mappings hypothesised by cognitive linguists are 
apparent in real-life instances of meaning construction” (2004:26). Anders Hougaard’s 
work is not primarily interested in the validity of the theory, either. Hougaard (2004) 
investigates compression in actual interaction, proposing an interactional approach to 
conceptual blending, but does not tackle issues in blending taxonomy or place explicit 
focus on optimality principles in interaction. Rather, his results indicate that there are 
discrete cognitive operations within conceptual blending in interaction, such as 
specific subtypes of conceptual disintegration, ‘splitting’ and ‘partitioning selection’ 
(see also Hougaard, 2005). As a result, his interactional approach offers interesting 
and highly relevant suggestions (such as the concept of ‘onstage cognition’ and the 
development of an interactional approach to conceptual integration), but is not 
concerned with the validity of blending taxonomies in interaction.  
 
                                                
16 Distributed cognition refers to the notion that complex human processes of reasoning and learning 
are to a certain degree dependent on their social and material contexts. Cognition is, in short, 
“distributed among people and their artifacts” (Giere & Moffatt, 2003:303). The analysis hence goes 
beyond the individual mind and instead takes into account “entire cognitive functional systems” 
(Williams, 2004:14) as a means of determining how individuals achieve a cognitive task via 
interaction with artifacts and other functional systems. Cognitive processes are understood to be 
distributed in three ways:  as distributed across various representational media (such as calculators or 
maps), as across social groups (with experts in varying, interrelated fields), and diachronically (with 
older cognitive processes impacting on present ones). 
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3.1.3. Studies on blending taxonomy 
 
In comparison to the above scholars, an interest in blending taxonomies is of interest 
to Bache’s (2005) and L. Brandt’s (2010) work. Bache (2005) proposes a revised 
blending typology that he regards as complementary to Fauconnier and Turner’s 
(2002) model. The typology consists of three main blending types, which Bache refers 
to as first-order, second-order and third-order blends (Bache, 2005:1619). These 
blending types are organised according to “complexity and sophistication”. For 
Bache, first-order blends are, from a psychological perspective, binding: “instances of 
basic mental compression and unification of complex perceptual experience” (ibid). 
Second-order blending in Bache’s model subsumes “the integration of basic abstract 
stories with abstract grammatical structures to produce actual grammatical 
constructions” (ibid:1622). The most complex blending type in Bache’s taxonomy are 
third-order blends that “integrate more clearly separate and independent Mental 
Spaces” (ibid:1625). As I refrain, for reasons outlined above, from using the powerful 
terminology offered by blending theory as a means of account for issues of neural 
binding and grammatical constructions, it is in my view Bache’s third-order blends 
alone which constitute ‘proper’ blends involving fully framed Mental Spaces; this is 
because only these frames require the simultaneous juggling of separate mental 
scenarios. Bache consequently subsumes those concepts which Fauconnier and 
Turner classify as mirror, single-scope and double-scope blends under the umbrella 
term Third-Order blends, and does so without further distinguishing between various 
levels of frame integration in this rather large and, to my mind, central group. For 
these reasons, I will refrain from taking Bache’s (2005) terminology into consideration 
any further. 
Blending typology is also at the heart of Line Brandt’s (2010) model, in which 
she proposes a conclusive revision of blending typology within a cognitive-semiotic 
framework. She makes a strong case for the importance of situational context in 
meaning-making, and bases her elaborate taxonomy on enunciative aspects. In a 
similar manner to Bache (2005), she differentiates between Mental Spaces Blends that 
employ fully-fledged scenarios, and intraspace integration and conceptual fusion, 
which do not contain across-space mappings and would correspond to Bache’s first- 
and second-order blends. In contrast to Bache, however, she identifies a considerable 
variety of Mental Spaces Blends (Bache’s third-order blends);  she groups these Mental 
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Spaces Blends in minute detail according to enuciative factors. Figure 9 visualises her 
typology.  
 
Figure 9: Brandt's (2010:321) blending typology 
 
The issue with Brandt’s highly detailed study is that it mainly relies on philosophical 
arguments rather than empirical data. The question as to whether interactants might 
after all empirically orient to the differentiation into mirror, single-scope and double-
scope blends as put forward by canonical blending analyses is consequently left 
unanswered. 
The following will now serve as a brief introduction to Ethnomethodological 
Conversation Analysis (EMCA) by first of all discussing its philosophical antecedents 
and then considering the consequences caused by the ‘marriage’ of Cognitive 
Semantics to this phenomenological approach. I will also introduce the reader to the 
data set and the methodology utilised. 
 
 
3.2. Methods for a socially grounded MSCI: Conversation Analysis 
 
 
Conversation Analysis (CA) is a systematic and rigorous methods for studying the 
orders of spontaneous, naturally occurring talk as well as the production and 
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understanding of social (inter)action in general, and stresses the essentially social role 
of language use (Drew, 2006).17 Adopting the basic assumption that ‘meanings’ are 
interactional, practical and social achievements (Hutchby & Woffitt, 1998) that are 
based on shared normative procedures (Ten Have, 1999), CA is now widely used in 
various disciplines within the social and cognitive sciences, such as social psychology, 
anthropology, discourse analysis, pragmatics and, of course, its ‘home discipline’ of 
sociology.  
One of CA’s main tenets is to study and explicate those features of language 
use in the broadest sense that are demonstrably relevant to meaning production 
among participants in social action. Only those aspects of interaction that participants 
themselves evidently orient to in their interaction are considered to be valid and 
interactionally ‘real’. In Ethnomethodology (EM), from which Conversation Analysis 
(CA) derived and which provides CA’s main programmatic background, implies that 
construction cannot be separated from action. Meaning, and therefore meaningful 
events, does not originate in people’s heads, but, in the (rather polemic) words of 
Harold Garfinkel (1963:190), “are entirely and exclusively events in a person’s 
behavioural environment […]. Hence there is no reason to look under the skull, for 
nothing of interest is to be found there but brains.” As a result, meaning allocation is 
not seen as an “inner private act of consciousness”, but rather as a “social, ‘public’ 
event” (Bergmann, 2004b:75). Contrary to trends in present-day Cognitive Linguistics 
(and consequently in MSCI, EM and CA), do not attempt to reconstruct “backstage” 
(Fauconnier, 1997) cognitive processes that lead to ‘internal’ understanding; rather, 
they aim to explicate the structural processes which lead to shared understanding as 
manifested in social action. Accordingly, CA may constitute an interesting starting 
point for investigating the relationship between individual and social cognition.18  
Before delving into the analysis itself, it would be sensible to introduce 
Conversation Analysis in further detail. The following will outline the key assumptions 
                                                
17 CA systematically studies everyday talk as situated in human interaction. In order to encompass 
other, non-verbal, yet relevant aspects that impact on the organisation of human social (inter)action 
(such as gaze or body alignment), the object of study is thus commonly referred to as talk-in-interaction 
rather than conversation (Hutchby & Woffitt, 1998). In this vein, linguistic units are understood to 
be objects that serve to methodically accomplish an action, such as apologising or complaining, 
rather than semantic units. 
18 Although both cognitive linguists and conversation analysts often fall prey to certain prejudices with 
regard to the respective other ‘camp’ (see Hougaard & Oakley (1997:16-17) for an overview), 
rewarding links to cognitive sciences that perceive cognitive processes as ‘distributed cognition’ (see, 
e.g. Coulson & Matlock, 2005; Hutchins, 2005) have already emerged.  
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subscribed to by Conversation Analysis as a research programme by first of all briefly 
introducing its development and philosophical underpinnings and, in a second step, 
summarising central findings that are relevant to the project at hand.  
 
3.2.1. CA: development and philosophical underpinnings 
 
Conversation Analysis first emerged in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when Harvey 
Sacks and Emanuel Schegloff began to develop a new method of ‘doing’ sociology.19 
Sacks and Schegloff established a methodology for analysing social interaction in situ 
and in vivo. This approach was to be methodologically sound and capable of attaining 
replicable results as a means of making sociology a “naturalistic, observational 
science” (Hutchby & Woffitt, 1998:24). In developing what was to become CA, Sacks, 
Schegloff and their fellow first generation conversation analysts (such as Gail Jefferson) 
were influenced by a number of researchers, schools and philosophies. As such, 
Erving Goffman’s and Harold Garfinkel’s work in particular constitutes the 
philosophical backbone of CA. 
Starting in the 1950s, Erving Goffman began to develop a sociological 
framework that focused on what he later called the Interaction Order (1983) of naturally 
occurring, everyday, mundane human interaction. Goffman’s approach was 
essentially a qualitative one based on eclectic observations he had made and which he 
then used in order to arrive at and demonstrate a conceptual system. His conceptual 
studies drew from a variety of disciplines, such as drama studies and game studies, and 
showed the great sociological relevance that can be found in everyday face-to face 
interaction. Such naturally occurring face-to-face interaction, Goffman maintained, 
was a locus where social order could be uncovered with the help of structural 
sociological analysis. His interest in the mundane, in non-experimental and naturally, 
occurring interaction and his sequential analysis of the ‘interaction order’, with which 
he tried to recreate the sequence of events of an interaction, is reflected in CA 
research.  
                                                
19 It should be noted that their interests lay in sociological problems and not so much in studying 
language. However, from its beginnings CA has been regarded as conducive to the study of language 
usage and human communication, and provides an interdisciplinary interface between sociology and 
linguistics. Following linguistics, CA understands language to be a structured system, and – in 
accordance with linguistic pragmatics –a means for communicative interaction (Hutchby & Woffitt, 
1998; Ten Have, 1999). As in sociology, CA perceives interaction as a social process.  
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Harold Garfinkel’s Ethnomethodology (1967) research programme (EM) may 
be regarded as the second major influence on the development of what was to become 
CA. Taking as a departure point the Hobbesian Problem of how social order can be 
remotely possible if man seeks to attain egoistic goals, Garfinkel, like Goffman, focuses 
on everyday social action. Despite this, Garfinkel’s focus was a different one. Strongly 
opposing the then pre-eminent functionalism and the Parsonian approach20, Garfinkel 
in his programmatic Ethnomethodology argued that members of a society are to be 
regarded as knowledgeable beings that are aware of and understand their own 
actions. Social actions in EM are practical actions that should be studied as emerging, 
locally produced practical achievements, as all facets of shared understandings are 
dependent on a variety of tacit, socially shared methods of reasoning (Heritage, 1995). 
Consequently, in Garfinkel’s view, the element to be researched is the situated, 
commonsense knowledge people have and exhibit, the methods relied on by 
interactants when achieving said action, or rather when producing and interpreting 
the “mundane world and commonsense understandings of it” (Schegloff, 1992:xxx).21 
Additionally, Garfinkel emphasised the contextuality and “muliplex relevancies” 
(Heritage, 1995:392) of all signs, arguing that they are embedded in actions and will 
thus be interpreted as part of these action. Garfinkel consequently challenges the pre-
Wittgensteinian notion of a direct link between sign and referent. Evidently, 
Garfinkel’s Ethnomethodology was heavily influenced by Wittgenstein’s language 
philosophy and phenomenology in the vein of Husserl and Schütz given that he takes 
a clearly hermeneutic stance and thus opposes the model of objectivity argued for in 
the positivist strand of sociology (Schegloff, 1992). Consequently, Ethnomethodology’s 
central belief that “the structural uncertainty of meaning in everyday interactive 
                                                
20 Garfinkel (1967) goes so far as to (once again rather polemically) state that functionalism treated 
members of a society as “cultural dopes”, as the Parsonian approach saw members of a society as 
acting upon internalized norms and rules and therefore considered social norms as the drivers of 
social action (Heritage, 1995). Garfinkel’s insistence on perceiving members of a society not as 
passive subjects that act on internalized norms and social pressure within a ‘container’ context, but 
rather as active and reality-transforming agents went hand in hand with the spirit of the 1960s – a 
fact that Bergmann (2004b) suggests might have further added to the rapidly increasing popularity of 
EM. 
21 Hence the name of Garfinkel’s research programme, Ethnomethodology. It refers to the tacit 
knowledge, the taken-for-granted methods and practices which members (ethnos) of a given culture 
have at their disposal when interacting with each other, when rendering their surroundings 
meaningful (Flick, Kardorff, & Steinke, 2004; Bergmann, 2004c). In Garfinkel’s (1967:11) own 
words, Ethnomethodology refers “to the investigation of the rational properties of indexical 
expressions and other practical actions as contingent ongoing accomplishments of organized artful 
practices of everyday life”.  
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events is a constitutive condition for certainty of meaning” (Bergmann, 2004b:76) 
recalls Wittgenstein’s (1953:63) conclusion that “where there is meaning there must be 
complete order. […] The most perfect order must also be hidden, therefore, in the 
vaguest sentence.” When considering phenomenology, on the other hand, 
Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis share an interest in intersubjectivity. 
Moreover, Schütz’s work is visible in Garfinkel’s writings when he employs Schütz’s 
(Schütz & Luckmann, 1979) ideas concerning the typified, dynamic and revisable 
character of commonsense knowledge and the categories in which it is organised 
(Heritage, 1995; Heritage & Goodwin, 1990). 
Although many of Ethnomethodology’s central principles (such as the focus on 
social action, the investigation into commonsense knowledge and the belief in 
knowledgeable agents) made their way into Conversation Analysis22, the two research 
programmes differ. Sacks firmly states that he aims to arrive at an observational, 
natural science23 (Sacks 1992; Schegloff, 1992) that could account for the generic 
‘machinery’ (Sacks, 1992) of conversation, a machinery that is external to individual 
speakers, but can be utilised to accomplish actions.  
Apart from these two key thinkers in sociology, technical advancement – 
namely the invention of the tape-recorder – also exerted considerable influence on the 
development of the radically new research programme that Conversation Analysis 
was to become. Researchers were now able to tape conversations. These recordings 
made it possible for the analysts to repeatedly listen to individual segments, helped 
them to avoid the methodological pitfalls posed by other methods, such as participant 
observation (Hutchby & Woffitt, 1998), and allowed them to focus on the local 
                                                
22 Conversation Analysis is often referred to as Ethnomethodology’s “research programme” (Flick et al., 
2004:10), hence the equally common abbreviation EMCA (Ethno-Methodological Conversation 
Analysis). It should, however, be noted that tension between EM and CA can be observed with 
regard to the formalisation and ‘linguisticalisation’ in CA, which, followers of ‘pure’ EM argue, leads 
to a neglect of the ‘haecceitas’, of the Heideggerian ‘here-and-now’ nature, of the “singularity of the 
real” (Bergmann, 2004b:79). 
23 A concise summary of Sacks’ argument for sociology to become a natural observational discipline 
can be found in Schegloff (1992:xxxi):   
 
“Contributions to science, including to sciences such as biology and neurophysiology, are composed 
of two essential parts. One is the account of the findings. The other is the account of the scientists’ 
actions by which the findings were obtained. What discriminates sciences from other epistemic 
undertakings is the claim that its findings are reproducible, and that reproducibility is itself grounded 
in the claim that the results were arrived at by courses of action reproducible by anyone in principle. 
Other investigators can, by engaging in the same actions, arrive at the same findings.”   
 
Sacks thus argued in favour of a social science that employs a rigid, reproducible methodology. 
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practices and tacit conduct of naturally occurring, ‘unmanaged’ (Bergmann, 2004c) 
interaction. What is more, recordings made research findings transparent (and, 
ultimately, challengeable), and thus contributed to efforts made towards attaining an 
observational natural science (Heritage & Atkinson, 1984).  
Further technological developments, such as the advent of video technology, 
did not have comparable consequences. Although video analysis of, for example, gaze 
and gesture, as represented by eminent scholars such as Charles (1986, 2000a, 2000b) 
and Marjorie H. Goodwin (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1992), allows for unmatched 
accuracy and is today commonly used to augment audio data in order to arrive at a 
more complete analysis of talk-in-interaction, the development of methods for video 
analysis seems to be lagging behind by a good two decades (Luckmann, 2006), and 
methodological discussions remain largely implicit. Only recently have scholars 
started to tackle the problematic aspects of video analysis; this includes the ‘reactivity’ 
problem (the interactants’ reactions to the camera), the “fusion, in shared time, of two 
structurally disparate modalities” (Luckmann, 2006:30), i.e. the vocal and visuospatial 
modalities and their differing methods of processing24, the complexity and abundance 
of data provided by videos and the resulting questions concerning data management, 
and finally the potential manipulation of videos for recipient design purposes 
(Knoblauch, Schnettler & Raab, 2006). In comparison to audio data, then, the use of 
audiovisual data for multimodal analysis is still largely underdeveloped. 
With Goffman and Garfinkel providing the theoretical framework and in light 
of the technical advancements ushered in during the 1960s, CA emerged as a research 
programme that allowed for the structures of interaction to be studied. The key 
assumptions and concepts put forward in the research enterprise reflect this 
background, and will be treated in further detail below. 
                                                
24 Whereas the vocal layer is subject to a temporal structure, visual perception does not follow similarly 
clear linear structure. For standard video analysis, eye movement and visual processing is near 
impossible to trace, and the distinction between relevant and irrelevant details of an interaction 
poses problems (Luckmann, 2006). Experimental studies working with head-mounted eye trackers 
hope to provide more insights. For EMCA-driven research, the central tenet that only those features 
which are demonstrably relevant to participants remains true. 
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3.2.2. CA: Key assumptions and concepts 
 
Conversation Analysis subscribes to the principle that in all forms of everyday 
interaction and communication, be it linguistically or non-linguistically-oriented, 
agents are engaged in coordinating their actions with others, in interpreting and 
making said actions intelligible. When talking, we are doing things, inviting, 
negotiating, arguing – and all linguistic levels can be associated with actions or 
activities (Drew & Heritage, 2006). In accordance with Ethnomethodology, 
Conversation Analysis consequently considers joint and coordinated action to lie at 
the core of human social behaviour. Utterances in this view are actions that are 
embedded, situated, and methodically produced in specific interactional and 
sequential contexts.25 CA aims to discover the tacit mechanisms through which agents 
collaboratively produce meaningful actions and the ordering of events, or rather 
naturally occurring talk-in-interaction. These mechanisms and methods are 
recognised as being orderly and available to agents due to their membership in a 
given community (Bergmann, 2004a; Drew & Heritage, 2006). Here, CA assumes the 
following basic propositions, as Psathas (1995:2-3; my comments added, VS) concisely 
summarises: 
 
• “Order is produced orderliness”: Order is integral and endogenous to the local 
setting in which the interaction occurs.  
• “Order is produced by parties in situ”: Order is “situated” and “occasioned” 
rather than imposed on the interactants from the outside. Order is similarly 
not seen as the strict adherence to a set of rules. In line with the assumptions 
                                                
25 The claim that utterances can be analysed as social actions is, of course, the central component of 
Speech Act theory. Although Searle’s work parallels that of Sacks (Searle’s pioneering paper, “What 
is a Speech Act”, was published at around the same time as Sacks’ first lectures in 1965), the two 
research traditions follow separate tracks and exhibit marked differences regarding methodology and 
focus. Austin (1962) and later Searle work on classes of utterance (such as the speech act ‘promising’), 
and study the conditions necessary and sufficient to felicitously accomplish a given speech act. 
Speech Act Theory thus does not focus on contextualized, individual, and naturally occurring 
utterances as Conversation Analysis does, but rather on types of utterances and the actions they 
accomplish. Furthermore, rather than addressing “necessary conditions” (Austin, 1962:14) for the 
“felicitous” (ibid) performance of a legally or ritually binding action as Speech Act theory does, CA 
aspires to uncover the “practices” and “partial methods” used by interactants to methodically 
produce that action in a given interactional context. Sacks, too, was critical of Speech Act theory 
(Heritage & Atkinson, 1984; Schegloff, 1992), as it failed to grasp the importance of interactional 
placement for the accomplishment of an action. 
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proposed by Ethnomethodology, agents produce order themselves. Meaning is 
“locally accomplished, situated, and conventional” (Psathas, 1995:52). 
• “The parties orient to that order themselves”: The order observed is not one 
that is perceived solely by the analyst or has been superimposed by a 
preformulated theory regarding that which is occurring; rather, the 
participants themselves are observed to orient to order.  
• “Order is repeatable and recurrent” 
• “The discovery, description, and analysis of that produced orderliness is the 
task of the analyst” 
• The frequency of a given phenomenon cannot be considered to form the basis 
for research in CA, as the focus lies on “discovering, describing, and analysing 
the structures, the machinery, the organised practices, the formal procedures, 
the ways in which order is produced.” 
• “Structures of social action […] can be described and analysed in formal […] 
structural, organisational, logical, atopically contentless, consistent, and 
abstract, terms”.  
 
Research in Conversation Analysis therefore broadly follows two aims: one the one 
hand, it investigates the sequential order of talk-in-interaction while on the other it 
explores the normative and inferential characteristics of talk-in-interaction (Hutchby 
& Woffitt, 1998). To illustrate this approach, I would like to briefly introduce a key 
topic in CA, turn-taking. Up to this day, accounting for turn-taking systems forms the 
very backbone of the research enterprise. Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson (1974) provided 
the first “systematics” (ibid) of turn-taking. In their seminal paper, they first of all 
understand turn-taking to be “locally managed, party-administered, interactionally 
controlled, and sensitive to recipient design” (ibid:696). There is, in other words, no 
rigid system imposed on turn-taking; it is negotiated in situ. Nonetheless, a systematic 
for turn-taking can be identified. In this respect, the authors differentiate between two 
central components of turn-taking: the Turn Constructional Component and the 
Turn Allocation Component.  
Regarding the first, turns comprise Turn Constructional Units (TCU), “the 
smallest interactionally relevant complete linguistic unit” (Selting, 2000:477). Such 
TCUs vary in length (i.e. a TCU might be a single lexical item or an entire sentence) 
and are followed by a transition-relevance place (TRP), the point at which speaker 
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change is a legitimate next action. Participants project a TCU to be possibly finished 
on the basis of certain context-sensitive parameters, the complex and context-
dependent interplay of pragmatic (is the proposed action possibly complete?), prosodic 
(turn-final intonation pattern), bodily (e.g. gaze direction and postural orientation) and 
grammatical features (syntactical completion).  
The Turn Allocation Component of the model refers to the ways in which 
turns-at-talk may be assigned. At a TRP, the current speaker may either select a new 
speaker (through gaze, questions, addressing and the like), or the next speaker may 
self-select in environments where prior talk allows for speaker change. In short, then, 
turn-taking in this model is interactionally negotiated and enacted in situ, and centres 
around TRPs at which speaker change may legitimately occur. 
When studying interactional phenomena such as turn-taking, CA endorses 
basic research tenets, the use of naturally occurring data, and the avoidance of a priori 
conceptualisations. The first tenet holds that only those interactional phenomena that 
would have occurred in any event, irrespective of the research project and the analyst, 
are chosen for analysis. Natural interaction is thus non-experimental action, or rather 
interaction that is situated in the unfolding of the interactants’ lives. At the heart of 
this tenet lies the central assumption that ‘ordinary conversation’ is the “primordial 
scene of social life” (Schegloff, 1996a:4) provides a much richer domain for analysis 
than experimental settings or invented examples (Heritage, 1995). As CA focuses on 
social action in face-to-face interaction, the phenomena analysed include the interplay 
of all those visual, auditory, tactual and/or kinaesthetic features within a spatio-
temporal framework (Psathas, 1995) that participants demonstrably rely on in order to 
jointly coordinate social action. Accordingly, the interactional phenomena analysed 
include vocal and visuospatial modalities (Stivers & Sidnell, 2005); this thereby 
incorporates lexico-syntactic and prosodic features as well as embodied actions, 
gestures, facial expressions, gaze, body posture and alignment. A major requirement is 
that the matters selected for study are those that participants in the setting are 
themselves demonstrably aware of and/or oriented to in the course of their actions. 
This departure from analysing purely ‘vocal’ aspects of interaction (which first 
generation CA research had still largely concentrated on) was made possible due to 
technical developments in video recording, and enjoyed widespread successful 
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promotion by Charles and Marjorie H. Goodwin.26 The recognition first of all that 
crucial facets of action relate in some way to the physical environment in which the 
action is embedded, the use of artefacts and the interactants’ bodies, and secondly that 
the sequential organisation of action is dependent on these factors (Ten Have, 1999) 
led to further theorising in EM, CA and Cognitive Linguistics, such as the Fused 
Bodies approach proposed by Hougaard & Hougaard (in press). This approach 
emphasises the important role of “whole bodies in interaction”, and aims to describe 
“sense achieved interactionally in and through the use of all embodied resources 
(including language) in face-to-face-interaction” (ibid).  
Furthermore, multimodal analyses have of late been used in order to shed light 
on cognitive processes. To this end, gesture studies are commonly applied, as gestures 
are seen as providing a window into the mind, or, as the title of one paper suggests, 
“Postcards from the mind” (Peter de Ruiter, 2007). Within MSCI research, 
multimodal analyses focusing on gestures have also become increasingly common. 
Sweetser (2007:210), for example, shows that “divisions of space in gesture similarly 
metaphorically represent Mental Spaces or areas of content” (original emphasis). 
Gesture analysis, she claims, can thus be used to determine the organisation of Mental 
Spaces. Despite these recent trends towards further inclusion of the body, however, 
CA remains predominantly interested in the interweaving of vocal and visuospatial 
aspects in sense-making processes (Stivers & Sidnell, 2005) with the vocal layer 
remaining prominent.  
Secondly, CA calls for the avoidance of a priori conceptualisations, and 
instead champions what is referred to as “unmotivated looking” (Psathas, 1995:45). By 
this, CA hopes to describe and analyse phenomena without consulting the existing 
repertoire of theories regarding human conduct, and to be open to new discoveries 
‘overlooked’ by previous theories. CA furthermore seems deeply critical of existing 
theories, often arguing that these theories would reduce the complexity of human 
interaction to simplifications and inflict “more scholarly and theoretical concerns […] 
upon members of society” (Wetherell, 1998:391). CA alternatively endeavours to 
chart the endogenous understandings being displayed by the interactants. Despite this 
critical take on existing ideas on social order, CA cannot be accused of being ‘a-
                                                
26 Along with scholars such as Christian Heath (e.g. Heath & Hindmarsh, 2002; Heath & Luff, 2006) 
and Adam Kendon (e.g., 1990b, 1997, 2004, 2008), who mainly works in interactional kinesics and 
had already started research on gaze and gesture in the 1960s. 
  LANGUAGE, COGNITION, INTERACTION 
   
 -59- 
theoretical’. As outlined above, CA strives to highlight the “inherent theories-in-use” 
(Ten Have, 1999:32) that participants employ rather than imposing interaction-
external models as a means of accounting for social conduct. Due to the rigorously 
empirical nature of such concepts, however, they cannot be regarded as imposing 
interaction-external theories on the interaction; instead, they arise from the systematic 
and accumulated study of interaction. Be that as it may, it should not be neglected 
that simply by selecting a particular instance of interaction for analysis, the analyst 
attributes this excerpt a particular relevance and neglects its diachronic dimension to a 
certain degree (cf. Wetherell, 1998). Despite coming from a different angle, 
Fauconnier (1997) also en passant points out that theory-independent observations 
and interpretations of ‘facts’ are impossible. Explication-only endogenous 
understandings can therefore never fully be achieved.  
CA’s focus on explicating the tacit structures of interaction without taking into 
account ‘larger’, ‘interaction-external’ models and concepts further led to fears that 
CA was a “bloodless” (Moerman, 1988:x) research enterprise that neglected aspects of 
‘context’ and ‘culture’.27 This ‘cultureless smack’ becomes especially prominent in 
early CA research, where tape recording of conversations are analysed without much 
reference to ‘context’ (Bergmann, 2004c). Following the understanding of ‘agency’ in 
Ethnomethodology, ‘context’ in the broadest sense and sociological variables such as 
age, class and gender are taken into account only when it is evident that the 
participants in the interaction themselves orient to these variables and that this in turn 
becomes visible in the recipient design of their contributions. Arguing that the actual 
context of an interaction cannot fully be defined and that that which is relevant 
cannot be fully determined by the observer (de Kok, 2008), practitioners of CA 
therefore usually refer to the most proximate context, the previous turn (Drew & 
Heritage, 2006), when speaking of ‘context’ – a conceptualisation that becomes visible 
in, for example, the study of adjacency pairs. Conversation Analysis has found that 
interaction works in pairs. Such adjacency pairs consist of a First Pair Part (FPP), 
which projects an action, and a Second Pair Part (SPP), which completes it. A FPP 
might be a greeting, to which the relevant SPP would be an acknowledgment of the 
greeting (through a nod or another culturally accepted form of greeting). In adjacency 
                                                
27 This view is related to the notion of ‘culture’ found in CA work: for Sacks (1992), ‘culture’ is the 
gadgetry that enables participants to produce recognisable actions. Culture is thus commonsense 
knowledge, the competences that enable members to produce and infer meaningful actions (Ten 
Have, 1999).  
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pairs, each action is both context-defined (resulting from a previous action) and 
context-renewing (defining the action that follows). Context in CA is thus not static, 
but dynamic (Heritage & Goodwin, 1990). As a result, CA opposes the standard 
sociolinguistic tenet of an “intrinsic and causal relationship between language and the 
social context in which it is produced” (Hutchby & Woffitt, 1998:5), namely the tenet 
that all interaction is influenced by interaction-external ‘context’. Accordingly, 
mainstream CA – and especially the early work conducted in this research enterprise 
– is not interested in the “ethnographic particulars” (Psathas, 1995:45) in which the 
interaction under scrutiny took place. Rather, it is the structure of the interaction that 
CA hopes to explicate, as orderliness in CA is not considered to be dependent on said 
particulars. On the contrary, sociological and psychological characteristics are 
understood to be manifested in the medium of conversational practices. The focus 
now should therefore turn to structural features. Only after these features have been 
determined is it possible (if at all) to investigate the way in which sociological factors 
may be displayed during talk-in-interaction (Heritage, 1995). This ‘pure’ strand of CA 
has, however, been criticised over the past two decades. The criticism originated from 
two camps: those CA researchers working in ‘Applied Conversation Analysis’ (also 
referred to as the ‘Studies of Work Programme’) and the ‘culturalist’ and ‘humanist’ 
branch of CA.  
Applied Conversation Analysis studies institutional talk to understand how a 
given interactional phenomenon might be tied to the larger context of the 
organisation in which an interaction is embedded (Psathas, 1995). It therefore aims to 
discern how social action is linked to social structures, and how epistemological and 
interactional asymmetries are produced in interaction. Drew & Heritage (1992) 
succinctly summarise three main aspects exhibited by institutional talk: 
 
• Interactants normally aim to achieve specific goals that are linked to their 
“institution relevant identities” (Ten Have, 1999:168) 
• Special constraints can be found that determine ‘allowable’ contributions; 
these are contributions that are relevant to the business or institutional goal at 
hand 
• Specific ‘inferential frameworks’ become salient and certain procedures are 
found in particular institutional contexts only. 
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Applied CA therefore takes a slightly different angle to ‘pure’ CA by investigating the 
local competencies and special knowledge exhibited by members in certain 
institutionally-contexted interactions, such as hospitals (e.g. Heritage, 2010; Heritage 
& Maynard, 2006; Paterniti et al., 2010; Drew, 2006), courtrooms (e.g. Drew, 1992; 
Ehrlich, 2002, 2006) or auctions (e.g. Heath & Luff, 2007a, 2007b, 2010) amongst 
others. Consequently, the criticism levelled against more ‘pure’ CA involves the 
latter’s propensity to assume that any interactional sequence contains allegedly 
context-independent devices. Applied CA has, however, shown that interactants in 
fact exhibit an orientation to specific institutional contexts that manifests itself in, for 
example, the turn-taking system, where in certain contexts, such as doctor-patient 
interaction or courtrooms, pre-prescribed rights at turn-taking might prevail. 
Nevertheless, applied CA does not opt for a ‘container view’ of context, whereby 
interaction-external constraints are imposed on interaction from the outside; rather, it 
argues that institutional talk contributes to the discursive construction of the 
institutions’ actual ‘institutional’ character, .Furthermore, it maintains that context-
free resources are applied in context-sensitive interactions by means of knowledgeable 
agents that display to others an orientation to, and awareness of, a given context 
(Drew & Heritage, 2006; Heritage, 2004). 
The ‘culturalist’ strand of CA voiced its criticism in Michael Moerman’s 
Talking Culture (1988), in which the author argues in favour of combining CA’s “high-
powered lens”, which, he feels, lacks “range, breath, and mise-en-scènce” (ibid:x), with 
ethnography and its “concern for context, meaning, history, and intention” (ibid:xi). 
As Moerman goes on to explain, this is necessary due to the fact that “we never 
merely exchange turns of talk. In all conversation, people are living their lives, 
performing their roles, enacting their culture” (ibid:22). What Moerman is thus 
proposing is what he refers to as ‘culturally-contexted’ Conversation Analysis. Here, 
ethnographic descriptions “provide meanings and material conditions of the scenes in 
which the actions occur” (Ten Have, 1999:56). Culturally-contexted CA therefore 
allows for a description that – albeit never complete – can illustrate the 
interconnection between cultural directives and individual action design; this is 
especially useful when working with communities which are unfamiliar to the 
researcher, as analysis of recordings of talk-in-interaction requires membership 
knowledge, foresight concerning a culture’s shared, tacit and taken-for-granted 
knowledge, or rather a community’s doxa (cf. Bourdieu, (1972)1977), cultural models 
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and practices (D’Andrade, 1984), if the occurrences in a given interaction are to be 
understood or differentiated between. As Geertz (1973) succinctly states, this 
essentially involves being able to tell twitches from. This cultural knowledge is 
especially important in humorous interaction (Kotthoff, 2006), as humour employs, 
alludes to, and comments on culturally salient ‘humour scripts’ (Raskin, 1985) as well 
as culturally salient phenomena, stereotypes and prototypes (Niemelä, 2010). 
Impersonations in particular often echo culturally shared voices that lie beyond the 
adjacent interactional context (Koven, 2002). Without awareness of the community’s 
taken-for-granted cultural knowledge and models, the social actions which humour 
may encompass cannot be fully grasped by the researcher. This point is also of key 
importance to cognitive semantic research, which contends that linguistic structure 
activates frame structure, such as cultural scripts and other forms of shared 
encyclopaedic knowledge; these forms of structure impede on, and are at the basis for, 
operations such as conceptual integration.  
In order to account for the roles played by shared knowledge and practices in 
the intersubjective coordination of meaning, I align with culturally-contexted CA, and 
utilise ethnographic information to describe and analyse the (context-free) operations 
with which (context-sensitive) meaning construction relying on conceptual blending is 
achieved. However, it is not just the treatment of ‘context’ within CA that needs to be 
reconsidered when applying it to a cognitive-semantic theory such as MSCI. 
Preliminary conceptual reconfigurations, too, are required for the interaction of the 
two approaches and the subsequent generation of useful results. These 
reconfigurations will be incorporated into the analysis to follow in later chapters, and 
will be reassessed on the basis of the results gathered in the process. A refined model 
of MSCI in interaction is offered in chapter six. 
 
 
3.3. A social-interactional approach to MSCI: Preliminary hypothesis on 
       conceptual reconfigurations 
 
 
Employing a predominantly ethnomethodological approach to investigate a cognitive 
semantic theory that hopes to offer new insight into “backstage cognition” 
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(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002) initially seems to result in clashes with regard to 
conceptions of cognition and meaning. Ethnomethodological Conversation Analysis 
perceives interactants as socially embedded, as making sense of a social world through 
ordered practices. In this way, CA seems almost “agnostic” (Hopper, 2005) towards 
cognitive processes, or, as Gitte R. Hougaard (2008) understands it, as residing on the 
‘communal end’ of a meaning-making continuum that stretches from individuality to 
communality. This focus on the social and the observable in contrast to the individual 
mind is reminiscent of the mentalism vs. behaviourism debate that dominated 
academic discourse for a good deal of the twentieth century, and resulted in the time-
honoured division between ‘social’ and ‘psychological’ dimensions of human 
behaviour, respectively (cf. Croft, 2009). Yet while CA can in many ways be 
considered a behaviourist enterprise in the vein of George Herbert Mead (1934) and 
his later supporters, the mind is not negated through this approach.28 Rather, the 
mind is conceptualised as a “shared activity” (Hougaard, 2008:198), with meaning 
emerging between interactants rather than in the individual mind alone. With its 
focus on the joint and shared, CA does not deny individual experience either, as 
Hougaard & Oakley (2008) point out. Instead, it puts its focus on the social and the 
enacted without denying psychological dimensions. In Schegloff’s (2003:39) words, 
cognition should consequently “be understood not necessarily by reference to the 
individual cut off from a world around, but by reference to an individual engendered 
and constituted by the world around in the first instance.”  
This view is not altogether different from the one held in Cognitive Semantics, 
which subscribes to experiential realism (Lakoff, 1987). As outlined in chapter 2, 
‘meanings’ in Cognitive Semantics are seen as being dynamically construed by an 
embodied mind that interacts with the world around it and with other cognising 
minds (Langacker, 1999, 2001; Williams, 2004). However, this latter dimension, 
namely interaction with other cognising bodies,  has largely been neglected in actual 
research, or at least prior to the ‘social turn’ (Croft, 2009; Harder, 2010). As a number 
of recent projects (see above) have shown, though, EMCA can be successfully aligned 
with Cognitive Linguistics approaches such as MSCI due to its phenomenological 
                                                
28 It should also be noted that Conversation Analysis cannot be regarded as purely behaviourist. 
Interactants are understood to be sense-making individuals rather than being fully driven by stimuli. 
Still, interactants obviously cannot determine their conversational partners’ experiences by looking 
into their heads. Instead, Hougaard (2004) argues, meaning experiences have to be signalled and 
shared, leading to the emergence of interactional meaning. 
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roots29 and resulting interest in shared knowledge. Marrying EMCA to MSCI helps to 
address key problems within the latter, but requires the rethinking of a few key issues.  
This importance of preliminary hypotheses for conceptual reconfigurations 
becomes further evident when once again considering the Achilles is a lion example 
discussed in chapter 2.3., where one interactant draws an analogy between the shared 
friend Achilles’ beard and that of a male lion. In this interaction, the interlocutors will 
do their best to align conceptualisation processes in order to attain intersubjective 
meaning construction. To do so, they will first rely on their shared knowledge of (a 
clean-shaven) Achilles, and the salience of his beard in their shared perceptual field. 
Secondly, the interactant will try to guide his/her partners’ mapping processes by 
emphasising central words of the utterance, gesturing to his/her face and waiting for 
signals of recognition to be emitted by the communicative partner. Should he/her not 
instantly comprehend the analogy, further steps will be initiated to ensure that all 
interactants arrive at approximately the same conclusions. Meaning is, in short, an 
interactive achievement, a “social doing” (Sinha, 1999:232). Nevertheless, the 
question remains as to how the central importance of the intersubjective dimension of 
meaning-making can be accounted for in a cognitive semantic analysis. 
 
3.3.1. Cognition as ‘centre stage’ rather than ‘backstage’ 
 
‘Mainstream’ Cognitive Semantics attempts to discern the ‘unconscious’ processes of 
‘backstage cognition’. This approach has led to the development of what Anders 
Hougaard (2008:181) calls “hypothetical modelling” of seemingly inaccessible mental 
operations. An approach inspired by CA, on the other hand, conceptualises cognitive 
processes as happening ‘onstage’ rather than ‘backstage’, to continue with Hougaard’s 
(2004) pithy exploitation of Fauconnier and Turner’s original stage metaphor. As the 
interactional data accumulated within CA shows, cognitive meaning-making processes 
are shared, coordinated, “interactionally enacted” and “part and parcel of the 
interactional action” (A. Hougaard, 2008:22). This would be the case in the Achilles 
example described above, where the speaker makes certain to explicitly guide 
mapping processes  by means of gestures and prosodic emphasis.  
                                                
29 For a further discussion of how Cognitive Linguistics (mainly in the vein of Lakoff, Johnson, Talmy 
and Langacker) relates to Phenomenology, see Zlatev (2010). 
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Cognition consequently takes centre stage due to the fact that it is publicly 
displayed. Conceptualising cognition as ‘onstage’ allows the joint processes of meaning-
making to be investigated rather than having to start at the product and hope to trace 
the steps that were taken in order to arrive there. Investigating the step-by-step 
negotiation of meaning-making as it temporally unfolds and is publicly revealed will 
consequently address one of the major points of criticism (cf. Gibbs, 2000) voiced 
against MSCI. 
 
3.3.2. Common Ground and Mental Spaces 
 
Mental Spaces in such a social-interactional approach are intersubjectively 
coordinated and are not isolated packages in an isolated individual. Returning to the 
Achilles example, the speaker will need to be sure that his/her communicative partner 
is aware of the fact that male lions have manes and that he/she has noted Achilles’ 
new look. Mental Spaces constructed by an individual cogniser in on-line cognising 
are accordingly based on assumptions regarding shared ‘Common Ground’30 as 
proposed by Herbert H. Clark (1996, 1982). In his definition, Common Ground refers 
to the “the sum of their [the interactants’] mutual, common, or joint knowledge, 
beliefs, and suppositions” (Clark, 1996:93). Without assuming a certain degree of 
Common Ground, of shared knowledge and awareness, this means that joint actions 
and, ultimately, successful communication are not possible. After all, Tomasello 
(2008:57), in building on Wittgenstein (1953), shows that “linguistic communication 
relies to a much greater degree than is readily apparent on uncoded communication 
                                                
30 Common Ground is sometimes also referred to as common knowledge (Lewis, 1969), mutual knowledge or 
belief (Schiffer, 1972) and joint knowledge (McCarthy, 1990; All in Clark, 1996). This notion of an 
assumed shared world is also prominent in Ethnomethodology, as in, for example, Garfinkel’s 
(1963:220, quoted in Hougaard (2004:cclxxxviii)) “congruency of relevances”, in which  
“The person [who] expects, expects that the other person does the same, and expects that as he 
expects it of the other the other expects the like of him that the differences in their perspectives that 
originate in their particular individual biographies are irrelevant for the purposes at hand of each 
and that both have selected and interpreted the actually and potentially common objects in an 
‘empirically identical’ manner that is sufficient for the purposes at hand.”  
Hougaard & Oakley (2008) go as far as to argue that Mental Spaces resembled Common Ground. 
For me, this seems somewhat ostentatious, as Common Ground is first of all understood to subsume 
all knowledge existing between participants, whereas Mental Spaces are built up for local meaning-
making; for this reason, Mental Spaces only subsume those features of shared knowledge that are 
relevant to current meaning construction. Secondly, it is still the individual that experiences events as 
meaningful. Mental Spaces thus have to be coordinated between interactants in order to achieve 
approximation in their construal. While they are signaled in an attempt to achieve shared construal, 
they nonetheless remain the construct of the individual. 
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and other forms of mental attunement.” Consequently, interactants have to make a 
cooperative effort to take into consideration their conversational partners’ potential 
actions, background knowledge, beliefs and intentions (Tomasello, 2008)31; otherwise, 
communication would simply break down. This is of particular importance in 
figurative and creative language use. Research in the development of metaphorical 
competence (e.g., Glaznieks, 2011) has shown that people lacking detailed knowledge 
of a certain domain find it impossible to understand novel metaphors recruiting that 
domain. Humour that relies on the recruiting of knowledge schemas not available to 
the audience will be entirely unsuccessful. As such, the consideration of the 
communicative partners’ potential knowledge, actions and intentions is of key 
importance.  
These assumptions with regard to Common Ground are reflexive and 
recursive, vary in quality and are therefore subject to judgment and evaluation, as 
evidence needs to be gathered to determine the validity of a given supposition. This 
evidence is established on the basis of such interactional resources as joint gaze or 
gestures. When wrong judgments are made as to the Common Ground, repair 
mechanisms are available to be utilised.  
Mental Spaces in an interactionally-oriented Cognitive Semantics rely on 
Common Ground, a view that is also implicit in Turner (2000:46), who writes that  
 
the effectiveness of the manipulations [i.e. rhetorical effects, VS] 
depends on the shared nature of these cognitive operations and 
conceptual structures – they are part of the backstage cognition of 
the members of the audience. […] What can be recruited to mental 
work depends on social and cultural location. Parts of the repertoire 
are common and can be assumed for any audience while other 
parts are special to special communities or special situations (my 
emphasis, VS). 
 
The effectiveness of cognitive operations, such as conceptual blending, therefore 
depends on assumptions made about shared knowledge and frames. As such, Mental 
Spaces are locally negotiated and interactionally displayed by participants in 
                                                
31 A related notion can be found in ‘mainstream’ Conversation Analysis, where the term recipient design 
denotes the ways in which talk in conversation is constructed or designed to display an orientation 
and sensitivity to the particular other(s) constituting are the co-participants. Recipient design affects, 
for example, word selection, topic selection, admissibility, the ordering of sequences and the 
conventions for opening and closing conversations (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). In contrast to 
Common Ground, however, it does not explicitly refer to epistemic, perceptual or cognitive 
dimensions. 
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interaction for joint sense-making purposes, and are based on the reflexive 
assumptions made concerning shared Common Ground.  
 
3.3.3. Coordination and Mental Spaces 
 
As Fauconnier (1994:2) points out, for Mental Spaces to be shared interactants need 
to “build up similar space configurations from the same linguistic and pragmatic data” 
in order to successfully communicate, because “to communicate is to trigger dynamic 
creative processes in other minds and in our own” (Fauconnier, 1997:182). What 
Turner (2000) and Fauconnier (1994, 1997) here seem to neglect, however, is that this 
building of “similar spaces” is a highly complex endeavour that is subject to careful 
coordination. Rather than trying to reconstruct the spaces which each individual 
builds, an interactional approach will necessarily focus on the shared Common Ground 
that interactants orient to in their conversations and that serve as a basis for joint 
meaning construction.32 For this reason, Mental Spaces are regarded as shared 
between interactants, whereby shared refers to the notion that a given piece of 
information or beliefs are assumed by the interactants to be available to all interactants. 
In this manner, Mental Spaces are also reflexive in that interactants are conscious that 
they and their partners are aware of a given proposition. This meta-cognition ties in 
with findings obtained in Theory of Mind research, which show that during 
childhood, humans develop an understanding of the mental states of others. Humans 
thus seem to know that others, too, have mental representations of the world and that 
these representations inform their respective actions. Humans consequently assume 
and orient to others’ motivational and mental states (Astington, 2001; Givón, 2005). 
People on the autistic spectrum and children under the age of four lack Theory of 
Mind, and therefore find it more difficult to understand figurative expressions, such as 
novel metaphors, irony or hyperbole, as their ability to ‘read’ the intentions, the mind 
of other, is not fully developed (Glaznieks, 2011). Moreover, it has been suggested in 
comparative psychology (e.g., Tomasello, 2008; Herrmann et al., 2007; Liebal et al., 
2009) that humans possess a special set of cognitive skills, known as social cognition, to 
                                                
32 In their discussion of conceptual blending and evaluation, Kok & Bublitz (2011), too, emphasise the 
importance of aligning our own mental worlds with that of our communicative partners, but do not 
go as far as to define Mental Spaces as relying on Common Ground; indeed, they do not even 
incorporate Common Ground into their blending model. 
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an extent that other primates simply do not. Social cognition is what allows humans to 
read intentions and cooperate in joint activities.  
This awareness of other minds can, as Clark (1996) finds, be built on either 
communal and cultural or personal knowledge. While communal knowledge (such as 
that of a lion’s appearance) is shared or assumed by way of belonging to a specific 
group or subculture, personally grounded knowledge refers to those assumptions that 
are based on previous, shared experiences accumulated by interactants in their 
personal interactions (such as Achilles’ erstwhile appearance), as well as on a 
perceptual basis (such as Achilles’ current look). That which is situated in the 
interactants’ shared perceptual field and subject to joint attention can hence be 
considered to belong to the personal Common Ground.  
Other aspects of the personal Common Ground relate to what Croft (2009) 
refers to as the “discourse basis”, which is the previous conversations interactants have 
experienced together. Communal Common Ground encompasses the shared stories, 
concepts, things, genres or symbols that circulate in a given community and that can 
be assumed as being shared by virtue of joint community membership.  
In this social-interactional approach, then, Mental Spaces are conceptualised 
as conceptual packets based on assumptions regarding Common Ground; they are 
publicly displayed and signalled, or rather interactionally enacted, and guided joint 
local processes of meaning-making and action. As reading minds is of course not 
possible, interactants can never be fully certain as to the quality and validity of a given 
feature (although the better that interactants know each other and the more personal 
Common Ground they share, the more the quality tends to enhance), and therefore 
constantly need to monitor, modify and coordinate their Mental Spaces. 
 
3.3.4. Mental Spaces as interactionally relevant and phenomenologically evident 
 
Conceptualising Mental Spaces as interactionally shared and substantiated by 
Common Ground serves to address another major criticism voiced towards MSCI, 
namely the question as to what Mental Spaces really are. After all, the founding 
fathers provide very little information as to a proper definition, and, depending on the 
analyst, many different elements are believed to reside in Mental Spaces: anything 
from perceptual and conceptual structure and structured and unstructured scenarios 
to emotions. Rather than perceptual structure, in this interactional approach Mental 
  LANGUAGE, COGNITION, INTERACTION 
   
 -69- 
Spaces now only comprise views, superstitions and knowledge, essentially framed 
semantic ‘meanings’ that are interactionally relevant and shared (cf. Hougaard, 2004).  
This also applies to the ‘contents’ of the blended space. Investigating blending 
in interaction means to explore blending on a phenomenological level and investigating 
consciously and mindfully set up blends, whose dialectic nature is explicitly oriented to in 
interaction. As a result, blending operations on the grammatical level (constructions 
blending with semantic content) or perceptual level (colour integration) are not 
considered, as the alleged input spaces are not explicitly acted out and oriented to in 
interaction. 
 
3.3.5. Current Discourse Space as a basis for communication 
 
It goes without saying that not all facets of the Common Ground understood to exist 
between interlocutors are treated as relevant at every moment in a given interaction. 
For this reason, I will draw on Langacker’s (2001) notion of Current Discourse Space 
(CDS). This discourse base space is used to refer to those aspects of the Common 
Ground that are “construed as being shared by the speaker and hearer as a basis for 
communication at a given moment in the flow of discourse” (Langacker, 2001:144).  
 
Figure 10: Langacker's (2001:145) Current Discourse Space 
 
Langacker here proposes that interactants in usage events draw on shared knowledge, 
but also take into account what he refers to as ‘context’, i.e. the “physical, mental, 
social and cultural” (Langacker, 2001:145) aspects that are treated as shared and 
relevant in the usage event, as well as discourse history – the Common Ground 
discussed in the previous chapters. A usage event in his model refers to the “action 
carried out by the speaker and hearer” (ibid:144).  
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It is not only this focus on social action that makes Langacker’s model 
compatible with discursive approaches to MSCI; he also accounts for the joint 
negotiation of meaning construction. His viewing frame in this regard describes the 
joint managing of the current attention range, i.e. the coordination of beliefs about 
currently relevant conceptual entities and the focus of attention (visually represented 
via --->). The viewing frame comprises what Langacker (2001) refers to as 
conceptualisation and vocalisation channels. These channels consist of factors such as 
speech management (turn-taking behaviour), as well as intonation and gesture, which 
are employed in the management of attention frames. The Ground in Langacker’s 
(2001) model refers to the process of meaning negotiation and coordination that the 
speaker (S) and his/her addressee, the hearer (H), are engaged in. Multiparty 
interaction is, however, more complex and the Ground of these interactions involves 
more than a speaker and a hearer. It has to be able to account for the “participants” 
and “non-participants” (Clark, 1996:14) witnessing the interaction, as awareness 
thereof has a significant impact on contributions. By way of example, in addition to 
coordinating their contributions with their addressees and fellow panellists, speakers in 
televised interaction also shape their contribution whilst keeping in mind the non-
participating audiences. These audiences can be divided into two types: the audience 
present in the studio, which can signal understanding through laughing or clapping, 
and the non-present audience watching via their TV screens. The coordination of 
blending operations in a way that allows the latter group to follow the exchanges and 
‘participate’ in the joint project, so to speak, constitutes a major challenge for the 
speakers. In order to account for the multiplex structure of multiparty, televised 
interaction, potential participants (i.e. all panellists), non-visual bystanders (i.e. the 
studio audience) and all other listeners (i.e. the TV audience) are included in my 
reconfiguration of Langacker’s (2001) Ground. Figure 11 provides a schematic 
visualisation of the participant structure in panel shows.  
 
 
Figure 11:  Participants in the Ground of televised multiparty interaction (cf. Clark, 1996:14) 
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For the analyses implemented in chapters 4 and 5, Langacker’s (2001) model is chosen 
over Fauconnier’s conception of a base space and Brandt & Brandt’s (2005) reworking 
thereof for the following reasons. First of all, the CDS  allows for the description of a 
steadily evolving mental space that serves as the basis for the interaction at hand. It 
subsumes those features of the vast Common Ground that are deemed to exist 
between interactants treated as shared and relevant at the moment of interaction, 
such as previous interaction, cultural paragons, perceptually salient items or culturally 
shared values, and constitutes the background for the various construal operations – 
these are features which are represented in the base space in the manner conceived in 
canonical MSCI.  
The CDS not only licenses and makes relevant blending scenarios by 
subsuming such features as discourse history and roles, but can, as a discourse base space, 
also serve as an input space that is blended with alternative scenarios, as is the case in 
the phenomenon discussed in the analysis of impersonation humour.  
Second of all, other than the model offered by the Aarhus research group in 
cognitive semiotics (cf. Brandt & Brandt, 2005), which differentiates in great detail 
between expressive acts, circumstances and pheno-world spheres in a semiotic base 
space but refrains from explicitly considering shared knowledge, Langacker’s (2001) 
Current Discourse Space allows the shared, yet unstable and fragmented nature of 
Common Ground to be explicitly acknowledged whilst simultaneously being able to 
depict its historically grounded and evolving nature with an focus on joint action, 
conversational relevance and cognitive construal. 
 
3.3.6. Blending analyses in a social-interactional Cognitive Semantics 
 
Regarding meaning construction in conceptual blending as jointly coordinated and 
recipient-designed further leads to the question concerning how blending analyses are 
conducted in this social-interactional approach. More specifically, the interactional, 
phenomenologically grounded approach taken here raises the question as to how to 
deal with the contested “generic space”. The generic space as conceptualised in 
canonical blending theory is, after all, not interactionally signalled and the ‘content’ of 
this type of tertium comparationis cannot be inferred from the interactants’ actions. 
Secondly, generic spaces are ‘post hoc’ constructed by analysts, and consequently do 
not provide any information as to the motivation behind and the different readings 
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arising from a blend in context. While representing a generic space in the analysis of, 
say, metaphors might be interesting and relevant to cognitive and philosophical 
studies, I here follow the standards adhered to in the most recent interactional 
blending research (see for example Brandt, 2008; Brandt & Brandt, 2005; Hougaard, 
2004; Oakley & Coulson, 2008; Oakley & Kaufer, 2008; Williams 2004, 2008). In an 
interactional and contextualised approach to Cognitive Semantics, a ‘post hoc’ 
constructed structure which lists the similarities between the inputs cannot faithfully 
be represented unless this generic structure is explicitly referred to by the interactants. 
Instead, the analyses focus on jointly coordinated and contextualised processes of 
meaning-making. 
 
The social-interactional approach to Cognitive Semantics championed in this project 
does not study meaning as processed in the individual mind, but as socially and locally 
constructed and interactionally relevant. In this approach, Mental Spaces are 
therefore understood to be shared and interactionally enacted for purposes of local 
understanding. They are thus based on Common Ground (Clark, 1996) in that they 
are rooted in communally or personally shared beliefs, suppositions or knowledge. 
They are publicly displayed and held for purposes of local meaning-making, and are 
embedded in the haeccitas, the here and now of the interactants.  
This approach consequently addresses the criticism brought against MSCI 
that targets the theory’s apparent focus on the logic of hidden meaning construction 
(cf. Brandt, 2005). The meanings emerging in blending operations are conceptualised 
as processes of creative meaning construction which are shared and designed by the 
recipient. Accordingly, the MSCI analyses only ever model projections which follow 
from the interaction under scrutiny, and avoid the ‘hypothetical modelling’ which was 
a common feature of early MSCI research. This is not to deny that the analyses and 
the graphic representations that subsequently appear in conjunction with them are 
completely void of the analyst’s membership knowledge or introspection. An 
interactional approach does, however, require empirically solid interactional evidence 
for all assumptions made as to the meaning construed by the participants. This focus 
on interactional evidence naturally leads to the analyses being less fine-grained and 
detailed than those offered in more traditional MSCI research, as Anders Hougaard 
(2004) has already pointed out when outlining his interactional approach to Cognitive 
Semantics. Yet, analyses conducted within a situationally and interactionally 
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grounded framework address those contextual and social aspects of cognitive 
theorising which are commonly neglected in canonical MSCI writing. It therefore 
leads to analyses that are answerable to the social worlds in which we debate, joke, 
play, and interact. 
Of course, it is important to note that this approach neither refutes individual 
cognition nor denies that it is the individual who ultimately experiences blends as 
meaningful. Rather, it explicitly acknowledges the social and material dimension of 
meaning-making processes and addresses the problem of ‘hypothetical modelling’ 
common in canonical MSCI research by concentrating purely on those aspects of 
cognition which are publicly displayed and oriented to by the interactants themselves 
in processes of joint meaning-making activities – in short, this approach investigates 
cognition as enacted and revealed in interaction.  
 
 
3.4. Data collection and data analysis 
 
 
3.4.1. Domain for study: Impersonation humour  
 
When browsing the literature on MSCI, it seems that blends occur everywhere: 
letters, numbers, grammar, religion and literature have all been described in blending 
terms. This great variety of tokens has lead to blending being labelled a “ubiquitous” 
(Bache, 2005) theory that is able to smartly account for everything and nothing at the 
same time. To address this problem, Pascual (2008:105) proposes the study of 
“blending types” in detail rather than “anecdotal tokens”, as the in-depth analysis of 
one type may contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the structure 
underlying the type. Gibbs (2000) and Bache (2005), too, suggest that in order to 
address MSCI’s ‘ubiquity problem’, which targets the “too general nature of 
blending” (Bache, 2005:1617), “localized hypotheses” (Gibbs, 2000:349) should be 
devised so as not to lose sight of the phenomenon.  
Following this line of argumentation, my analysis will concentrate on one 
specific phenomenon, i.e. impersonations in interactional humour. I have chosen this 
phenomenon firstly because the “other-character-mode” (Chilton, 2008:241) is a 
prime example of conceptual blending given that it integrates two personae (the 
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‘reference’ and the ‘presentation’, to employ the semiotical terminology coined by the 
Aarhus research group in cognitive semiotics) and thus results in discursive 
dissonance. Brandt (2010), who subsumes impersonations under the category of 
‘virtual identification blends’ similarly argues that they constitute the “most 
prototypical” and “most intriguing” (331) blending type.  
The clear presentation of semiotically distinct, i.e. dissonant, input scenarios 
evident in impersonation blends subsequently helps to address one of the fundamental 
problems in MSCI research: that of delineating Mental Spaces. In a scenario where 
one ‘real’ space (the impersonator, or animator in Goffman’s (1981) framework) 
signifies another ‘fictive’ space (the impersonated, or figure in Goffman), it is clear that 
two spaces are at work (cf. Brandt, 2008; Brandt & Brandt, 2005). These spaces are 
‘theatrical’ in nature (cf. Brandt, 2005), and contain imaginable scenarios rooted in 
the interactants’ Common Ground. 
Furthermore, such voice changes seem to be pervasive in interactional 
humour, where they constitute a “recognisable structure of activity” (Sidnell, 
2006:380) that largely relies on the creation of unconventional meanings (cf. the 
incongruity theory of humour). Impersonations in particular and polyphonic humour 
in general hence seem to constitute a popular and successful blending type that is 
characterised by polyphony, performance and playfulness. The following pages set out to 
describe the phenomenon in further detail, drawing on research in linguistics, humour 
studies, performativity and literary studies. Following this, the phenomenon is 
discussed in an MSCI framework, thus demonstrating the extent to which 
impersonations recruit various levels of frame-integration complexity. 
 
3.4.1.1. Polyphonic narrative, double-voiced discourse and impersonations 
 
Although the importance of discursive dissonance for a clear delineation of Mental 
Spaces has been discussed above, this dissonance in impersonations takes on a further 
characteristic, that of polyphony. The term derives from Bakhtin’s treatment of 
Dostoyevsky’s works. In his Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics ((1963)1984), Bakhtin 
proposes that in order to account for Dostoyevsky’s highly complex work, his 
characters need to be thought of as speaking in unmerged, polyphonic voices. In what 
Bakhtin calls the ‘polyphonic novel’, the author is placed alongside his/her characters 
as an equal rather than merely as their creator. We are thus faced with a plurality of 
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consciousnesses, and the author, the characters and the audience together participate 
as equals in the creation of the novel’s ‘whole’. For Bakhtin, the author speaks with 
(rather than about) a character as someone who is actually present. This notion of 
polyphony is highly analogous to phenomena found in spoken interaction, where 
participants quote, mimic and otherwise make use of ‘voices’ other than their own.33 
Polyphonic narrative can thus also be witnessed in everyday interactions such as 
impersonation humour.  
 
Impersonations as polyphonic narratives 
Impersonations are fragmented polyphonic and “scenic” (Kotthoff, 2007) narratives 
that mainly achieve polyphonic voice through prosodic (Günthner, 1999) and bodily 
means.34 In this regard, research on conversational narrative has shown that 
animated, multimodal enactments of reported speech often appear at a story’s high 
point (Niemelä, 2010), thereby constructing a “sense of immediacy”, making the story 
more vivid, and ultimately attaining conversational involvement (Pascual, 2006; 
Tannen, 1989). Humorous impersonation seems to present such high points in a 
‘story’ whose context has, in accordance with Bakthin’s idea about the polyphonic 
narrative, to be co-constructed by the recipient: in impersonation humour, we are 
confronted with at least two voices, or consciousnesses: the creator’s and the 
character’s voices are co-present and contribute equally to the ‘whole’ of the emerging 
impersonation. It is the creator, through whose body and voice we perceive the 
character(s), who tailors his contributions to the specific requirements of the speech 
event at hand and the audience in question, and who, by means of his/her quoting, 
evaluates the quote at hand and takes a stance on it. Apart from the creator’s voice, 
we also witness the created or quoted character, who can agree or disagree with the 
creator or ‘quoter’, who is the subject of his/her “own directly signifying discourse”, 
and whose consciousness “is given as someone else’s consciousness” (Bakhtin, 
(1963)1984:7). The voice of the created or quoted character is thus independent of 
                                                
33 See for example Tannen (1989), Günthner (1999) and Couper-Kuhlen (1999) on polyphony in 
reported speech, Kotthoff (2002, 2007) on double-voicing in playful, reported dialogue and (2009) on 
irony development, Koven (2002) on voicing in conversational narrative, Glick (2007) on voice and 
chronotope in stand-up comedy, and Priego-Valverde (2009) on double-voicing in failed humour. 
34 Following Günthner (1999), I subsume features of pitch, loudness, pausing and duration under 
prosody. The term voice quality will be used to describe paralinguistic features such as whispering, 
aspirated voice or falsetto voice. Bodily resources refer to features such as gesture, facial expression 
and body positioning and alignment.  
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that of the creator’s.35 Finally, there is the audience. In Bakhtin’s view, the audience is 
an active participant, and adds its consciousness to the emergent whole of the 
impersonation. The importance of adding the recipient’s “own consciousness” 
becomes especially transparent in impersonations that are ‘best-of’ performances and 
that with their elliptical speech style (Kotthoff, 2007) only provide fragments of the 
ensuing impersonation’s context or “storyworld” (Günthner, 1999). They 
consequently metonymically represent, or provide dramatic illustrations of, whole 
stories. Impersonations thus exhibit that which Ohmann (in Wirth, 2002:26) calls a 
“world-generating function” (welterzeugende Funktion) in reference to poetic language, as 
the communicative context of the fragments provided in the impersonation needs to 
be imagined and co-constructed by the recipient – this is a feature that Tannen (1989) 
claims heightens conversational involvement. As a result, impersonations heavily rely 
on Common Ground, such as personally and culturally shared stereotypes and 
prototypes whose most salient features provide prompts for construal and enable 
coherence (Kotthoff, 2004, 2007).  
While interactional humour has often been described as a case of sheer 
‘layering’ (Clark, 1996), i.e. putting an additional semantic layer onto non-marked 
interaction, or as the creation of a ‘play world’ (Bateson, (1955)1972) that is somehow 
set apart from the ‘real’ world, the Bakhtinian notion of polyphony now allows the 
interactionally demonstrable co-presence of multiple ‘consciousnesses’ to be 
accounted for in impersonation humour. Together, they form an interwoven network, 
and do not, as other notions would have it, add additional layers or construct worlds 
that are set apart from ‘reality’. On the contrary, all of these different voices are 
combined, and it is only through their interaction that the emerging ‘whole’ of the 
impersonation attains its communicative status. Impersonations are thus polyphonic.36 
In his treatment of monologue and dialogue, Bakhtin introduces yet another 
useful distinction, that of monologic and dialogic discourse. For Bakhtin, monologic 
voice is single-voiced, and hence does not explicitly recognise other people’s words. 
Dialogic discourse, on the other hand, is double-voiced, and thus contains explicit 
                                                
35 As Glick (2007) points out, it should be noted that due to the performative context in which the 
humorous exchanges under investigation in this project are embedded, there are already at least two 
‘voices’ present: that of the professional entertainer and that of the individual. Impersonations thus 
add a third, and sometimes even fourth voice. 
36 Polyphonic humour is not restricted to impersonations alone, as other humour genres such as irony 
are also clearly double-voiced. This means that impersonations only constitute one type of 
polyphonic humour. 
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references to words that have been uttered before. Double-voiced discourse adds “a 
new semantic intention into a discourse which already has, and which retains, an 
intention of its own” (Bakhtin, (1963)1984:189). The ‘original’ utterance is thus 
“decontextualised” and becomes “recontextualised” in a new speech event (Günthner, 
1999; Koven, 2002). As a prime example of double-voiced discourse, Bakhtin 
mentions parody, which he defines as adapting someone else’s discourse, but 
introducing “into that discourse a semantic intention that is directly opposed to the 
original one” (Bakhtin, (1963)1984:193).  
As with polyphony, the concept of double-voiced discourse can again be 
adapted to account for impersonation humour. The impersonator either directly 
quotes or introduces a fictive quote that s/he then equips with a new communicative 
intention, that of displaying the quoted sequences as a laughable. Impersonations are 
thus a means of taking a stance, of publicly commenting on the character, events and 
utterances presented (Günthner, 1999; Labov, 1972a). 
Impersonations in interactional humour are, in sum, fragments of polyphonic 
and therefore dialogic narratives that only provide brief, ‘best-of’ insights into a 
storyline that has to be co-constructed by the audience. They can hence be subsumed 
under what I propose to call polyphonic humour. Polyphonic humour gains its special 
qualities from the interactional co-presence of multiple voices that taken together 
account for the ‘whole’, the communicative effects of the impersonation. Additionally, 
polyphonic humour is dialogic in that the original communicative intention, the 
illocution of the (fictive or non-fictive) quoted segment is replaced by a new semantic 
intention.  
 
3.4.1.2. Performance and theatr(ic)ality in impersonations 
 
Mimicry, parody and other forms of impersonation humour all show one special 
feature that sets them apart from other forms of polyphonic discourse, such as mere 
quoting or irony: they are emerging, embodied performances that are playfully and 
comically keyed (Kotthoff, 2006, 2007). Impersonations can therefore be regarded as 
‘dramas’ that are staged before an audience. This staging capacity is what 
differentiates them from joke telling: where a joke relies solely on verbalisation, 
impersonation performances can utilise bodily illustrations. As Kotthoff (2004) argues 
when considering the sketch, the strength of humorous performances lies in its 
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theatrical element. Impersonations therefore rely heavily on the comical effects that 
embodied performances and stylisations can cause, as it is just such animated, 
theatrically and dramatically staged performances that allow us to experience events 
more intensively through the use of various semiotic resources and media (Sidnell, 
2006; Wirth, 2002).  
Before delving deeper into the finer details of humorous performances, it will, 
however, be necessary to delineate the concept of ‘performance’ itself, as this notion 
(German: Performanz and Performativität) has become an almost ubiquitous concept 
within the humanities.37 For the sake of clarity, at this point I would like to adopt 
Fischer-Lichte’s (2002) treatment of performance, which is linked to theatrality38 and 
staging39. Coming from a theatre studies background, she conceives of performance as 
the theatrical staging of a role-swap, and adds that performances are acts of 
presentation through bodily and vocal means before an audience, and which rely on 
the interplay of staging, corporality and perception. An utterance is transported from 
the “living environment” to a “theatrical stage”, and during this process undergoes 
modulating transformations. According to this definition, then, theatrality and 
performance constitute a perceptional and semiotic mode (Fischer-Lichte, 2002) that 
shares the notion of iterability40 and modulation with Bakthin’s (1984) concept of 
double-voiced discourse. However, performance is not all about aesthetic pleasure; 
rather, it serves two other functions as well: framing and typification41,  which can 
                                                
37 Wirth (2002:9) identifies four key concepts that performance can denote: (1) the “serious” 
performance of speech acts, (2) the staged performance of theatrical or ritual acts, (3) the constitution 
of imagination, and (4) the material embodiment of messages. He does, however, note three 
tendencies which the concept seems to develop within culture studies: theatricalisation (Theatralisierung), 
iteralisation (Iteralisierung) and medialisation (Medialisierung).  
38 The term ‘theatrality’ is here, in accordance with Alter (1981), utilised in order to avoid the negative 
connotations attached to the more common notion of ‘theatricality’. Under theatrality, Fischer-
Lichte (2002:299) subsumes four aspects: staging as a specific semiotic mode, corporality, perception, and 
performance. Theatrality, she claims, only applies when all four aspects are present. 
39 Fischer-Lichte (2002:295) defines staging (German: Inszenierung) “as the application of specific 
aesthetic practices whose performative and corporal ‘excess’ achieves a certain effect” (my 
translation). 
40 Here used to denote the creative recontextualisations of ‘replica-tokens’ (Wirth, 2002:52). 
41 Typification according to Schütz and Luckmann (1979) refers to the human tendency to perceive 
and structure the world in ideal types for which typical kinds of behaviour are assumed. In 
typification processes, pragmatic reduction takes place and idiosyncratic features of a certain type 
are ignored, and only the attributes relevant to the specific situation at hand are considered. 
Typification will here be used synonymously with stereotypisation in cases where groups rather than 
individuals are portrayed (Plum, 1998). 
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most concisely be described as the coordination of Mental Spaces which building 
in/incorprate interactional meaning-making. 
First of all, the resources ostentatiously and markedly exploited in 
impersonation performances are used in the coordination of inferences. Ostentatious, 
marked performances thereby serve a framing function. Within the “theatre frame” 
(Kotthoff, 2007; Wirth, 2002) construed in impersonations, performative gestures take 
on specific theatrical purposes. Their transformation from one context to the other 
requires reflection on both their original context as well as their ‘new’ one. It requires 
the simultaneous maintenance of the inputs contributing to the integrated 
performance. 
Secondly, mimetic performative resources such as body positioning, facial 
expression, code-switching or prosodic cues serve as prompts to either construct a 
particular type (Günthner, 1999) or to mimic previous discourse. By playing with and 
relying on (assumptions about) shared knowledge regarding stereotypical ways of 
speaking and acting as well as of cultural prototypes, performed impersonations thus 
act as cues for the co-construction of both the “storyworld”, or “reporting space” 
(Niemelä, 2010) in which the impersonation is set and the types inhabiting said world 
or space. In impersonations lacking a diegetic introduction, the storyworld is not 
described, but evoked solely through stereotypically performed details that make use 
of bodily semiotics in addition to lexico-syntactic and prosodic features. Here, a high 
degree of typification is required, and subtleness must be avoided, as the scene needs 
to be quickly understood by the recipient (Kotthoff, 2004); after all, impersonations 
are meant to depict and demonstrate referents rather than describe them (Niemelä, 
2010). In this respect, impersonations with their exaggerated imitations of people and 
hyperstylisations of cultural prototypes and stereotypes resemble caricatures and 
cartoons.42 Although these art forms arguably constitute predominantly visual and 
static media, caricatures, cartoons and ridiculing impersonation nevertheless share 
striking similarities. First of all, the humour of all three types heavily relies on the 
interplay between two semiotic channels, the verbal and the visual. Psychological 
research has shown that images exert a stronger and longer-lasting influence than 
words (Plum, 1998), which might serve to account for the attractiveness of 
impersonations. As Samson and Huber (2007:14 in Tsakona, 2009:1172) point out 
                                                
42 While cartoons are “drawn jokes”, caricatures always imply criticism in the broadest sense (Plum, 
1998:28). 
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when discussing cartoons, bodily semiotics can augment the verbal channel in three 
ways: by simply illustrating a verbally told joke without adding to the humour, by 
providing additional information to the lexico-syntactic layer and thus contributing to 
the humorous effect, and, thirdly, by providing essential contextual information 
without which humour would not be possible. In a similar fashion, bodily 
performances elaborate on the verbal channel and vice versa. It is through the 
interaction of these two channels that hyperdetermination (Tsakona, 2009), in effect 
the facilitation of high density of metonymic and metaphoric inferences43, can occur. 
Hyperdetermination and the interaction between visual and verbal semiotic modes 
constitute impersonation humour’s asset.  
Secondly, polyphonic impersonations show resemblance to caricatures, which 
can be defined as visual “representations […] in which distinctive aspects are 
exaggerated” (Rhodes & Brennan, 1987:474). In caricatures, the process of 
simplification takes place, trivial features are largely neglected or even omitted while 
the most distinctive features of a character or type, typically the ones that deviate most 
from an idealised norm, are magnified, hyperbolically intensified, and thus 
emphasised as a means of facilitating recognition. In impersonations, the depicted 
type or character’s most salient features, the features that most deviate from the 
idealised norm, be it body posture, facial expression, dialect or voice quality, are 
exaggerated in the performance to make recognition possible. Furthermore, 
caricatures, in much the same way as impersonations, present the depicted as 
laughable (Plum, 1998), as deviating from the expected norms adhered to by the in-
group.  
Humorous impersonations are therefore caricaturing performances, staged 
role-swaps which are achieved through bodily and vocal means. Changes in body 
posture and alignment, facial expression, pitch, code and register are all semiotic 
performative resources commonly employed to signal a type or person and the world 
inhabited by this person during impersonation performances. However, 
                                                
43 The linguistic and visual cues provided in caricatures, cartoons and impersonation performances 
function as triggers for metonymic and metaphoric inferences, as recipients are able to access aspects 
of shared knowledge or frames solely by alluding to a salient aspect of that frame. For this to happen, 
at least one visual or verbalised constituent of the cartoon, caricature or impersonation needs to be 
sufficiently salient (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003) in order to ensure activation of the intended frame. Due 
to the great variety of inferences possible in humour that relies on multiple semiotic channels, 
variations in humour appreciation can be accounted for: recipients may choose to focus on one or 
two aspects and draw inferences from them, and choose to neglect others (Tsakona, 2009). 
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impersonations are only ever successful if they are perceived as being funny or witty. 
Here, it is of central importance that the recipient receives enough cues to co-
construct the narrative and types underlying the performance.44 The stylisation of the 
character, be it a fictive or a ‘real’ one, thus needs to be easy to identify for the 
recipient if they are to achieve intersubjectivity and attain and ensure Common 
Ground (Clark, 1996; Kotthoff, 1998, 2007).  
Humorous impersonations are performances in that they transform and 
modulate utterances through the ‘excessive’ use of bodily and vocal means before an 
audience. Performative resources thus provide cues as to the character or type 
portrayed, and at the same time constitute a framing device that helps the recipient to 
construe the speech situation at hand as polyphonic and humorous and playful in 
nature. It is this latter point that I shall be turning to now, as impersonations attain 
their framing as humorous through their specific keying as play rather than through 
performance features such as code-switching or ‘crossing’ (Rampton, 1999) into 
varieties other than one’s own.  
 
3.4.1.3. Impersonations, play and humour 
 
Since the groundbreaking work of Huizinga (1949) and Bateson ((1955)1972), a 
plethora of research on play has become available. Summarising the discussions about 
the nature of play would exceed the scope of this chapter, which is why, for the sake of 
brevity,  I would like to use Goffman’s (1974) comprehensive definition of the “rules” 
that “transform serious, real action into something playful”: 
 
a. The playful act is so performed that its ordinary function is not realized […]. 
b. There is an exaggeration of the expansiveness of some acts. 
c. The sequence of activity that serves as a pattern is neither followed faithfully nor 
completed fully […] 
d. A great deal of repetitiveness occurs. 
e. When more than one participant is to be involved, all must be freely willing to play, and 
anyone has the power to refuse an invitation to play or […] to terminate the play once it has 
begun. 
f. Frequent role switching occurs during play […]. 
g. The play seems to be independent of any external needs of the participants […]. 
i. Signs presumably are available to mark the beginning and termination of playfulness. 
(1972:41-43) 
 
                                                
44 In Fischer-Lichte’s (2002:283) words, “Jeder Zuschauer erschafft sich seine eigene Aufführung.” 
Theatrical performances only provide prompts for the creative construction of scenic narratives 
and/or types in the recipient.  
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Regarding impersonations in humour, it is obvious how they constitute playful 
performances: apart from being double-voiced due to the fact that the (projected) 
original communicative intentions are transformed and recontextualised, we find 
exaggerations, dramatisations and ‘best-of’ performances that ignore the (projected) 
original sequential pattern. More importantly, the impersonations are playful, as they 
are not seen as contributing to ‘serious’ communication, or rather communication 
that is employed to attend to “external needs”. Furthermore, impersonations are 
based on role-switches, and need to be systematically signalled as set apart from non-
play and other voices through the use of disjunct markers and comical keying.  
However, not all play and not every performance is humorous or makes us 
laugh. As play, a definition of humour as a remains elusive, and has for millennia been 
a major subject of dispute for philosophers, psychologists, linguists, anthropologists, 
and neuroscientists alike. Humour has many facets, and relies on the interplay of 
cognitive, affective and physiological systems and socio-cultural factors (Marin-Arrese, 
2008). Within the large body of research available on humour, three major theoretical 
strands can be identified (Attardo, 1994; Brône, 2010; Zillmann, 1983):  
The first is cognitive theories, which focus on the notion of incongruity (or: 
inconsistency) and, consequently, its resolution. Incongruity theories seem to be 
among the least disputed within the context of humour research, and are based on the 
assumption that there are two different frames or scripts that are mutually 
incompatible, but have a common element that makes it possible to shift from one 
frame to another. A recipient normally reduces information to the most salient script, 
and proceeds in this script until s/he encounters a semantic problem which forces the 
recipient to access a different script in order to solve the communicative obstacle. This 
previously hidden script allows for understanding, and hence leads to a feeling of 
surprise, satisfaction and, ultimately, laughter. Historically, research in this vein has 
been conducted by philosophers including Arthur Schopenhauer, Søren Kierkegaard 
and Immanuel Kant, authors such as Arthur Koestler and psychologists (Jerry M. Suls 
being the prime example). Influential cognitive humour theories have been proposed 
by Victor Raskin and Salvatore Attardo (e.g. Attardo, 1994, 2001; Raskin, 1985), 
whose Semantic Script Theory of Humor and General Theory of Verbal Humor have proven to 
be highly influential in linguistic research. Incongruity humour has previously been 
described as relying on processes of conceptual blending (cf. e.g., Brône, 2010; 
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Coulson, 2005), as the theory is especially suitable for depicting the simultaneous 
‘juggling’ of distinct, incongruous scenarios. 
The second theoretical strand is social theories, which discuss issues of 
superiority, aggression and disparagement in humour. These theories concentrate on 
the social and interpersonal dimension of humour and the negative attitude of the 
producer of humour towards the target. Research in this field has been conducted by 
Charles R. Gruner, Henri Bergson and, historically, by philosophers such as Aristotle 
in Poetics, Plato in Philebus and Thomas Hobbes in his work Human Nature. According 
to social theories, humour can be perceived as an aggressive game during which 
“wittiness becomes a symbol of intellectual and social superiority” (Brône, 2008:2029). 
Gruner (1997) has developed a game-theoretic account of humour which yields 
important insights into the understanding of the social functions of conversational 
humour.45  
Psychoanalytical tension-release models constitute the third strand. Inspired by 
Sigmund Freud (1905) and Herbert Spencer, these models focus on structures and 
psychological processes which lead to the production of laughter. In Freud’s theory, 
laughter and humour provide a release mechanism for suppressed and socially 
unacceptable behaviour, such as taking pleasure in another’s misfortune and 
shortcomings or talking about sexuality. The theory is thus especially appriopriate for 
accounting for obscene humour, which in Freud’s view lead to amusement “because it 
constitutes a transitory overcoming of sexual repressions” (Zillmann, 1983:99).  
Although all of these theories seem to be able to sufficiently address specific 
forms and levels of humour appreciation, it hardly comes as a surprise that no single 
theory has yet managed to satisfactorily account for all humour found in human 
interaction. Integrative models have, however, been proposed, such as the one put 
forward by Suls (1977). Yet these models still leave many questions unanswered.46 As 
such, impersonations could certainly be discussed from all perspectives, most notably 
incongruity and superiority theories. According to incongruity theories, the humour 
emerging from impersonations could result from the clash of the two voices, those of 
the the parodist and the ‘parodee’. The humour arising from joint fantasising 
(Kotthoff, 2007), or more specifically the performance of fictive stories and cultural 
                                                
45 For an in-depth historical overview of research adopting superiority theories, see Zillmann (1983).  
46 Regarding Suls’ (1977) attempt at unifying superiority and incongruity theories, for example, 
Zillmann (1983) criticises the theory’s apparent failure in explaining the very reasons for the arousal 
of mirth. 
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prototypes, may rely on culturally incongruous characters and roles and the 
underlying celebration of shared cultural knowledge. 
Superiority theories, on the other hand, could argue that impersonations 
facilitate the implicit evaluation of the original voice, which could allow for a ‘put-
down’ humour element to be added to the impersonation. After all, it is such ‘direct’ 
quotes as those found in impersonation humour that enable “implicit person 
characterisation” (Kotthoff, 2007:268), and it is through such implicit 
characterisations and typification that evaluative stance can be communicated. Here, 
issues of affiliation and disaffiliation, of cultural identity and alterity, seem to play a 
role. Funniness arises not from the belittlement of any particular group or person, but 
from those with whom we feel little or no affiliation. We thus seem to prefer to 
ridicule, to laugh at a perceived outgroup or person, but laugh along with people we 
feel we affiliate with. As a result, the appreciation of humour seems to be a matter of 
disposition and affiliation (Zillmann, 1983). In this regard, the humour arising from 
impersonations might depend on the sub-genre: mimicry and the restaging of past 
dialogue (Günthner, 1999) uttered by persons present on the one hand show 
similarities to forms of teasing by focussing on and publicly exposing the perceived 
weaknesses of the ‘butt’ that is present in the interaction. One could thus argue that 
mimicry is a means of exerting power and of reinforcing social norms and normative 
morality by displaying deviant behaviour (as reflected in the original utterance) as 
laughable within the group. Teasing and other forms of put-down humour, such as 
‘banter’, have sometimes been labelled as being ‘pro-social’ (Boxer & Cortés-Conde, 
1997; Habib, 2008), as they are playfully keyed, and can be used to signal intimacy 
within established groups by indicating that the interlocutors are so intimate that they 
can ridicule each other without having to fear any serious consequences.  
However, other psychological research has shown that “teasing is more a 
means of achieving superiority than a means for establishing solidarity” (Tragesser & 
Lippman, 2005). The teaser in this view is perceived as dominating the ‘butt’, as 
elevating his/her own status by displaying social and ‘moral’ superiority. In the end, 
the perceived level of aggressiveness of teasing impersonation humour will depend on 
a large number of variables, such as the degree of group integration, one’s status 
within the group, and the extent to which the teasing is framed as play (Plester & 
Sayers, 2007). Mimicry and the restaging of past dialogue are nonetheless a means of 
reinforcing the social norms and values that are held as valid within the group, as such 
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jocular abuse of people present is one way of presenting deviant behaviour as 
inappropriate and laughable. In parody, on the other hand, the ‘butt’ is not personally 
present, but represents the deviant behaviour of an out-group that is perceived as ‘the 
other’. Parodies thus constitute a means for establishing and celebrating in-group 
status and values through shared humour47 by indexing the ‘other’ and projecting 
disapproved values and characteristics onto an out-group (Davies, 1982, 1998). Issues 
of social identity and alterity, of elevating ones own value system over that of a 
perceived out-group, come into play here. 
I would also like to add another aspect that may contribute to the humorous 
effect of impersonations and which is not sufficiently addressed by the humour 
theories illustrated above. It occasionally seems to be the case that the hyperstylisation 
and typification of cultural prototypes and culturally salient, famous personalities 
alone seem to suffice for the evocation of mirth among recipients. Here, Kotthoff 
(2004), arguing with Bergson (1900), claims that it is the mimetic approximation of the 
impersonation that is responsible for the humour and resulting pleasure. She adds that 
such “comedy humour” in this respect shows resemblance to antique comedy, which 
also exhibits a high degree of typification responsible for evoking mirth. A similar 
explanation was proposed as a means of accounting for caricature, where Gombrich 
(1978 in Plum, 1998:41) emphasises the importance of resemblance and equivalence. 
In essence, while the constituent parts of a caricature pursue divergence, as a whole it 
seeks equivalence to the ‘original’. As Aristotle has already pointed out in his Poetics 
(1996), humans thus seem able to find pleasure in mimesis alone, in the recognition of 
the object behind skilful imitations. This point, of course, also leads to humour 
becoming a risky, potentially face-threatening48 test for understanding (Sacks, 1974), 
as not being aware of the referent in humour will lead to a failure in showing and 
celebrating in-group status. 
However, it should be kept in mind that humour is still a highly complex and 
situational phenomenon whose amusing effect can be attributed to numerous 
idiosyncratic and highly context dependent factors which can hardly be fully 
accounted for; rather, they need to be investigated on a case-by-case basis. 
Conversational humour is full of playfully transformed and humorously keyed 
references to previous discourse(s), of citations, allusions and references to other styles 
                                                
47 Cf. the notion of Joking Cultures (Fine & DeSoucey, 2005). 
48 See e.g. Haugh (2010) and Zajdman (1995) for research on face and humour. 
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of speaking, and as such provides a means for commenting on social norms and 
indexing identity. It can therefore be said that humorous impersonations subsume 
polyphonic and multimodal performances of fragmented, non-contextualised 
narratives that are comically and playfully keyed, and rely heavily on shared 
knowledge, stylisation and typification. Humorous impersonations are locally 
occasioned, and systematically signalled as distinct from previous discourse, but are 
also inextricably intertwined with and made relevant by adjacent talk, exhibit a 
specific interactional structure, and are subject to practices that signal the end of the 
performance. 
 
3.4.2. Impersonations as conceptual blends 
 
Impersonations are prime examples of conceptual blending, as two distinct voices are 
present and one persona is presented through the body of another. In these “Virtual 
Identification Blends” (Brandt, 2010:91) the impersonated is understood as ‘being’ the 
impersonator. Yet while the impersonator and the impersonated might be perceived 
as identical during the performance, they are not identical once the inputs become 
available and qualitative inferences emerge. Decompression is consequently of vital 
importance in impersonation performances. 
Imagine a person impersonating a character from a horror movie by quoting a 
salient, central line uttered by that character; this person not only copys the verbal 
performance, but also assumes the body posture and facial expression displayed by the 
original character. This impersonation constitutes the blend, yet for it to be 
meaningful the performance has to be decompressed in order for the story world of 
the performance to become present. In impersonations, the character in the blended 
performance metonymically stands for the narrative space49 (Dancygier, 2008) which 
                                                
49 Dancygier (2008:54) conceives of a narrative space as a mental space that is required for story 
comprehension. The text itself only provides partial elements of the narrative space, which is why it 
necessitates further structure and elaboration to provide full(er) understanding. As she analyses 
complex narratives, such as Margret Atwood’s The Blind Assassin, Dancygier perceives of narrative 
comprehension as a hierarchical blending process. The narrative space is, in her model, at the 
topmost level, and integrates other Mental Spaces that were introduced to the text and needed to be 
integrated with other spaces to attain an emergent, coherent story.  
 While the notion of a narrative space as the blend of a variety of text elements is conducive to the 
analysis of complex literary narrative, my use of the term Narrative Space does not presuppose 
blending operations. Rather, I perceive of the narrative space as a mental space that is set up for 
meaning construction in narrative, and hence is subject to certain presumptions, such as event 
structure (e.g. presentation of a conflict) and the furnishing of further elements as the text evolves. 
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s/he inhabits. In such an impersonation, a whole story is compressed into a few lines 
uttered by one of its characters. In order to access this narrative space, the 
interlocutors are required to decompress the performance they are confronted with. 
Decompression is required for the polyphonic nature of the blend to become 
manifest. It is only through the ‘unpacking’ of the blend that the co-presence of two 
voices becomes evident. The interactants firstly need to be (made) aware that the 
performer is not speaking as ‘herself/himself’, and secondly need to be able to infer 
the role which s/he is playing. The blend is thus an integrated performance that 
compresses the represented and the representer into uniqueness via the vital relation 
of representation (cf. Fauconnier & Turner, 2002:97f). However, the polyphonic 
dimension of this blend only becomes discernible when co-participants are able to 
unpack this performance and identify its input domains, as figure 12 illustrates. 
Polyphony consequently arises from decompression and the resulting interplay of the 
input spaces that are brought together in the integrated performance.!!
 
Figure 12: Polyphonic blends 
 
 Mirror, Single- and double-scope impersonation blends 
Impersonations make use of various types of blending, from mirror to double-scope50, 
in the classification offered by Fauconnier & Turner (2002). In impersonation blends, 
the dividing lines depend on two frame structuring aspects: discourse scenario and semiotic 
codes51 employed for meaning-making purposes. A human impersonating another 
human of the same discourse scenario, as in the case of mimicry or the restaging of 
                                                                                                                                      
Unlike a blend, there are no cross-space mappings; rather, elements are added to the narrative space 
itself as the story unfolds during telling. 
50 As simplex blends are not considered ‘true’ blends for the reasons outlined in chapter 2.3., they will 
not be dealt with in the analyses. 
51 By semiotic codes I refer to conventionalised processes by which signs are attributed meaning in a 
given speech community. Due to each semiotic code having various sub-codes, frame clashes are 
placed on a continuum from highly incompatible (e.g. impersonations of horses or chickens) to fully 
compatible (no clash of semiotic codes, as the same accent and pitch are used in the unmarked 
language of both characters, i.e. the impersonator and the impersonated). 
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past discourse, is thus classified as a mirror blend case. In mirror impersonations, no 
frame clashes in discourse scenario and the signs used in meaning-making occur, as 
the impersonator remains oriented to the original discourse world, and uses the 
semiotic code already employed in the original utterance.  
In single-scope impersonations, however, humans impersonate another human 
from a different (fictive or non-fictive) discourse world. Here, frame clashes occur on 
the discourse scenario level, and is rather limited on the semiotic codes level. The 
emerging blend is structured by the fictive discourse world alone.  
In this typology, then, humans impersonating machines or plants constitute 
cases of double-scope blending, as frame clashes occur both with regard to discourse 
scenario and the semiotic codes employed by the impersonated. Machines or plants 
do not use human means of communication, yet impersonation blends rely on the 
visual and verbal integration of input domains, and are acted out, or rather presented, 
through a human body. This means that semiotic codes employed for the 
representation of a non-human sign-system are human. For this reason, 
impersonations that equip plants or other non-human objects and beings with a 
‘voice’ face frame clashes that ‘human’ impersonations do not. The emergent 
structure of the impersonation blend contains elements from both semiotic and 
discursive worlds. It is double-scope.  
 
Table 1: Typology of Impersonation Blends 
Blending Type Discourse scenario Semiotic system  
Mirror Blend  
(e.g. restaging of past 
discourse) 
Same discourse scenario in both input 
spaces, as designated person from CDS is 
portrayed  no major frame clashes 
Human semiotic system in 
both input spaces  no 
major frame clashes 
Single-scope Blend (e.g. 
impersonation of non-
present fictive human) 
Discourse scenarios are clearly distinct from 
each other; impersonated character inhabits 
another (fictive or non-fictive) space that 
contributes the emergent frame structure  
Human semiotic system in 
both input spaces  no 
major frame clashes 
Double-scope Blend (e.g. 
impersonation of a non-
human or inanimate 
entity) 
Discourse scenarios are clearly distinct from 
each other; the space inhabited by the 
impersonated contributes only some frame 
structure to the blend. 
Non-human sign process 
portrayed through human 
semiotic resources  major 
frame clashes 
 
As Table 1 illustrates, in this project the point of distinction between single and 
double-scope blends is drawn along the dividing line of discourse worlds and semiotic 
codes used in joint meaning-making processes. Whereas blends that involve inanimate 
objects failing to master human communicative codes will be classified as double-
scope networks, blends that recruit (fictive or real) humans inhabiting clearly distinct 
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scenarios will be classified as single-scope. The restaging and mimicking of previous 
discourse is, as it is set within the same discourse scenario, classified as mirror-blend.52 
 
Why study impersonation blends? 
As humour is a deeply social phenomenon, it relies heavily on the celebration of 
shared knowledge and values. For this reason, impersonations require careful 
interactional coordination and the recruiting of shared knowledge frames for their 
polyphonic nature and, consequently, the story world presented to become evident 
and shared. Investigating polyphonic humour in interaction should therefore help to 
address key problems in the analysis of conceptual blending:  
 
• Ubiquitous blends: Blending theory has been employed to account for a wide 
variety of phenomena, and has subsequently been criticised for being unable 
to provide much insight into the question investigated. By addressing a special 
blending type in its interactional context rather than assessing eclectic, isolated 
examples from diverse fields, potent and meaningful results can be gathered 
that illustrate the theory’s productivity without neglecting the specifics of the 
phenomenon it describes.  
• Delineating Mental Spaces and inputs: As impersonations are characterised by two 
distinct and interactionally explicitly signalled characters inhabiting discrete 
epistemic and semiotic domains, the identification and delineation of input 
spaces is generally indisputable. In impersonations, the interactants explicitly 
orient to the distinct personae presented whilst simultaneously maintaining 
and aligning to different discourse scenarios. This explicit orientation to 
discursively dissonant scenarios helps to avoid the rather arbitrary space 
partitioning found in canonical MSCI. 
• Processes vs. products: Rather than starting at the ‘product’ of blending and trying 
to reconstruct the cognitive steps taken to arrive at this product, investigating 
impersonations in interactional humour allows for the contextualised tracking 
of the processes behind interactional blending.  
• ‘Solipsistic’ analysis: As the focus lies on ‘interactional blending’, conceptual 
integration is first of all taken into the social (and hence visible) realm. Special 
attention can be paid to the step-by-step co-construction of meaning between 
                                                
52 See chapter 4.1. for detailed case studies of each blending type. 
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performers and their audience. The accusation of focussing too much on the 
individual mind, of neglecting the social dimension of meaning-making, is 
consequently countered. Secondly, a social-interactional analysis that pays 
attention to the co-construction of meaning avoids hypothesising about 
psychological processes which occur unconsciously within milliseconds without 
the aid of appropriate neuroscientific tools. Instead, only blending that is 
explicitly signalled in interaction and temporally unfolds in interaction is 
considered in order to allow for empirically demonstrable results. 
• Empirical grounding: Canonical blending analysis has been accused of relying on 
introspection alone and lacking empirical grounding. By studying blending as 
an interactional achievement in impersonation humour through the use of the 
methodology devised by an established research endeavour (EMCA), 
empirically valid results can be gathered. 
 
A detailed interactional study of different impersonation types will thus provide the 
tools for testing the blending typology (RQ2) advocated by Fauconnier & Turner 
(2002) and describing the ways in which processes of conceptual blending are 
coordinated in interaction (RQ1). 
 
3.4.3. Data Source 
 
3.4.3.1. Studying interaction-as-broadcasted in Never Mind The Buzzcocks  
 
The collections which this study recruits were taken from the British comedy panel 
game show Never Mind The Buzzcocks (NMTB), and were recorded between 2006 and 
2010. NMTB is a long-running British quiz show (1996-today) which is produced by 
Talkback Thames and is aired on the BBC and other British channels such as 
DAVE53. The show, which the BBC advertises as an “irreverent pop quiz”, is targeted 
at a young and mostly male audience. Pop music knowledge is used to test two 
competing teams54, and the show has earned a reputation for providing especially 
                                                
53 DAVE markets itself as the “home of witty comedy banter” and shows mainly reruns of programmes 
that target a young, predominantly male demographic (16-34 years). Examples of shows include the 
car series Top Gear and the comedy sketch show Little Britain (BBC News 20/09/2007). 
54 The way in which the programme focuses on pop music shows the extent to which ‘knowledge’ in 
quiz shows is configured by cultural and social contexts (Holmes, 2006; Fiske, 1987). The 
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provocative and harsh humour that according to some commentators (e.g. Wignall, 
2008) seems to constitute one of the show’s major attractions. This conclusion can also 
be drawn when looking at the BBC’s promotion of the show: “With the show's 
reputation for the unpredictable, guests are always primed for the occasional 
embarrassment and harmless ribbing as their knowledge of music is put to the test” 
(BBC Press Office).  
The teams consist of two captains that like the host feature in most episodes. 
Each captain has two guests on his team that change from week to week. Guests are 
usually British (or Anglophone) celebrities of various denominations: pop stars, 
comedians, actors or even news presenters. The show’s general appeal thus seems to 
result not so much from the competition element, but rather from the opportunity it 
provides to ‘consume’ a celebrity. As Kurzman et al. (2007:353) argue, postmodern 
celebrity culture ‘honours’ celebrities for their distinctiveness whilst at the same time 
trying to undermine said distinctiveness, thereby exposing their ordinariness. NMTB 
makes such consumption possible. Although the celebrities’ achievements are 
recounted (some use the show to promote a new album, autobiography or film), they 
are mostly observed to be guessing answers, failing to recognise popular songs, 
becoming the ‘butt’ of somewhat opprobrious jokes, exchanging repartees, (in one 
case) getting drunk, and telling anecdotes. Their ordinariness and humanity can be 
traced, and they become what Schickel (1985) calls “intimate strangers” with whom 
the fan can enter into a unilateral relationship. Over the past few decades, such panel 
quiz shows have become extremely popular in British television, as other formats such 
as A Question of Sport (BBC, 1970-today), QI (BBC, 2003-today), and Have I Got News For 
You (BBC, 1990-today) all rely on similar concepts.55  
The participants are seated behind desks in what Kendon (1990a) terms ‘F-
formation’: all panellists and the audience present in the studio are arranged around a 
                                                                                                                                      
epistemological basis assumed in NMTB illustrates the form of ‘knowledge’ believed to be valued by 
the show’s target audience; in effect, knowledge drawn from “common social experience” (Fiske, 
1987:267) is presented as being relevant and important. 
55 Quiz and game shows have a long tradition in British radio and television broadcasting. While many 
focus on ‘schooled’ knowledge (such as University Challenge), quiz shows that centre on issues of 
popular culture are less common, and constitute a more recent development. Have a Go! (BBC, 1946-
1967) was among the first to venture into the realm of the popular and the carnival; like later Never 
Mind The Buzzcocks, it was also not primarily a quiz show, but a show that relied on the participants 
(‘ordinary folks’) recounting anecdotes and exchanging cheerful banter (Holmes, 2006). With NMTB 
and other current panel quiz shows, however, it is not the ‘ordinary’ people that do the guesswork 
and the story telling; it is celebrities.  
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central, triangular space and are thus able to co-orient to each other, as figure 13 
illustrates.  
 
 
Figure 13: NMTB panel set-up 
 
The triangular set-up is headed by the presenter, whose desk sits at the ‘top’ of the 
triangle and is framed by the desks of the competing teams. The teams’ captains are 
seated in the middle, with their two guests to their right and left, respectively. 
Opposite the presenter, and invisible to the TV audience, is the studio audience. The 
major screen, which is used to show music videos that are related to quiz questions, is 
positioned behind the presenter. Further screens are built into the teams’ desks, and it 
is these inbuilt screens that the teams mostly orient to when working on the quiz 
questions. The show opens with titles and theme music, after which applause from the 
studio audience is followed by the presenter (British comedian Simon Amstell and 
selected guest hosts in the seasons under investigation,) opening with a scripted 
monologue containing a few jokes that he delivers looking into the camera, ‘directly’ 
at the TV audience. The guests are subsequently presented. Video clips show the 
guests in their familiar occupational fields: performing in music videos, delivering 
stand-up comedy or presenting TV shows.At the same time, the host (in voiceover) 
introduces the guests with the help of a few, usually face-threatening comments that 
are acknowledged through (sometimes canned) audience laughter.  
These comments already establish the tone of the show, and legitimise face-
threatening jocular abuse. After these scripted introductory remarks, the games begin. 
The first game is usually ‘Sorry, no refunds’, in which teams have to guess why a given 
concert was cancelled. Alternatively, the games ‘What have we pixelated?’ or ‘whoop 
whoop it’s the sound of da police’ are played. As each team is asked a different 
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question, they are not in direct competition and no time pressure is excerted. The 
teams are free to choose from three possible answers provided by the host, and the 
guesswork provides ample opportunities for further exchanges of ‘banter’ that are 
once more explicitly acknowledged with audience laughter. The guessing is largely 
non-scripted (the guest may be given a set of jokes written for them), but is subject to 
editing. Should the team not fail to provide the correct answer, the question is posed 
to the other team; this team may then indeed offer the solution –  this is an 
arrangement that is also valid for the games played later in the show. After this first 
game, the host puts forward several questions to his guests. These questions usually 
serve as a trajectory for further spontaneously-occurring jocular abuse. The games 
resume after these exchanges with the ‘Intros round’, in which two members of the 
team perform the opening beats of two pop songs without instruments or vocals for 
the third member to guess. This game also requires approximately ten minutes, and is 
again followed by an intervention of jocular-abusive chitchat chaired by the host. The 
next game, the so-called ‘Identity parade’, is then introduced. In this game, each team 
is presented with a line-up of five people in similar attire, and is tasked with 
determining which person was a former pop star. The line-up is not allowed to speak 
or move, which is why their appearance provides the only cues for guessing the 
correct answer. As a result, this game generally leads to an abundance of 
impersonations, as impersonations constitute one way of assigning identities to the 
members of the line-up. After this, the final game, ‘Next lines’, is played. The teams 
are provided with the first line of a song, and must provide the following one. 
Afterwards, the host announces the winner of the week’s show.  
Despite this rather straightforward structure, point allocation is slightly 
arbitrary and opaque (as it is in all panel quiz shows). As panel game shows go, the 
overarching object of the show is not to win the quiz (there are no prizes either, as is 
the case in other television quiz shows, such as Who Wants To Be A Millionaire?), but to 
entertain the audience in the studio and behind television sets through witty repartees, 
the telling and joint celebrating of personal anecdotes, and general ‘banter’. The high 
density of humorous exchanges, and in particular of impersonations, makes the show 
a highly suitable resource for studying the various aspects of humour in interaction.  
However, within Conversation Analysis, TV broadcasts are sometimes 
considered to reflect ‘artificial’ language use, as the interactions might have been 
scripted or subject to rehearsal. Alternatively, the recordings may have been edited 
  LANGUAGE, COGNITION, INTERACTION 
   
 -94- 
before airing. Despite these legitimate doubts, quite a large number of research 
enterprises consult TV broadcasts as a source. These projects either focus on aspects 
of ‘institution talk’ (e.g. Heritage, 1985; Heritage & Greatbatch, 1986; Heritage & 
Roth, 1995; Greatbatch, 1988) or of general talk-in-interaction – arguing with 
Schegloff’s (1978) assertion that interactants do not shift to an entirely different 
apparatus of interactional procedures when being broadcasted, (e.g. Norrick, 2010b). 
Whilst the first group investigates the formalised speech exchange systems found in 
broadcasted interaction and focuses on the distribution of speaker roles and turn-
taking rights, the latter argues that under certain circumstances, conclusions that 
apply to ‘more natural’ data can be drawn as well. To this end, careful considerations 
are required, and reflection regarding the ‘product-ness’ of the data should not be 
neglected. As videos are “locally and contingently produced” (Mondada, 2006:51), it 
is not ‘pure’ talk-in-interaction that is at the heart of the investigation , but rather 
interaction-as-broadcasted. As Mondada (2009:67) succinctly points out, video data in 
whatever shape or form do not constitute “transparent window[s] on social 
interaction”, but are “situated product[s] of video practices” that are subject to 
shooting and editing choices, such as cutting or reassembling shots, and post-
production arrangements, such as the adding of canned laughter.56 Thus, broadcasted 
interaction is not ‘just’ talk-in-interaction, but interaction that has already been 
interpreted in a certain way and is actively shaped by professionals: 
 
Interactional order [in video data] is the local product of the participants’ 
practices engaged within interaction, the product of participants’ 
orientations to the camera, as well as the product of the video practices 
themselves. Participants produce the interactional order, either by 
engaging in the interaction or by filming and editing it. By paying attention 
to the actual timed details of the interaction, cameramen and editors orient to the 
same linguistic and multimodal resources as the participants and exploit them within 
the professional practice of configuring videos. Cameramen and editors 
mobilize local resources in order to achieve a specific accountability of 
what is videotaped, achieving an interactional organization which is not 
only recognizable but also rearranged, highlighted, and emphasized in a 
specific way, thus reshaping the ongoing interaction (Mondada, 2009:72; my 
emphases). 
                                                
56 In NMTB, an audience is present. However, canned laughter is added in post-production to further 
key/identify the interaction presented as humorous and encourage the television audience to share 
the sentiment. Research on laughter (e.g. Freud 1905; Glenn, 2003) has shown that laughter is (at 
least partly) socially mediated and that people are more likely to laugh when they believe their in-
group is amused as well. Additionally, shared laughter does not occur simultaneously, but is 
prompted by one conversationalist who is then joined by the others. It is these interactional effects 
that canned laughter hopes to exploit (Platow et al., 2005) as a means of triggering a jovial effect 
among the TV audience. 
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Mondada’s research has shown that TV directors of talk show formats locally orient 
to the same lexico-syntactic and visuospatial resources as the interactants in their 
interpretations and, consequently, editing decisions. The editing choices are recipient-
designed according to the directors’ interpretations, as the images shown and the 
information added (such as canned laughter) highlight embodied features of talk that 
are deemed relevant for the interpretation of the action at hand. This can, for 
example, be seen in the camera movements’ relation to turn-taking. Here, the shots 
shown predict and follow turn constructions, as is confirmed in my analyses (see 
chapter 5.2.2.). When the turn is complete, the camera moves to the participant 
projected to provide the next turn, thus providing and highlighting the multimodal 
details the TV audience is thought to require in order to interpret the joint action as 
co-constructed by the director and presented to the TV audience. 
Consequently, interaction-as-broadcasted is recipient-designed for a wide 
audience, and is rendered intelligible and accountable by television professionals. The 
action presented exploits the same grammatical and multimodal resources that the 
‘original’ interactants relied on, but certain resources and sequences are highlighted 
and foregrounded by the professionals reworking the original recordings. The analysis 
of broadcasted data hence provides insight into the resources employed by members 
to accomplish a given action, but at the same time these resources can only ever be 
analysed as forms of social action whose further participants are the editors and 
directors who have actively reshaped the ‘original’ interaction.  
 
3.4.3.2. Transcription 
 
The transcription of talk-in-interaction, which graphically represents selected features 
of interactants’ behaviour in conversation (Kowal & O’Connell, 2004), is integral to 
data analysis in CA, as in the process of detailed transcribing, previously unnoticed 
interactional phenomena can be identified. Consequently, transcriptions should 
faithfully capture the ‘nature’ of interaction in minute detail whilst at the same time 
making interactional details available for analysis. However, transcripts are not 
regarded as the primary data, but are a tool for analysis, a way of presenting the 
‘fleeting’ nature of the phenomena under investigation in written form. Due to the 
complexity of spoken interaction, transcripts are nevertheless necessarily incomplete 
and impressionistic reductions, and constitute selective ‘translations’ (Ten Have, 1999) 
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of the actual interaction into written form; they mediate between the recordings – 
themselves already reductions, reconstructions and subject to recording practices and 
choices – and the images constructed thereof post-hearing or seeing. These 
‘translations’ are therefore contingent on a number of choices relating firstly to the 
orthographic rendering of the words spoken,57 and secondly the interactional details 
included in the transcript.  
Due to the great variety of research questions and interests, a number of 
transcription systems are in circulation that each aim to represent certain interactional 
details. Most of these systems are based on the one developed by Gail Jefferson (as in 
for example Jefferson, 2004) dating back to the early days of Conversation Analysis. 
This system is a ‘vertical’ one, and aims to explicate the sequential nature of talk. In 
Jeffersonian transcriptions, one utterance is printed below another to show the onset 
of a new turn. This vertical alignment leads to the question concerning when to divide 
a line and start a new one. A variety of solutions have been proposed for this problem: 
phrasal or clausal units could constitute a line, as could breath units, intonation units 
or Turn Constructional Units (Ten Have, 1999).  
Apart from this focus on the sequential nature of talk and said problems 
arising from the ‘vertical’ set-up, the Jeffersonian system has a further disadvantage. 
As it was developed in the heyday of the tape recorder, it is unimodal, focusing on the 
verbal channel only, and is hence not suitable for representing the multimodal58, 
visuospatial dimensions of talk-in-interaction. Nevertheless, video data provides 
helpful information for interaction analysis, as it “preserves the temporal and 
sequential structure which is so characteristic of interaction” (Knoblauch et al., 
2006:19). However, representing the synchrony and integration of visual and vocal 
semiotic channels and their structural differences provides a problem for transcribing 
audiovisual data. To address this issue, multilayered transcription systems like the 
                                                
57 The question here is whether the word ‘spoken’ should be orthographically represented in the 
standard variety, as it runs the risk of losing important interactional details such as code or style-
switching, or whether phonological approximation to the actual delivery should be attempted, which 
would thereby risk the transcript’s readability. A common solution to the problem is to use ‘eye 
dialect’ (Kowal & O'Connell, 2004). Here, standard orthography and variety are employed most of 
the time, but the spelling is modified to represent utterances that strongly deviate from the norm 
(Ten Have, 1999), as in gotcha for “got you”. As the decision regarding which deviations to 
include seems to be a highly subjective one, only those variations and switches that interactants 
themselves notably orient to in the interaction under scrutiny will be included in the transcript. 
58 Multimodal is, following Allwood (2008), understood as referring to transcripts that hope to account 
for at least two “sensory” or “production” modalities and hence include aspects such as gesture and 
postural orientation in addition to speech. 
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robust, yet readable German Gesprächsanalytisches Transkriptionssystem (GAT and 
GAT 2) (Selting et al., 1998; 2009) were developed. With GAT, a ‘basic’ transcript 
can be augmented with additional information, following what Selting et al. (ibid) 
refer to as “Zwiebelprinzip”. These additional layers allow the representation of 
prosody, stress, pitch, tempo, rhythm, nonverbal actions such as sneezing, proximity, 
kinetics, facial expressions and gaze in various levels of detail. Nonverbal features can, 
as in score writing (Luckmann, 2006), be inserted below the line that represents the 
verbal layer, and annotated screen shots are inserted to further illustrate visuospatial 
aspects of talk-in-interaction. The temporal ‘location’ of these non-verbal activities is 
represented by dashes and lines connecting them to the corresponding position in the 
verbal layer. The adding of frame grabs or screen shots have of late prompted 
discussion on the changing nature of transcripts and transcription procedures. 
Knoblauch et al., for example, argue that a “visual mentality” (2006:16) seems to 
underlie transcription practices that rely on frame grabs; it is, they claim, a mode of 
analysis which depends more on “visualisation and imagination” (ibid) than on thick 
written descriptions and that might consequently impede on the analytical, 
observation-generating function which the transcription process facilitates.  
Despite these doubts, partially ‘visual’ systems such as GAT are used by a 
number of other European and Anglophone researchers: Goodwin (e.g. 2003a, 
2003b) works with annotated screenshots to illustrate the interactional role played by 
the body, gestures and gaze in interaction. In a similar vein, Mondada’s (2009) 
multilayered transcript, which she uses to analyse TV broadcasts, represents the talk 
as spoken in a first (numbered) line. In the (unnumbered) line below, the interactants’ 
multimodal actions are described. The third (unnumbered) line chronicles or shows in 
one or more screenshots or frame grabs the image(s) broadcasted at this point in the 
interaction. Mondada’s system thus allows the illustration of the temporal synchrony 
of unfolding actions. 
Furthermore, multimodal corpora, such as the Idiap Wolf Corpus, have of late 
been developed. These corpora contain annotated audiovisual recordings of natural 
face-to-face interaction. While these corpora facilitate simultaneous access to 
recordings and transcription, they face similar problems to paper-based transcripts of 
audiovisual interaction. Thus, synchronising information pertaining to the modalities 
represented is still problematic (Allwood, 2008), but projects such as Social Signal 
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Processing Network (SSPNET) have enjoyed considerable success (see e.g. Bousmalis et 
al., 2011) in automatically identifying non-verbal cues. 
Due to its varied research questions that require different levels of granularity 
in analysis, this project does not make use of automated systems, but largely follows 
the standards set out by the GAT system, and recruits additional ideas and systems to 
represent aspects that are especially relevant to the action studied, and interaction-as-
broadcasted. Audience clapping will be represented by xxx, as suggested by Atkinson 
(1984), and preceded by AU in the agent column. In order to account for the temporal 
dimension, clapping that occurs simultaneously with spoken interaction will be 
indicated below the vocal layer with which it co-occurs using square brackets to 
indicate co-temporality. Clapping that occurs outside of other interaction will be 
measured and its duration given in brackets after the symbols indicating the clapping. 
Clapping that is notably louder than before will be indicated using capital letters (e.g. 
AU:   xxXXx). Audience laughter, whether canned or more naturally occurring, will be 
indicated using the @ symbol. Jefferson and other CA researchers (Jefferson, 1979; 
Jefferson et al., 1977; Jefferson et al., 1987) have emphasised the importance of 
rendering laugh particles onomatopoetically and syllabically (such as huh-huh, 
hahaha, or heh-heh) to better account for their various interactional functions. As the 
chorus that is audience laughter cannot be broken down into these subtypes, the @ 
symbol, following the same standards as set out for demonstrating the temporal 
unfolding of audience clapping, will be used. Participant laughter will, however, be 
symbolised onomatopoetically and syllabically where possible. Furthermore, 
screenshots detailing the visuospatial dimension of the interaction-as-broadcasted will 
be supplied next to the line providing the verbal channel, and will again be 
synchronised to account for the temporal and synchronous unfolding of the 
interaction-as-broadcasted. Additionally, voice changes in impersonation humour will 
be signalled with <@ at the onset and @> at the offset, as suggested by Couper-Kuhlen 
(1999) and employed by Niemelä (2010). An overview of the transcription symbols 
used can be found on p.xi.  
 
3.4.4. Data analysis: Process 
 
In a first step, all instances of impersonations occurring in the corpus were identified, 
transcribed and grouped according to impersonation type. Of the 109 impersonations, 
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23 were classified as mirror-impersonations, 62 as single-scope impersonations and 24 
as double-scope impersonations.  
The analyses in this project were twofold, consisting first of all of cognitive 
semantic and secondly of interactional analyses. The cognitive-semantic analysis 
depicts the sequences under investigation in traditional MSCI terms, albeit in lesser 
detail than found in the standard literature, as only those aspects that interactants 
orient to are included in the analysis (replete with an added Current Discourse Space 
to account for in situ cognition). This discursively-informed cognitive-semantic 
analysis sets out to describe how interactants coordinate processes of conceptual 
integration in situ, thus addressing RQ1. The interactional analysis subsequently 
investigates the extent to which interactants orient to the blending typology advocated 
by Fauconnier and Turner (2002), thereby focussing on RQ2. The following will 
explain the analytical steps taken in each ‘input’ discipline, MSCI and CA, before 
describing in further detail the synergetic analysis applied in this project. 
 
3.4.4.1. Cognitive-semantic analysis: General principles 
 
MSCI analyses consist of modelling the conceptual integration network that is 
assumed to exist behind a blend – a product of human creativity that is assumed to be 
based upon various inputs. The input spaces, mappings and compressions that are 
seen as contributing to this understanding are diagrammed and described. In a first 
step, the input spaces that contribute to the network are identified. In a next step, the 
analyst would normally look for shared structure in the input spaces; this structure 
would then be diagrammed in the generic space. For reasons outlined above, I will 
refrain from abstracting away from the input spaces and the depiction of a generic 
space. Following the description of input spaces, cross-space mappings, the “vital 
relations” that connect the various entities within the input spaces are identified. 
These relations are then explored with regard to their compression type. In a further 
step, the frame structure of the blended space is investigated to determine which 
conceptual integration type (e.g. single-scope or double-scope) is at work. The blended 
space is subsequently examined with respect to its emergent properties, the inferences 
it allows for, the governing and optimality principles at work, and the extent to which 
the blend gets elaborated upon later on in the interaction.  
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The result of the analysis is then depicted in a blending diagram. Williams 
(2004:27) points out that such diagrams are “necessarily idealised”, as “the actual 
integration network constructed by a specific person at any given moment will depend 
on many factors, including (among others) past history, the present setting and 
situation, and the current focus of discourse” – in short, aspects of Common Ground. 
Intersubjectivity, Williams continues, is only achieved as a result of alignment between 
the networks individually constructed by the interactants. As the approach taken here 
refrains from modelling the processes underway in the minds of the individual, only 
the emergent shared meaning and those aspects that the interactants publicly display 
in their interaction are depicted in the diagrams.  
 
3.4.4.2. Interactional analysis: General principles 
 
Like most qualitative research endeavours, CA does not subscribe to any one ‘silver 
bullet’ technique of analysing data. Rather than superimposing formal rules for 
analysis, CA encourages the utilisation of a ‘conversation analytical mentality’. This 
reluctance to incorporate formal rules, Bergmann (2004a) claims, derives from the 
assumption that in qualitative research, the appropriateness of a given method can 
only be assessed in hindsight, as too little is known about the issue investigated prior to 
the actual analysis (this state of affairs being the very reason for investigation in the 
first place). In qualitative analysis, canonical and mechanical methods, he goes on to 
argue, are prone to only ‘discover’ phenomena which are already well known. In 
accordance with this premise, EM and CA promote the development of a 
methodological approach that suits the phenomenon under investigation. To this end, 
the literature recommends that the process outlined below should be generally 
followed (Hutchby & Woffitt, 1998:94-95; Ten Have, 1999:103). 
 
1. Through ‘unmotivated looking’ (Sacks, 1984) an interactional phenomenon 
that could be of interest is located. By ‘phenomenon’, CA does not understand 
linguistic objects as such, but rather the interactional effect that is 
accomplished. This interactional phenomenon then constitutes the first 
instance. Its occurrence, as Psathas (1995:50) points out, shows that “the 
machinery of its production is culturally available, involves members’ 
competencies, and is therefore possibly (and probably) reproducible.” 
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Therefore, any specimen is essentially worthy of investigation. This first 
instance is described in detail, and special focus is paid to sequential patterns. 
It needs to be shown that participants are oriented to the action described and 
display this understanding in subsequent talk. The instance that is studied is 
not seen as a “reflection of reality”, but rather “as part of the reality studied” 
(Ten Have, 1999:38). 
2. Similar instances are identified in the data. The phenomenon or action that 
has been identified needs to be supported and exemplified through extensive 
data displays and descriptions. To this end, ‘collections’ are built that comprise 
larger sets of data. However, these collections are still studied as multiples of 
single instances. In CA, quantification does not constitute an alternative to the 
in-depth analysis of single instances, and is merely used to reinforce the 
robustness of an argument. 
3. The description is tested on other instances in the data, and the account is 
refined to arrive at a formal description that can account for all examples in 
the collection. It should be shown how particular practices, procedures or 
devices are methodically used and normatively oriented to as a means of 
generating particular and recognisable actions. In this process, the analysis of 
deviant cases can be helpful, as deviant cases may make it possible to extract 
the conditional relevance of a turn or feature.  
 
Although CA does not posit a ‘royal way’ or any ‘golden rules’, the research enterprise 
nonetheless insists on rigorous, general and formal descriptions of interactional 
phenomena.  
 
 
Figure 14: Data analysis: Process 
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This project integrates the two methodologies outlined above and follows the 
procedure outlined in figure 14. Instances of impersonation humour which show 
‘external’ voice changes, i.e. assuming the voice of a person clearly different from 
one’s own persona (see chapter 3.4.1. for full characteristics), were identified in the 
data set and transcribed according to the standards set out in chapter 3.4.2.2. The 
instances were then grouped according to blending operation subgroups in order to 
build collections that contain instances of mirror, single- and double-scope integration 
networks, and discussed in accordance with the standards set out in CA. One central 
instance of each blending type was subsequently described and analysed within the 
framework of discursively oriented Mental Spaces and Conceptual Integration theory 
outlined in chapter 3.3. In a next step, the interactional organisation of one central 
instance of each collection was described. Following this, a second step describe the 
vocal (lexico-syntactic features, prosody, pitch, pausing) and the visuospatial channel 
(body alignment, gaze, gesture, facial expression) was taken in order to analyse the 
methods relied on by interactants to systematically and step-by-step signal the blend 
constructed. Following this, preliminary rules for each blending type were formulated 
that were then tested on other instances from the respective collection. During this 
process, the rules, methods and procedures identified were redefined to maximise 
generality. In a final step, the interactional structures of all blending types were 
compared in order to determine potential differences that would validate the 
distinction proposed in previous research.  
The results of the analysis are presented in the next two chapters in a format 
that does not reflect the steps undertaken in a chronological manner; instead, the 
method of expression has been chosen to best reflect the findings gathered in the 
process. While chapter 4 will provide initial suggestions as to the issues raised in RQ1, 
chapter 5 is dedicated to RQ2. Chapter 6 will consolidate the results gathered and 
propose a refined model of in situ meaning-making which employs MSCI. 
 
  LANGUAGE, COGNITION, INTERACTION !
! -103-!
CHAPTER 4: IMPERSONATION BLENDS: CASE STUDIES 
 
 
This section provides detailed case studies of mirror, single-scope and double-scope 
impersonation blends in an interactional Cognitive Semantics framework. The case 
studies first of all offer sequential analyses of the impersonations, addressing not only 
the means by which impersonators link impersonations to prior turn-by-turn topical 
talk, but also the overall interactional organisation of the performance. In a second 
step, the findings are subsequently utilised as part of a cognitive semantic analysis that 
provides detailed illustrations of the joint negotiation of conceptualisation processes.  
As the data provides insights into interaction-as-broadcasted, the visual 
grammar of the show is also taken into account to provide a more holistic picture of 
how blending processes are negotiated in televised interaction (cf. chapter 3.4.3.1). 
Furthermore, each case study focuses on marginally different aspects in order to 
illustrate the intricate complexities behind each blending type and to avoid 
redundancies in aspects that are shared across blending types. A conclusion will 
summarise and critically discuss these initial findings; this will lead into the 
interactional analyses presented in chapter 5 providing more in-depth studies of the 
different means employed for jointly building impersonations and comparing these 
methods across blending types. In this manner, the case studies trace the steps taken to 
jointly set up impersonation blends in interaction-as-broadcasted, and offer further 
details regarding the terminology and criteria used for classifying blends in this 
project.  
 
 
4.1. The Sports Commentator: A Mirror Blend Impersonation 
 
 
Mirror impersonation blends all demonstrate similar frame structure and semiotic 
codes. All spaces contributing to the emergent impersonation blend are largely 
structured by similar events, and feature the same characters. This can be observed in 
The Sports Commentator impersonation. 
  LANGUAGE, COGNITION, INTERACTION !
! -104-!
The impersonation occurs during the intros round, in which guest panellist 
GL tries to guess a popular song from its introduction, which is performed a cappella 
by her fellow team members. Important to note is that GL is known (and has been 
introduced) as a sports presenter for the BBC. 
 
NMTB SE23E02_2 3:30 (The Sports Commentator I) 
 
01 GL: something like (-)  
 
 
02  like the (.) FOUr tops 
 
 
03  is it, (.) jackson five? 
 
04 RG: you just gonna go with numbers, 
 
05 AU: @@@ (4.0) 
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06 PJ: she thinks she’s doing the REsults, 
 
07 AU: @ (1.0)  
08 PJ: <@ tops fou_↑`our;  
 
09  jackson fi_↑`ive; @>  
10 AU: @ (1.0) 
 
 
 
4.1.1. Interactional organisation guides conceptualisation processes 
 
The sequence begins with GL guessing the name of the band whose song (or rather 
the first beats of the introduction) has just been performed by her fellow panellists. 
Seemingly by accident, GL suggests two consecutive bands with a number in their 
name. Due the conventions of the discourse setting, which explicitly requires 
(adversarial) joking, RG’s ‘joke-first practice’59 (Schegloff, 1987) is a relevant next !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 Schegloff (1987:212) defines the ‘joke first’ practice as “before providing the serious 'next' which is 
sequentially relevant, the participant provides a joke first.” !
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action to GL’s first-pair part (FPP, lines 01-03). Yet his joke, which is acknowledged 
by the audience via laughter and which is deemed a relevant second pair-part (SPP) to 
a joke (ibid), digresses from and disrupts the topical turn-by-turn talk for several turns, 
and leads the conversation in another direction. PJ appropriates the central 
component of RG’s joke, which profiles the numbers in the band names offered by 
GL, and uses it as a springboard, so to speak, to deliver an impersonation; this draws 
attention to an aspect of shared knowledge about GL that had thus far not been 
oriented to: her ‘day job’ as a sports presenter. The jokes therefore complement each 
other, and the impersonation is “triggered” (Jefferson, 1978:220) in the unfolding of 
turn-by-turn talk. The impersonation itself is, in other words, locally occasioned, and 
constitutes a relevant next action to a concluded (i.e. FPP followed by SPP) joke 
sequence.  
Again, laughter is a relevant next action to the humorous impersonation, and, 
as none of the other participants contributes another joke, topical talk is resumed by 
means of RG delivering the SPP to GL’s original FPP. As such, the sequential 
organisation of the sequence in which the impersonation is embedded follows the 
structure outlined below: 
 
FPP1 
 FPP2: Joke1  figure-ground reversal, salience imbalance 
 SPP2: @ 
  FPP3: Joke2  impersonation integrates Joke1 with non-relevant aspects of GL’s role  
         as guest panellist 
  SPP3: @ 
SPP1 
 
RG’s first quip (line 04) constitutes a case of figure-ground reversal, which is a 
commonly utilised mechanism in humour (cf. Brône, 2010; Veale, Feyaerts, & Brône, 
2006). More precisely, the joke’s success is based on a salience imbalance (Giora, 
1997, 1999, 2003): the context of GL’s utterances profiles the salient meaning of the 
band names only. The numbers are part of said band names, and their individual 
meanings are therefore suppressed in favour of the conventionalised band names 
which are stored – and in FPP1 oriented to – as a whole. Yet by semantically 
analysing, or rather “hyper-understanding” (cf. Veale et al., 2006), the lexical 
meanings of the band names given by GL and profiling the numerical dimension they 
both share, RG redirects the focus of attention, and activates their ‘core’ lexical 
meaning (something which had thus far been suppressed). As a result, on the 
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pragmatic level RG ascribes an anomalous strategy to GL: rather than correctly 
guessing the band name based on shared knowledge of pop music, she ‘lists’ numbers. 
Figure 15 illustrates the Current Discourse Space (CDS) for these turns.  
!
Figure 15: CDS for the Sports Commentator, FPP1 - SPP2 
 
The box in the focus of the viewing frame represents the profiled meaning. In FPP1, 
the band names are presented as conceptual entities. The lexical item and number are 
a semantic whole, and designate one concept (represented in the visualisation in the 
bold box), namely the bands Four Tops and Jackson 5. This meaning is negotiated 
between GL and her primary addressees, i.e. her fellow panellists with team captain 
NF. This addressee relation becomes evident in the visual grammar of the sequence, 
which presents images of the panellists whenever GL pauses during her turn. Her 
construal is not challenged by the panellists, and even RG returns to GL’s construal 
after the joking sequences (in SPP1), thus confirming the greater salience of the 
original construal which did not semantically analyse the individual meanings of the 
lexical units contributing to the utterance. 
Note that there is no integration of elements and spaces present as yet. This 
first joke relies solely on information already available within the CDS itself, and no 
new elements need to be inferred. It is only with PJ’s contributions (line 06ff) that we 
find more complex, across-space mappings (or rather: elements). PJ accepts RG’s 
construal in his FPP3 (line 06 in the transcript), and builds on the profiling of the 
numbers. However, his quip is more intricate, as it changes the activity type by 
analogy from a pop music quiz to the announcement of sports results and, in 
consequence, profiles GL’s professional (GLp) rather than ‘celebrity’ persona. The 
incongruity resulting from this clever alteration in activity type, which contrasts GL’s 
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alleged views about the current activity type with the salient ‘actual’ (i.e. 
interactionally negotiated) activity type, might, in addition to the pleasure received in 
recognising the reference to GL’s professional persona, lead to a humorous effect. The 
incongruity projected in the impersonations (i.e. supposedly presenting sports results 
in a comedy panel game show) is resolved through recognition of her ‘other’ persona, 
thereby leading to sudden congruity. Figure 16 on the left illustrates the CDS for this 
first part of FPP3, which constitutes the preface60 for the impersonation upon which the 
impersonation in FPP3-2 (lines 08-09 in the transcript) is built and which is represented 
in the figure 16 on the right.  
 
!!!!!!!Figure 16: CDS for FPP3(1-2) 
The impersonation preface which PJ sets up in line 06 consequently profiles the 
elements and activity types relevant for processing his reframing of GL’s original 
utterance. Instead of guesses in a pop music quiz, the listing of band names is 
reframed as the announcement of sports results in the impersonation that ensues. 
Element N of the band names is profiled once again, but is treated independently 
rather than as a constituent of the fixed form-meaning pairings originally profiled by 
GL in FPP1. The band Four Tops consequently becomes “tops four” in the emergent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 The notion stems from research on conversational narratives, and describes the means by which 
storytellers manage participant alignment in story telling. In her study on storytelling in conversation, 
Jefferson (1978:219) found that stories in interaction may be preceded by a “story preface with which 
a teller projects a forthcoming story”. Such prefaces can affect the reception of the story by the other 
participants due to their promotion of a certain stance. In a similar manner to story prefaces, 
impersonations can be preceded by such prefaces that not only project an impersonation sequence 
and consequently reserve an extended number of turns-at-talk, but also create a sense of distance (cf. 
Gülich & Quasthoff, 1986) between the Current Discourse Space and the situation the narrative is set 
in. In short, prefaces provide the central elements (such as characters, the setting(s) and event 
structure) of the impersonations’ narrative world which participants in interaction require in order to 
process impersonations (cf. Sacks’ (1974) joke prefaces).  
Sacks (1972, 1974) also discusses pre-tellings in his treatment of conversational narratives and joking. 
As this term explicitly emphasises the diegetic (telling) dimension of a narrative, I will refrain from 
using the concept, but instead adopt Jefferson’s (1978) slightly broader term, which allows for a 
greater tolerance for the mimetic dimension of impersonations. 
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structure of the impersonation; this echoes the presentation of sports results, in which 
the team name is stated before the results. GL’s original (Nr+N)B and (N+Nr)B 
becomes NT+NrR: the N component of the band names becomes a team name while 
the Nr component becomes a result. Figure 17 provides a detailed visualisation of the 
process. 
!
Figure 17: Detailed visualisation of “The Sports Commentator”  
 
All inputs and elements contributing to the impersonation blend (PJ, GLp and the 
generic activity of uttering N+Nr) are already present in the discourse scenario. 
Despite the form of the utterance being identical in all inputs (uttering generic N+Nr), 
the impersonation performance is of a marginally different activity type, as it 
constitutes the announcement of sports results. As such, the performative dimension 
differs, yet the form and event structure (listing numerous N+Nr) remains the same.61 
In the blend, GL is consequently assigned an incongruent performance embedded in 
and contrasted with the normative activity of guessing during the intros round. The 
impersonation sequence (including the preface) thus exhibits a different pragmatic 
sub-structure, as it constitutes a double-voiced reworking of a previous utterance; this 
is to say that it attributes a different communicative goal to the original utterance. Yet 
this other activity type attributed to GL’s FPP is presented as occurring within the 
current speech event (as is evident from PJ’s “She thinks she’s doing” in line 06), the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Cf. Fauconnier & Turner’s (2002) analysis of the regatta blend, which is their prototypical example of 
a mirror blend. Both yachts sail the same course, i.e. follow the same ‘form’ and event structure, yet 
their differing contexts and goals are not focused on in the linguistic realisations the blend gives rise 
to. 
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pop music quiz, and not another ‘world’. This is therefore contrasted with the 
normative activities associated with the current game in the current discourse. GL is 
construed as mixing up her ‘hats’, so to speak, habitually presenting (team) names in 
combination with numbers which, in the emergent structure of the blend, become 
results. The impersonation consequently profiles an aspect of her persona that has 
thus far not been oriented to, and attributes GL’s alleged views to what she is doing, 
but does not provide visits to a clearly distinct discourse scenario, such as a football 
match. The impersonation purely reworks elements that are already present in the 
current discourse scenario and that are subject to the same meta-frame structure of 
the current normative activity. Throughout the impersonation, all participants remain 
oriented to the relevant activity, namely guessing the correct band name and song 
title; in short, they all focus on the same discourse scenario (cf. the configuration of the 
CDS in figure 16). Furthermore, the form and event structure remain the same in all 
spaces. “The Sports Commentator” is hence a mirror impersonation in our blending 
typology.  
 
4.1.2. Signalling the blend: Changing voices 
 
It has been established above that this sequence requires complex mappings that lead 
to the high point of the two joking sequences, the impersonation. Although the 
impersonation heavily builds on the first joke (FPP2), PJ’s impersonation preface in 
line 06 provides the central elements of the performance by outlining its protagonist 
and central activity (“doing the results”). Note the use of the progressive in the 
preface, which effectively ‘zooms in’ on the activity and puts the event structure into 
focus.  
After the preface, PJ leaves space for audience appreciation signals (line 07), 
which signal the audience’s willingness to align themselves as the recipients of the 
impersonation (cf. Norrick, 2010a). During the laughter sequence, PJ breaks off eye 
contact with his co-participants, and delivers the impersonation sequence in a marked 
intonation pattern that accentuates the numbers. As PJ established the activity of 
‘doing results’ in the preface, this intonation pattern can be taken to mirror the 
announcement of results by sports presenters, whose accentuation of the numbers 
reflect the importance placed on results. His orientation away from his co-participants 
during the impersonation is further accentuated by the visual grammar of the 
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interaction-as-broadcasted, which shows PJ together with his co-panellists during the 
preface, but in close-up focuses solely on him turning his head to his right at the onset 
of the voice change. Once his short performance is over, we are presented with an 
image of a laughing GL, thereby further accentuating the fact that she was the ‘butt’ 
of the joke, the highlight of which was the impersonation sequence. 
The Sports Commentator is a brief mirror-blend impersonation that illustrates 
the complexities involved in setting up impersonation blends. Jointly negotiating 
blends involves the methodological step-by-step introduction of relevant epistemic 
domains. Such blends are never unmotivated, but result from, and are normatively 
relevant to, turn-by-turn talk and joint action. As such, this sequence clearly 
demonstrates that (shared assumption on) joint action both enables and constrains the 
meaning which emerges from blending. 
 
 
4.2. The Proprietor: A Single-Scope Impersonation Blend 
 
 
In single-scope impersonation blends, the discourse scenarios of the input spaces are 
clearly distinct from each other, yet only one space (i.e. that of the impersonated) 
provides the organising structure of the impersonation blend. In short, such single-
scope impersonation blends facilitate visits to a discourse scenario that is construed as 
alien and distinct to the current discourse setting. Mirror impersonations, on the other 
hand, reframe actual previous discourse, and do not ‘switch’ discourse worlds. Other 
than double-scope impersonations, however, single-scope blends show no frame 
clashes with regard to the semiotic code used in meaning-making processes; this is due 
to the fact that a fictive or non-fictive human from a similar cultural and linguistics 
sphere is impersonated. “The Proprietor” discussed below is an excellent example of 
such a single-scope impersonation blend, as it clearly demonstrates the systematic 
introduction and careful negotiation of visits to other semantic ‘worlds’ that 
conceptual blending in interaction can give rise to. The impersonation occurs during 
the identity parade game, which involves identifying a former pop star from a line-up 
of five people. 
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NMTB SE19E06_3 04:15 (The Proprietor) 
 
01 BB: i think number five is   
 
02  the proprietor of a reMOte (.)   
03  GUEst house; 
 
04 AU: @@@ (4.4) 
 
05 BB: <@ <<len, nas> ˇYE:s, (.)   
06  there is ˇr[oo::m in the east wing, 
 
07 JJ:            [hehe  
08 BB: ↑ahu[huhu  
09 AU:     [@]@@ (4.1) 
 
10 BB: would you like me  
 
11  to run you a BAth,  
12 AU: @@x@ (4.6) 
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13 JJ: wha [what what 
 
14 BB:      [breakfast is served   
15  [between seven and seven o three:; 
 
16 JJ: [?°h  
17 AU: @@@ (3.0) 
 
18 BB: <<f> ON MY (.) BAck.> > (2.0) 
 
19  <<ff> ↑hu[ohoha> @>  
20 AU:          [@@@ 
 
 
4.2.1. Belief space and narrative space in impersonation prefaces 
 
As the task at hand is to identify a 1970s pop star from the members of the line-up, the 
impersonation needs to be relevant to previous discourse. To this end, BB sets up, in 
MSCI terms, a belief space (“I think”, line 01), in which No. 5 is the proprietor of a 
remote guesthouse. This belief space is set up relative to the ‘base space’, or the CDS 
in our terminology. Via the access principle (or ID principle), the already familiar 
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element a in the Current Discourse Space is connected to element a1 in the Belief 
Space, as visualised in figure 18. 
  
 
Figure 18: Belief Space set up in the preface to ‘The Proprietor’ 
 
The Belief Space is interactionally relevant to current discourse, as it first of all utilises 
an element of that discourse as its trigger. Secondly, engaging in guessing the right 
candidate is relevant to the activity currently underway. Furthermore, attributing this 
identity to No. 5 in the line-up is acceptable, as the comedy genre in which this panel 
quiz is set leads to greater acceptance of non-topical talk. In this impersonation 
preface (lines 01-03), BB not only attributes a novel identity to No. 5, he also frames 
the story he is about to introduce by providing basic information as to the setting and 
the protagonist. In short, BB establishes a narrative space (cf. Dancygier, 2008). He 
provides cues for the audience to further infer the details of this narrative world: the 
setting of his impersonation is, as BB explicitly remarks, a “remote (.) guest house”. 
The emphasis of the adjective ‘remote’ might be employed in order to draw a link 
between the cultural saliency of remoteness and scenes of horror and deviancy (cf. 
Davies, 1998; Davies, 2005). Remote hotels, motels and inns are, after all, a common 
setting for horror stories in Anglo-American culture, as is evident when considering 
Hitchcock’s Psycho, Mangold’s Identity, the splatter film Hostel, and Stephen King’s 
1408. In Psycho in particular, the initially innocent-looking proprietor of a motel is 
actually revealed to be a ruthless murderer. It is this widely shared knowledge, 
culturally speaking, which may be capitalised upon in BB’s preface. The preface is 
followed by audience laughter, a token of appreciation that signals understanding and 
approval, and licenses BB to further illustrate the idea he introduced and therefore the 
internal frame structure of the belief space.  
The preface, and thus the belief space it sets up, yields a number of inferences 
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that float back to the Base Space (the Current Discourse Space) and alter it. No. 5 is 
attributed the identity of a guesthouse proprietor via the identity connector ℑ. He is, 
furthermore, probably slightly deviant in one way or another, as, due to its marked 
intonation pattern, the adjective ‘remote’ has to be regarded as an ostensive stimulus 
that is intended to activate culturally shared frames of deviancy and horror.  !
4.2.2. From preface to performance 
 
Although BB’s preface is acknowledged by the audience and his co-participants 
through appreciation tokens in the form of laughter, the belief space is not fully 
abandoned after the preface. Instead, BB reserves more turns-at-talk to further 
illustrate and explore the internal structure of the story space introduced in the 
preface. Interactionally, this is firstly signalled by BB’s slightly rising intonation pattern 
at the end of the Turn Constructional Unit (TCU)62, thereby projecting that he has 
not yet finished his turn-at-talk. The other participants do not claim the floor, thus 
showing that they accept the preface as leading to a further elaboration of the 
narrative world introduced. The belief space consequently becomes a narrative space, 
furnished with expectations as to the further interactional unfolding of the sequence 
(e.g. reservation of extended sequence of turns-at-talk). 
Secondly, during the four seconds he leaves for the audience to deliver their 
appreciation signals BB prepares an impersonation blend by employing embodied 
disjunct makers that signal he is breaking with topical discourse. Before starting to 
speak as “The Proprietor”, he alters his body position and direction of gaze. He 
hunches his shoulders and stares straight ahead, away from his fellow panellists and 
with eyes wide open. Using these ostensive stimuli, BB shows that he is now oriented 
to a discourse scenario which is different to the CDS. As the proprietor role is highly 
salient in the personal common ground between BB and his audience, this character 
might be recruited from the very beginning of the bodily performance via the drama 
connector 픇 (cf. Fauconnier, 1997); at the latest, this will occur in line five, when BB 
as “The Proprietor” talks of rooms available and the interaction-as-broadcasted 
presents an image of No. 5 (see line 09 in the transcript). BB as the proprietor is 
contrasted with an image of No. 5 at the end of each segment of the impersonation, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 See chapter 3.2.2. for an overview of the turn-taking system. Chapter 5.3. will further focus onfloor 
management in impersonations.  
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thereby using yet another semiotic channel to indicate that the mapping is still active. 
BB and the other participants in the interaction-as-broadcasted thus carefully 
introduce the blend and the mappings it requires, drawing on a number of semiotic 
resources. 
In the four recycles of a transition place (lines 05-08, 10-11, 14-15, and 18-19) 
that follow (cf. Jefferson, 1978), BB further elaborates on the internal structure of the 
narrative space by playing on culturally salient horror scenes, such as the bath (cf. 
Hitchcock’s Psycho), and deviant, incongruous behaviour, such as providing just three 
minutes in which to eat breakfast and which is served on the proprietor’s back. 
Despite the fact that BB still ‘inhabits’ the body of The Proprietor, JJ attempts to claim 
the floor in line 13; however, he is interrupted by BB’s continuation of his story. As 
JJ’s attempt occurs after a rather long (5 seconds) space left by BB for signals of 
appreciation, this may constitute evidence that such pauses should be subject to a 
maximum length of four seconds (cf. chapter 5.3.).  
The impersonation reaches its climax through prosodic markers such as 
micropauses after each word in line 18, and ends with highly dramatised post-
utterance completion laughter that is characterised as abnormal and maniacal. The 
two final elements of the impersonation, the accentuated “on my back” and the 
‘maniacal’ laughter, are thus produced in punch line mode. Norrick (2010a :75) has 
shown that the “recipients may also laugh at what they take to be the punch line of a 
joke”. For this reason, a line delivered using the features associated with punch lines 
(increased loudness, words accentuated individually) is treated as the punch line that 
ends the impersonation, even though semantic features, i.e. the creation of incongruity 
(Kotthoff, 2006; Oring, 1989), are also met with other elements of the performance. 
However, Jefferson (1978) has found that for conversational storytelling, punch lines 
often summarise the central elements of a narrative. In this respect, these last two lines 
of the impersonation constitute a clear recapitulation of the madness theme that had 
already been alluded to in the preface via the explicit mentioning of “remote”. All the 
other segments that contribute to the impersonation (lines 06-15 in the transcript) 
accentuate the madness-theme less overtly than these final two turns. Their prosody 
and semantic content are presented as far more deviant than in the previous recycles, 
and consequently echoes the structure projected in the preface far more effectively. 
This first of all illustrates that Jefferson’s (1978) findings of punch lines “condensing” 
narratives might also apply for impersonations. Secondly, the sequence also 
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demonstrates that delivering punch lines may require a prosodic ‘mode’ that 
distinguishes the punch line from previous elements. Furthermore, such punch lines 
may constitute an exit device, signalling that the impersonation sequence has reached 
its climax and is now complete. This becomes evident when the participants in the 
interaction-as-broadcasted ‘leave’ the narrative space after the climactic laughter 
sequence in line 19, and return to topical talk in the CDS, which is introduced with an 
“anyway” by a fellow panellist. 
 
4.2.3. Frame structuring in The Proprietor 
 
The frame structure of the blended performance is provided solely by the narrative 
space, and is induced via pattern completion. BB exclusively supplies high points of a 
story that has to be co-constructed by the audience on the basis of shared common 
ground in the narrative space. The (potential) event structure surrounding the ‘best-of’ 
utterances presented in the performance, i.e. the script (cf. Schank & Abelson, 1977), 
and other elements of the internal space structure, such as the addressee(s) of the 
contributions, have to be inferred by virtue of frame induction. The narrative 
structure of the impersonation is consequently exclusively structured by the story 
space set up by BB in the preface. There are no major frame clashes regarding the 
semiotic code, which leads to the blend being single-scope in our typology.  
However, the way in which BB chunks his contributions and the visual 
grammar (Holland, 2000) presented in the interaction-as-broadcasted illustrate that 
despite presenting a single-scope visit to another ‘world’, he remains primarily 
oriented to the discourse base space, interactionally speaking. Leaving enough space 
for appreciation tokens on the part of the audience after every TCU and concluding it 
with post-utterance completion laughter demonstrate this point. The images shown in 
the interaction-as-broadcasted during the spaces BB leaves for audience appreciation 
signals are medium shots of BB’s entire panel and close-ups of the ‘butt’ of the 
impersonation, No. 5. As a result, the visual grammar of the interaction-as-
broadcasted further illustrates that the discourse base space is oriented to at these 
moments. During BB’s impersonation sequences, however, BB is shot in close-up, thus 
providing evidence that the narrative space is the only element in focus. Even so, both 
BB and the visual grammar of the interaction-as-broadcasted chunk the performance 
such as to continuously orient back to the discourse base space that contains topical 
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turn-by-turn talk. Although the narrative is entirely structured by the story space set 
up in the preface, it is therefore the pragmatic dimension that ultimately determines 
much of the performance of the narrative world presented.  
Continuing in this vein, the impersonation has emergent pragmatic properties 
that are relevant to, and project back into, the discourse base space: No. 5 is ascribed 
deviant behaviour and constructed as a laughable. It also allows inferences about BB’s 
qualities as a comedian, as well as his culturally shared values, knowledge and themes. 
In brief, all inferences are created from the perspective of the base, i.e. the space 
containing topical turn-by-turn talk. Figure 19 illustrates the temporal unfolding of the 
conceptual mapping process negotiated in the impersonation blend. 
 
 
Figure 19: “The Proprietor” impersonation blend 
 
It therefore becomes evident that the interactional, pragmatic dimension exceeds 
considerable power over both the ‘selection’ of frames that concepts can be blended 
with in impersonations and the delivery of the impersonation and inferences arising 
from this. 
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4.3. The Metal Detector: A Double-Scope Impersonation Blend 
 
 
Double-scope impersonations are characterised by frame clashes with regard to both 
discourse spaces and semiotic codes. Impersonators perform a non-human character, 
subsequently rely on other signs for communication, and inhabit a world of that is 
clearly distinct from the current discourse scenario. The Metal Detector sequence 
discussed in this chapter is an excellent example of such an impersonation. The team 
members seated next to team captain NF are asked to guess which pop star designed 
their own brand of metal detector.  
 
NMTB SE21E04_1_09:34 (The Metal Detector) 
 
01 NF: are metal detectors made out of 
metal, 
 
02  cos that’s always confused me. 
 
03 AU: @ (1.0)  
04 SA: good point= 
 
05 NF: they just detect themselves 
 
06 KS: right they just beep   
07  [they’re CO:nstantly beeping= 
 
08 AU: [@@@  
09 NF: <@ ↓meep (.) me again (.)   
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10 AU: @@ 
 
11 NF: ↓meep (.)  
 
12  ah that was me (.)   
13  so:rry (-)   
14 AU: @  
15 NF: ↓meep  
16  i can’t HElp it, (.) 
 
17  I’m MAI:nly MEtal. @> 
 
18 AU: @@@@ 
 
19 NF: could we have a look at the clip. 
 
 
4.3.1. Interactional organisation: Negotiating viewing frames 
 
This sequence is not the first reaction to the FPP posed by host SA, i.e. the question 
regarding which pop star has their own brand of metal detector. NF’s team has 
already provided an answer “expressed in dance” (further evidence for the joke-first 
strategy central to NMTB), which is considered “wrong” by SA. The sequence under 
scrutiny here is therefore the second diversion from providing the ‘correct’ answer and 
hence the projected SPP. The interactional organisation of the sequences is as follows: 
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FPP1: Pop star – metal detector 
 SPP1-1: Dance 
 SPP1-2 (Assessment): Wrong 
  FPP2: Materiality (warranted) 
  Acknowledgment token: Good question 
  Further elaboration of FPP2, including impersonation 
  SPP2: @@ 
 FPP3: Clip 
 
After SA deems the team’s first answer as “wrong”, NF moves away from the topical 
talk, and focuses instead on the materiality of the metal detector. This change in focus 
has to be accounted for (cf. Sacks, 1992), and is warranted by giving a reason for the 
diversion (line 02 in the transcript “cos that’s always confused me”). If we consider the 
changes the CDS undergoes in this sequence, we find the following: FPP2 now 
foregrounds the element Metal Detector (MD) in the viewing frame, whilst 
backgrounding elements P (pop star) and D (activity ‘to design’). These elements are 
not relevant to the action proposed by FPP2. Figure 20 illustrates the change in focus. 
 
!
Figure 20: Changing viewing frames in "The Metal Detector" (lines 01-04) 
 
4.3.2. ‘Zooming in’ on a narrative 
 
SA, who is presented as the prime addressee for this question, provides an assessment 
and acknowledgment token (“good point”), which, together with the audience 
appreciation token in the form of laughter, licenses NF to further elaborate on the 
problem he has just presented. Both NF and his fellow panellist KS each provide one 
turn in which they expand on the central aspects of the problem posed in FPP2, with 
NF providing the activity (“they just detect themselves”, line 05) and KS offering the 
sonic dimension (“beep”, lines 06-07) of the dilemma. In giving these further details, 
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they provide the event structure and protagonists, as well as the central conflict of the 
narrative. Rather than a factual discussion concerning the materiality of metal 
detectors, it is KS’s contribution in particular which advances the ‘discussion’ to a 
more detailed and sensual level: in using progressive aspect (line 07, “they’re 
constantly beeping”), she ‘zooms in’ even further on the conflict, presenting it as an 
ongoing process and from the “inside” (cf. Yule, 1998:64ff). As such, by building on 
the viewing frame proposed by NF, KS zeroes in on the narrative established. The 
viewing frame once again shifts, with the ‘world’ of an incessantly beeping, self-
detecting metal detector coming into the spotlight. As figure 21 illustrates, this 
narrative space is now oriented to, and provides the ground for NF’s impersonation. 
The central character, activity and conflict are already in focus, so NF starts his 
impersonation with the salient sonic feature introduced by KS during her previous 
turn, namely a rendering of the beep sound made by metal detectors when detecting 
metal. From the outset of this impersonation, NF shifts his gaze away from his co-
participants (a detailed analysis of gaze and postural orientation of this sequence is 
offered in chapter 5.2.2.), signalling that he is not oriented to the discourse world 
inhabited by his fellow participants; instead, he now ‘lives’ in the narrative space 
introduced over the course of the previous turns. Employing a discursively dissonant 
sign, the “meep”, is a further means of signalling the role change. The sonic 
dimension of the metal detector’s world can be taken as salient in the common ground 
due to KS’ prior description of the detector’s activity. After a micro pause NF adds 
“me again”, returning to a familiar code; nevertheless this utterance is by now firmly 
attributed to the metal detector. Figure 21 visualises the transitions the CDS 
undergoes over the course of these two turns. 
!
Figure 21: From narrative to impersonation (lines 06-07) 
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Over the next few recycles of a Transition Relevant Place (TRP), each of which are 
followed by appreciation tokens in the form of laughter, NF expands upon the conflict 
faced by the metal detector, ending with a climactic and highly dramatised 
explanation of the crisis it encounters; this can be considered the punch line of the 
impersonation (lines 16-17). The explanation offered in these lines is a repetition of 
the component(s) already introduced in the preface to the impersonation and, by 
repeating this, “condenses” (Jefferson, 1978:223) the narrative in the punch line once 
again. The impersonation comes ‘full-circle’, so to speak, and its contingence with 
previous talk is once more displayed. Once the audience has delivered their final 
appreciation of the impersonation sequence, NF formally returns to topical talk, 
asking to replay the clip which introduced the original quiz question posed by SA in 
FPP1.  
As is the case for the other impersonation sequences discussed in the previous 
sections, the metal detector impersonation seems irrelevant to topical talk, as it is not 
sequentially implicative; rather, it is “deleted” (Jefferson, 1978:229). Although 
introduced as relevant to prior topical discourse, the impersonation, it appears, is 
treated as a unit that is ,not germane to further turn-by-turn talk. Impersonations are 
for interactional play and entertainment, but are not sequentially implicative for 
ensuing talk. In other words, while an impersonation sequence projects a laughter 
sequence as a relevant next action, it is usually not followed by further related 
commentaries, as is commonly the case with stories. 
 
4.3.3. Frame-structuring in double-scope impersonations 
 
When we investigate the impersonation sequence in more detail, it becomes evident 
that different processes of frame integration are at work than the processes in the 
previous two examples. First of all, the impersonation is set in a discourse scenario 
marked as clearly distinct from the one in which the original interaction (FPP1) is 
situated. Similar to single-scope impersonation blends, the impersonation allows for 
visits into the established narrative worlds. Other than mirror-scope blends, however, 
these impersonations are not accessed from the Current Discourse Space and the 
topical prior talk it ‘contains’; instead, they provide mimetic illustrations of narratives 
from within the narrative space. In focus is the (fictive) narrative world rather than the 
reframing of (actual) previous discourse scenarios. 
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Single-scope impersonation blends like “The Proprietor” differ, however, from 
more double-scope blends such as “The Metal Detector”. While “The Proprietor” 
relies on human semiotic codes in both input spaces, “The Metal Detector” faces a 
frame clash regarding not only the signs used in communication, but also human 
intentions and feelings attributed to the machine. The impersonation consequently 
encounters frame clashes both with regard to the discourse scenario and semiotic 
systems. The emergent structure of the blend for this reason presents a human-like 
machine which not only masters its ‘own’ semiotic codes (the ‘meep’, which is purely a 
human rendering of a non-human sound), but also those of humans (complete with 
the politeness system). Furthermore, in addition to being able to feel frustration over 
its materiality, it can also express this frustration in an apologetic manner.63 
Moreover, an addressee A needs to be inferred in the blended space via pattern 
completion. 
Figure 22 provides a detailed illustration of the blending process behind this 
impersonation, and shows the double-frame clashes which the Metal Detector 
impersonation contains (see also figure 21, which shows the discursive unfolding of the 
impersonation). 
!
Figure 22: The Metal Detector impersonation blend 
 
While the impersonation is accessed from the narrative world of the metal detector 
alone, it contains NF’s voice in an unmarked code (except for the “meep”), and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 Cf. other human-like machines in popular culture that master politeness, such as Star Wars’ C-3PO, 
which blend machines with human pragmatics. 
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consequently borrows structure from both input spaces. It is thus double-scope in 
nature.  
 
 
4.4. The Way We Think, The Way We Act 
 
 
The case studies provide hypotheses as to the way in which discursive conceptual 
blending is coordinated in interactions. Impersonation blends have to be relevant  to 
previous actions (i.e. their relation to previous topical talk has to be displayed); they 
also have to be methodologically introduced, entered and exited. The relevance to 
joint action both constrains and licenses impersonation blends, and furthermore 
guides conceptual mappings, and, consequently, meaning-making. From a 
methodological point of view, this relevance is made transparent in interaction, and a 
prototypical impersonation structure can be observed. Prefaces relate narrative worlds 
to previous interaction, and ‘zoom in’ on the narrative space in which an 
impersonation is set. Aside from this, they project impersonation structure and 
evaluative stance, and provide the central frame elements, such as protagonists and 
event structure. Conversely, Demarcation markers, such as breaking off eye contact and 
postural orientation, signal actual voice changes, and make clear that all actions are 
now to be understood from within the narrative space rather than from the discourse 
space containing topical turn-by-turn talk. The performance design of impersonations is 
such as to secure the floor for an extended sequence of turns-at-talk whilst providing 
the audience with sufficient opportunity to signal appreciation and continuity. Exit 
devices such as TCUs delivered in punch line mode are employed to mark the end of a 
longer impersonation sequence, and ensure that the impersonation relates to the 
preface.  
It appears, then, that impersonating another voice is first and foremost a social 
activity that needs to be carefully organised and negotiated. ‘Doing’ an impersonation 
is a social activity, an activity that is carried out for and with someone and which has a 
social purpose. For this reason, such blends cannot be delivered ‘wildly’; rather, novel 
concepts introduced need to be relevant to the action underway, they must be 
carefully introduced for the interactants to comprehend the pertinence of uniting 
these concepts, and they must be delivered in orientation to the action at hand. As a 
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consequence, it is the performative, interactional dimension that appears to structure 
the delivery of the impersonation, as well as making the impersonation blend relevant 
and legitimising it, i.e. visiting ‘other’ worlds and integrating semantically distinct 
concepts. 
The joint, rule-dominated quest for shared meaning construction evident in 
interactional data consequently suggests that orientation to joint action guides 
conceptualisation processes and therefore meaning-making to a considerable degree; 
this is a factor which is often neglected in more canonical Cognitive Linguistics 
research. To further discuss this hypothesis, the following section(s) will describe in 
detail the interactional methods employed in organising impersonation blends of all 
three types and, in a second step, will discuss the extent to which the “level of 
performance” (Kotthoff, 2006) governs meaning construction in conceptual blending 
processes. !
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CHAPTER 5: INTERACTIONAL ORGANISATION OF 
IMPERSONATION BLENDS 
 
 
Building on the results gathered and hypotheses generated in chapter 4, this section 
systematically discusses the interactional organisation of impersonation sequences and 
provides a typology of the methods employed to set up impersonations for each 
blending type. By carrying out a detailed analysis of the techniques used to negotiate 
the introduction, performance and ending of such impersonation sequences, the issue 
regarding whether interactants show an orientation to frame integration complexity in 
the joint quest for meaning-making is addressed. In other words, the analysis will 
discuss the question as to whether the various blending types proposed in MSCI 
actually reflect distinct discursive practices.  
I hope to first of all trace these blending practices in the local occasioning of 
impersonation blends. To this end, chapter 5.1. describes the strategies employed by 
interactants to introduce impersonations of varying frame-integration complexity. 
How are the various narrative worlds introduced in which the impersonations are set? 
How is the tellability of impersonations warranted in interaction? The successful 
parsing of the voices present in impersonation sequences is of key importance to the 
performance. For this reason, chapter 5.2. focuses on the methods employed to 
distinguish between the voices speaking and acting in impersonations. This central 
chapter deals with both linguistic and bodily semiotics as a means of further discussing 
the role played by quotatives in setting apart voices, and observing the extent to which 
discontinuation of gaze and postural orientation might be utilised to signal semantic 
distance. Chapter 5.3. will then concentrate on the linguistic performance of  
impersonations. Are there varying strategies when it comes to floor management? 
How are turns-at-talk negotiated? Are there differences as to the chunking of the 
impersonations? In the final step of the analysis, I will describe the strategies used for 
ending such performances and return to topical turn-by-turn talk in chapter 5.4.. Are 
some impersonations sequentially deleted and others sequentially implicative? Do 
certain voices require more interactional work to be exited than others?  
The methods described therefore work together to construct discursive 
practice, meaning that they do not themselves constitute actions. Thus, while the 
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mode of presentation might suggest that these methods are already meaningful when 
viewed in isolation, I would like to emphasise the fact that it is only the finely tuned 
orchestration of these methods that builds actions. For this reason, the last section, 
chapter 5.5., provides an overview of the methods identified and the actions which 
they serve to develop, and furthermore discusses their relation to frame integration 
complexity.  
Each chapter will provide initial conclusions and consider the relevance which 
the findings obtained have on determining the extent to which conceptual blending 
complexity is reflected in discursive practices. The implications of my results are 
discussed in detail in chapter 6, which – based on the outcome of my analysis – 
proposes a refined model of meaning-making through conceptual blending. 
 
 
5.1. Local occasioning and diegetic prefaces 
 
 
In his Republic (Πολιτεία), Plato differentiates between diegetic and mimetic narration. 
While the first form refers to a narration in which poets do not explicitly hide their 
voices, but speak as ‘themselves’, mimetic narration refers to characters speaking in 
their own voice in the narration. This division has since been described as telling versus 
showing and simple versus scenic presentation (Friedman, 1975).  
As the case studies in the previous section have shown, voice changes in 
impersonations are often dramatic illustrations of just such diegetically established 
storyworlds, providing the “narrative macro-structure” (Solomon, 2004:261), or an 
‘abstract’ (Labov, 1972a; Norrick, 2000) of the mimetic impersonation. The case 
studies furthermore suggest that double-scope blends may require a more elaborate 
prefacing structure than single-scope and mirror blends; while “The Proprietor” and 
“Sports Commentator” are prefaced by just a single TCU uttered by the 
impersonator himself, “Metal Detector” shows an elaborate preface which is co-
constructed over the course of a number of turns by two participants. Based on this 
observation, this section will  compare preface structures across blending types to find 
further evidence which will support the hypothesis. While such prefaces already play 
an important role in securing an extended sequence of turns-at-talk, floor 
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management will be discussed in further detail in chapter 5.3.; this chapter will pay 
close attention to the function of prosody in turn organisation and discuss in detail the 
prosodic format of prefaces.  
 
5.1.1. Local occasioning and preface formats in mirror impersonations 
 
Mirror impersonations attribute identities, affective stance or tacit motives to co-
participants. In the NMTB corpus, six formats for introducing mirror prefaces can be 
identified, with each serving to achieve marginally different pragmatic effects.  
First of all, impersonators may offer their assessment of a prior speaker’s action 
before restaging that action in an accentuated form. For this type, voice change is 
achieved with the help of the quotative be like (cf. chapter 5.2.1.). In formalised terms, 
prefaces follow the format  
 
Assessment S – be like [IMPmarked repeat] 
 
This format occurs in scenarios in which the impersonation illustrates the affective 
stance diegetically displayed by, and hyperbolically attributed to, a co-participant. 
Consider the following sequence: 
 
NMTB SE24E11_1_12:00 (Bemused look) 
 
01 NF: i’ve NEver seen anyone !
02  look more bemused; !
03  you’re like- !
<@ !
 
The highly exaggerated re-enactment of a co-participant’s affective stance in 
“Bemused look” ‘cites’ an element of the talk which precedes the impersonation 
sequence. It thus shows that the sequence, while not being directly relevant to topical 
talk per se, is occasioned by that talk and therefore results from monitoring it. The 
Assessment S component of this format (lines 01-02 in the transcript) provides the 
diegetic evaluation of the source (which in this case is ironic). As such, it frames the 
ensuing impersonation, providing cues as to how it is to be understood. The second 
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component (line 03), on the other hand, serves to introduce the mimetic quote 
through a quotative frame (cf. chapter 5.2.), while the mimetic impersonation itself is 
presented in the format referred to by Jefferson (1978) as ‘marked repeat’. The (in this 
case visual) repetition of a previous action performed by speaker (S) is hyperbolically 
accentuated in the impersonation. Apart from highlighting S, the ‘butt’ of the 
impersonation, as a subject of ridicule, this accentuated ‘quoting’ further contributes 
to warranting the impersonation’s tellability by showing its relation to topical talk, 
which is its source. The superlative in the preface (Assessment S component, lines 01-
02) likewise points to the reason why the impersonation is deemed narratable and 
“newsworthy”, to borrow Norrick’s (2010a:105) term. Such superlatives constitute an 
effective tool for displaying the impersonation’s importance and consequently 
asserting the right to perform it. 
In a similar vein, impersonators may re-describe a previous action (U), 
diegetically displaying their own evaluative stance on this prior action, before 
mimetically restaging the original quote in a manner that supports their assessment of 
the original token. This second format can be formally described as 
 
RedescriptionU [IMPmarked repeat] 
 
and is illustrated in “Smug Jonas”. 
 
NMTB SE20E05_2_02:37 (Smug Jonas) 
 
01 SA: yes jonas; (.)  !
02  i would have given you a point, (-) !
03  but you were ↑a bit SMUg about it.! !
04 JA: [<<ff> i !WAS!n’t smug about it >] !
05 AU: [@@@                             ]xx (2.4) !
06 SA: <@ i know it (0.4)  !
07  it’s northern- (.)  !
08  the stone roses wi:th, (.)  !
09  blabla (.) !WRO!ng. @>  !
10 AU: @@@ (5.6) !
11 SA: please try and do better next time. !
 
The impersonation here serves as a mimetic illustration of the assessment (“smug”) 
provided in the diegetic redescription of a prior utterance in the preface (line 02-03). 
As JA challenges SA’s assessment in line 04, the impersonation is also a relevant next 
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action, providing evidence for the correctness of the assessment. RedescriptionU 
[IMPmarked repeat] is thus a format that is recruited when doing impersonations in order 
to illustrate a purpose. The diegetic preface not only provides details as to the voice 
speaking and acting in the impersonation sequence, but also sets out the evaluative 
and affective macro-structure in which the ensuing illustration is to be understood and 
interpreted. The impersonation itself mirrors the source, but accentuates components 
that serve to prove the assessment provided in the preface. In “Smug Jonas”, the 
impersonator assumes a relaxed and self-assured body language throughout the 
impersonation sequence. The accentuated complacency of the marked repeat of JA’s 
original contribution is then contrasted with the accentuated !WRO!ng in line 09, 
which completes SA’s performance, and ties back in with prior topical turn-by-turn 
talk, as it once more provides the reason for not granting the point requested by JA. 
The impersonation thus serves to illustrate the macro-structure diegetically outlined in 
the preface. 
Marked repeat such as the instances highlighted in “Bemused look” and 
“Smug Jonas” may also feature in mirror impersonations preceded by a disjunct 
marker (DM), such as “Oh”. The disjunct marker (also referred to as change-of-state 
token (Heritage, 1984) or touch-off marker (Schegloff, 1996)) signals a break from topical 
discourse, while the impersonation sequence [IMP] cites an element of the original 
utterance, but reframes it so as to allow affective stance to emerge. This third type of 
mirror impersonation format features in “Banana outfit”, and can be formalised as 
 
Disjunct Marker [IMP(marked repeatE)] 
 
NMTB SE23E07_1_03:06 (Banana outfit) 
 
01 MW: DAniel have you ever worn anything for a !
02  photo shoot that you thought, (.) !
03  oh dear. i shouldn’t be doing this. !
04 DM: we:ll um no sea horses; i (.) !
05  i’ve worn a (.) uhm BAnana outfit before; !
06 MW: <<acc> OH, (.) (h) <@ NO(h) (.)> !
07  ↑nothing too embarrassing- !
08  just a banana outfit. @> (-)! !
09 AU: @[@ !
10 DM:  [yea. !
11 MW: ↑why? !
 
  LANGUAGE, COGNITION, INTERACTION !
! -132-!
In this example, the impersonation sequence is diverted away from topical talk via the 
disjunct marker (DM) “oh” (line 06). The DM signals that the impersonation provides 
a break with prior discourse, instead offering an accentuated rephrasing of the original 
contribution in the impersonation. The impersonation’s relevance to topical talk is 
nonetheless clearly displayed in the impersonation sequence itself. The trigger for the 
impersonation (lines 07-08) in “Banana outfit” is an element of prior talk, which 
becomes clear towards the very end, namely in the punch line of the impersonation 
(line 08), when the token is cited. Jefferson (1978) discusses the device DM + marked 
repeat in her study into conversational storytelling, and has been able to prove that 
such repeats may also occur in punch lines only. As in Jefferson’s stories, then, the 
relevance of the ‘Banana Outfit’ impersonation to topical talk is only warranted 
towards the end of the sequence. The impersonation preface format Disjunct Marker 
[IMP(marked repeatE)] thus occurs in scenarios which reframe the original 
contribution rather than simply continuing it, as would be the case in zero-preface 
impersonations (see below). To set this reframing apart from the original contribution, 
a DM is used. Relevance to topical turn-by-turn talk is signalled through a marked 
repeat, which illustrates that the reframing has the prior utterance as its source. 
The fourth format, too, provides a means of reframing a prior contribution by 
a co-participant, yet does so more explicitly through the use of a format that may be 
formalised as  
 
S V-ing X [IMP(marked repeatE)] 
 
In this format, the impersonator in the preface openly states the activity V-ing X s/he 
believes speaker S to have engaged in when doing a prior action. This is the case in 
the “Sports Commentator” discussed chapter in 4.1., but also in the following 
sequence which occurs in the same episode: 
 
NMTB SE23E02_3_00:52 (Sports Commentator II) 
 
01 GL: number one number five and number three (.) !
02  have smiled; (.) quite a lot; !
03  number three has stopped now;  !
04  cos i’ve said that; !
05  but number five and one smile a lot. !
06 RG: GAby; (.) i know=i know you’re a commentator !
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07  but can you ju(h) @ !
08  @@ (1.6)! !
09 GL: <<f> i’m BEIng a DEtective;> !
10  some[one- !
11 RG:     [no you’re being a COMmentator, !
12  [<@ number one just smiled !
13 GL: [NO twO’s just smiled cos HE thinks- !
14 RG: now number two is smiling !
15  number three is coming with a late smile, !
16  <<acc> there, he’s coming up, !
17  number four !
18  number four comes in with a smile !
19  number five with a grimace; !
20  number five number five,> @> !
21  @@ !
 
Both “Sports Commentator” sequences are preceded by a preface that outlines the 
reframing of the original contribution in which the ensuing impersonation is to be 
understood. The preface provides co-participants with the voice about to speak (S) 
and the activity which S is understood to be engaged in (V-ing X). Special emphasis is 
placed on the action V-ing, as the progressive is used, thereby further focusing on the 
activity at hand and serving to highlight the impersonation’s relation to prior topical 
talk. This relevance to topical talk is additionally warranted through providing 
‘reasons’ for the original speaker’s alleged failure to orient to the normative activity at 
hand (i.e. providing an answer to the quiz question). This alleged violation of the 
normative activity being undertaken is made explicit prior to the concise redescription 
of the original contribution through the S V-ing X [IMP(marked repeatE)] format. In 
lines 06-07 of “Sports Commentator II”, RG already indicates in a jocular fashion his 
interpretation of GL’s contribution (lines 01-05) as failing to provide the relevant SPP 
(i.e. the answer to the question posed in the quiz). The same applies for “Sports 
Commentator I”, where GL allegedly fails to offer a straightforward answer, and 
instead only guesses band names. The impersonations therefore demonstrate the 
purported reasons for the alleged failure of co-participants to adhere to normative 
standards. Both the alleged failure as well as the reframed redescription of the original 
activity are already provided in the diegetic preface. The impersonation itself simply 
provides an accentuated mimetic illustration of the reframing proposed in the turns 
preceding the performance. In both “Sports Commentator” sequences, GL’s attempt 
to provide the right answer is partially quoted in the impersonations. However, 
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impersonators adopt the speech pattern employed by sports commentators, and do 
not cite the original version word-for-word; rather, they rearrange and recontextualise 
the lexical items of GL’s original contribution in a way that aligns with the assessment 
which was diegetically provided prior to the impersonation. 
Such assessments as sources for impersonations can furthermore take the form 
of questions, and can be formalised as  
 
Questioning [IMP(marked repeatE)] 
 
This fifth format is recruited in “Northern lass”: 
 
NMTB S24E08_pt2_01:49 (Northern lass) !
01 DV: do we have to stand yea?  !
02 PJ: yes we do=o !
03 DV: [great! !
04 PJ: [diana vickers! !
05 DV: very excited ! !
06 LM: what about STAndin? ! !
07 DV: [ye(h)es! !
08 AU: [@@@ (1.9)! !
09 
10 
LM: <@ <<northern accent> i’m a simple northern girl  
with a simple wishes! !
11 AU: @[@@! !
12 LM:  [i wish i could go to london and stand, > @> !
13 AU: @@[@ (1.6) !
14 LM:   [<<f> WEll tonight your drEAms come true.> !
 
When DV claims to be “very excited” about standing up (lines 05-07), this constitutes 
a jointly negotiated figure-ground reversal and, in turn, salience-imbalance (Giora, 
2003). While DV’s excitement would be deemed legitimate were it related to the 
upcoming task, LM’s question for understanding (line 06) proposes a non-salient 
reading that assumes a completed prior sequence (lines 01-02). Through his question, 
LM not only claims to ‘hyperunderstand’ (cf. Brône, 2008) DV’s assessment (lines 03 
and 05), but also reads into her original contribution as a source of deviant behaviour. 
Being excited about such a plain activity as standing up is presented as violating 
norms. DV adopts LM’s reading (line 07), and acknowledges through laughter 
particles her appreciation of the humorous figure-ground reversal. 
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Questions of the type posed in “Northern lass” therefore constitute a means of 
proposing hyperunderstanding and figure-ground reversal. The impersonation then 
illustrates and further accentuates the diegetically established figure-ground reversal. 
This recontextualisation and rephrasing of the original utterance is methodologically 
linked to prior topical talk via the question as well as a repeat of a lexical element in 
the performance itself, which again shows that prior topical talk represents the source 
of the impersonation and the figure-ground reversal it relies on.64 
Finally, the last format neither shows preface, disjunct marker nor marked 
repeat. I refer to this format as zero-preface. Impersonations showing such zero-
preface contribute to the further visualisation of thoughts and feelings. Rather than 
repeating, they expand upon a co-participant’s utterance which occurred immediately 
prior to the impersonation. As such, impersonations lack a diegetic preface that 
outlines the macro-structure in which a mimetic illustration is set, and they heavily 
rely on alternate means of signalling voice-changes and referents, such as postural 
orientation and bodily mimesis, gaze direction or style switching. In “Frustration”, it 
seems as though impersonator PJ simply continues the line of thought pursued by the 
original speaker: 
  
NMTB SE23E08_2_03:00 (Frustration) 
 
01 SB: Oh this is frustrating; (.) !
02  VEry frustrating. !
03 PJ: <@ i had no idea  !
04  a quiz would be like that  !
05  [i really didn’t @> !
06 AU: [@@@ !
07 NF: well you might as well guess. !
 
As the original speaker, SB has already shared his emotional state, and the 
impersonation continues in this sentiment, meaning that no further diegetic 
renderings of the type discussed in the sequences above seem to be required. The 
impersonation does not constitute a break with topical talk, as it neither reframes nor 
recontextualises the original contribution.  
In sum, then, mirror impersonations seem to employ preface formats that 
allow for the assessment and ensuing redescription of previous utterances. Marked !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 As the prefacing formats which other blending types exhibit illustrate, questions in general are a 
means of drawing attention to aspects which the impersonator finds noteworthy. 
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repeat of elements of a co-participant’s prior action is of central importance in order 
to signal the impersonation’s relevance to topical turn-by-turn talk. However, one 
format does not rely on marked repeat: zero-prefaced impersonations do not break 
with prior topical talk, or offer recontextualisations of prior utterances, but are 
continuous with them. The impersonator simply persists with the action in which the 
impersonated is currently engaged.  
 
5.1.2. Local occasioning and preface formats in single-scope impersonations 
 
Aside from mirror impersonations, single-scope impersonations are set in discrete 
discourse scenarios that are set apart from the scenario oriented to by topical turn-by-
turn talk. For this reason, prefaces diegetically signal the shift to other semantic spaces 
via the formats discussed below. While  
 
XI1 be like YI2 [IMP] 
 
constitutes a simile and discloses a direct point of comparison between similar 
activities occurring in the two discourse scenarios I1 and I2, other ‘story abstracts’ 
simply transfer one element (E) from topical talk (I1) to a discourse scenario (I2) that is 
explicitly marked as disjunct from I1 via temporal (t), spatial (l), epistemic (e), and 
modal (m) space builders. In addition, the activities occurring in the discourse scenario 
which has therefore been established need not correspond to those in I1. Yet while 
these space builders help the narrative world and the actions (A) occurring in that 
world to be differentiated from the world oriented to by the current topical talk, the 
prefaces display the extent to which the ensuing impersonation is locally occasioned 
by prior talk in that these prefaces make salient an aspect of said talk (E) which serves 
as a trigger for a ‘joke first’ (cf. Schegloff, 1987) performance. This format can 
consequently be formalised65 as  
 
(e/m)-EI1 ≡/⊨ E’I2-A-(t-l)[IMP] !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 This formalisation serves as shorthand for describing a common impersonation preface. In 
consequence, usage of the symbol “–“is not intended to denote a relative complement in this context, 
but is meant to simply make a distinction between the elements contributing to the preface format. 
Similarly, parentheses are used here to indicate the optional status that epistemic, modal and 
spatiotemporal space builders enjoy. 
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Before elucidating upon this format further, it is important to first consider the highly 
common XI1 be like YI2 [IMP] format as occurs in “Brothers”. The impersonation in 
this sequence takes place after two co-participants briefly argue over the optimum way 
to perform a song. In comparing the activity being engaged in during prior topical 
talk to those of a fictional scenario, NF’s diegetic preface (line 01-02) clearly shows 
that his contribution is relevant to prior discourse, as this discourse is the source of his 
assessment. In addition, NF’s contribution is ‘noteworthy’ and interesting to his co-
participants, as it displays the behaviour engaged in during the previous turns as 
somewhat deviant and laughable. The simile allows for an emphatic assessment of 
prior talk.  
Once the audience has acknowledged the preface through tokens of 
appreciation in the form of laughter (line 03), NF is licensed to perform an 
impersonation sequence that further illustrates the point made in the preface. 
 
NMTB SE23E10_2_03:00 (Brothers) 
 
01 NF: YOU twO are like (.) brothers on  !
02  BUnk beds arguing (-) !
03 AU: @@  !
04 NF: <@ ↑that’s no way dad’s favourite record  !
05  ↓it IS you idiot; !
06 AU: @@@ !
07 NF: <<f> don’t make me drop lego on your head; !
08  from [up high > @> (--) !
09 AU:      [@@xx@ !
10 NF: okay. !
 
Comparing the activities underway in current topical talk to a distant discourse 
scenario seems to be especially apt for triggering impersonation sequences (see also for 
example “Alan Bennett” in chapter 5.2.), which serve to further exemplify the 
comparison and allow for inferences to emerge. Note that this format is likewise based 
on the assessment of prior turn-by-turn talk, and thus parallels the prefacing strategies 
identified for mirror impersonations. 
The second format identified for single-scope impersonations does not aim to 
compare activities between disjunct discourse scenarios, but places elements of one 
discourse scenario in another. Bear in mind, however, that the likelihood thus 
construed relates to elements (e.g. characters) of topical talk and not activities per se.  
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These storyworlds are disengaged from topical turn-by-turn talk via a number 
of distance markers that do not explicitly reflect on the relationship which exists 
between the two scenarios contributing to the impersonation blend; on the contrary, 
they first and foremost mark these scenarios as disjunct. The worlds set up in such 
prefaces might be delineated from topical turn-by-turn talk in the following ways: 
 
a) Temporal distance (t): Future markers as in “I look forward to hearing on CNN 
[IMP]” (S24E10_1_07:35) or the past tense as in “I hope she was at the zoo, 
and they all just went [IMP]” (NMTB SE23E02_1_04:31) serve to indicate 
temporal distance, and act as space builders in the construction of narrative 
spaces. 
b) Spatial distance (l): Narrative worlds in single-scope impersonations might also 
be clearly segregated from current topical turn-by-turn talk via spatial distance 
markers, as is evidenced not only in the zoo example above, but also in NMTB 
SE23E08_1_03:13, in which the impersonator prefaces his impersonation with  
“And then she does a drunk Welsh tour guide in Brussels [IMP]”.  
c) Epistemic distance (e): Such prefaces set up ‘belief spaces’, to recruit Fauconnier’s 
(1997) original conception. Through lexical items such as I think (as in NMTB 
SE23E02_3_04:10 “I think the bloke who put them together just went [IMP]” 
or NMTB SE23E11_3_03:13 “I think it’s the Lithuanian Boyzone [IMP]”), 
belief spaces are built that are distinct from, but nonetheless stand in relation 
to, current topical talk. 
d) Modal distance (m): These prefaces construct what Fauconnier (1997) refers to as 
‘possibility spaces’, and often recruit the lexical item might to indicate modal 
distance from topical turn-by-turn talk. NMTB SE24E08_1_05:45 illustrates 
this. Here, the impersonation is prefaced by “There might be a slight legal 
issue that you cannot just go and go [IMP].” Alternatively would or could are 
used to signal modal distance. 
 
These markers demarcate the boundary between the narrative space in which a 
single-scope impersonation is set and topical turn-by-turn talk. Prefaces recruiting the 
markers and illustrating the macro-structure of the narrative spaces thus framed are 
(and this an issue which should not be overlooked), locally occasioned in the sense that 
the scenarios sketched are either directly relevant to the action currently underway 
  LANGUAGE, COGNITION, INTERACTION !
! -139-!
(e.g. serve to answer a quiz question) or fall under what Schegloff (1987) refers to as 
the ‘joke-first practice’, a feature which is licensed by the pop quiz setting. The jokes 
always have as their source an element E of topical talk, but briefly ‘detour’ from said 
topical talk in placing that element in a disjunct narrative. Consider “Mexican 
Building Society”, which occurs during the line-up game. The panellists are 
confronted with a line-up of five people dressed in stereotypically Mexican costumes, 
and are tasked with determining which member of the line-up is the former guitarist 
of 1990s band “Terrorvision”. 
 
NMTB SE20E06_3_01:08 (Mexican Building Society)66 
 
01 PJ: i’m looking at number one and i’m thinking (.) !
02  it’d be very nice to open an account !
03  in a mexican building society. !
04 AU: @@  !
05 PJ: <@how may pesetas would you like to deposi::t, !
06 AU: @@@ !
07 PJ: chan i incherest you in a chigh interchest accou=ount, !
08 AU @@@ !
09 PJ: i chave to remind you you chave limited  !
10  access to your money::, @> !
11 AU: @@ !
12 PJ: do(h)n’t you(h) wa(h)nt to take these? !
13 AB: wh-what you wanna do to them? !
14 PJ: (h)HOme !
15 AU @@ !
 
Like in “The Proprietor”, the impersonation sequence does not aim at providing a 
SPP to the quiz question, but constitutes a joke-first. However, the joking has as its 
source an element of this topical talk: a member of the line-up (E) that is currently in 
focus in topical talk (I1) is assigned a deviant personality in a disjunct scenario (I2). The 
mappings that link the current discourse scenario to the narrative space are explicitly 
set up. For joking purposes, the impersonator here construes a likelihood between an 
‘element’ (namely Nr. 1, the member of the line-up) in I1 with the protagonist of the 
narrative scenario he establishes as a means of entertainment. Such joking sequences 
are certainly do not occur at random, but are locally occasioned and methodologically 
linked to prior talk.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 PJ is here aiming to emulate a Spanish accent. What is here transcribed as “ch” is realised as the 
voiceless uvular fricative [χ]. 
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As prefaces to single-scope impersonations provide the macro-structure of the 
storyworld in which the projected impersonation is set, they will usually supply the 
following: 
 
a) Obligatory: The voice(s) speaking and acting in the story space (I2) and their 
relation to current discourse scenarios (I1). Consider for example NMTB 
SE21E05_1_05:29 “She (E ∈ I1) was like the Jackson Five’s father (E ∈ I2) 
[IMP]” and NMTB SE19E06_3_04:15: “I think Nr. 5 (E ∈ I1) is (≡) the 
proprietor (E ∈ I2) of a remote guest house [IMP]”, which relate an element E 
of topical talk (I1) to another element in a disjunct narrative space (I2). 
b) Obligatory: The actions A performed by the character, which are either 
provided in the form of a quotative (go, be like) or made explicit, as, for 
example, in NMTB SE21E05_3_03:20: “It’s one of these scenes where the 
villain tries to pass himself off as the member of the team to escape the night 
club; with number two is it [IMP]”. Alternatively, the characters introduced 
might metonymically represent actions and be and based on shared cultural 
knowledge, as in “The Proprietor”, in which the introduction of the voice and 
the spatial setting inhabited by said voice seem to suffice in order to infer event 
structures. 
c) Optional: The spatiotemporal properties of the story space (e.g. remote guest 
house, zoo, night club). These are, however, often metonymically inferred in 
impersonations that feature well-established characters whose spatiotemporal 
surroundings may be metonymically inferred (the setting for “Alan Bennett” 
might thus, for example, most likely be a theatre). 
 
It may be concluded, then, that single-scope impersonation prefaces provide brief 
abstracts of their narrative space, and display the joke’s local occasioning in prior 
topical talk. They either follow the simile format XI1 be like YI2 [IMP] that explicitly 
reflects on the relationship between activities occurring in both input spaces, or adopt 
the format (e/m)-EI1 ≡/⊨E’I2-A-(t-l) [IMP], in which element E triggers the setting up 
of a narrative scenario for entertainment purposes. In doing so, these prefaces allow 
for the observation of elements of the current discourse scenario in relation to a 
disjunct one. The ensuing clash of semantic worlds allows for inferential qualitative 
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assessments, and, if successful, for humour to emerge. Impersonations following these 
prefaces do not, however, feature the marked repeat found in mirror impersonations, 
and their relevance to topical talk is consequently only displayed in their prefaces. 
 
5.1.3. Local occasioning and preface formats in double-scope impersonations 
 
The methods used to display the impersonation’s relevance to topical talk and the 
impersonation preface formats found in double-scope impersonations strongly parallel 
those formats recognised in single-scope impersonations. However, prefacing 
sequences to double-scope impersonations tend to be more elaborate and developed 
over a greater number of turns than those observed in single-scope impersonations. 
Double-scope impersonations are often locally occasioned through (rhetoric) questions 
that help to ensure joint attention to be paid towards an aspect of topical talk deemed 
noteworthy by the impersonator. 
Consider, first of all, the XI1 be like YI2 [IMP] format also found in single-scope 
impersonations. In “Holiday horse”, impersonator NF likens a co-participant’s 
puzzled look to that of a horse “that’s been asked to book a holiday [IMP]”. He 
therefore provides a simile, effectively a direct comparison between the two activities, 
which allows for assessments to emerge. The format thus exactly parallels the one 
detected for single-scope impersonations, with the sole semantic difference of the latter 
involving non-human points of comparison.  
Similarly, the format (e/m)-EI1 ≡/⊨E’I2-A-(t-l) [IMP] accounts for the 
remaining double-scope impersonation prefaces. Prior to the performance of double-
scope impersonations, their protagonists (E), spatiotemporal setting (t/l) and, activity 
(A) have to be elucidated upon. This becomes especially evident in “Stevenson’s 
rabbit” (NMTB SE19E05_1_08:11), in which the narrative scenario of the double-
scope impersonation is built up over a number of turns.  
 
NMTB SE19E05_1_08:11 (Stevenson’s rabbit) 
 
01 DB: do you think it is uh (.)  
02  a little (.) steam-powered dildo    
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03 
04 
 with little (.) chocoloate (.)  
uhm toffee apples on the side?  
 
05 AU: @@@  
06 PJ: a steam-powered DILdo?  
07 AU: @@  
08 DB: yeah  
09 PJ: <@ <<f>oh if i’m pleasuring myself  
10  i have to do it in the victorian 
style; > 
(-) 
 
11 AU: @@  
12 PJ: <<f> where’s my coa:l james?> @>(-)  
13 AU: @  
14 PJ: stevenson’s rabbit;   
15  <<steam sounds in three intervalls>> 
(--) 
 
 
16  <<whistle sound, twice>> (--)  
17 AU: x@x@x  
18 RI: <@ (isenba:rt) what’s under your hat? 
@> 
 
19 AU: @@  
20 RI: <@ i have QUIte a SURprise for you 
mylady. @> 
 
 
First, a rhetorical question consisting of a marked repeat (“A steam-powered dildo?”) 
of a co-participant’s prior utterance directs attention to the trigger E of what is to 
become a series of impersonation sequences. This marked repeat is followed by a first 
impersonation, a mirror-impersonation, which introduces the relevant action A and 
the temporal setting t. However, the agent, and consequently the perspective being 
profiled, changes between this first impersonation and the double-scope 
impersonation that follows. For this reason, the impersonator has to explicitly 
introduce the new voice, which he does exclusively by providing its terminus 
technicus, so to speak (“Stevenson’s rabbit”). This term could itself be analysed as a 
double-scope blend, uniting spaces containing frame knowledge about steam engines 
and brand names of phallic sexual devices – however, this shall not be discussed at 
present. Of more immediate interest is the fact that this sequence illustrates the 
importance assigned to identifying the voice acting in a particular impersonation. The 
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activity in which this machine is engaged can be inferred metonymically and through 
inferencing strategies of the action presented. These strategies interact in meaning-
making. The sounds and body movements displayed by the impersonator can only be 
understood in reference to the frames made available by the introduction of the voice, 
whilst the performance serves as a hint as to the activity and, in a second step, 
illustrates and brings this activity before one’s very eyes. 
This rather intricate setting-up of narrative spaces for double-scope 
impersonations is also evident in “Metal Detector”, whose preface is constructed by 
two participants over an extended sequence of turns, providing the voice (E) as well as 
event structures and their sonic dimension (A). However, even if only one interactant 
sets ups the diegetic preface, it is still introduced with great care, as “Babybel” 
illustrates. This example features fictivity markers (“I like to imagine”) prior to 
providing information on the voice about to speak (E, Babybel), the activity (A) 
engaged in (“walking / getting pulled up in a net”), and the location (“a forest”). 
In essence, then, the local occasioning and prefacing formats of single and 
double-scope impersonations are almost identical. Both exhibit two main 
characteristics: simile, which compare agents and an activity in the current discourse 
scenario with those of a scenario that is marked as clearly discrete, and the linking of 
trigger element E in the current discourse scenario to a role and activity in a discrete 
scenario. Marginal differences as to the degree of elaboration can nevertheless be 
traced. 
 
5.1.4. Discussion 
 
This section has shown that apart from providing the macro-structures of the 
narrative world in which a given impersonation takes place, such prefaces fulfill a 
number of other interactional functions as well. First and foremost, they serve an 
important role in displaying the local occasioning of impersonations and the 
narratives in which they are set, and consequently serve to warrant tellability (Sacks, 
1974, 1992). Telling stories and performing voices in said stories requires showing the 
proposed narration’s relevance to previous topical talk and getting co-participants to 
be interested in the story (Norrick, 2000). After all, the narration of a story usually 
requires the negotiation of a slight “shift in focus” (Solomon, 2004:261), as well as 
claiming an extended sequence of turns-at-talk and the alignment of co-participants as 
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story-recipients. Prefaces may thus project multi-turn discourse units, and 
consequently suppress the turn-taking model valid for unmarked topical turn-by-turn 
talk. Such discourse units are consequently expected to be noteworthy, and to relate to 
the current theme of the interaction; this is why prefaces tend to explicate their 
relevance to topical talk through such fixed phrases as this reminds me of (i.e. the 
‘Speaking of x’ format identified in Jefferson, 1978). Secondly, prefaces may already 
project the intended reception of the narrative under construction.  As such, they may 
already display whether, for example, the proposed narrative is to be taken as 
humorous or not. 
When comparing such techniques across blending types, it becomes evident 
that differences in local occasioning and prefacing formats between the various types 
of impersonation blends can indeed be traced. While mirror impersonations do not 
require space builders, but rather DMs such as “Oh” and the marked repeat of prior 
contributions, single and double-scope impersonation blends on the other hand set up 
discrete discourse scenarios through space builders such as “I imagine”. However, the 
dividing line between single and double-scope impersonations is not quite as clear-cut. 
Double-scope impersonations rely on the same formats as those identified for single-
scope, but usually require more elaborate prefacing sequences. These findings are 
summarised in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Overview of preface formats across blending types 
 Distance markers Anchoring in topical talk Pragmatic function 
• Disjunct marker (e.g. 
“Oh”) 
• Zero 
• Trigger profiled through 
question 
• Marked repeat 
• Attribution of 
identities, affective 
stance or tacit 
motives to co-
participant 
Mirror 
impersonations 
• Redescription of activity 
 
• Simile (“be like”) 
• (Re-)description of original 
activity 
• Assessment of prior 
utterance by co-
participant 
• Attribution of identity 
or affective stance to 
co-participant 
• Space builder 
(epistemic, modal, 
spatiotemporal) 
 
• Subject of topical talk 
transferred to distinct 
discourse scenario (trigger 
element may be profiled 
through question(s) and 
marked repeat(s)) 
• Illustration of joke-
firsts 
Single-scope 
impersonations 
• Redescription of activity 
in prior topical talk + 
space builders 
 
• Simile (“be like”) 
 
• Assessment; displaying 
theme of topical talk 
as comical   
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Double-scope 
impersonations 
Cf. single-scope Cf. single-scope Cf. single-scope 
 
Can, then, these findings be understood to constitute the first evidence of cognisers’ 
orientation to the typology put forward by Fauconnier & Turner (2002)? While the 
fact that mirror impersonations do not show the space builders found in more 
complex frame-integration scenarios initially points towards a validation of the 
difference between mirror and single or double-scope integration impersonations, a 
closer look actually reveals that the formats identified all relate to different actions,  
thereby further supporting the hypothesis outlined in chapter 4.4. Mirror 
impersonations exhibiting a preface or disjunct marker and single and double-scope 
impersonations recruiting the XI1 be like YI2 [IMP] format all contribute to 
constructing an assessment of an element of prior topical talk. Single and double-
scope impersonations recruiting the (e/m)-EI1 ≡/⊨E’I2-A-(t-l) [IMP], on the other 
hand, usually serve to introduce illustrations of joke-firsts. These actions span across 
blending types, and it is these actions that interactants seem to orient to. However, 
further evidence is needed to support this hypothesis. The following sections will 
therefore investigate further methods employed in the local management of 
impersonation sequences in order to determine whether they do indeed serve to 
further legitimate the original blending typology or not. 
 
 
5.2. Demarcation markers: Parsing the diegetic from the mimetic 
 
 
The previous chapter outlined the mechanisms employed for creating story-worlds in 
which impersonations are set. While these prefaces constitute an impersonation 
sequence’s diegetic aspect, the impersonation itself is a mimetic visit to the story-
world. Despite this, parsing the diegetic from the mimetic requires careful and subtle 
changes in footing (Goffman, 1981). Footing, Goffman (1981:128) writes, involves “the 
alignment we take up to ourselves and the others present as expressed in the way we 
manage the production or reception of an utterance.” In other words, impersonators 
have to demonstrate to their co-participants that they are now speaking in the voice of 
a character in their own story-world.  
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This section will explore the methods (i.e. demarcation markers) used to signal 
such changes in voice across blending types by first of all focusing on the use of 
quotative frames and secondly on the discontinuation of postural orientation and gaze in 
mimetic oratia recta. These two methods constitute the main demarcation markers 
identified in previous research. Performative semiotic resources, such as grimacing or 
code-switching, may also function as demarcation markers, and will be considered in 
chapter 5.3.  
 
5.2.1. Quotative systems 
 
Quotative systems have mainly been explored in studies on oratia recta, or direct 
speech67, which has long been of interest to researchers from a multitude of 
disciplines. This has in turn lead to diverse sets of terminology to arise, all aiming to 
grasp the phenomenon of changing voices and thus restage or perform the dialogues 
of another. Tannen (1986:312), for example, talks of constructed dialogue to draw 
attention to the fact that such enacted quotes are not word-for-word copies of original 
quotes, but are consciously created “dramas”. In a similar vein, Macaulay (1987) talks 
of quoted direct speech to emphasise the polyphonic nature of such voice changes. The 
changes in footing in oratia recta are commonly signalled, previous research has found, 
through quotatives such as say, be (like), go or do. 
Similar to such constructed direct quotes in conversational narrative, 
impersonations may also be introduced by imitation clauses, to use Vandelanotte & 
Davidse’s (2009) more accurate terminology. Such quotative frames68 signal the 
“syntactic bracketing” (Kohn & Franz, 2009:259) of the direct speech of a character 
other than one’s own, and thus shift the deictic focus (cf. Bücker, MS) from the 
impersonator and the current discourse scenario to the impersonator and the story-
world inhabited by the character. It is clear, then, that they constitute a major means 
for signalling voice changes. Normally, quotatives include more neutral reporting !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Following Golato (2002:26), the term direct speech is here used to refer “to those kinds of reported 
discourse in which the speech and body behaviors of others or oneself are introduced as presently 
ongoing speech.” The term reported speech is not used in conjunction with the phenomenon, as Tannen 
(1986:311) suggests, it is a “misnomer”. Such utterances hardly ever accounts for that which has been 
uttered on another occasion, i.e. they do not constitute factual reports of actual events. 68! Overt introducers in Ferrara & Bell’s (1995) terms, or dialogue introducers in Johnstone’s (1987) 
terminology. In the following, I will only use the term quotative, but will nevertheless take it to refer 
to imitation clauses, as only those quotatives that allow for embodied voice changes will be discussed.!
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verbs that do not exude a particular pragmatic effect (cf. Johnstone, 1987; Romaine & 
Lange, 1991; Tagliamonte & Hudson, 1999), such as say and tell, or verbs illustrating a 
certain voice quality, like whisper or shout (so-called graphic verbs in Labov’s (1972a) 
terminology), a certain manner (whine), or emotion, for example weep (cf. Yule, 1998). 
The latter three are, however, not as common in oral narrative as they are in (more 
traditional) written narrative (cf. Macaulay, 2001; Yule, 1998). In addition, the 
English quotative system is not entirely stable, and has always been subject to ‘fashion’ 
trends, with quotatives such as be all being used exhaustively over a given period and 
then eventually discarded (Kohn & Franz, 2009).  
As impersonations rely heavily on non-verbal aspects, such as sound-effects 
and body movements (gesturing and mimicking), traditional verba dicendi that focus 
on the act of speaking only, for example say or tell, are not found in the NMTB 
impersonation corpus.69⁠ Verba dicendi such as say would even be considered as 
ungrammatical in more mimetic quotes, Singler (2001) argues, as they do not account 
for their multimodal dimension. Instead, impersonations are introduced either 
through “semantically nonreportative” (Vandelanotte & Davidse, 2009:777) 
quotatives that allow for multimodal performances, such as be, be like and go, or – and 
this applies to the vast majority of cases – a zero-quotative.70 
 
Table 3: Distribution of quotatives across blending types (n=109) 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 In NMTB, however, say is used as a quotative in more verbatim and less embodied reports of 
previous events that are presented as factual. 
70 Interestingly enough, these quotatives represent those “new quotatives” as classified by Yule 
(1998:287) in his grammar, thereby providing evidence for the degree to which non-standard 
language is used in the corpus. 
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As illustrated in Table 3, the most common quotatives in the NMTB corpus are zero-
quotative, followed by go and like. Only single-scope impersonations show additional 
quotatives, such as all that, bare be and bare like.  
The preference for zero-quotatives in impersonations in my corpus may have 
numerous causes, not least grammatical reasons. In this respect, Kohn & Franz (2009) 
have shown that a subject in the third-person singular prefers to use zero-quotatives. 
As most single and double-scope (and even mirror) impersonations are characterised 
by third-person singular subjects, this would be one way to explain its 
disproportionate popularity in my corpus. However, the zero-quotative is also used in 
instances in which a second-person singular subject is present, as is the case in 
prefaces of the “You’re V-ing + Impersonation” format. For this reason, the 
grammatical argument put forward by Kohn & Franz (2009) cannot account for all 
instances of zero-quotative usage. What seems to be of greater importance is the 
theatrical, mimetic dimension projected by a zero-quotative. Previous research (e.g. 
Mathis & Yule, 1994) has noted that zero-quotatives are especially common for 
introducing a quote that is set in a highly “dramatic scenario” (Yule, 1998:286), 
whereby the roles have already been established either in the preface or previous 
discourse. Further to this, zero-quotatives seem to have a propensity for introducing 
scenarios that do not necessarily have to be representations of (f)actual events, i.e. they 
may introduce even more fictional talk. According to this line of argumentation, zero-
quotatives create a greater degree of drama in an already established story-world, and 
add a certain degree of immediacy to the impersonation. As they do not explicitly 
reflect on authenticity, they are more independent than impersonations introduced by 
a quotative: they are ‘as’ rather than ‘as if’. In short, the impersonated character is 
presented as more autonomous, as less ‘controlled’ by the impersonator than is the 
case for oratia recta introduced with a quotative. That a quotative that signals this much 
independence should also account for many of the mirror impersonations is thus 
surprising. After all, these mirror impersonations set out to explicitly attribute deviant 
behaviour to co-participants rather than letting independent voices act out (fictional) 
narratives. For this reason, a higher degree of framing by the impersonator could 
reasonably be expected. 
The second-most frequent imitation quotative in my corpus is go. Go is 
considered to be a relatively young quotative, is believed to have originated in the US 
approximately forty years ago (Vandelanotte & Davidse, 2009), and has propagated 
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across the English-speaking world since. Macaulay (2001), for example, found it to be 
the most prominent quotative in his study on quotatives used in young Glaswegians’ 
storytelling. This prominence was, however, preceded by a decline in usage in the 
1990s, when be like became more popular (Buchstaller, 2006). My findings support 
Macaulay’s (2001) and Buchstaller’s (2006) claims regarding the renewed popularity of 
go, and show that go remains a key quotative in British varieties of English.  
The etymology of the quotative go can be traced back to “imitative use[s] of 
go” (Vandelanotte & Davidse, 2009:798), which have been documented from the 18th 
century onwards in such utterances as “Tang goes the harpsichord” (1812, H. Smith 
& J. Smith, Rejected Addr. 117; OED online). When considering its origin as a quotative 
used to introduce onomatopoetic renderings, the main functions which go is associated 
with today are hardly surprising. Rühlemann (2008) finds it to occur primarily in 
conversational narrative, and Tagliamonte & Hudson (1999) claim that go may be 
used to introduce non-lexicalised sounds in said environment. Macaulay’s (2001) 
findings support their results, whilst Yule (1998) adds that go shows a certain 
predilection for occurring in situations where non-factual scenarios are ‘quoted’. In 
addition, Johnstone (1987) illustrates that go does not have a lexical meaning (i.e. it 
does not indicate a manner in which something was uttered). With this flexibility 
regarding its relationship to (f)actual events (cf. zero-quotatives) namely its tendency to 
occur prior to fictive, yet highly dramatised scenarios which include non-lexicalised 
sounds, it is little wonder that go should feature prominently in the corpus. 
It is thus highly unexpected that the functionally similar quotative be like and 
variations thereof do not occur as frequently. Although be like does appear to be a 
relatively novel quotative (with first documented usage dating back merely to the 
1960s), it has been particularly well-researched, and been subject to much attention 
from pragmatics, historical linguistics and grammaticalisation studies, corpus 
linguistics and contact linguistics (for references, see Kohn & Franz, 2009; Fox & 
Robles, 2010). Although the quotative originated in Californian American English, it 
is also well-documented in British varieties of English (cf. Macaulay, 2001; 
Tagliamonte & Hudson, 2008), and, with its usage being mainly recorded among 
young people71, could thus be expected to feature in the NMTB corpus. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!71!The popularity of like, which has been described as an “explosion” (Fox & Robles, 2010:715) does 
not only concern its function as a quotative, but affects a variety of discourse marker functions, 
thereby fuelling further research interests in the different uses of like (e.g. Miller & Weinert, 1995). Its 
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As a quotative, be like is used to introduce performed, enacted quotes, as well as 
attitudes, evaluations, inner thoughts and feelings (Golato, 2000; Tannen, 1989; Yule, 
1998; Fox & Robles, 2010; Streeck, 2002; Tagliamonte & Hudson, 1999). 
Furthermore, it does not necessarily attribute authenticity to the quote (cf. Kohn & 
Franz, 2009; Fox & Robles, 2010). One may therefore reasonably expect that it is 
even more suitable to be used in conjunction with impersonations, especially given 
that be like as a quotative originates from the etymologically oldest meaning of like, the 
comparative. This is still evident in its use as a quotative; it marks a comparison with 
an event, suggesting that which is to follow is not a precise reproduction of a speech 
event, but an approximation (Fox & Robles, 2010; Golato, 2000; Yule, 1998).  
With its focus on the enacted, multimodal, evaluative and emotive as well as its 
tolerance for the fictive, be like would consequently be a prime candidate for framing 
impersonations. This preliminary hypothesis is further supported by Fox & Robles’ 
(2010:716) recent study, which found that the much rarer variant of be like, namely it’s 
like, is used to enact “the thought, feeling or attitude presented rather than describing 
it”, thus adding “bodily displays” (ibid:725) to a quote. As a supplement to this, 
Streeck (2002:581) refers to be like quotes as “body quotations” due to their tendency 
to introduce embodied performance. However, variants of be like only introduce a 
small number (n=6) of impersonations within the corpus. 
 ! As the majority of speakers in the NMTB corpus are male, questions 
concerning gender naturally arise. Yet while the preference for be like is, in American 
varieties of English at least, linked to gender, be like in British English does not seem to 
be preferred by female speakers (Buchstaller, 2008) anymore, ⁠ suggesting that gender 
might not play a role in the lack of use of the quotative be like in the corpus. !
Due to the size of the data set, I will not be able to enquire further into the 
statistical distribution of quotatives, but will rather offer a qualitative analysis that 
aims to shed light on the functions performed by the various quotatives according to 
blending type. To this end, this chapter will explore the use of quotatives in each 
blending type in detail to determine whether blending complexity could have an 
impact on the use of quotatives in impersonations.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
popularity as a quotative has been allocated to recent trends in US-American culture that feature 
“self-revelation as a preferred cultural mode” (Ferrara & Bell, 1995:283). A similar viewpoint that 
links the success enjoyed by be like as a quotative within a culture obsessed with performance and self-
revelation is addressed by Streeck (2002) and Fox & Robles (2010). 
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5.2.1.1. Quotatives in mirror impersonations 
 
In total, 61% (n=56) of all mirror impersonations are introduced without a quotative. 
As such, it will be useful to first consider zero-quotatives in mirror impersonations 
before comparing them to instances of go and be like in a second step.  
When investigating the sequential environment in which zero-quotatives are 
embedded in mirror impersonations, it appears that they are especially prone to be 
followed by impersonations that restage, rephrase or further expand upon a previous 
utterance by a co-participant, with a focus on exposing the alleged ‘true’ motives and 
thoughts behind the original utterance – these are functions which previous studies 
(e.g. Ferrara & Bell, 1995) only attributed to the quotative be like. Therefore, zero-
quotatives in mirror impersonations introduce performances that claim to expose 
internal aspects, inner monologues and motives, rather than externalised actual 
utterances. In doing so, these impersonations reframe the original utterance and 
attribute a distinctly fictional dimension to the original quote, projecting an 
incongruity between the actual, original utterance, and the inner thoughts opposing it. 
The original utterance is thus displayed as ridiculous. The impersonation, in 
consequence, does not recount a previous telling, but adds a novel fictional (and 
mostly derogatory) semantic aspect to it, claiming to uncover the actual, hidden 
motives behind the saying. Consider again “Northern lass”. 
 
 
NMTB S24E08_pt2_01:49 (Northern lass) !
01 DV: do we have to stand yea?  !
02 PJ: yes we do=o !
03 DV: [great! !
04 PJ: [diana vickers! !
05 DV: very excited ! !
06 LM: what about STAndin? ! !
07 DV: [ye(h)es! !
08 AU: [@@@ (1.9)! !
09 
10 
LM: <@ <<northern accent> i’m a simple northern girl  
with a simple wishes! !
11 AU: @[@@! !
12 LM:  [i wish i could go to london and stand, > @> !
13 AU: @@[@ (1.6) !
14 LM:   [<<f> WEll tonight your drEAms come true.> !
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In this sequence, LM’s impersonation of DV (lines 09, 10 and 12) expands on her 
original contributions within the framework of established stereotypes regarding the 
north of England, projecting that these are her actual motives behind expressing her 
approval of having to stand up. This focus on internal, psychological aspects behind 
utterances that seem to be projected by zero-quotatives is evident in a number of 
samples, such as “Travel Lodge”: 
 
NMTB S23E11_2_09:26 (Travel Lodge) 
 
01 FB: i heard a story about you; (.) right;  !
02 DJ: <<p> good> !
03 FB: it was a kiss and tell,! !
04 DJ: right! !
05 FB: by a lady who said, (.)! !
06 DJ: yea ! !
07 FB: that YOU took her to a premier TRAvel lodge,! !
08 DJ: ↑ME?! !
09 AU: @@! !
11 FB: yeˇa! !
  ((…)) !
18  i’m not wrapped up i’m single= !
19 FB: yeah= !
20 DJ: so a single guy  !
21  should be allowed to do what he wants !
22 FB: <@ yeah. if i’m not DAtin her- (.) !
23  it’s the TRAvel lodge. @> !
24 AU: @@ !
 
As in the previous example, this impersonation (lines 22-23) discerns a humorous 
‘true’ intention from a prior contribution, thereby allegedly laying bare the more 
polite phrasing of the original utterance. These examples go to show that a zero-
quotative in mirror impersonations is employed to reveal the hidden motives behind 
an actual utterance, thus creating incongruity and presenting the original as a 
laughable. 
In contrast, consider the following sequence that recruits the quotative go. 
 
NMTB S23E10_3_05:40 (Flirting) 
01 DO: aston did you get her number? !
02  i LIterally saw her looking at you go, !
03  <@ HEy babe, @>! !
04  and you went,! !
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05  <@ ↑yeah it’s been a long time !
!
06  i, ((mimicks phone call)) @> (1.0)!
!
07  like that.! !
08 AU: [@! !
09 DO: [did you do that,= !
10 AM: it HAs been a long time, yeah.! !
 
Unlike in impersonations recruiting a zero-quotative, the voice-changes in this 
sequence do not showcase internal motives, but claim to restage actual utterances 
(lines 03, 05-06). Furthermore, characters in this sequence are not introduced in the 
preface. Neither is the event structure projected in the preface (line 01 – ‘getting 
phone number’) reflected in the two impersonation sets that follow. It thus appears 
that in the NMTB corpus, the quotative go is used in mirror impersonation blends in 
order to signal role changes in impersonation scenarios which  
 
a) focus on the externalisation of utterances, and  
b) whose character(s) and event structure have not fully been established in 
the turn(s) preceding the impersonation.  
 
Impersonations preceded by go, additionally show somewhat more embodied aspects 
than those preceded by zero-quotatives. This might be due to zero-quotative 
impersonations focussing more on the internal while go introduces externalised 
utterances that were (allegedly) uttered rather than purely thought, which naturally allows 
for a greater degree of embodiment.  
The same holds true for instances of be like in the mirror impersonations 
collection. In such cases, be like is used to introduce highly embodied ‘quotes’ that are 
often non-linguistic, i.e. non-lexicalised sounds or purely visual quotes (e.g. grimacing). 
Consider again “Bemused look”. 
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NMTB SE24E11_1_12:00 (Bemused look) 
 
01 NF: i’ve NEver seen anyone !
02  look more bemused; !
03  you’re like- !
<@ !
 
In this sequence, NF visually depicts the affective stance displayed by the 
impersonated in the previous turn. Similar to enactments preceded by go, those 
following be like thus claim to restage and, in doing so, accentuate and caricature 
actual previous actions by another character. Therefore, unlike impersonations using 
zero-quotatives, be like and go in mirror impersonations seem to introduce 
performances that display actions that were allegedly actually carried out in the turns 
preceding the impersonation. However, go seems to project verbal actions, whereas be 
like allows for the emotional or affective stance displayed in the original action to be 
focussed upon. Mirror impersonations preceded by zero-quotatives, on the other 
hand, tend to disclose internal motives that were not made transparent by the original 
action rather than bodily actions and verbalisations. In consequence, go and be like 
permit a greater degree of embodiment than found in zero-quotative impersonations.  
In addition, restaged actions introduced through be like topicalise the emotional 
or affective stance displayed in the original action. Similar to those impersonations 
introduced via go, the content repeated and accentuated is not familiar to all 
participants in the interaction-as-broadcast. In “Flirting”, for example, the television 
audience was not able to bear witness to the original exchange. In “Bemused look”, 
the original negative stance taken by the impersonated is briefly shown in the 
interaction-as-broadcast, but is not emphasised. In effect, then, the impersonators 
make visible actions which had previously been hidden from view, meaning that these 
impersonations require the greater degree of framing provided by a quotative in order 
to ensure that all participants in the interaction-as-broadcast are able to detect the 
voice change and its referent. In contrast, impersonations introduced through a zero-
quotative only restage previous actions which all participants in the interaction-as-
broadcast had access to and which can be assumed to be part of the shared Common 
Ground. Table 4 summarises these findings. 
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Table 4: Overview of quotative functions in mirror impersonations 
 Projected impersonation 
focus 
Familiarity of participants with 
projected content 
Embodiment 
Zero-
quotative 
Ascribed tacit motives 
behind previously 
articulated utterances 
The input utterance is known to all 
participants, but the ‘hidden motives’ 
attributed to the impersonated are not 
 lesser degree of framing required 
Low 
Go Accentuated restaging of 
previous (largely linguistic) 
utterances by co-participant 
The input utterances is not known to 
all participants  higher degree of 
framing required 
Medium 
Be like Accentuated restaging of 
previous (largely bodily) 
actions that display affective 
stance 
Not all participants are aware of the 
original action  higher degree of 
framing required 
High 
 
In all, then, the use of quotatives in mirror impersonations seems to differ from the 
functions identified in previous literature in two main ways: while be like indeed focuses 
on the display of inner states, it does so with inner states that had actually been 
expressed and hence made visible. Zero-quotatives, on the other hand, attribute 
hidden motives to previous actions. This stands in stark contrast to the claims made by 
Fox & Robles (2010) who found that be like may be used to display inner thoughts. In 
mirror impersonations in my corpus, this function is embodied by the zero-quotative. 
Secondly, previous studies (e.g. Yule, 1998; Kohn & Franz 2009) found that go 
and be like are used to introduce more fictitious scenarios. In the NMTB corpus, 
however, both go and be like are found in impersonations that claim to accurately 
restage previous actions, thus accentuating certain aspects which the impersonator 
finds noteworthy. The following chapters will establish whether these discrepancies 
from previous findings might be due to frame integration type. 
 
5.2.1.2. Quotatives in single-scope impersonations 
 
As a zero-quotative is, again, the most common way to introduce an impersonation in 
single-scope impersonations, this chapter will first investigate the environments in 
which this type occurs before comparing it to go and be like. 
Unlike in mirror impersonations, zero-quotatives in single-scope 
impersonations are not used to make visible hidden motives behind actual utterances, 
but are utilised as a means of introducing externalised actions that occur in highly 
fictive, but well-established story-worlds in which all characters and event structures 
have been clarified. “Polish band” illustrates this point: 
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NMTB S20E05_1_04:23 (Polish band) 
 
01 PJ: five always had that vibe about ‘em; !
02  like, (.) !
03  the band were something they did ! !
04  when they weren’t ON SIte. (-)! !
05 AU: @@@! !
06 PJ: five didn’t break up! !
07  they were just actually replaced  !
08  by a chEAper POlish band;  !
09 SA: ye[ah !
10 AU:   [@@@ !
11 PJ: <@ <<Polish accent> we come dance sexy  !
12  for you (.) !
13 AU: @ !
14 PJ: two pounds (.)  !
15 AU: @ !
16 PJ: cash in hand only (--) !
17 AU: @@@ !
18 PJ: then we do conservatory. > @> !
19 AU: @@ !
 
In this sequence, PJ first establishes a fictive story-world in which the members of the 
1990s boy band Five work as “brickies” rather than musicians, and are consequently 
replaced by “cheaper” Polish workers. Once he has set up the story-world with its 
characters and event structure, he does not need to further frame the impersonation 
through a quotative, but can provide a mimetic, theatrical visit to the discourses 
occurring in the alternative world. The same applies to “Cooking with villains”: 
 
NMTB SE21E08_1_04:34 (Cooking with villains) 
 
01 BB: yeah. (.) COOking with VIllains. (h)> !
02  <@ i’ve just broken  !
03  into this beautiful house; (.) !
04 AU: @ !
05 BB: the alarms will go off ! !
06  in thrEE minutes; (.) !
07 AU: @@@! !
08 BB: time for a LOvely salmon salad. @>!
!
09 AU: @@@ !
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This impersonation occurs in an exchange commenting on the recent boom in 
cookery shows in Great Britain. There is a low degree of authenticity (i.e. the 
impersonations provide mimetic visits to a world that is framed as fictive, yet 
alternative to the one shared via Common Ground) and the impersonations are 
largely verbal, with only limited recursions to embodied features, such as gesturing in 
“Cooking with villains”. As in “Polish band”, the impersonation occurs after a preface 
that provides the central character and event of the space set up, and provides a 
dramatic illustration of discourse that could occur in the narrative space. This 
discourse does not, however, add any new value to the development of the story itself. 
It merely illustrates the story, the event structure and characters of which were already 
outlined in the preface. This evocative quality of single-scope impersonations 
introduced through zero-quotative is the main factor that differentiates them from 
single-scope impersonations introduced through quotatives such as go or be like.  
When investigating impersonation sequences introduced through go, it 
becomes evident that such sequences mainly occur in conversational storytelling when 
they are used to develop the narrative further. Instead of providing mimetic visits to a 
story-world already set up, then, these impersonations are crucial to the telling of 
events themselves. The following examples illustrate this point.  
 
NMTB SE22E01_1_09:25 (Upset French) 
 
01 PJ: I think- i think i think !
02  if there A:RE any french people !
03  watching they’re gonna go, !
04 AU: <@ <<ff> AAH quelle est POp quiz 
!
05 PJ: IMB!É!cile;! !
06 AU: @[@@! !
07 PJ:  [((encore)) > @>! !
08 AU: @@@ !
 
The preface of “Upset French” does not point to the event structure, the contents or 
the affective quality of the impersonation, as is the case for impersonations introduced 
with a zero-quotative. It does, however, introduce the voice speaking in the 
performance itself. The impersonation in this case is delivered in (rather rudimentary) 
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French, but due to the fact that it is highly embodied, the affective stance it projects 
should also become evident to co-participants who have little or no knowledge of the 
language. In addition, the story’s main aspect – the rendering of previous discourse on 
the pronunciation of the French plural -s as “imbecile” – recruits a loanword (French: 
imbécile) which will subsequently be shared among the co-participants. Thus, the 
impersonation is not a visit to a story set up in the diegetic preface, but itself 
contributes to the event structure. 
This phenomenon is also witnessed in longer impersonation sequences 
introduced through the quotative go. Consider the “Jason Orange” sequence discussed 
in further detail in chapter 5.2.2.2. Here, a lengthy impersonation of singer Jason 
Orange reflecting on nuclear power is introduced with go, and is preceded only by but 
then again you see he’d go in and go, (line 06). In short, the preface does not 
give any information as to the contents of the impersonation; rather, it purely provides 
the character about to perform an action. It is the impersonation itself that provides 
the narrative structure. 
Furthermore, go is used to introduce shorter impersonation sequences which 
might, in addition, take place in dialogue with other voices performed by the same 
impersonator. As a result, go is used in the local management of voices that contribute 
to the narrative development of a story, as is evidenced by the following sequence. 
 
NMTB SE22E01_1_11:07 (Kylie) 
 
01 TM: i’ve got this image of her? !
02  cos she’s she just seems so down to  !
03  earth? you know? and she’s FOrtysomething  !
04  and she’s dressed  !
05  in this roller skating outfit, !
06  i- i’ve got this image of (.)  !
07  all theserecord producers  !
08  coming up to her and going, !
09 
 
 <@ so kylie (.)   
!
10  we’re doing this new rave thing !
11  and it’s like this eighties synthesizer, 
@> 
!
12  and her just going, !
13  <@ oh, okay, yea,!
!
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14 AU: @! !
15 TM: aright? @> (-)! !
16  <@ and you got to wear  !
17  this futuristic roller skater outfit @> !
18  <@ oh, yea, aright, that sounds (-) !
19 AU: @@ !
20 TM: that sounds fine, (.) !
21  how much am i getting paid for this? @> !
22  <@ TEn million dollars @> !
23  <@ Oh ten million dollars (.)  !
24  i’ll put that into my savings account.(-) !
25 AU: @@ !
26 TM: oh i wish i had a baby; @> !
27  [@@@ !
28  [you know, that sort of thing. !
 
In this staged dialogue between Kylie Minogue and her record producers, go is used to 
introduce each voice. Once the two voices have been established, TM switches 
between them without quotative frames, relying solely on performative demarcation 
markers, such as pitch, accent and gestures. This again points to the fact that zero-
quotatives may only be used in environments in which all voices have been firmly 
established. In sum, then, we find that go introduces impersonations that  
 
a) contribute to the unfolding of the narrative 
b) require local management of multiple voices and 
c) rely on embodied as well as linguistic features. 
 
Single-scope impersonations introduced with be like, on the other hand, are first of all 
used to  introduce impersonation sequences which transport attitudes rather than 
semantic content to further a narrative. Following on from this, be like secondly seems 
to allow for non-verbal items (e.g. screams, onomatopoeic renderings, gestures) to be 
implemented in the impersonation (cf. Fox & Robles’ 2010 findings). The non-
lexicalised sounds performed in “Umbrellas”, for example, serve the display of the 
affective stance also evident in “Justin Bieber”. This latter sequence occurs in an 
exchange on how a boy as “sweet” as Justin Bieber could possibly utter the offensive 
words “don’t fucking touch me again”. The semantic content of the impersonation 
does not, in consequence, add novel information to the narrative space in which it is 
embedded, but provides information as to the (alleged) attitude of the impersonated. 
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NMTB SE24E10_1_07:25 (Justin Bieber) 
 
01 JG: he might be saying that in that picture !
0  he’s like- (.) !
04 
05 
 <@ <<playful voice> don’t fucking touch 
me again; (--) !
06 AU: @@! !
07 JG: double dog dare you,> @>!
!
08 AU: @@@ !
 
Be like can, in a similar manner to go, also be used to manage multiple voices within 
one impersonation sequence, as “Umbrellas” further illustrates. 
 
NMTB SE23E09_1_05:37 (Umbrellas) 
 
01 JL: People probably show up with umbrellas  !
02  and then when she sings umbrella  !
03  they’re like, !
04  <@ <<f> AAhaa wh’ aa !BRI!lliant,>@> 
!
05  and she’s like, !
06  <@ not again. @>!
!
07 AU: @@@! !
 
As the other quotatives found in single-scope impersonations do not occur in either 
mirror- or double-scope impersonations, I refrain from discussing them in greater 
detail. They include bare like, bare be, verb+like and speech act verbs (such as 
propose). Table 5 summarises the functions identified for the three most prominent 
quotatives in the corpus. 
Table 5: Quotative frame functions in single-scope impersonations 
 Projected impersonation 
focus 
Familiarity of participants with 
projected content 
Embodiment 
Zero-
quotative 
Mimetic visitations into 
story-worlds already set up 
Characters and event structure of the 
narrative are familiar to all co-
Low 
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participants  lesser degree of framing 
required 
Go Furthering of story; local 
management of multiple 
voices 
The story has not been elaborated 
upon, not all voices have been 
introduced  higher degree of 
framing required 
Medium 
Be like Staging of (often bodily) 
actions that display affective 
and evaluative stance; local 
management of multiple 
voices 
Affective stance transmitted through 
the impersonation; not all characters 
introduced in preface  higher degree 
of framing required 
High 
 
These functions largely parallel those identified for mirror impersonations. However, 
differences are observed with regard to the focus of the impersonation. Whether or 
not they can be attributed to frame integration complexity will be discussed once the 
quotative system in which double-scope impersonations are embedded has been 
described. 
 
5.2.1.3. Quotatives in double-scope impersonations 
 
The double-scope impersonations in the NMTB corpus are either introduced through 
zero-quotatives or go. No variants of be like occur, which is surprising, as Golato (2000) 
has found be like this to introduce ‘quotes’ featuring non-human entities. It does, 
however, appear as if the function attributed by Golato (2000) to be like this can be 
fulfilled by zero-quotatives, given that the preface outlines characters and event 
structure. This becomes evident in “Holiday horse”, where NF impersonates a 
confused horse. 
 
NMTB SE24E12_1_13:53 (Holiday horse) 
 
01 NF: my i thought that was you staring  !
02  blankly at the screen like a !HOR!se  !
03  that’s been asked to book a HOliday (h) !
04 AU: @@@ !
05 NF: ((3 secs of mimicking horse; 
grimacing)) !
 
As in mirror and single-scope impersonations using zero-quotatives, the zero-
quotative in double-scope impersonations requires a clear setting of the scene during 
the preface sequence. The impersonation itself is merely a mimetic visit, a ‘sneak-
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preview’ into the diegetically set-up story space. In “Holiday horse”, however, it has 
another function thus far only found in single-scope impersonations which are 
introduced through be like; in effect, the performance illustrates the affective stance of 
the impersonated character, and is highly embodied. This also applies to “Babybel”, 
where the impersonation accompanies the telling of a story, providing brief 
illustrations of both bodily action and the affective stance of the impersonated as the 
story unfolds. These illustrations are first and foremost gestural, with only a brief 
verbal element towards the end of the story. It is thus that such impersonations ‘bring 
before the eyes’ (cf. Aristotle, Rhetorics) a diegetically set-up narrative. They do not 
themselves contribute to narrative development, but merely demonstrate it visually 
through a high degree of embodiment and via sound bites which emphasise affective 
stance. 
 
NMTB SE23E03_1_05:21 (Babybel) 
 
01 NF: i like to imagine a babybel  !
02  walking through a forest  !
03  and all of a sudden  !
04  getting pulled up into the air (-) 
!
05 AU: 
NF: 
[@@@ 
[((1 sec embodied impersonation of 
   trapped babybel cheese)) !
06 NF: his little wax feet  !
07  kicking through the netting, !
08  <@ ↑help me,  
((2 sec embodied impersonation)) !
 
The ‘bringing-before-the-eyes’ quality of impersonation introduced by means of zero-
quotative is, in my corpsu, antithetical to those preceded by go. In these cases, the 
impersonation itself is central to the unfolding of the narrative. The narrative has not 
fully been set out diegetically, but is further driven by the characters’ actions. 
Consider the following sequence, which provides yet another instance of equine 
anthropomorphism. 
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NMTB SE24E02_1_03:15 (Displeased horse) 
 
01 NF: see that horse’s body language? (.) !
02  that horse is going, !
03  <@ get me out of this video. (-) !
04 AU: @@ !
05 NF: this is the !WOR!st music EVer. (.) !
06 AU: @ !
07 NF: i don’t care how many carrots and sugar !
08  you gi(h)ve me(h); @> (-) !
09 AU: @@ !
10 NF: you can lead a horse to a pop video !
11  but you can’t ma(h)ke it like(h) it. !
 
In “Displeased horse”, the voice of the horse contributes to the unfolding of the 
narrative. The diegetic preface does not provide any information as to the actions or 
attitudes that the horse might be offering. In contrast, double-scope impersonations 
introduced with zero-quotatives, such as “The Metal Detector”, take place in a fully 
established world. The metal detector’s problems and actions are established in the 
diegetic preface; all the impersonation adds is the Aristotelian “bringing-before-the-
eyes” of an already established story. Impersonations introduced through go, on the 
other hand, are of key importance to narrative development. 
As “Displeased horse” also illustrates, go is used for distinctly vocal and verbal 
elements rather than visual aspects. While zero-quotatives may also be used to 
introduce solely visual representations in double-scope impersonations, go seems to 
demand a sonic, if not verbal mimetic approximation. 
Altogether, then, the use of quotatives in double-scope impersonations seems 
to be determined by  
 
a) the degree to which the story space has already been established in the 
preface, and  
b) the semiotic resources used in the impersonation.  
 
Table 6 provides an overview of the functions identified for zero-quotatives and the 
quotative go in double-scope blends. 
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Table 6: Quotative functions in double-scope impersonations 
 Projected impersonation 
focus 
Familiarity of participants with 
projected content 
Embodiment 
Zero-
quotative 
Mimetic visits to story-
worlds already set up 
Characters and event structure of the 
narrative are familiar to all co-
participants  lesser degree of 
framing required 
High 
Go Furthering of story; mainly 
sonic / verbal 
The story has not been elaborated 
upon, not all voices have been 
introduced  higher degree of 
framing required 
Low to 
Medium 
 
The functions therefore largely parallel the ones identified for single-scope and, to a 
lesser extent, mirror impersonations. The main difference here is the degree of 
embodiment for zero-quotatives, which was rather low for mirror and single-scope 
impersonations and was proven to be high in double-scopes. I will further discuss this 
point in the following section.  
 
5.2.1.4. Discussion of findings 
 
The high frequency of zero-quotatives and the low occurrence of be like in the NMTB 
corpus was unexpected considering the findings derived from previous research on 
oratia recta. Yet upon closer inspection it became evident that these “imitation clauses” 
(Vandelanotte & Davidse, 2009) fulfil clearly delineated functions and, in tight 
coordination, interplay with other phenomena, such as postural orientation and 
preface formats, as a means of building action. Quotatives contribute to signalling 
“This is what I am about to do”. These results further support Golato’s (2002) 
assessment of the context-sensitivity of quotatives. Their use is rule-governed and 
dependent on the action underway. 
What is here referred to as ‘impersonation’ appears to in fact consist of a wide 
variety of actions used to achieve a number of goals. Through impersonations, 
participants may, for example, ascribe unfavourable motives or thoughts to a co-
participant, restage past discourse, or ‘bring-before-the-eyes’ of co-participants the 
best-of instances of a narrative. For building these actions, impersonators have to first 
of all locally manage the voices contributing to the narrative, and secondly establish 
the epistemic ground upon which is built the greater narrative in which the 
impersonation is set. To this end, quotatives such as go and be like provide a means of 
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locally managing voices and the narrative unfolding of a story. Conversely, 
impersonations that attribute and reveal tacit motives or identities to a co-participant 
recruit zero-quotatives. However, quotatives are also orchestrated in conjunction with 
the semiotic resources which a given action employs. When visually illustrating a story 
through one’s body, gestures and grimaces, be like or zero-quotative might be used. On 
the other hand, when the action is , intended to make a narrative more vivid through 
the staging of sonic or verbal aspects, go is the quotative of choice. 
It thus appears that the use of quotatives is not dependent on frame-
integration complexity, but more on the actions currently underway; as such, it 
parallels the strategies identified for diegetic prefaces. Some of these actions are only 
found in one blending type (e.g. displaying a co-participant’s tacit motives) whilst 
others are found across blending types, such as mimetic visits to a story-world which 
had already been diegetically set-up in a preface. With regard to quotatives and 
prefaces, then, it is the actions that determine their selection, not frame-integration 
complexity. 
 
5.2.2. Embodied demarcation markers: Gaze and postural orientation 
 
Gaze, turning one’s face and postural orientation all play a major role in organising 
interaction and participation frameworks (cf. Goodwin, 1981; Goodwin, 2003a; 
Kangasharju, 1996; Kendon, 1990). Depending on the situated activity in which it is 
embedded, gaze and body positioning can in this regard be employed by interactants 
to publicly indicate the focus of their orientation. Participants can, for example, 
position themselves as hearers of talk by orienting their bodies towards the speaker’s. 
In this context, Goodwin (1981) has found that speakers will discontinue talk should 
hearers not visibly orient to them. The importance of bodily and visually orienting to 
communicative partners becomes evident in the NMTB corpus as well, when in 
“Listening”, guest panellist NH explicitly addresses the host SA’s visual 
disengagement with his story, questioning whether he was listening at all.  
 
NMTB SE20E05_1_03:25 (Listening) 
01 NH: uh (.) SEAn from five went to my 
school. 
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02 FF: ↑oh 
((SA heard shuffling through 
papers)) 
 
03 NH: WEnt to my school; 
 
04 SA: so(rry)? 
 
04 NH: a- are you LIStening? 
 
05 SA: i’m [listening (--) so:rry 
 
06 AU:     [@@ 
 
07 NH: not sure you we=ere 
 
 
This sequence illustrates the extent to which bodily orientation and gaze are central to 
the interactional organisation: NH interrupts his story-telling when he notices that one 
of his recipients, SA, is not posturally aligning himself as the recipient of the story. 
This goes to show that the discontinuation of bodily orientation is an accountable 
action and is crucial to the organisation of the participant framework. 
Secondly, postural orientation and gaze can be employed in turn-taking to 
select addressees in interaction: I will normally turn to and, more importantly, look at 
the person I wish to address. In connection with this, turning away from an 
interactant can be employed to show distance and disengagement. Gaze, face, and 
body positioning are therefore crucial in displaying the focus of attention in 
interaction. 
Impersonations exhibit unique features when it comes to gaze, face and body 
positioning. Previous research (e.g. Goodwin, 1984; Lee, Neidle, MacLaughlin, 
Bahan, & Kegl, 1997; McClave, 2000; Niemelä, 2010; Sidnell, 2006) has shown that 
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in the situated activity system ‘enactment’, gaze and postural alignment with co-
participants is discontinued. During the enactment, the impersonator discontinues eye 
contact with co-participants, and further signals that s/he is oriented to another 
discourse scenario by orienting her/his body away from co-participants. Bodily and 
visual orientation with the main co-participants in interaction is resumed once the 
enactment is finished. Gaze and postural orientation have thus been identified as a 
key signalling device in parsing the diegetic from the mimetic. 
While these findings largely concur with my data set, they do not, however, 
apply to all instances, as gaze, and more notably face and body positioning, are not 
presented as being fully discontinued in one type of impersonation. Mirror blending 
impersonations that ascribe an identity to a co-participant are, in the interaction-as-
broadcast, presented as being delivered while posturally orienting towards the person 
that the impersonation is being assigned to. Furthermore, differences can be observed 
regarding the degree to which gaze and body positioning is discontinued; it seems that 
impersonations which more aggressively ascribe deviant behaviour to co-participants 
(i.e. face-threatening acts) can be delivered whilst gazing directly at the impersonated, 
as will be demonstrated below. 
 
Video-based analysis of postural orientation: preliminary remarks 
Analysing gaze and body position based on video, and more importantly, edited 
televised data runs the risk of being criticised for two reasons. Firstly, in all video data 
it is difficult to fully determine exactly what a person is actually looking at. Secondly, 
these visual elements are among the most notably edited in televised data: the final 
product that is aired, the interaction-as-broadcast, presents interaction not from one 
static angle, but is edited in such a way that shots are shown from a number of 
perspectives and distances. The interaction-as-broadcast appears as a unified whole. 
With this variety of shots ranging from close-ups to long shots, though, how is the 
effect of smooth interaction with people visually engaging with one another achieved? 
The “visual grammar” (Holland, 2000) of filming practices employs two key 
techniques. First of all, the 180-degree rule holds that all people shown have to maintain 
screen directions, so as to avoid confusion as to their location in the set-up (similar to 
football games, which are broadcast from one side of the pitch only, as confusion 
would otherwise arise regarding which goal a team is attacking). NMTB employs 
three camera positions: long shots and medium long shots show the panel set-up from 
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the perspective of the studio audience (the studio audience is never visible, nor are the 
backs of the panellists), while ensuing close shots of teams and their members in 
interaction are shot in shot, reverse-shot structure. This second technique, whereby 
people in dialogue are filmed individually with one side facing right and the other 
facing left, allows the illusion of people interacting with each other rather than with 
the audience. When dialogues between the different teams or the host and the teams 
are presented in NMTB, the interactants are shown from the perspective of their 
respective interactants (known as an ‘over the shoulder’ shot). As this is standard video 
practice, the allusion of people visually engaging with each other is created when their 
gaze is level. The only time that people are filmed from a frontal perspective, 
consisting of gazing directly into the camera, is during sequences in which the host 
addresses the television audience rather than the panellists alone and during 
impersonation sequences (see below). The gaze direction of panellists is thus presented 
to the television audience as a means of visually engaging with another participant in 
interaction whilst employing the 180-degree rule and shot, reverse-shot structure. In 
consequence, the gaze direction studied here is gaze as presented and constructed in 
the interaction-as-broadcast.  
 
5.2.2.1. Gaze and postural positioning in mirror impersonations 
 
In all instances of mirror impersonations in my data set, the postural and facial 
orientation of a speaker is not shifted consistently throughout the enactment to signal 
a change in footing (Goffman, 1981) or speaker roles, as the general gaze direction, 
level of gaze, and body positioning is maintained with only slight gaze shifts upwards 
or downwards and the reclining of upper bodies. There are even instances in which 
gaze is only interrupted at the beginning, but resumed during the impersonation. 
Consider “Narcissistic Barrowman”.  
 
NMTB JB_pt2_02:35 (Narcissistic Barrowman) 
 
01 
 
SA: i uhm I’m putting my foot down.  
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02  YOU cheated there; bill bailey 
 
03 JB: <<ff> ↑I didn’t CHEAt,> 
 
04 SA: not !YOU!; BArrowman 
 
05 JB: [right, 
 
06 AU: [@@  
07 SA: ↑ALways about you isn’t it? 
 
08 AU: [@@  
09 JB: [<<smiley voice> Yeaˇeah> 
 
10 
11 
12 
13 
SA: <@ <<f> I’ll be on MAria (.) 
I’ll be on torchwood 
I’ll be on any !BLOOd!y show  
that will have me> (1.1)  
14 JB: @@@ 
 
15 SA: E(h)ven BU(h)zzcocks. @> 
 
 
In this sample, SA impersonates JB, playing on the latter’s alleged proclivity to appear 
on British TV shows. As is shown in figure 23, SA starts off his impersonation by 
reclining in his chair and audibly breathing in after the preface; his general postural 
orientation to his main addressee, JB, is nevertheless maintained. At the 
commencement of the enactment, SA briefly gazes upwards and to his left, but soon 
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levels his gaze directly at JB. By the end of the first TCU of the enactment, namely the 
prosodically marked MAria (line 10), he again fully orients both gaze and upper body 
towards the impersonated JB. His gaze and body retain the same orientation 
throughout the remaining two TCUs of the performance, with the sole exception of a 
brief lateral head shake towards his right on the accentuated BLOOdy (line 12). 
McClave (2000) and others (e.g. Goodwin, 1980) have found that lateral movements 
of the head may be used as intensifiers in evaluations. As this head movement is 
synchronised with a prosodically marked word, it may therefore be used to further 
emphasise the word rather than act as a discontinuation of gaze. At the end of his 
performance, SA finally terminates his gaze, looking down at his desk. It thus appears 
as though in aggressive enactments that attribute a deviant identity to people present, 
the gazing practices differ. While the onset of the enactment is marked by 
discontinuing gaze, large chunks of the impersonation may be delivered whilst gazing 
and orienting towards the recipient. The end of the impersonation is again marked by 
the cessation of one’s gaze. It is consequently different from ‘ordinary’ impersonations, 
where shared gaze is resumed once the impersonation is complete (as, for example, 
Niemelä (2010) contends). 
 
!
Figure 23: Gaze and postural orientation in “Narcissistic Barrowman” 
 
Interestingly enough, this ‘deviant’ enactment behaviour is counter to the practices 
employed in post-production, where impersonators are shown with frontal close-ups 
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during enactments to further add to the illusion that impersonators are oriented to to 
another discourse scenario rather than to their co-participants (which is usually shown 
using the shot, reverse-shot technique). In this example, however, SA remains oriented to 
his right whilst being presented from the front. This indicates that producers seem to 
place distinct importance on the discontinuation of body posture and gaze in their re-
shaping of the interaction – more so than the original participants, who seem to 
accept orientation towards the impersonated during enactments. 
In less aggressive or face-threatening mirror impersonations, however, gaze 
tends to be discontinued throughout the impersonation. Nonetheless, postural 
orientation towards the enacted is continued, contrary to claims made in previous 
research. Consider again the “Sports Commentator I” sequence discussed in chapter 
4.1. In this sample, the impersonator, PJ, does an impression of a member of the other 
team. While PJ gazes at the host during the preface to his performance (i.e. to his left), 
he turns his gaze further to his right on the onset of the impersonation (cf. figure 24). 
As he is now sitting straight ahead, he is posturally positioned in a manner directly 
facing the ‘butt’ of his impersonation. However, his gaze direction in the 
impersonation-as-broadcast is presented as going towards his right rather than straight 
ahead. This means that he does not look at her during the impersonation, but is 
bodily oriented towards her.  
 
!
Figure 24: Gaze and postural orientation in “The Sports Commentator I” 
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It may therefore be concluded that in mirror impersonations, gaze is mostly 
discontinued while a general bodily orientation to the person that is being 
impersonated is maintained – this stands in stark contrast to previous findings on this 
subject. Gaze may be resumed in especially aggressive impersonations once the voice 
change has been established. This type of enactment is discontinued by terminating 
one’s gaze, whereas less aggressive enactments are ended by re-establishing shared 
gaze again. The two subtypes notwithstanding, it appears that in mirror 
impersonations, participants show a strong orientation to the current discourse setting 
by maintaining a postural orientation to the co-participants with whom they were 
engaged during the preface.  
 
5.2.2.2. Gaze and postural positioning in single-scope impersonations 
 
While impersonators largely retain a postural impersonation towards the 
impersonated during impersonations that enact a person present in the discourse 
scenario, single-scope impersonations in which the impersonated inhabits a different 
discourse scenario show greater discontinuation of bodily and facial orientation. 
However, such instances are not always as clear-cut as standard literature would lead 
one to believe. While gaze is always discontinued at the start of an impersonation, it 
might –albeit briefly – be redirected towards the main communicative partner during 
the commencement of the Turn Constructional Units (TCUs) contributing to an 
enactment. Consider, for example, the “Jason Orange” sequence.  
 
NMTB S20E04_1_07:05 (Jason Orange)72 
 
01 
 
PJ: well one might imagine  
 
 
02  that madonna isn’t really qualified to  
03  solve such matters in this country. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 The transcript contains IPA symbols (in square brackets) where marked deviations from the standard 
used by PJ occur. Jason Orange, a member of the boy band Take That, is from Manchester, and PJ 
mocks a northern accent in this impersonation sequence. 
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04 SA: but jason orˇange; 
 
05 PJ: he IS; 
 
06  but then again you see he’d go in and go,  
07  <@ ri::ght (-)  
08 AU: @  
09 PJ: nuclear power and tha’;   
10 AU: @  
11  like-  
12  S[u]m of it is good li::ke  
13  @  
14  Wh[o]t makes electricit[!]  
15 AU: @  
16 PJ: B[u]t’!(-)  
17 AU: @@  
18 PJ: S[u]m of it ‘s b[a]::d  
19 AU: @@  
20 PJ: like, (.) i wanna stop the bad stuff (-)  
21  keep the good. @>  
22 AU: @@@  
 
As figure 25 shows, PJ is shown as being strongly oriented to SA during the interaction 
preceding the impersonation sequence. He turns further away from SA during the 
preface to his impersonation (albeit not crossing the 90-degrees axis), but glances back 
at SA three times during the first three TCUs of his performance: briefly on the 
lengthened vowel of ri::ght (line 07), then again at the onset of the second TCU on 
nuclear (line 09), and for the entire third TCU, namely sum of it is good 
li::ke (line 11). As his turning of the head is not synchronised with emphasised 
syllables, this glancing towards his left (and hence original communicative partner) 
could constitute a verification for acknowledgment or tokens of appreciation. 
However, this latter point unfortunately cannot be confirmed by my data set, as the 
interaction-as-broadcast does not show potential backchanelling signals by SA in this 
sequence, nor is this shown in some of the other instances (e.g. “Great Value”) in 
which this brief glance by the impersonator back to the host can be observed. There 
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is, though, evidence that such fleeting looks back to the host (who perceptibly holds  
most power in the studio set-up) are indeed backchannelling requests, as the 
interaction-as-broadcast shows a laughing host following such glances in other 
sequences (cf. analysis of “Metal Detector” below). This is also confirmed by previous 
research on head movements, which has indicated that brief lateral head movements 
may be used as nonverbal backchanelling requests (cf. McClave, 2000).  
 
Figure 25: Bodily orientation in “Jason Orange” 
 
The remaining five TCUs of the impersonation performance are delivered whilst fully 
oriented on the 90-degrees axis and hence away from SA. By the end of the 
enactment, PJ is reclining in his chair and crossing his arms, with his head even turned 
slightly more to his right than to his left. Over the course of the impersonation, then, 
he has continuously moved further away from his original interactional partner; from 
keeping a general orientation and even glancing back to SA during the first few turns, 
he crosses the 90-degrees axis and orienting more to his right. The longer PJ inhabits 
the role and the discourse world he has set up, the more he orients away from the 
original interaction.  
For briefer single-scope impersonations, however, the impersonator does not 
posturally orient as far away from the original interactant, nor does s/he utilise gaze 
during the impersonation to check for tokens of acknowledgment. On the contrary, 
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gaze and facial alignment is ostensibly discontinued in short impersonation sequences, 
which is entirely different to topical talk. In “Northern Mac”, host LM mocks guest 
DV for the second time for her northern accent, and impersonates a fast food outlet 
customer from the north of England.  
 
S24E08_2_11:18 (Northern Mac) 
 
01 LM: <<singing> return of the mac> 
 
02 PJ: <<singing> o=o u=u>  
03 DV: I GEt uh burger uh macʔflurrʔic, 
 
04 LM: MAc burger, you think’   
05  ↑<<f> It’s not an advert for big 
mac,> 
 
06  return of the mac,   
07  <@oh I’ll have fries with that>= 
 
08  [return of the mac (.)  
 AU: [@@@  
09 LM: we don’t do ADverts  
10  <<ff> we’re trying to BREAK   
11  this northern stereotype>  
12  return of the mac,   
13  <@ oh ri:te    
14  i’ll have cheeseburger and [fries  
 AU:                            [@@@ 
 
15 LM: and apple pie as well please @>  
 
This sequence illustrates how in shorter impersonations that only last one or two 
turns, head movement and gaze play a key role in parsing the diegetic from the 
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mimetic. While LM fully orients to DV prior to the enactment as well as during the 
diegetic interlude, he aligns his upper body and gaze more at a ninety degree angle 
during the impersonations, gazing and gesturing straight ahead towards an implied 
conversational partner (see figure 26). As this is a brief and rapid sequence, he jolts his 
body towards the right and centre in order to signal the moment when he assumes the 
role of the stereotypical northern consumer of a fast food outlet and when he returns 
to addressing DV in topical talk. He does not, however, cross the 90-degree axis with 
his upper body during his impersonation, but retains a general orientation to DV by 
keeping his left shoulder directed forwards. This is in line with Goodwin’s (2003b) 
findings, which suggest that the upper parts of the body are more flexible in shifting 
alignment, while the lower limbs are used to indicate general alignment. Brief 
engagement and disengagement is thus displayed by turning the head or shoulders, 
while general alignment is signalled through the posture of the lower body, such as 
direction of the legs when seated. As the “Northern Mac” sequence is quite short, the 
disengagement probably did not last long enough for the orientation of the lower 
limbs to change fully. In contrast, “Jason Orange” (cf. figure 25) constitutes a longer 
break of topical talk, and may thus lead to a further orientation away from the original 
interactants. 
 
!
Figure 26: Postural orientation in “Northern Mac” 
 
Although gaze may be briefly redirected towards previous interactants at the 
commencement of longer impersonations (presumably to check for tokens of 
acknowledgment that allow for further continuation of the impersonation), postural 
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alignment and discontinuing gaze appear to be crucial to single-scope impersonations. 
Other than in mirror impersonations, the body, face and gaze are aligned more to the 
90-degrees axis (‘straight ahead’) than towards the original interactants. Whether this 
does indeed constitute a clear indicator for the division between mirror and single-
scope impersonations will be discussed below. 
 
5.2.2.3. Gaze and postural positioning in double-scope impersonations 
 
The importance of discontinuing postural orientation and gaze with previous 
interactants is also evident in double-scope impersonations, in which impersonators 
assume the role of non-humans in other discourse scenarios. Consider “Metal 
Detector” once more. As shown in figure 27, NF orients to his main co-participants, 
host SA (to his right) and guest KS (to his left) during the co-constructed prefacing 
sequence, but then orients straight ahead from the onset of his impersonation of a 
metal detector.  
 
!
Figure 27: Postural orientation in “Metal Detector” 
 
The first question that provides the relevance for his later impersonation is directed at 
SA, and NF consequently bodily orients to the host. However, when KS further 
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elaborates upon the ‘problem’, NF turns to her, aligning himself as the recipient of her 
talk. Yet NF delivers his next turn oriented away from her, thus signalling that he is 
speaking in another voice. This is accepted by his co-participants, as they arrange 
themselves as recipients by showing postural orientation to NF and laughing at his 
performance without attempting to interrupt. Once NF’s impersonation has been 
established, his gaze can be interpreted as being directed by the metal detector, 
addressing co-imagined figures in space. This is, for example, evident in NF’s brief 
alteration in bodily posture to reflect an upward direction, presumably to the person 
using the metal detector, before delivering the apologetic I can’t help it. He, too, 
briefly gazes at host SA before offering the final TCU of his impersonation. Is this 
brief lateral head movement a request for backchannelling, or is it the metal detector 
addressing a general audience? As the next shot shows SA laughing, it can be inferred 
that in the interaction-as-broadcast, NF’s brief gaze to the right is indeed a way to 
verify recipient tokens. The interaction-as-broadcast consequently aligns host SA as 
the main recipient of the impersonation, i.e. the recipient oriented to by NF during his 
performance; this is despite the fact that the other co-participants also align 
themselves as recipients of his enactment via their strong postural orientation towards 
NF. As in single-scope impersonations, then, backchanelling requests are possible in 
the interval between an impersonation’s TCUs. Furthermore, double-scope 
impersonations also require an otherwise steady discontinuation of gaze and postural 
orientation.  
 
5.2.2.4. Discussion  
 
Overall, then, is there evidence for the usage of separate techniques in single and 
double-scope blends as there are in mirror and single-scope blends? When considering 
an example that features mirror, single-scope and double-scope impersonations in 
close succession, double-scope impersonations at first glance do indeed seem to 
require a clearer discontinuation of postural orientation. In “Stevenson’s rabbit”, 
impersonator PJ ascribes a tacit Victorian identity to a co-participant (i.e. mirror-
blend; cf. discussion of zero-quotative mirror impersonations in chapter 5.2.1.) prior 
to enacting a ‘steam-powered dildo’. This double-scope impersonation of a machine is 
then followed by a single-scope impersonation performed by another co-participant, 
RI. Let us now consider this complex sequence in more detail. 
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NMTB SE19E05_1_08:11 (Stevenson’s rabbit)73 
 
01 DB: do you think it is uh (.) 
 
02  a little (.) steam-powered dildo    
03 
04 
 with little (.) chocoloate (.)  
uhm toffee apples on the side?  
 
05 AU: @@@  
06 PJ: a steam-powered DILdo?  
07 AU: @@  
08 DB: yeah  
09 PJ: <@ <<f>oh if i’m pleasuring myself  
10  i have to do it in the victorian 
style; > 
(-) 
 
11 AU: @@  
12 PJ: <<f> where’s my coa:l james?> @>(-)  
13 AU: @  
14 PJ: stevenson’s rabbit;   
15  <<steam sounds in three intervalls>> 
(--) 
 
 
16  <<whistle sound, twice>> (--)  
17 AU: x@x@x  
18 RI: <@ (isenba:rt) what’s under your hat? 
@> 
 
19 AU: @@  
20 RI: <@ i have quite a surprise for you 
mylady @> 
 
 
The three impersonations are made relevant in a guessing game, during which one 
team member, DB, suggests to his fellow team members, PJ and RI, that the futuristic 
chocolate fountain in a video clip might actually be a “steam-powered dildo”. This is 
latched upon by PJ who, while strongly orienting to DB, repeats the key term before 
delivering his first impersonation, through which he describes a ‘Victorian’ attitude to 
DB. He briefly glances away at the start of the impersonation, but remains oriented to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 The transcript only shows frame grabs when they aid understanding of the sequence.  
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DB throughout most of the performance, and often looks at him directly. However, 
once he begins to impersonate the machine, he orients straight ahead, lowers his head 
and produces sound effects commonly associated with steam engines; these sounds are 
accompanied by gestures and body movements. He is not once presented as orienting 
to his co-participants during this sequence, as figure 28 shows.  
 
!
Figure 28: Postural orientation in “Steam-Powered Dildo”  
 
RI’s impersonation of yet another Victorian person (this time single-scope) follows PJ’s 
enactment, illustrating again that a subsequent joke is a relevant next action to a prior 
joke. However, RI shows crucial differences as regards bodily orientation. Whereas 
PJ, who is seated in the middle, positions his body to face straight ahead in his 
enactment of a machine, RI’s single-scope impersonation of a human is presented as 
keeping a postural orientation to his team members on his left. This postural 
orientation is much stronger at the beginning of the impersonation, and appears 
somewhat more discontinued towards the second TCU of his enactment. He gazes 
upwards and to his right, but from shoulder-level downwards maintains a general 
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orientation to his team (i.e. he does not cross the 90-degrees axis). This corresponds to 
the conclusion made above: discontinuation of postural orientation is gradual and 
progresses in impersonations that require ‘legitimacy’ from other co-participants. The 
impersonation is presented as something that is relevant to the joint action underway, 
as the impersonator aligns himself as a member of the interaction even during an 
impersonation. 
To conclude, while PJ is oriented to his main co-participant DB during the 
impersonation of the Victorian human, he discontinues his gaze and is oriented at a 
ninety degree angle throughout his performance as the machine. RI’s single-scope 
impersonation is then delivered whilst looking away from his co-participants, although 
he maintains a general postural orientation towards them (i.e. he does not cross the 
90-degree axis); this is consistent with previous examples of single-scope blending. 
Despite this, ”Stevenson’s Rabbit” hardly proves that double-scope impersonations 
require more discontinuation than single-scope impersonations, as numerous 
impersonations recruiting novel discourse scenarios are delivered whilst continuously 
orienting to a co-participant. How, then, can these instances be accounted for?  
 
Problem cases 
A number of otherwise clearly single-scope impersonations are delivered with a 
particular gaze and maintaining postural orientation to a co-participant. In “Alan 
Bennett Monologue”, host FB does a single-scope impression of what he frames as a 
prototypical Alan Bennett monologue; he does so whilst being shown as clearly 
orienting to CV, who had the previous turn.  
 
NMTB SE23E11_3_00:39 (Alan Bennett Monologue) 
 
01 CV: YEah but I DId see it then cos the children  
02  were a bit younger then;   
03  so we used to STAy in on a saturday night  
04  <<p> and,>  
05 NF: but you’re an AMAzing mum  
06 AU: @@  
07 NF: and made them watch the [ex(h)fa(h)cto(h)r;  
08 AU:                         [<<p>@@>  
09 CV: NO=NO=NO   
10  cos they WANted to watch the ex factor at that age.  
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11 NF: <pp> alright>=  
12 FB: THIs is like a alan BEnnett monologue now (-)  
13 AU: @@@  
14 FB: <@ i remember we had (raVEEtis) [that night; (--)  
15 AU:                                 [@@@  
16 FB: [(there were)] the EXfactor  
17 AU: [@@  
18 FB: i went for the custard creams  
19  there was NO custard creams;  
20  HAr[vey; (.)  
21 AU:    [@@  
22 FB: HArvey had taken the LAst custard cream;  
23 FB: and in MAny ways   
24  THAt summed up OUr relationship. @>  
25 AU: @x@x@x  
 
!
Figure 29: Postural orientation in “Alan Bennett Monologue” 
 
As figure 29 illustrates above, FB briefly gazes to his right and away from his 
interactants at the beginning of his impersonation, but keeps looking back to his left 
and therefore back to his original interactants during the enactment sequence. He 
turns his gaze away very briefly at the onset of each TCU, but returns it towards the 
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end of each section. In addition to this, the interaction-as-broadcast presents CV as 
the addressee of this single-scope interaction, as she is shown laughing in close-up after 
the preface and at the end of the impersonation sequence. This parallels the strategies 
identified for mirror-blends.  
How can this be accounted for? When examining the pragmatics of these 
performances, it transpires that in all these samples, the impersonation is employed to 
mock a co-participant for allegedly deviant behaviour. By maintaining a postural 
orientation towards and gazing at the interactant, impersonations can be used to 
effectively state ‘this is you’ – no matter whether they are mirror or single-scope (cf. 
assessment of mirror blends using zero-quotative). 
In a similar vein, gazing at co-participants whilst embodying another role is 
also possible in joint, multi-party role-play, where the impersonator aligns himself as 
one character in the story space and the addressee another. This is, for example, the 
case in “Easy Robin”, where DM, PJ and BB address JA, who had previously been 
introduced as the actor playing Robin Hood in a recent BBC dramatisation, as 
“Robin”, assuming unnamed characters of the Robin Hood story space.  
 
NMTB SE20E05_2_04:21 (Easy Robin) 
 
01 DM: <@ EASy Robin leave it [<<f> LEAve it- >  
02 JA:                     [<<p> a’right.>  
03 AU:                     [@@  
04 JA: I know I know.  
05 PJ: <<f> we’ve A:ll had some meat>=  
06 DM: [<<f> don’t WOrk it robin,> (-)  
07  [@@@  
08 BB: NOt so MErry now are ya? @>  
09 AU: @@@xxx  
 
As shown in figure 30, discontinuation of gaze is not observed at the onset of the 
characters’ role-swaps, showing that the enactors fully orient to the story space in a 
manner akin to the theatre. It is only BB’s concluding contribution to the sequence 
that shows a clear discontinuation of gaze. However, it cannot be inferred as to 
whether BB is speaking as a character of the story-world set up in previous 
interactions or is actually speaking as ‘himself’, orienting again to the previous 
discourse space and signalling the break with on-going ‘fictive’ talk by discontinuing 
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gaze. Still the fact remains that DM and PJ assign a role to a co-participant, and 
address him as such in this story-world throughout their enactment. Their 
performances are characteristic of role-play and theatre-like, as they fully orient to the 
discourse-world set-up (and consequently the characters in said discourse-world) 
rather than topical turn-by-turn talk. Similar to the previous case, these samples 
attribute an identity to a character present through postural orientation, gaze, gesture 
and other strategies of address (such as naming). 
 
!
Figure 30: Postural alignment in “Easy Robin” 
 
5.2.3. Conclusion 
 
The analyses in this section confirm the hypothesis outlined in chapter 4. It is not the 
blending typology as proposed by Fauconnier & Turner (2002) that determines the 
quotative, gaze and postural orientation in impersonation blends, but the pragmatic 
dimension of a given impersonation. In impersonations that arise from spontaneous 
turn-by-turn talk and directly assign an identity to the co-participant currently being 
engaged, postural orientation is not discontinued, and gaze may resume during the 
performance. In addition, these impersonations recruit zero-quotatives. 
Impersonations that suggest potential scenarios in possible worlds for illustration 
purposes are, however, delivered while discontinuing gaze, regardless of how 
incompatible the input frames are, or how much structure from each input is 
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incorporated into the blended space. Their use of quotatives is dependent on a) the 
local management of talk (i.e. whether or not the story space has been fully elaborated 
upon or not), and b) the semiotic resources recruited in the performance (i.e. be like for 
solely visual or non-lexicalised sounds; go for largely verbal performances that 
themselves further narrative development). The demarcation markers employed in 
interactional impersonations thus depend on the action currently underway rather 
than on frame-integration complexity. Table 7 summarises the actions built through 
impersonations and the methods employed to achieve them.  
 
Table 7: Overview of actions built through demarcation markers (quotatives, gaze, postural orientation) 
Action Quotative Gaze Postural orientation 
Doing ‘this is you’ ∅ Discontinued with 
‘butt’ at onset; may be 
taken up again during 
performance 
Orientation to ‘butt’ 
maintained 
Go: impersonation 
furthers narrative 
development 
Be like: visual / 
onomatopoetic 
illustration of 
diegetically set-up 
narrative 
Doing illustrations of 
spatiotemporally, 
modally and 
epistemically disjunct 
discourse-worlds 
∅: illustration of 
diegetically set-up 
narrative 
Fully discontinued with 
co-participants 
Fully discontinued 
with co-participants 
 
Whilst sections 5.1. and 5.2. have largely focused on the introduction of 
impersonation sequences to topical talk, the following chapters will focus more on the 
internal structure of impersonation sequences. In the spotlight will be methods 
employed for floor management and exit devices which enable the return to topical 
turn-by-turn talk in order to discern whether these aspects are also related to the 
building of social actions that span across blending types or are rooted in frame 
integration complexity. 
 
 
5.3. Designing performances: Floor management, chunking and listing 
 
 
The previous chapters have already touched upon a central feature of impersonations: 
in most cases, they constitute multi-turn units (cf. Schegloff, 1996b) – or ‘discourse 
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units’ in Houtkoop & Mazeland (1985) – and hence suppress the turn-taking model 
found in ‘normal’ turn-by-turn talk (cf. chapter 3.2.2. for an overview). Participants 
wishing to tell a joke, a story, or provide any longer turn thus need to a) secure the 
right to reserve an extended sequence of turns-at-talk through a TCU projecting 
subsequent TCUs (cf. chapter 5.1.), and b) project the end of their contribution.  
The analyses in this section will thus focus on the question relating to how such 
multi-turn units are managed in the varying blending types. This will be accomplished 
by concentrating on the methods employed in securing further turns-at-talk during the 
performance of impersonation sequences. I will first focus on the structural level, and 
describe the ways in which the various impersonations are chunked and marked 
through “incompletion-signals” (Houtkoop & Mazeland, 1985:599) or “projecting 
components” (Selting, 2007:491) as “not-designed-to-be-ending” (Schegloff, 
1996b:83). In a second step, I will closely examine the role that prosody and especially 
pitch play in floor management; this is due to the fact that it is “melodic phrasing” 
(Couper-Kuhlen, 2009:178) which is instrumental to signalling continuity and endings 
in longer projects (Selting, 2000, 2010).  
The present section will furthermore concentrate on the ways in which the 
length of an impersonation performance is interactionally negotiated. Impersonation 
sequences that extend over a number of TCUs are, to this end, chunked such as to 
leave silent pauses in between the various segments of the performance. While these 
silences occur at what would in ‘normal’ conversation constitute a TRP, they are not 
treated as such by co-participants in longer projects (cf. Houtkoop & Mazeland, 1985). 
Instead, at these points co-participants in the interaction-as-broadcast signal that they 
are still aligned as recipients through tokens of appreciation in the form of laughter 
and clapping. Schegloff (1996b:96) points to the object-like nature of TRPs in general. 
They are thus shaped a particular way, and are subject to limitations regarding for 
example their temporal unfolding. This structural chunking of impersonations will be 
discussed with a specific focus on a) turn length and structure, b) the shape taken by 
such spaces at the end of the TCUs (‘intervals’ in my terminology) which comprise 
impersonations according to blending type, and c) the essential role played by 
prosodic design in signalling floor holding and yielding.  
 
 
 
  LANGUAGE, COGNITION, INTERACTION !
! -187-!
Prosodic analysis: Methodology 
As this chapter will also investigate issues relating to prosody, a word on terminology 
and methodology is required.74 While the terms intonation and prosody are 
sometimes taken to be synonymous (e.g. Wells, 2006), subsuming features such as 
pitch, stress and rhythm, I largely adhere to the terminology established in 
interactional linguistics. While prosody is seen as the “interplay of pitch, loudness, 
duration and voice quality” (Selting, 2010:5) employed as “communicative signals” 
(ibid), intonation principally describes the “melodic movement in pitch” (Szczepek 
Reed, 2006:4). As intonation (i.e. the relative changes occurring in pitch level over a 
particular segment of talk) centrally contributes to negotiating turn-taking (cf. Selting, 
2005), the following chapters will recruit pitch analyses to draw conclusions as to the 
role that intonation plays in securing an extended sequence of turns-at-talk in 
impersonations. Pitch results from the “frequency of vibrations of the vocal folds” 
(Szczepek Reed, 2006:3), and is measured in hertz (Hz). Pitch contours (also referred 
to as fundamental frequency (F0) trace) will be assessed by isolating the relevant TCUs and 
analysing the changes in fundamental frequency from pitch-peak to TCU-end with 
the help of the praat computer analysis package. These analyses serve to determine 
whether a declining, rising or level intonation pattern is visible, and indicates the 
extent to which such intonation patterns serve to achieve turn-holding or turn-yielding 
in multi-turn projects. Figure 31 shows one such frequency analysis of a female 
speaker ranging between 90 and 356 Hz. 
!
Figure 31: Intonation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 This project is not primarily concerned with issues in prosody, and will, for this reason, not be able to 
delve into the potential offered by prosodic analyses in detail. 
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The so-called ‘punch-line’ mode is a common technique for signalling the end of an 
impersonation. In order to determine the features contributing to the prosodic 
realisation of such punch-lines, stress and accent will be analysed. As loudness (i.e. 
intensity) plays a role in both realising and perceiving stress and accent75 (ibid), 
changes in decibel (dB) and hertz (Hz) over the course of a TCU will be analysed, 
again with the help of praat. Acoustic waveforms (see figure 44) that illustrate loudness 
are further recruited to describe the negotiation of intervals (used for audience tokens 
of approval in the form of laughter and clapping) between TCUs contributing to an 
impersonation performance. Such ‘intervals’ and other pauses will, in addition, be 
calculated by isolating the interval space occurring between the end of a (linguistic) 
TCU and the beginning of the next word as a means of gaining information regarding 
their length and realisation. 
 
5.3.1. Floor management and performance design in mirror impersonations 
 
Chapter 5.1.1. illustrated the multitude of prefacing formats that mirror 
impersonations can assume depending on the action projected. This is also reflected in 
the way they are chunked. While an impersonation whose preface ends in a quotative  
(e.g. be like or go) or a disjunct marker (e.g. oh) is not followed by an interval during 
which co-participants align themselves as recipients of an impersonation, an 
impersonation prefaced by syntactically and pragmatically complete redescriptions 
and zero-quotatives do indeed leave such a space. 
Consider the following examples. In “Banana Outfit”, the impersonation 
latches on to the previous TCU, and is indicated as distinct by the disjunct marker 
“Oh”. Similarly, after the preface recruiting the be like quotative, impersonator NF in 
“Bemused look” does not leave space for his co-participants to align themselves as the 
audience of his brief impersonation; rather, he appends it to the preface.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 Stress describes syllabic prominence achieved primarily through increased loudness, whereas (pitch) 
accent combines features of loudness and pitch (Szczepek Reed, 2006). 
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Figure 32: Pitch contour for the quotative be like in "Bemused look" 
 
As figure 32 shows, the pitch contour of the quotative therefore does further project 
continuation and is turn-holding rather than turn-yielding via largely maintaining a 
mid-level plateau rather than falling,.76 
There seems, however, to be a difference in pitch contour when it comes to 
quotatives. Go is usually found to have a higher rise in pitch then be like, as the 
following extract from “Flirting” (figure33) illustrates.77 
!
Figure 33: Pitch contour for the quotative go in "Flirting" 
 
Nonetheless, both intonation contours, whether maintaining a mid-level plateau or 
showing a jump to a higher peak, contribute to securing the floor, and the 
impersonation latches directly onto foregoing talk. The same applies to 
impersonations that are displayed as being continuous with the previous turn and that 
will continue in the previous voice. They not leave an interval either; rather, they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 Most speakers in the corpus follow a Received Pronunciation Intonation (RPI) pattern. Speakers 
recruiting from other varieties showing different intonation patterns will be indicated. 
77 This difference in intonation between be like and go might be traced back to their respective 
etymological origin. Whereas the intonation contour found for be like points to its illustrating and 
comparative function and treats what follows more as an adverb rather than a distinct unit, go might 
function more like a traditional quotative, introducing the verbal externalisation of another person’s 
words. Further research will be required to test this hypothesis. 
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adjoin themselves to prior talk. This applies to “Travel Lodge” and “Frustration”, 
which both claim to continue (yet accentuate) the affective stance displayed by the 
prior speaker. 
In contrast, mirror impersonations that are prefaced through syntactically and 
pragmatically complete redescriptions of prior actions leave space for co-participants 
to align themselves as recipients of a longer unit. In “Sports Commentator I”, 
impersonator PJ offers a redescription of co-participant GL’s actions prior to starting 
his impersonation of her. This preface starts with the first syllable accentuated at a 
higher pitch; this is a technique which has been found to introduce “big packages” 
(Couper-Kuhlen, 2001, 2009). As figure 34 shows, after a sharp fall, the contour rises 
again towards the end of the TCU. This prefacing TCU is thus marked as incomplete 
and projects further elements (cf. Selting, 2010:8). 
!
Figure 34: Rising pitch contour on "Spots Commentator I" preface 
 
After the redescription in the preface, PJ leaves 1.8 seconds for the audience to 
provide tokens of appreciation and align itself as the recipient before initiating the 
impersonation he projected in the preface. This format is also present in “Northern 
lass”. In this sequence, impersonator LM leaves 1.9 seconds between his prefacing 
question the commencement of his zero-quotative impersonation. However, the 
duration of such an interval between preface and impersonation is jointly negotiated 
rather than pre-determined. The more approval displayed by the audience, the longer 
the pause may last. In “Smug Jonas”, audience laughter and clapping between the 
preface (lines 01-03) and the impersonation (lines 06-09) almost mutes JA’s dismissal 
(line 04) of the redescription proposed in impersonator SA’s preface, and is 
consequently ignored and sequentially deleted by his co-participants. The approval 
  LANGUAGE, COGNITION, INTERACTION !
! -191-!
sequence lasts a total of 3.8 seconds, 2.4 of which SA leaves for audience approval 
after JA’s unsuccessful attempt at a rebuttal. The effect that more successful 
refutations of redescriptions have on the temporal limitation of intervals becomes 
evident in “Sports Commentator II”, where the ‘butt’ of the joke, GL, strongly 
challenges the redescription proposed by impersonator RG. For this reason, RG 
interrupts GL’s rebuttal (line 09), once more repeating his redescription, prior to 
latching the impersonation directly onto this repeat, with GL still attempting to gain 
the floor (line 13) and ‘giving in’ only once the impersonation has already started. 
It therefore becomes evident that the property of the spaces between a prior 
turn and a mimetic impersonation are interactionally enacted and subject to the 
activity currently being negotiated. While those mirror impersonations that are 
prefaced through a TCU marked as syntactically, pragmatically and prosodically 
complete might leave approximately 2 seconds for an interval during which the 
audience aligns itself as the recipient of a humorous sequence, those impersonations 
which claim to continue a prior speaker’s turn or are embedded in a TCU that cannot 
be projected as complete are appended directly onto diegetic talk.  
Other than single and double-scope blends, mirror impersonations are rarely 
chunked in a way that provides further interval spaces during the performance, and 
only one instance of the otherwise prototypical 3+1 format (see below) is found in my 
corpus. The 3+1 impersonation format consists of a list of three elements (cf. 
Jefferson, 1990; Selting, 2007) which are delivered in close succession prior to a longer 
interval followed by a final element. As previous research has already unearthed, three 
appears to be a ‘magic number’ in interaction (e.g. Erickson, 1992; Jefferson, 1990; 
Lerner, 1994; Selting, 2007). When negotiating turn-taking, participants orient to 
such lists, projecting the third component  as potentially turn-final. In impersonations, 
however, the prototypical format adds a fourth and final component to that list after a 
longer interval. The mirror impersonation “Narcissistic Barrowman” follows this 
format. 
 
NMTB JB_2_02:35 (Narcissistic Barrowman) 
 
10 
11 
12 
13 
SA: <@ <<f> I’ll be on MAria (.) 
I’ll be in torchwood 
I’ll be on any !BLOOd!y show  
that will have me;> 
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14 AU: @@@ (1.1)  
15 SA: E(h)ven BU(h)zzcocks. @>  
 
SA’s impersonation comprises a list that illustrates JB’s seeming willingness to appear 
on British TV shows in three anaphoric blocks78. These blocks are delivered in 
parallel intonation contours. They commence with high pitch on “I’ll”, which then 
drastically falls to a mid-level plateau prior to slightly falling towards the end of the 
TCU (see figure 35). The third unit is  delivered in punch line mode (cf. chapter 
5.4.2.), and is thus further marked as the climax of the impersonation.  
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 References to ‘blocks’ largely correspond to the intonation unit as described by Couper-Kuhlen (1986) 
and others. Intonation units are parts of speech that are produced in one coherent intonation contour 
(Szczepek Reed, 2006:27). Couper-Kuhlen does not consider intonation units to be on par with 
‘sense units’, but introduces the notion of ‘paratones’ to describe topical organisation and coherence 
in spoken language. These paratones, she claims, are equivalent to “conceptual paragraphs” 
(1986:189f),  constitute what Mukherjee (2001:41) calls “intonational paragraphs”, and serve to 
prosodically structure longer and more topically coherent sequences of talk. As the concept has been 
extensively criticised as a functionally irrelevant concept that is not compatible with findings made in 
memory research (cf. ibid:42ff), I refrain from discussing impersonations in terms of paratones. 
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!
Figure 35: Pitch contour on "Narcissistic Barrowman" 
 
The three-part list is followed by an interval of 1.1 seconds before the final element of 
the impersonation (depicted in figure 36) is delivered. This final element is marked as 
turn-final via laugh particles (cf. chapter 5.4.4.) and a relative falling, turn-final 
intonation contour. 
!
Figure 36: Pitch contour on Plus-1 in "Narcissistic Barrowman" 
 
While such lists or other forms of chunking leave intervals in the performance, most 
other mirror impersonations contain a binary structure consisting of two TCUs with 
no prolonged interval spaces in between. This may be due to their restaging and 
accentuation of past dialogue, concisely pointing to perceived incongruities in prior 
talk. As ‘normal’ turn-by-turn topical talk prefers turns-at-talk to consist of one TCU 
only, the turns upon which the majority of these restagings are based are themselves 
relatively short, and, in a 1+1 format, illustrate the projected incongruity in their final 
element.  
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This binary structure is also reflected in the prosodic design of the 1+1 
impersonation format. The first element in these samples is delivered in a way that 
ends on a mid-level plateau, while the second element ends in falling final pitch. 
Intonation contours therefore firstly play a role in marking continuity at the end of the 
first block and secondly on its completion and turn-yielding at the end of the second 
component. Consider again “Banana outfit”, which illustrates the 1+1 format and is 
visualised in figure 37. 
Starting with a comparatively higher pitch, the first element of the 
impersonation (“nothing too embarrassing”) is delivered at a relative mid-level 
plateau, thus displaying turn-holding. The second element, which ends with the 
incongruous item “banana outfit”, then shows falling final pitch, allowing for turn-
yielding. 
!
Figure 37: Pitch contour in 1+1 format ("Banana Outfit") 
 
 This aspect is further illustrated in “Travel Lodge” (figure 38), where the first element 
of the impersonation (“if I’m not datin’ her”) also ends in a relative mid-level plateau, 
while the second element that contains the incongruous moment displays turn-final 
intonation.79 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 Impersonator FB displays a Scottish accent, which is why the pitch contour does not mirror the one 
in “Banana Outfit” (uttered by a speaker using Received Pronunciation Intonation (RPI)). While 
speakers of RP usually display a falling intonation contour towards the end of declarative or neutral 
turns, speakers of northern British varieties may recruit Urban Northern British Intonation (UNBI), 
which tends to end turn-final declaratives in a low rise or rise slump (cf. Cruttenden, 2007), as 
displayed by FB in this sample. 
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!
Figure 38: Pitch contour in 1+1 format ("Travel Lodge") 
 
Due to their propensity to restage past dialogue and, in doing so, draw attention to 
perceived incongruities in prior talk by co-participants, mirror impersonations, then, 
tend to be short, consisting of just one or two TCUs. Only one instance of the 
otherwise common 3+1-format can be found in the corpus. Interval spaces for 
audience approval are only observed after prefaces that provide a diegetic 
redescription prior to its mimetic illustration. These prefaces show a rising intonation 
contour at the end, thus projecting further TCUs which contribute to the larger 
project. While the impersonations that ensue begin with a relatively high pitch, they 
show falling final pitch towards the end. Impersonations in the 1+1 format that 
accentuate allegedly incongruent behaviour deliver the first element in a manner that 
ends with a mid-level plateau intonation, while the second element that features the 
incongruity at the end is delivered in falling final pitch. 
 
5.3.2. Floor management and performance design in single-scope impersonations 
 
As has been proven, single-scope impersonations are either used to illustrate 
diegetically set-up story-worlds, or contribute to the narrative unfolding of these story-
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worlds. Similar to mirror impersonations prefaced by a diegetic redescription, the first 
group is followed by an interval during which the audience delivers tokens of 
appreciation and aligns itself as the recipient of the ensuing performance. The diegetic 
prefaces to such performances are delivered as syntactically, pragmatically and 
prosodically complete. Their intonation contours shows unit-final falling pitch, as the 
prefaces of “Polish band” (figure 39) and “The Proprietor” (figure 40) illustrate. 
!
Figure 39: Pitch contour on single-scope diegetic preface ("Polish band") 
!
Figure 40: Pitch contour on single-scope diegetic preface ("The Proprietor") 
 
These prefaces consequently differ from those used in mirror impersonations, which 
redescribe past actions by co-participants. As outlined in the previous section, these 
prefaces  are delivered with a rising intonation pattern.  
Those single-scope impersonations introduced with a quotative, however, 
mirror the intonation contour identified for mirror impersonations, namely a rise to a 
high peak in the final accented syllable for the quotative go and a mid-level plateau for 
be like. The following diagrams (fig. 41-42) illustrate the intonation contours for the 
two formats. 
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!
Figure 41: Pitch contour on quotative be like in single-scope impersonation (“Justin Bieber”) 
!
Figure 42: Pitch contour on quotative go in "Upset French" 
The impersonations following such introductory dialogue elements directly latch onto 
previous talk with no prolonged interval between them. Due to their non-final 
intonation contour, they further contribute to projecting an extended sequence of 
turns-at-talk. 
The third group constitutes those impersonations which occur after a TCU 
that is pragmatically, syntactically and prosodically marked as complete and has 
begun to illustrate a humorous narrative. These impersonations are followed by an 
interval during which the audience has the opportunity to display minimal responses 
and continuers, such as laughter. The duration of these intervals depends on the 
quality of the audience appreciation signals. If, for example, laughter starts to subside, 
a following TCU has to be delivered by the impersonator, as otherwise co-participants 
will have the right to claim the floor. In the NMTB corpus, the maximum length for 
such an interval seems to be around four seconds before co-participants attempt to 
take the floor. This becomes evident in “The Proprietor”. Impersonator BB leaves an 
interval space of 4.4 seconds after the preface, during which he ‘slides’ into the role of 
the impersonated, aligning his body posture and facial expression accordingly. The 
audience shows appreciation through clapping and laughter, thereby licensing him to 
further inhabit the scenario set up. His performance follows the 3+1-pattern already 
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introduced for mirror impersonations. The first contributions mark the construction 
of the ‘list’, as they are delivered in rising intonation at the end of each unit, thus 
projecting further contributions to the performance. Figure 43 visualises this 
intonation contour. 
!
Figure 43: TCU-final rising intonation in list construction ("The Proprietor") 
 
After each chunk, he leaves an interval consisting of approximately four seconds for 
the audience members to signal appreciation and their status as recipients. After the 
second chunk, however (lines 10-11), BB leaves a space of 4.6 seconds. As the sound 
visualised in figure 44 illustrates below, audience laughter is already fading when his 
co-participant JJ attempts to take the floor in line 13. Apparently, BB has left too 
much time for this interval, but, as he continues his performance almost 
simultaneously to JJ’s attempt, he shows sensitivity to the issue. 
!
Figure 44: Co-constructing intervals in the chunking of "The Proprietor" 
 
After delivering the third element of his performance (lines 14-15) in a slightly falling 
intonation contour, he leaves another interval space of 3.2 seconds before delivering 
the plus-1 in punch line mode (cf. chapter 5.4.2) with a falling, turn-final intonation 
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contour. A highly stylised post-utterance completion laughter sequence finally ends 
the performance.  
This 3+1-format is a common way of doing impersonations, and can be 
schematically illustrated as follows: 
 
1) Diegetic preface 
2) Interval for audience appreciation and alignment 
3) Chunk 1: turn-holding, rising intonation  
Optional: Interval 
4) Chunk 2: turn-holding, rising intonation  
Optional: Interval 
5) Chunk 3: turn-holding, intonation falling to mid-level 
6) Interval 
7) Plus-1: turn-yielding, turn-final intonation contour  
Optional: punch line-mode, laugh particles as end markers 
 
Depending on local needs, further chunks may be added (as can be observed in “Jason 
Orange”). The plus-1 is nevertheless always delivered in turn-final intonation (i.e. 
falling), and illustrates a perceived incongruity. 
In essence, then, single-scope impersonations differ from mirror 
impersonations in one regard: while the prefaces to mirror impersonations tend to be 
delivered in a turn-holding (rising) intonation contour, prefaces to single-scope 
impersonations are delivered in falling (i.e.) turn-final intonation. In addition, mirror 
impersonations are likely to be shorter, and do not provide interval spaces as liberally. 
Single-scope impersonations, on the other hand, are usually chunked in such a way as 
to provide jointly negotiated spaces for audience appreciation signals during the 
performance. 
 
5.3.3. Floor management and performance design in double-scope impersonations 
 
Double-scope impersonations differ from mirror and single-scope impersonations in 
one major respect: in not one case in the corpus can an interval between the preface 
and the performance be detected. Even impersonations that are prefaced  by 
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prosodically, pragmatically and syntactically complete TCUs are not followed by an 
interval; rather, the impersonation latches on without leaving further space. 
There may be two reasons for this lack of intervals after prefaces. First of all, 
such double-scope impersonations of non-human entities occur less frequently than 
impersonations of fellow humans. They are, in consequence, less established as a 
discursive practice. To secure the floor for their performances, then, impersonators 
may need to capitalise on their preface more quickly, as co-participants cannot be 
expected to orient to a possible follow-up in the form of an impersonation. If this is the 
case, then this lack of interval supports the interactional relevance of the blending 
typology as proposed by Fauconnier & Turner (2002). On the other hand, however, 
double-scope impersonations are often non-linguistic, or are initiated with a non-
verbal component, such as a grimace. Entirely non-verbal embodiments, such as in 
“Holiday horse” or “Stevenson’s rabbit”, begin immediately after the diegetic preface, 
and last for approximately three seconds. They therefore parallel non-verbal mirror 
impersonations, such as in “Bemused look”, which also start immediately after the 
preface. Although “Bemused look” is introduced by the quotative be like (i.e. it would 
therefore not be followed by an interval in any case) and the double-scope examples 
show zero-quotatives, this already points to the pre-determining function embodied by 
other semiotic channels, such as grimacing or body postures. All impersonations 
which recruit such channels in addition to the verbal layer ‘slide’ into the 
impersonated body prior to assuming its voice. “The Proprietor” here, too, constitutes 
a typical example: immediately after the preface and during the interval that follows, 
impersonator BB already assumes the impersonated character’s posture and facial 
expression, leading to further laughter coming from the audience (which might to 
some extent explain the unusually long duration of the interval). It thus transpires that 
non-verbal elements of impersonations may be delivered straight after the preface, 
and, in cases that also contain a verbal layer, serve as an ‘interlude’ which allows the 
silences between verbal elements of impersonations to be prolonged. 
Those double-scope impersonations that feature a linguistic component in 
their performance follow the techniques described above for mirror and single-scope 
impersonations. Once impersonations containing verbal elements have been 
established, they may be chunked in such a way as to allow for intervals to occur. 
They also orient to lists of three and the 3+1-format discussed above. In “Metal 
Detector”, for example, impersonator NF delivers three blocks, all of which are 
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introduced with the non-lexical rendering of the sound made by metal detectors 
(“meep”). He leaves intervals for audience approval between the blocks, and delivers 
the third and final component in punch line mode and falling, turn-final intonation 
contour. “Displeased horse”, on the other hand, demonstrates the 3+1-format: the 
impersonation is delivered in three units, while the plus one is a joking meta-comment 
on the horse which has just been impersonated. 
 
5.3.4. Discussion 
 
When studying the performance of impersonation, then, single-scope impersonations 
appear to be the most typical. In general, they are longer projects delivered with more 
interval spaces which are longer in duration, thus pointing to their well-established 
nature. Impersonators doing single-scope impersonations here seem to be able to rely 
on their co-participants’ orientation to a salient communicative practice. Mirror and 
double-scope impersonations are, all in all, shorter, and leave less space for such 
intervals. In addition, double-scope impersonations are more often purely non-
linguistic, relying on other semiotic channels such as facial expression and gesturing. 
While these aspects point towards the validity of the typology put forward by 
Fauconnier & Turner (2002), it should, however, be kept in mind that these aspects 
also contribute to the building of action and frame integration complexity is not 
relevant to action. The action accomplished via non-verbal gestures in double-scope 
blends is indicative of a diegetically produced story – an action to which single-scope 
blends such as “The Proprietor” also contribute. Similarly, purely non-verbal 
impersonations are used to build the action of detecting deviant or noteworthy 
behaviour from co-participants, as the mirror impersonation “Bemused look” 
illustrates. The extent to which single-scope impersonations are celebrated in contrast 
to mirror and double-scope impersonations may furthermore have cultural reasons: a 
mirror impersonation often constitutes a potentially face-threatening act (cf. Brown & 
Levinson, 1986), and is hence interactionally problematic. Single-scope 
impersonations which allow for the dismissal of a non-present human are, on the 
other hand, a useful tool for creating solidarity. By mocking and jointly laughing at a 
non-present other, in-group status may be celebrated. This means that single-scope 
impersonations are also a means for creating group solidarity. According to this line of 
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argument, then, marking non-human entities as outsiders may be less attractive and 
for this reason less common. 
In short, the methods identified in this section contribute to building social 
action which occurs in situated cultural scenarios and  spans blending types. On this 
basis, they cannot ,be used as evidence for validating that different blending types 
constitute separate discursive practices.  
 
 
5.4. Ending and exiting impersonation sequences 
 
 
While the previous section focused on the largely prosodic methods used to secure an 
extended sequence of turns-at-talk, this chapter will closely examine on further 
techniques for indicating the end of the multi-turn unit ‘impersonation’. Such 
practices are crucial to this situated activity system, as they are of central importance 
to managing turn-taking. They display a discourse unit’s (Houtkoop & Mazeland, 
1985) conclusion and consequently the point at which the standard turn-taking model 
deployed in spontaneous ‘normal’ conversation (cf. Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 
1974) may be resumed.  
In this section I will therefore discuss the various methods employed for 
indicating designed closure by the impersonator (cf. Schegloff, 2009), and the 
techniques used for re-engaging with topical talk and the shift in participant alignment 
that this requires. The previous sections further support the hypothesis that the 
techniques employed in the interactional negotiation of impersonations seem to be 
guided by and simultaneously inform the social action in which such sequences are 
embedded rather than orient towards the blending typology advanced in MSCI. As 
such, this section will not discuss the techniques grouped according to blending types, 
but will start with the methods themselves and discuss the extent to which they are 
found in the varying types against the backdrop of previous findings. Furthermore, the 
chapter will  only discuss techniques specific to impersonations, and will not touch 
upon other markers that project a possible Transition Relevant Place (TRP), such as 
syntactic or pragmatic completion (cf. Sacks et al., 1974). 
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5.4.1. Repeats 
 
Previous research has established that a common practice for ending longer units in 
talk-in-interaction (such as stories or answers) are so-called ‘repeats’ (Schegloff, 2009, 
2011), which cite an element from the beginning of the unit and thus mark its 
conclusion. Such repeats are, however, not exceptionally common in the NMTB 
corpus, and can only be found in mirror impersonation and a single double-scope 
impersonation.  
Mirror impersonations, which have as their source prior talk, are naturally 
inclined to signal conclusion via such repeats. Amongst other mirror impersonations, 
“Northern lass” features such a repeat. The lexeme stand is focused on as early as the 
preface introducing the impersonation sequence (“What about standin’?”), and also 
concludes the performance (“I wish I could go to London and stand”). The same 
pertains to “Banana outfit” and “Travel Lodge”, in which the impersonators conclude 
their performances by repeating the central element of the original contribution. This 
central component also constitutes the incongruous element that clashes with 
assumptions created in the first TCU. The cited element in turn-final position 
therefore draws attention to the allegedly incongruous behaviour of co-participants. In 
all sequences, the repeated lexeme stands in TCU final position and follows the 
format x[IMPx]. The lexical item repeated thus provides a bracketing of the 
impersonation sequence, and at the same time relates back to topical talk, thereby 
signalling that the performance sequence has reached a conclusion. 
Conversely, single-scope impersonations seem not to favour this technique, as 
no repeats occur in this type. They do, however, appear again in one double-scope 
impersonation, namely “Metal Detector”. This impersonation occurs after a question 
sequence that focuses on the materiality of metal detectors and ends with a repeat of 
the incongruous ‘problem’ dwelt upon in the preface. The central component of the 
preface, “Are metal detectors made out of metal?”, is also the concluding element of 
the impersonation’s final TCU (“I’m mainly metal”, line 19). As such, the adverb 
‘metal’ brackets the impersonation. Still, this is the only sequence in which such a 
repeat contributes to completing an impersonation sequence. A possible reason for 
this distribution of the ‘repeat’ exit device may be that such returns to lexemes used in 
the turn preceding the performance are especially prone to occur in impersonations 
that have a verbal component of topical talk as their trigger, as is the case for most 
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mirror impersonations (except for those continuing in the voice of a co-participant 
without disjunct markers) and “Metal Detector”. In contrast, impersonations that do 
not reflect on or further illustrate a verbal component of prior turn-by-turn talk resort 
to other means of indicating their potential completion. 
 
5.4.2. Punch line-mode 
 
Punch lines are usually the final element of a joking sequence, providing both its 
climax and humorous incongruity. In verbal humour, such punch lines are delivered 
in a special ‘mode’ (Norrick, 2010) that involves the emphasis of each lexical80 item as 
well as increased overall loudness. The marked performance of punch lines is of 
paramount importance, as participants will orient to it and, according to Norrick 
(ibid), laugh at what they  consider to be the highpoint of a joking sequence (based on 
performative evidence). Punch lines (or, rather: units delivered in prototypical punch 
line mode) are thus a major means of signalling the end of an impersonation 
performance. In addition, Jefferson (1978) asserts that punch lines summarise 
narratives. This feature relates to other ending devices discussed in this section, such 
as codas and postscripts.  
Based on these findings, such punch lines can be assumed to constitute a major 
means of concluding impersonation sequences. Impersonations delivered in punch 
line mode are found across blending types. However, as mirror impersonations largely 
rely on the quoting of previous utterances, they are not prone to showing such 
climactic prosodic framing in their performance.81 They might nevertheless feature a 
punch line which follows the impersonation sequence. “Northern lass”, for example, 
ends with a comment delivered in punch line mode. As this punch line is not 
attributed to the previous speaker, it is not part of the impersonation proper, but as 
part of a coda (see chapter 5.4.4.) delivers a meta-comment on the impersonation in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 The definition of ‘stress’ is, of course, a notorious problem, as it is not just loudness, but also pitch, 
duration, and ‘secondary cues’ such as glottal stops which contribute to perceiving a given syllable as 
stressed (Couper-Kuhlen, 1986). My analysis here concentrates largely on loudness as the key 
contributor to realising and perceiving a given syllable as stressed. Accent, on the other hand, is 
achieved via loudness and changes in pitch (cf. Szczepek Reed, 2006:6). 
81 Mirror impersonations that recruit ‘climactic’ speech patterns such as the ones employed by race 
commentators are found in the corpus. I would, however, refrain from treating them as punch lines, 
as they first and foremost copy a speech genre rather than serve the local management of talk, and 
secondly do not lead to a conclusion that condenses a narrative, as is evidenced by both “Sports 
Commentator” sequences. 
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accentuated punch line mode. Figure 45 visualises the intensity with which the punch 
line is delivered.  
 
Figure 45: Intensity for "Northern lass" punch line-attachment 
 
Impersonator LM leaves 1.6 seconds in the interaction-as-broadcast for audience 
laughter after the impersonation performance and prior to delivering the punch line. 
This final line is instigated with the stressed discourse marker “well” at 74.84 dB, 
followed by a strongly accentuated utterance of the word “dreams” at 73.99 dB, and 
then succeeded by a less intense “true”. The average intensity for this impersonation 
attachment is 66.46 dB; this is noticeably louder than the impersonation performance 
itself, which featured an average intensity of 62 dB.  
“The Proprietor”, a single-scope impersonation, illustrates even more clearly 
the concluding function fulfilled by the punch line mode. After a long pause of 3 
seconds, line 18 (“on my back”) is in this impersonation delivered in a husky voice. All 
words receive equal stress (cf. figure 46), with a micro-pause before “back”. Of all the 
items in the entire impersonation sequence, “back” is the one which is uttered in the 
lowest pitch (cf. figure 47), thus further proving the concluding function of this TCU. 
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!
Figure 46: Intensity for punch line in "The Proprietor" 
!
Figure 47: Pitch contour for "The Proprietor" punch line 
 
Finally, consider once more “Metal Detector” and the punch line (line 17 in the 
transcript) which condenses its narrative structure. As in “The Proprietor”, all lexical 
items of “I’m mainly metal” are approximately equally stressed, as is shown in figure 
48. 
!
Figure 48: Intensity for punch line in "The Metal Detector"  
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It therefore transpires that punch lines – performed after a longer silence consisting of 
between 1.5. and 3 seconds long in a louder and highly accentuated mode – are a 
means of ‘doing’ endings of multi-turn unit impersonations. While they are more 
typical for single- and double-scope impersonations, mirror impersonations might also 
feature prosodic framings akin to the frame employed in punch line-mode. 
 
5.4.3. Coda 
 
In their influential treatment of conversational narrative, Labov & Waletzky (1967) 
introduce the term coda to denote the final element of a story that relates back to the 
moment of speaking. A similar concept is found in impersonations. Once an 
impersonation has been delivered, impersonators might provide a brief meta-
commentary upon completion, recruiting a non-marked register and body positioning 
and, in doing so, ‘return’ to the current discourse scenario characterised by topical 
turn-by-turn talk. Such codas are found across blending types, and thus cannot be 
accepted as a reflection on frame-integration complexity. In mirror blends, “Flirting” 
shows such a postscript, when, in line 07 in unmarked voice for example, 
impersonator DO utters “like that”, directly attaching itself the impersonation 
sequence. DO thus points to the illustration of the activity offered by the 
impersonation, but also introduces a trajectory that allows him to return to topical 
turn-by-turn talk when, in line 09, he repeats the question which he posed to AM 
prior to the impersonation sequence.  
Similarly, TM uses such a meta-commentary in “Kylie”, a single-scope 
impersonation,  when he utters “you know, that sort of thing”, again directly  
appending itself the impersonation. Labov & Waletzky (1967) have already pointed to 
the use of the deictic marker that commonly found in such codas, arguing that that 
points to the sequence recently concluded as distant and accessed from the perspective 
of topical talk. In using a coda with the obviate deictic marker that, impersonators 
display their impersonation sequences as complete and distant from the current 
discourse, and invite co-participants to re-engage in topical turn-by-turn talk following 
their multi-turn performance.  
Another form of coda for impersonation sequences are what I refer to as 
‘summaries’. In “Displeased horse”, a double-scope enactment, impersonator NF 
follows up on his impersonation with just such a summary, and evaluates the 
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impersonated horse’s actions from a distant perspective, that of the discourse scenario 
containing topical turn-by-turn talk. In lines 09-10, he subsequently concludes that 
“you can lead a horse to a pop video, but you can’t make it like it”. In contrast to the 
previous two examples, however, this evaluation concerns the impersonated horse 
rather than the performance as such (as the “like that” of the sequences discussed 
above do), and is not delivered in a manner that directly ‘latches onto’ the 
impersonation, so to speak, but occurs after a silence of about 1.5 seconds. The 
summary, while delivered through NF’s ‘own’ voice rather than the horse’s, thus 
constitutes a continuation of the joking, i.e. a top-up joke, rather than a return to 
topical turn-by-turn talk. It does, however, contribute to marking the impersonation 
sequence itself as complete, and thus parallels the functions fulfilled by the coda in 
“Northern lass”, a mirror blend (“Well tonight your dreams come true”). Both 
impersonation sequences receive a top-up joke after a break of approximately 1.5 
seconds delivered in unmarked voice, but are still oriented to the joking activity rather 
than topical talk. 
It thus appears that such attachments contribute to the conclusion of 
impersonation sequences in two ways: they firstly provide a means of exiting a voice 
and distant discourse scenario by pointing to the illustrating function of the 
impersonation and can secondly serve as a means of returning to the original voice, 
delivering a follow-up joke prior to returning to topical turn-by-turn talk. These two 
functions differ with regard to their temporal distance to the impersonation. While the 
first is delivered in a manner that directly attaches itself to the impersonation, the 
latter is uttered after a brief silence of about 1.5 seconds (cf. chunking). For all this, 
though, no difference as to blending type can be detected, as impersonations across all 
sets employ codas. 
 
5.4.4. Laugh particle transitions 
 
Across all impersonation types, laugh particles in the final TCU of an impersonation 
are used to signal the transition from the impersonated voice to the unmarked voice 
and, consequently, the return to topical turn-by-turn talk. Apart from marking this 
transition, laugh particles also provide a meta-commentary on the uptake expected 
from recipients (cf. Jefferson, 1979), and thus further contribute to the humorous 
framings of the performance. Finally, such laugh particles frequently occur towards 
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the climax of a humorous narrative (cf. Goodwin, 1984), and in doing so contribute to 
signalling the conclusion of an  impersonation. 
Consider, first of all, “Narcissistic Barrowman”. In this mirror impersonation, 
SA concludes his performance with “E(h)ven BU(h)zzcocks.” in line 15. The 
insertion of laugh particles into this concluding TCU serves to further frame the 
performance as pragmatically complete; in effect, a humorous illustration of JB’s 
allegedly deviant behaviour has been delivered, and impersonator SA invites his 
recipients to laugh along with him. In this manner, however, SA also tones down the 
face-threatening act (FTA) (cf. Brown & Levinson, 1987) inherent in the mirror 
impersonation. Marking it as humorous, i.e. non-serious, mitigates the FTA. This 
mitigation is further enhanced by the fact that the laugh particles in this segment also 
serve to frame a case of self-deprecating humour, as they contribute to the 
presentation of SA’s own show as worthy of ridicule. 
Such laugh particles only occur in final TCUs of impersonation sequences, as 
becomes clear in the double-scope impersonation “Displeased horse”. In this 
sequence, two joking sequences centre on the topic of horses in pop videos. The first 
(lines 05-07) is an impersonation of the horse, whilst the second (line 09-10) constitutes 
a comment on the topic displayed in the form of a coda (see above). Both joking 
sequences end in TCUs containing laugh particles. While the impersonation is 
concluded with “gi(h)ve me(h)” (line 07), the ensuing comment ends with 
“ma(h)ke it li(h)ke it.” (line 10). The laugh particles therefore serve to ‘do’ 
endings of distinct joking sequences and to invite recipients to laugh as well.  
Apart from such laugh particles occurring within speech, Jefferson (1979) finds 
that post-utterance completion laughter may serve similar goals. Only one instance of 
such post-utterance completion laughter occurs in the NMTB corpus. In “The 
Proprietor”, however, it is the impersonated character himself that delivers a highly 
stylised laughter that ends his ‘appearance’ rather than that of the impersonator. It 
nonetheless serves to fulfil a similar objective to the embedded laugh particles found in 
the examples above. Laugh particles project designed (i.e. projected) closure of 
humorous impersonations, and thus provide a means of transitioning from the 
impersonated voice back to the original. In addition, they invite recipients to laugh 
along as a relevant next action before topical turn-by-turn talk is continued. As laugh 
particles in unit-final position occur across blending types, they do not hint at frame 
integration complexity either. 
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5.4.5. Practices for reengaging with topical talk 
 
Impersonation sequences project laughter as their relevant next action. Once the 
audience has delivered this token of appreciation, topical talk is resumed at the point 
at which it was discontinued through the impersonation. These impersonations are, in 
other words, treated as non-implicative for topical talk. Impersonations may, however, 
have further implications for topical talk, and can be followed by codas (see above) in 
the form of “postscripts” (Jefferson, 1978:229), assessments, or top-up jokes. 
As a starting point, consider those impersonations which are treated as 
irrelevant to topical talk. In these sequences, topical talk is resumed from the point 
where it stopped prior to the impersonation. The techniques employed for turn-taking 
management in this case are either 
 
a) co-participant self-selects, or 
b) current speaker continues after the token of appreciation. 
 
In a), co-participants have a variety of techniques at their disposal with which to 
return to topical discourse. Firstly, they may recruit discourse markers such as anyway 
as a means of signalling the conclusion of the ‘detour’ made by the impersonation 
sequence and the recommencement of prior topical talk. Previous research (e.g. 
Bublitz, 1988; Ferrara, 1997; Lenk, 1998) has identified anyway as the paradigmatic 
discourse marker for concluding ‘digressions’. In such environments, anyway is used to 
return to prior topical talk. The use of this discourse marker by co-participants rather 
than current speakers to return to topical talk is thus relatively dramatic, as by doing 
so they mark the impersonation sequence as non-implicative for topical talk. 
However, co-participants only resort to such apparently drastic measures after the 
implementation of impersonations that provide illustrations of playfully established 
story-worlds. Treating them as conversational ‘décor’, which is irrelevant to the 
progression of topical talk, is, for this reason, not face-threatening. After all, the 
relevant SPP, namely laughter, has occurred prior to the co-participant forcing the 
resumption of topical talk. This becomes evident in the single-scope impersonations 
“The Proprietor” and “Cooking with villains”.  
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The Proprietor (NMTB SE19E06_3_04:15) 
 
18 BB: <<f> ON MY (.) BAck.> > (2.0)  
19  <<ff> ↑hu[ohoha> @>  
20 AU:          [@@@ (1.5)  
21 
22 
23 
24 
AB: anyway.  
there’s a bit of a division between, 
some of them got sparkly jackets, 
some of them (.) jackets. 
 
 
In the first example, impersonator BB uses numerous techniques (punch line-mode, 
falling intonation contour, stylised post-utterance completion laughter) to show 
designed closure of his multi-turn impersonation unit. Once the audience has 
delivered their tokens of appreciation, co-participant AB proposes a return to topical 
talk in line 21, again referring back to the guessing game. 
 
NMTB SE21E08_1_04:34 (Cooking with villains) 
 
08 BB: time for a LOvely salmon salad. @>! !
09 AU: @@@ (2.0) !
10 
11 
SA: anyway. 
we’re very pleased about the cooking show. 
!
12 JE: brilliant.  !
 
Similarly, in “Cooking with villains”, host SA resumes topical talk after the laughter 
sequence, addressing his previous primary conversational partner, JE, and redirecting 
talk to the theme of their prior interaction. 
However, co-participants self-selecting do not need to recruit discourse 
markers to signal conclusion of the impersonation sequence or a return to topical talk. 
They might also draw attention to an element of prior topical talk by either citing this 
element or posing a question on that topical talk.  
 
NMTB SE23E02_2 03:30 (The Sports Commentator I)  
 
08 PJ: <@ tops fou_↑`our;   
09  jackson fi_↑`ive; @>  
10 AU: @ (1.0)  
11 
12 
13 
RG: you were on to four tops 
i give you a clue 
you were right. 
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NMTB SE22E01_1_09:25 (Upset French) 
 
04 AU: <@ <<ff> AAH quelle est POp quiz !
05 PJ: IMB!É!cile;! !
06 AU: @[@@! !
07 PJ:  [((encore)) > @>! !
08 AU: @@@ (1.0) !
09 MR: and there was, (.) what was CEE? !
 
In the mirror impersonation “Sports Commentator I”, host RG summarises – after 
the audience’s token of appreciation for the impersonation – GL’s contributions to 
topical talk prior to PJ’s impersonation, thereby leading back to the original activity. 
In the single-scope impersonation “Upset French”, team captain MR returns to 
topical talk by asking a question about the activity. In both cases, the impersonation 
sequence itself is not treated as relevant to the furthering of topical talk, but as a 
digression that served amusement. 
Impersonators themselves may return to topical talk without further reference 
to the performance just delivered – thus illustrating that treating impersonations as 
non-implicative for further topical talk does not constitute a potential FTA, but rather 
common practice. In single-scope blend “Northern Mac”, impersonator LM, after the 
obligatory laughter sequence, provides the correct answer to the quiz question posed. 
In the double-scope impersonation “Metal Detector”, impersonator NF asks to again 
see the video clip upon which the quiz question posed to his team is based.  
Secondly, a group of impersonations can be identified that is followed by 
further postscripts and commentaries in the form of a coda rather than a straight 
return to topical talk. These impersonations are not treated purely as conversational 
‘décor’ that may be concluded merely by the bestowal of a token of appreciation, but 
are followed by a closing sequence that reflects on a) the impersonation’s relevance by 
providing a concise ‘morale’, or b) its aggressive nature prior to returning to topical 
talk. 
After this concluding sequence involving the impersonator and the co-
participants negotiating the emerging implications of the impersonation, topical talk 
may be resumed using the same strategies identified for impersonations that are not 
followed by such a sequence. Through questions and repeats, which are sometimes 
introduced with a discourse marker such as anyway or well, joint attention is redirected 
to topical talk. In “Travel Lodge”, for example, it is the impersonator who uses the 
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discourse marker anyway to mark closure of the impersonation sequence (“teller-
triggered self-digression management” in Ferrara’s (1997:343) terms) prior to 
providing a meta-commentary on the aggressive nature of his mirror impersonation 
(lines 25-26). Once the ‘butt’ of his impersonation, DJ, has accepted this instance of 
mitigation (line 27) and impersonator FB has, too, confirmed this ‘ceasefire’ (line 28), 
FB reverts back to topical talk by starting to repeat the quiz question posed to the 
team prior to the digression proposed by FB (line 29).  
 
NMTB S23E11_2_09:26 (Travel Lodge) 
 
22 FB: <@ yeah. if i’m not datin her; (.) !
23  it’s the TRAvel lodge. @> !
24 AU: @@ !
25 FB: anyway i don’t know why (.)  !
26  i’ve decided to start a beef with you,  !
27 DJ: we’ oh we’re cool we’re cool [he he !
28 FB:                              [we’re cool man. (-) !
29  erm any ideas, er= !
30 CV: !I! have !
 
Impersonations, whether mirror, single-scope or double-scope in nature, are, in 
conclusion, followed by similar strategies for reengaging with topical turn-by-turn talk. 
Topical talk might be resumed immediately after the token of appreciation in the 
form of audience laughter has been delivered through repeats of prior segments or 
questions leading back to prior talk. These strategies may be introduced through 
discourse markers such as anyway, which further serve to mark the multi-turn unit as 
complete. It is either the current speaker that returns to topical talk by employing 
these strategies, or a co-participant that self-selects. Impersonations might, however, 
be followed by a postscript (coda) that serves to negotiate the emerging implications of 
an impersonation between performer and co-participants. Once this postscript 
sequence has been concluded, topical talk recommences following the same strategies 
as for impersonations which are not followed by such postscripts. 
 
5.4.6. Discussion 
 
While mirror impersonations – due to their focus on prior talk by co-participants – 
seem to show a certain propensity to be concluded via repeats that illustrate alleged 
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incongruity in turn-final position rather than punch line-mode, other exit strategies, 
such as coda and laugh particles in unit-final position, occur across all impersonation 
types. The same applies to strategies identified for returning to topical talk. All 
blending types rely on the same array of techniques, including using concluding 
discourse markers prior to repeating an element of prior talk or asking a question 
concerning the previous activity.  
These findings once again point to the hypothesis that interactants in 
meaning-making processes primarily orient to joint action rather than the cognitive 
tools employed to build this action. Meaning-making, then, emerges from and is 
guided by recursive beliefs regarding the action currently being negotiated rather than 
one’s ability to blend distinct semantic frames. Blending may indeed be a tool used in 
meaning-making, but it does not appear to be the way that we make meaning. This 
hypothesis is discussed further in chapter 6, which will propose an organic model for 
meaning-making that integrates cognitive tools, such as conceptual blending, with the 
locus of meaning – intentional social action. 
 
 
5.5. An action-based typology of impersonation blends 
 
 
‘Doing’ an impersonation is a social, jointly negotiated activity that serves to achieve 
two main goals. First, impersonations may be used to build assessments of prior 
contributions. These stance-taking impersonations follow three distinct formats. 
Firstly, they may offer an accentuated restaging of a prior contribution (e.g. “Banana 
outfit”), as visualised in figure 49. This form of impersonation is not diegetically 
prefaced, and voices are set apart through disjunct markers such as “oh”. Shared gaze 
and postural orientation is discontinued in these impersonations. Secondly, 
impersonations-as-assessments may be prefaced with a reframing of the prior activity, 
which is followed by a (re)staging of the original contribution. In impersonations that 
offer a reframed restaging (e.g. “Sports Commentator”, “Northern lass”), shared gaze 
and postural orientation are discontinued, and quotatives may or may not be used 
depending on the degree of bodily display projected. In this respect, be like is, for 
instance, used to introduce more bodily restagings (cf. “Bemused look”, “Holiday 
horse”). On the other hand, shared gaze and postural orientation is maintained in 
  LANGUAGE, COGNITION, INTERACTION !
! -215-!
impersonations that offer adapted stagings of diegetically presented assessments of 
allegedly negative character traits displayed by co-particpants (e.g. “Narcissistic 
Barrowman”, “Smug Jonas”). Furthermore, quotatives are not used in this type. 
These more aggressive impersonations effectively state, ‘this is you’. Finally, 
assessment of prior talk through impersonations may be delivered by continuing in the 
voice of the prior speaker without reframing the contribution (e.g. “Frustration”). 
These impersonations latch directly onto prior talk, and gaze and postural orientation 
are maintained. 
 
Figure 49: Typology of impersonations for assessments 
 
The second group of impersonations subsumes narrative joke-firsts that are set in 
distinctly separate discourse scenarios. Two subgroups can be identified (cf. figure 50). 
First of all, such joke-first narrations may be diegetically presented; the preface 
outlines the spatiotemporal macro-structure of the story-world, while the 
impersonation provides a mimetic visit to that world, and illustrates ‘best-ofs’ resulting 
from the narrative presented (e.g. “The Proprietor”, “Cooking with villains”, “Polish 
band”). These impersonations are introduced with zero-quotative, discontinued gaze 
and postural orientation. They are highly dramatised, and tend to be chunked in the 
3+1-format, showing a propensity to end in punch lines. Secondly, such narrative 
impersonations may not constitute brief visits to a diegetically set-up story-world, but 
actually contribute to the construction and narrative advancement of the story-world. 
They are thus polyphonic narratives, with short voice changes contributing to the 
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unfolding of a story (e.g. “Kylie”). These impersonations are introduced through 
quotatives (go is largely used for verbal elements), and shared gaze and postural 
orientation is discontinued during the performance, but may be adopted again during 
‘intervals’. 
 
Figure 50: Typology for narrative joke-first impersonations 
These greater actions – assessment and story-telling via and in conjunction with 
impersonations – span across all blending types. While mirror blends are more prone 
to contribute to assessments, single and double-scope blends may serve to build 
assessments (e.g. “Brothers” or “Holiday horse”), but also to develop joke-first 
narratives and illustrations. Participants in the interaction-as-broadcasted in their joint 
negotiation of meaning-making orient to these types, as is evident in “Sports 
Commentator II”, in which the ‘butt’, GL, explicitly challenges the redescription of 
her contribution to topical talk. GL’s attempts to rebuff the assessment proposed by 
the impersonator illustrate the fact that she is not treating the impersonation as a non-
face threatening joke-first narrative, but as an explicit (negative) assessment of her 
contribution.  
‘Doing’ an impersonation is thus a jointly negotiated activity that is triggered 
by and methodologically displays its relevance to topical talk. However, the analyses 
have evinced that an orientation to disjunct discursive scenarios is reflected in 
interaction via the discontinuation of postural orientation or the use of grammatical 
disjunct markers and space builders when orienting to non-topical scenarios. Yet it is 
the orientation to the ‘greater’ action achieved through the impersonation 
performance that guides both the intersubjectively negotiated construction of Mental 
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Spaces and the mappings occurring between them. The Mental Spaces recruited to 
the blends are systematically introduced with an eye toward recipient design, and the 
meaning emerging from the integration of distinct frames is dependent on and 
constrained by recursive beliefs regarding the joint action currently being negotiated. 
For Mental Spaces and Conceptual Integration Theory to be a comprehensive theory 
which comprises thinking and meaning-making, it will need to incorporate the 
cooperative and goal-oriented nature which is evident in jointly negotiated online-
meaning-making. The following section will propose one such model. 
 
 
 !
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CHAPTER 6: THE PRIMACY OF PRAGMATICS !
 
The analyses in the previous chapters have shown that neglecting the interactional 
dimension of meaning-making processes does not hold up to online meaning 
construction in interaction. “Context matters”, in the words of Fauconnier 
(2006:657),. The structure emerging from the integration of distinct frames, as well as 
the mapping processes occurring between input spaces is, it turns out, largely guided 
by a quest to arrive at meanings that are experienced as interactionally relevant, as 
Fauconnier (2006) also acknowledges. For this reason, blending is not something that 
happens wildly during interaction, but something that achieves shared meaning from 
and is made relevant (in the broad sense of the term as employed by Grice (1975), in 
and Sperber & Wilson’s (1986) expanded notion thereof) by being tied to a given 
social action. Although Fauconnier & Turner (2002:333f) mention relevance, among 
numerous others, to be one of the “governing principles” behind blending, and claim 
that “context” will determine the “happiness” or “equilibrium” of a blend (ibid:44), 
they do not seem to regard (pragmatic) relevance as one of the more important ones. 
They first of all devote only a single page out of the 396 which comprises their 
magnum opus to the principle, and secondly focus on “Network Relevance”, which 
“can be satisfied for an element in the blend if it can be successfully taken as a prompt 
for unpacking” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002:334). With this focus on Network 
Relevance, Fauconnier & Turner concentrate largely on relevance in relation to 
internal aspects of the blend and the outer-space relations compressed in the blend. 
The blend is here conceptualised as ‘bigger’ than action, and might actually influence 
action due to the fact that agents ‘live’ in a blend.  
The more pragmatic notion of relevance as a blending constraint that I would 
like to propose, however, starts at the other end, and regards joint action as ‘bigger’ 
than blending. Relevance to joint action is, I argue, not only the major constraint 
exerted upon blending; it also prompts blending processes, and determines their 
internal structuring, such as vital relations (cf. Brandt & Brandt, 2005; Schmid, 2011 
for similar assessments).  
Considering the issues raised in chapters two and three, and building on the 
results gathered in chapters four and five, in the following I propose a model of MSCI 
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that answers to the centrality of relevance and joint action in meaning-making 
processes.  
 
 
6.1. Conceptual blending in interaction: a discursively grounded model of  
       in-situ meaning coordination 
 
 
As was shown above, the meanings emerging from creative blends are  relevant to and 
prompted by jointly coordinated beliefs regarding social action, such as joking or 
commenting on a mutual friend’s new appearance. Following on from these basic 
findings, the inputs into and mappings occurring in blending-in-interaction must be 
interactionally relevant, systematically introduced, sequentially organised, recipient 
designed, and jointly produced; furthermore, the meaning that emerges is grounded 
in assumptions concerning joint action and shared Common Ground, and is 
intersubjectivily shared. Otherwise, repair mechanisms are employed. Figure 51 
incorporates these results and illustrates a general blending model82 that hopes to be 
able to “explicitly model [the] specific features of local context” (Coulson & Oakley, 
2005:1507) that impede on meaning construction. Other than Brandt & Brandt’s 
(2005) model (see chapter 3.1.1. for a full description), which posits a “virtual space” 
that gives rise to a “meaning space” and formally differentiates between semantics and 
pragmatics, this model does not propose an apparently ‘meaningless’ space that that 
precedes the one containing meaning. Rather, it regards all processes as guided by 
orientation to joint actions and a quest for interactionally relevant meaning. For this 
reason, no “virtual spaces” are required in fully contextualised meaning-making 
processes. In addition, my approach departs from Brandt & Brandt (2005) in that it 
explicitly considers Theory of Mind and interacationally coordinated beliefs with 
regard to the Common Ground existing between interactants. It furthermore makes 
allowance for the role of signs and stimuli. In doing so, this model aims to provide an 
integrated approach that considers both interaction and cognition, thereby providing 
suggestions for advancing MSCI within a socio-cognitive framework as suggested by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 This model is not able to account for simplex blends; rather, it is only able to justify conceptual 
integration which recruits theatrically distinct scenarios, thereby resulting in dissonance on the 
discourse level (see chapter 3.1.3. and 3.4.1.). 
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scholars such as Croft (2009). In the following, I will describe the model in more 
detail, illustrating it with examples discussed in the previous chapters.  
 
!
Figure 51: A discursively grounded model of in-situ meaning coordination 
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This model represents the processes understood to be in force on the side of the 
recipient (Interactant 2). Assuming their partners in interaction to be intentional 
agents capable of conducting similar cognitive operations, interactants aim at 
approximation in construal. The intersubjective coordination of meaning is conducted 
with the help of signs. For this reason, the signs and symbols83 used in communication 
are represented in between the interactants. These include words, morphemes, 
prosody, gestures, and material objects (to name merely the most apparent ones 
discussed in chapter five). Not all signs, i.e. activities interactionally treated as signs are 
produced intentionally. Communicators designing their contributions also emit signs 
unintentionally. Blushing is a case in point. Furthermore, the blowing of one’s nose’ 
during a conversation may either be treated as a sign or simply ignored in our quest 
for joint meaning coordination. For this reason, the model represents some signs and 
symbols within a circle and some outside the circle. The latter are meant to illustrate 
that such signs do not necessarily need to be intended as signs and, secondly, that not 
all signs consciously emitted by one interactant need to be accepted by the other. 
Failing to notice an irony marker, such as a wink, would constitute such a ‘neglected’ 
sign.  
Nevertheless, we assume our interactional partners to be intentional beings. 
We assume that the acts our interactional partners implement, the symbols they 
employ, must somehow refer to either their affective or mental states and/or elements 
which hold a particular degree of of relevance or meaning for us (cf. Grice’s (1975:46) 
Maxim of Relation that subsumes the axiom ‘be relevant’). Why else would they 
employ them if not for others to notice and infer meaning? The major “evidence of 
[their] intention to convey a certain meaning” (Wilson & Sperber, 2006: 607) is, after 
all, the signs utilised by our communicative partners. 
On what basis are the signs a) selected as potentially meaning-bearing, and b) 
attributed a ‘referent’ (i.e. meaning)? In the model I would like to propose, the 
network of signs we are confronted with is observed through a filter informed by beliefs 
about signs that can be expected to occur in the current interaction (and, vice versa, 
the signs inform beliefs as to what can legitimately be expected next). Consider a 
situation in which two conversational partners are communicating in English and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 Under the term ‘sign’, Peirce subsumes indices, icons and symbols. Symbols are of importance to this 
model, as they refer to those signs “whose relation to their objects is an imputed character” (Peirce, 
1868: Sec.14) and which are consequently subject to an inferencing process.  
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first partner abruptly switches to conversing in French. If this instance of code 
switching had not been expected, the second partner might be rather difficult to parse 
the linguistic layer, as the second partner was simply not prepared to hear another 
language within that particular conversation. The same applies to non-linguistic signs. 
It is only through this filter that signs become stimuli, to employ Sperber & Wilson’s 
(1986) terminology.  
Signs that were selected to become stimuli can serve to set-up of Mental 
Spaces, such as the spatial demarcation markers employed by impersonator BB in the 
preface to “The Proprietor”. As interactants aim at arriving at joint construals, the 
stimuli might be produced in a more ostensive (ibid) fashion in order to coordinate the 
setting up of Mental Spaces. In “The Proprietor”, BB stresses the adjective ‘remote’, 
and leaves a micro-pause before stating the location, the ‘guest house’; this therefore 
places specific emphasis on the location and, in consequence, guides the audience to 
set up a new Mental Space. The ‘content’ of this Mental Space is continually evolving, 
and, for all participants, is informed by beliefs about shared cultural and personal 
Common Ground. The Mental Space is further constrained by beliefs about the 
language game currently being negotiated – the preface to BB’s impersonation in “The 
Proprietor” would, after all, have awoken somewhat different expectations had it been 
uttered in, say, a business meeting and attributed to the CEO of a company.  
In order to denote the social actions that guide localised meaning making, I 
employ the Wittgensteinian (1953) notion of ‘language games’ rather than social 
action, as the first has certain advantages over the latter. The term allows the 
following to be accounted for: a) conventionality and abstraction evident in the 
linguistic system, b) the rule-governed nature of language use, and c) the intrinsic link 
of meaning to action. Wittgenstein (1953:§7) defines language games “as the whole, 
consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven.” In doing so, he places 
language games in between what de Saussure (1916) refers to as langue and parole, and 
thus manages to transcend this time-honoured dichotomy. Wittgenstein first of all 
considers the level of abstraction and convention in language usage – langue, in De 
Saussure’s conception. After all, the original German text refers to Sprachspiel rather 
than Sprechspiel (Helmuth Feilke, personal communication). Sprache points to the 
systemic component of language, and the level of abstraction that leads to 
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conventionalised meanings associated with a given sign and structure.84 Secondly, the 
term game85 takes into account the rule-governed nature of language use, and 
emphasises the practices in which language is embedded. In this fashion, Wittgenstein 
‘weaves’ the conventionalised meanings of language into communicative practices, in 
situ social action, and the larger situation in which it occurs. The “textile metaphor” 
(Friedrich, 2012) of weaving as employed by Wittgenstein  in this respect places specific 
emphasis on ‘context’, i.e. the situatedness of linguistic systems in social action. The 
Saussurian langue and parole are not separate layers that can be investigated in 
isolation, but are interdependent and integrated – in short, they are interwoven. 
Pragmatics is inherent to our knowledge of the language system (cf. Mukherjee, 2004) 
and language is, for this reason, interlinked with action in language games. Employing 
the term language game rather than action alone consequently allows for the level of 
convention and abstraction underlying language use to be considered whilst 
simultaneously foregrounding the essential role that (beliefs on joint) action plays in 
meaning-making. 
What, though, is ‘action’? Defining the term is notoriously difficult. The 
literature seems to agree that ‘proper’ action needs to be intentional and goal-
oriented. In addition, some form of meta-awareness is required. For this reason, 
agents need to have a certain degree of control over their activities, and deliver them 
with a purpose in mind. Intention and goals are thus central components of action. 
While much research concerning the philosophy of action has focused on the 
individual, Bratman (1992) concentrates on cooperative activity and emphasises the 
shared nature of action, which fundamentally relies on “mutual responsiveness” 
(ibid:327). Agents here share intentions and coordinate their activities to achieve a 
joint goal. The coordination of activities contributing to the building of joint action 
depends on our ability to acknowledge others as intentional, thinking beings.86  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 cf. also Bühler’s (1934) notion of Sprachgebilde vs. Sprechakt and Chomsky’s (1965) rigid differentiation 
into competence and performance. 
85 The German term Spiel is broader than the English game, as it also incorporates aspects that would be 
subsumed under play in English. As Stern (2004:90) points out, the playful nature alluded to by 
Wittgenstein in his metaphor is, for example, lost in the English translation. 
86 This view departs slightly from canonical MSCI when Turner (2000:6) states that “[c]onceptual 
integration is path dependent: blends are put together and unpacked using what the understander 
already has in his conceptual structures.” Although Turner (2000) mentions in passing that the 
‘sender’ might have a certain meaning in mind which is recipient-design (though he employs 
different terminology), he seems to identify the major cognitive load involved in meaning-making 
processes as lying on the ‘receiver’ rather than on all of the parties involved in the interaction. 
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As Croft (2009) points out, this highly complex process is facilitated by a 
number of devices. For one, joint attention, as for example established through 
linguistic devices or shared gaze and pointing, can act as a coordination device. 
Similarly, joint salience (i.e. features of context that are salient by way of human 
perceptual and cognitive capacities or shared cultural heritage) facilitates coordination 
between interactants. Thirdly, conventions help the individual to infer the intentions 
of the partner. Conventions comprise regularities in behaviour that are made use of 
recurrently in a community as a means of addressing repeated coordination problems. 
Meaning construction is facilitated by these coordination devices, yet starts with the 
basic assumption that interactants try to accommodate their communicative partners’ 
needs (cf. Grice’s (1975) cooperative principle). 
This ability (cf. Theory of Mind) allows us to form predictions about the type 
of behaviour that can be expected from our interactants. Beliefs concerning the 
language game, i.e. the language system and the action it is integrated in  
consequently give rise to expectations both with regard to stimuli to be expected and 
the rules on what is normatively acceptable in a given discourse setting. It is hard to 
imagine that construing a blend such as “The Proprietor” would be acceptable in a 
more formal language game, such as, say, a court hearing. Knowledge of 
appropriateness is thus embedded in the language game. 
Apart from licensing blending operations, beliefs about the language game 
furthermore guide mapping processes between the inputs set up by the stimuli and 
enriched via beliefs on Common Ground as well as shared world knowledge. The 
mappings are guided by coordinated beliefs with regard to relevance to the joint 
action currently being negotiated. In impersonations that are not prefaced in 
particular, the mappings are based solely on shared beliefs concerning joint action. In 
“Smug Jonas” and other mirror blends that mockingly reframe an interactant’s prior 
contribution, correspondences are largely directed by beliefs about relevance. The 
impersonator does not explicitly name the role s/he is taking on, and the mapping is 
guided by beliefs about the language game of mocking (“What could s/he be doing 
now?”), while stimuli (such as the marked repeat of the prior speaker’s utterance) serve 
as further evidence to those beliefs, which consequently strengthens the mappings. 
Mapping processes between input spaces and from the input to the blended space are 
thus subject to beliefs regarding the degree of relevance to a given language game, and 
are dependent on the interplay of certain stimuli and expectations. 
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Finally, the meaning emerging from conceptually blending the inputs is 
coordinated as being relevant to the language game and, within that language game, 
leads to what Wilson & Sperber (2006) term a “positive cognitive effect”, i.e. “a 
worthwhile difference to the individual’s representation of the world” (ibid:608). In 
many of the impersonations discussed in the previous chapters, this cognitive effect 
concerned inferences which provided assessments, or simply a pleasure in mimesis (i.e. 
the recognition of a referent and the ensuing celebration of shared knowledge and in-
group status). 
For this reason, the Blended Space is couched in between the fields denoting 
beliefs about the language game and beliefs regarding personal and cultural Common 
Ground. The meaning that intersubjectively emerges from interactional blending 
operations heavily depends on those two factors. Without considering the action 
currently being negotiated or the knowledge that is assumed to be shared between 
interactants, MSCI cannot faithfully claim to be a theory that a) transcends the 
semantic-pragmatic distinction, and b) is able to account for “emergent meaning” 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002:37). For this reason, “the way we think” is not 
conceptual blending, but rather the basic quest for meaning which is relevant to the 
social action currently being negotiated. This overarching cooperative quest for 
interactionally relevant meaning needs to be incorporated into cognitive semantic 
research. 
 
 
6.2. Project summary 
 
 
Conceptual Blending and Mental Spaces Theory has been proven to be a highly 
appealing theory for describing the cognitive processes which give rise to creative 
language usage. By bringing distinct semantic scenarios into mutual interaction, novel 
structure emerges which is fundamentally more than the sum of its parts and contains 
elements that are found in neither of the input spaces. MSCI is thus able to reconcile 
long-standing debates in metaphor theory and problems in semantics, such as indirect 
reference, presupposition and counterfactuals. Despite its intuitive attractiveness and 
promising ideas, MSCI has been criticised for a number of reasons. Most 
prominently, it has been accused of losing sight of the phenomenon, neglecting the 
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historicity, material and social dimension of situated cognising, and therefore not 
being able to account for contextualised meaning construction. MSCI thus appears to 
be largely rooted in ideational theories of meaning which neglect the social and 
action-based dimension of meaning-making (as emphasised for example by 
Wittgenstein (1953), Austin (1961), and Searle (1969)). MSCI is furthermore 
considered to be simply too complex, proposing artificial, post-hoc constructs on 
seemingly isolated minds. A case in point is the highly complex blending typology that 
lies at the heart of MSCI. This typology proposes a continuum of frame-integration 
complexity which cognisers have at their disposal; this ranges from simplex blends to 
double-scope blends. The authors claim that double-scope frame integration is the 
very factor which makes human achievements such as mathematics, arts and religion 
possible. Yet the typology proposed has so far not been tested on actual data, and has 
rightly been accused of constituting a post-hoc analytic category. MSCI’s focus thus 
seems to lie on competence rather than performance despite aspiring to defy the semantic-
pragmatic distinction (cf., e.g. Fauconnier, 2006). A usage-based approach to 
language – and Cognitive Linguistics in general claims to be rooted in the tradition 
(cf. e.g. Evans & Green, 2006; Geeraerts, 2005) – should, however, be able to 
overcome this “rigid Chomskyan dichotomy”  (Mukherjee, 2004:96) between 
theoretical ability and genuine behaviour, and propose a “model of language 
cognition […] able to account for actual usage” (ibid:87).  
For this reason, this study aimed to investigate blending-in-interaction in order 
to  
 
a) trace the way in which conceptual blending is negotiated by interactants in 
situ, and  
b) determine the extent to which participants-in-interaction orient to the 
allegedly post-hoc blending typology proposed by MSCI’s founding fathers. 
 
In order to avoid the ‘ubiquity problem’ and the often-problematic delineation of 
Mental Spaces, one phenomenon that involves two semiotically distinct semantic 
scenarios was studied in detail. Impersonation humour requires the appropriation of 
voices other than one’s own, and may therefore be considered to be an excellent 
example of conceptual blending that occurs on various levels of frame integration 
complexity from mirror- to double-scope blends.  
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When investigating blending-in-interaction, theoretical preconceptions that 
equip blending for the discursive approach taken here have to be developed. As such, 
it was first of all suggested that Mental Spaces in an interactional framework cannot 
be regarded as isolated conceptual packages in an individual’s mind, but rather as 
interactionally displayed and locally negotiated in interaction. Secondly, it is  assumed 
that new Mental Spaces are set up relative to a discourse base space that shares 
features with Langacker’s (2001) Current Discourse Space; this Space subsumes 
assumptions concerning shared knowledge and beliefs about the current discourse 
setting and history. Thirdly, mapping processes in conceptual blending are regarded 
as interactionally coordinated. 
Blending-in-interaction was studied by drawing on the methodological 
framework suggested by Ethnomethodological Conversation Analysis (EMCA). 
EMCA offers an apt array of tools to firstly discern the methods employed by 
interactants to jointly negotiate meaning which emerges from the integration of 
distinct semantic scenarios, and secondly to determine the extent to which participants 
in their interactional projects orient to the blending typology advanced in MSCI. The 
material was drawn from the British comedy panel game show Never Mind the Buzzcocks 
(NMTB). Impersonation sequences identified in shows aired between 2006 and 2009 
were transcribed according to the standards set out by GAT. As the sequences stem 
from televised data, they constitute interaction-as-broadcasted (cf. Mondada, 2009), 
and were analysed with an eye on their constructed nature given that camera 
operators and editors serve as additional participants on the show. 
The analyses primarily showed that an orientation to semantic worlds is 
evident in interaction. Gaze and postural orientation are, for example, discontinued 
when presenting a character that inhabits a distinct discourse scenario which is 
presented as separate from topical talk with regard to spatio-temporal, modal and 
epistemic properties. Interactants signal the distinct input scenarios contributing to 
impersonation blends in a methodological manner; however, in this respect they do 
not orient to frame-integration complexity. Single-scope and double-scope blends 
both are signalled drawing on the same interactional methods. In addition, postural 
orientation is maintained when attributing a role or properties of a character to a co-
participant. For this reason, the orientation to the action currently being negotiated 
(e.g. attributing a deviant identity to a co-participant) appears to excert more influence 
  LANGUAGE, COGNITION, INTERACTION !
! -228-!
on performance than semantic distance. Although conceptual blending would indeed 
seem to be a cognitive tool, it is not a discursive practice in its own right. 
It therefore became apparent that the performance of actions that rely on tools 
of conceptual blending is not guided by an orientation to frame blending, but by the 
language game (Wittgenstein, 1953) currently being coordinated. As a result, frame 
integration complexity is not a category that future studies should rely on. Rather, a 
distinct focus on the ‘doings’ which employ blending should be considered.  
In my corpus, the language games impersonations contribute to in the corpus 
comprise the following: 
 
a) Assessment of prior contribution by co-participant to topical talk 
a. Attribution of deviant identity to co-participant in interaction 
b. Illustration of diegetically presented assessment of prior action 
b) Illustrations of joke-first narrations 
a. Best-off visitations into diegetetically set-up narrative scenarios 
b. Polyphonically narrated joke-first sequences 
 
For the reasons outlined, MSCI cannot be considered a theory of meaning-making 
that transcends the time-honoured division into semantics and pragmatics. Despite 
claiming that MSCI is able to account for “how meaning is constructed and how 
language prompts for meaning” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002:147), the meanings 
resulting from the integration of distinct semantic scenarios do not relate to the 
process of conceptual integration. The meanings emerging from the joint 
coordination of frame integration are primarily guided by jointly negotiated 
assumptions regarding the language game currently being negotiated, and by the 
relevance which a given sign is taken to hold in relation to that particular language 
game. Conceptual blending therefore does not constitute the way in which we think in 
order to arrive at a meaningful experience, but is a tool that may be jointly consulted 
in our quest for interactionally relevant meanings. For MSCI to be a theory that 
transcends the semantics-pragmatics division and that is able to account for fully 
contextualised meanings, it will need to incorporate notions of Common Ground, 
language games (including social action), intention and relevance. It will also need to 
explicitly acknowledge the historicity inherent in meaning-making processes. One 
such model was suggested in the previous section. The model takes a serious stance as 
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to the key role that beliefs play regarding contextual relevance (i.e. relevance to jointly 
negotiated projects) in online, interactional meaning-construction. By incorporating 
notions of signs, stimuli, relevance, language games and Common Ground and 
regarding conceptual blending as a cognitive tool, it hopes to be able to account for 
the emergence of fully-contextualised meanings arising from jointly negotiated frame 
integration. The model thus accounts for the pivotal role which the ‘pragmatic’ (i.e. 
joint, cooperative action) plays in meaning-making. Thus, that which been deemed 
irrelevant (cf. competence – performance distinction) in previous research in cognitive 
sciences is actually revealed to exert considerable influence on cognition.  
 
 
6.3. Prospects for further research 
 
 
While this project proposed a model that “locate[s] meaning in communicating 
minds” (Brandt, 2010:495), it nevertheless only focuses on one cognitive semantic 
theory. Despite commendable attempts by eminent researchers such as Langacker 
(2001) and Croft (2009), other approaches within the discipline as a whole have  thus 
far neglected the central role played by beliefs on joint action in meaning 
construction. For this reason, it would doubtless be interesting to develop a more 
overarching project that – in addition to emphasising the role of embodiment – also 
incorporated the inherently social nature of meaning-making in other cognitive 
semantic research enterprises. Such projects could investigate the way in which our 
social nature gives rise to image schemas, or how it influences issues in categorisation 
and polysemy. In this respect, further useful links to phenomenology could be 
developed. 
Continuing in this vein, Cognitive Linguistics as a whole and Cognitive 
Semantics in particular would greatly benefit from a more explicit philosophy of 
language that goes beyond the level of embodiment, and takes into account prior 
debates and the historicity of the concepts discussed. Rather than focusing on an 
attempt to delineate Cognitive Linguistics by using analytic approaches to philosophy 
of language, the development of a distinctly cognitive-linguistic philosophy that is able 
to account for both the bodily and the social nature of language would certainly be 
worthy of merit. This cognitive-linguistic philosophy of language should furthermore 
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engage with prior and current debates in philosophy of language, such as those 
conducted in metaphorology, or studies on emergence and nature of meaning. 
Within MSCI, further empirical and experiential studies would be required 
that strip the theory of its convoluted, highly-detailed, top-down principles and 
terminology, and focus on questions such as the following: 
 
• Psycholinguistic studies  
o Development studies: does the ability to consciously integrate distinctly 
theatrical scenarios bear any relation to Theory of Mind development? 
Which role does the development of second-order cognition play in the 
ability to parse and produce blends that recruit semiotically distinct 
frames and rely on mappings occurring between them? 
o Clinical experiments: how and to what extent does metacognition 
impairment affect the ability to process and produce novel blends? To 
what extent does Theory of Mind impairment (through for example a 
unilateral frontal lobe lesion (cf. Rowe et al., 2001)) affect the 
production and parsing of blends? 
• Studies in experimental semantics:  
o Eye-tracking studies could offer insight into processes of decompression 
in visual blends such as caricature.  
o Drawing experiments that provide subjects with a decontextualised 
neologism and which utilises conceptual blending (such as land yacht) 
could be used to extract details as to the information transfer occurring 
between domains and the resulting construal.  
o The role played by priming effects in the construal of such novel 
constructions could be investigated in order to shed more light on how 
mappings are guided by the quest for relevance. 
o Studies tracing eye movement could be employed to discover whether 
separate conceptual domains are accessed in the production and 
parsing of discursively dissonant blends. 
 
MSCI in particular and Cognitive Semantics in general have enabled us to perceive 
meaning as a dynamic and essentially perceptual process. By taking into account the 
embodied nature of cognising, first-generation cognitive linguists overcame the rigid 
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constraints posited by analytic language philosophy and linguistic studies conducted in 
the tradition. In order to fully reclaim language and cognition as inherently human 
phenomena (and thus rejecting technical metaphors, such as the computing mind 
popular in the 20th century and evident in formal approaches), an explicit 
consideration of the social grounding of cognition, Theory of Mind and cooperation is 
required.!!!
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SPRACHE, KOGNITION, INTERAKTION. 
KONZEPTUELLE INTEGRATION ALS DISKURSIVE PRAXIS 
 
 
 
 
Kapitel 1: Konzeptuelle Integration in einer interaktionalen Linguistik. 
Einführung  
 
 
Die kognitive Linguistik entstand in den 1970er Jahren in Reaktion auf die damals 
vorherrschenden formalen Zugänge zur Spracherforschung. Im Gegensatz zur 
generativen Linguistik wird dabei angenommen, dass Sprache kein „autonomes 
Modul“ (Rickheit et al., 2010:14) darstellt, sondern auf allgemeinen kognitiven 
Möglichkeiten des Menschen, wie Wahrnehmung und Kategorisierung, beruht. 
Darüber hinaus wird die „Körpergebundenheit“ (Schwarz, 2008) des menschlichen 
Denkens und Sprechens betont, die sich beispielsweise in prä-linguistischen Bild-
Schemata (Rickheit et al, 2010) zeigt und so Sprache und Denken strukturiert. 
Innerhalb der kognitiven Linguistik beschäftigt sich die kognitive Semantik mit 
Bedeutungskonstitution. Die kognitive Linguistik geht hier von einem situierten, 
dynamischen Prozess aus (die Konzeptualisierung), der auf bildlicher mentaler 
Simulation, Weltwissen und Körpergebundenheit basiert.  
Obwohl die kognitive Linguistik durch die Einbindung des Körpers in die 
Analyse von Prozessen der Bedeutungskonstitution zu einer produktiven Erweiterung 
des Forschungsfeldes geführt hat, wurde ihr in den letzten Jahren zunehmend 
vorgeworfen, den sozialen Aspekt der Bedeutungskonstitution zu vernachlässigen. 
Croft (2009) fordert so beispielsweise eine ‚soziale Wende‘, die zur Überwindung der 
tradierten Teilung in soziale und psychologische Aspekte von menschlichem 
Verhalten führen soll. Trotz einiger erster Versuche ist die Einbindung der vorrangig 
sozialen Funktion von Sprache innerhalb der anglophonen kognitiven Linguistik noch 
nicht vollzogen worden. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit setzt hier an und bietet einen Beitrag zur Entwicklung 
einer dezidiert sozial-interaktional fundierten kognitiven Linguistik und Semantik. Sie 
konzentriert sich dabei auf die von Fauconnier und Turner (2002) formulierte 
Theorie zu mentalen Räumen und konzeptueller Integration (Mental Spaces and 
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Conceptual Integration Theory). Dieser (hier unter MSCI gefasste) Theoriekomplex 
versucht, „das Herz menschlicher Vorstellungskraft“ (ibid: 89, Übersetzung VS) zu 
erschließen, und geht davon aus, dass aus der Integration zweier separater 
semantischer Szenarien (so genannter Input-Domänen) über einen generischen 
Raum, der Strukturen und Elemente umfasst, die beide Input-Domänen gemeinsam 
haben, eine neue Bedeutungsstruktur emergiert.  
Trotz der Attraktivität und intuitiven Plausibilität des Theoriekomplexes 
ergeben sich einige Probleme. Die oben bereits skizzierte Vernachlässigung sozialer, 
interaktionaler Faktoren in der Bedeutungskonstitution stellt einen wichtigen Punkt 
dar. Außerdem werden in der Theorie Phylogenese und Ontogenese von 
Bedeutungen nicht immer klar getrennt, sowie die Etymologie und Historizität von 
figurativen Ausdrücken nicht berücksichtigt. Die vorliegende Arbeit fragt daher nach 
zwei miteinander verwobenen Aspekten: 
 
• Forschungsfrage 1) betrifft die interaktionale Aushandlung von konzeptioneller 
Integration. Wie werden mentale Räume in der konkreten Interaktion 
kenntlich gemacht? Wie werden sie in Beziehung zueinander gesetzt (mapping)?  
• Um Forschungsfrage 1) weiter zu konkretisieren, bezieht sich Forschungsfrage 
2) auf einen theorieimmanenten Aspekt und untersucht die von Fauconnier 
und Turner (2002) formulierte Typologie von konzeptueller Integration. So 
soll gefragt werden, inwieweit die hochkomplexen doppelt gerahmten 
Integrationsnetzwerke (double-scope blending), die in der Forschungsliteratur als 
Bedingung menschlicher Einzigartigkeit beschrieben werden, eine eigene 
diskursive Praxis1 darstellen und sich von weniger komplexer konzeptioneller 
Integration interaktional unterscheiden lassen.  
 
Zur Beantwortung dieser beiden Forschungsfragen untersuche ich Fallbeispiele von 
polyphonem Stimmwechsel in der Scherzkommunikation mithilfe der Methoden der 
Konversationsanalyse. Die Stimmwechsel beruhen in prototypischer Weise auf 
konzeptioneller Integration unterschiedlichen Komplexitätsgrades und erlauben so !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Meine Verwendung des Ausdrucks ‘diskursive Praxis’ unterscheidet sich hier explizit von der 
kulturwissenschaftlichen Tradition im Sinne von Foucault oder Butler. Ich beziehe mich auf das 
interaktionale, diskursive ‚Tun‘, das gemeinsam zwischen Sprecher_innen ausgehandelt wird und 
dabei auf Abstraktionen bisheriger Erfahrungen basiert. In meiner Arbeit ist von Interesse, ob die 
verschiedenen Typen von konzeptioneller Integration unter Rückgriff auf unterschiedliche Methoden 
und Praxen verhandelt werden. 
  LANGUAGE, COGNITION, INTERACTION !
! -257-!
die Beschreibung von interaktionalen Aushandlungsprozessen der von Fauconnier 
und Turner (2002) beschriebenen kognitiv-semantischen Prozesse. So wird 
Forschungsfrage 2) beantwortet. Im Anschluss an die Analyse wird ein Modell 
vorgeschlagen, das auf den Analyseergebnissen basiert, der sozialen Dimension von 
Bedeutungsaushandlung Rechnung trägt und somit auf Forschungsfrage 1) eingeht. 
 
 
Kapitel 2: Der Theoriekomplex. Mentale Räume und konzeptuelle 
Integration 
 
 
Dieser Abschnitt bietet eine Einführung in das von Fauconnier (1994, 1997) 
entwickelte Konzept zu mentalen Räumen und die darauf aufbauende Theorie der 
konzeptuellen Integration (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). In der kognitiven Semantik 
wird davon ausgegangen, dass Sprache nicht inhärent bedeutungstragend ist, sondern 
Bedeutungskonstitutionen anregt. Diese Bedeutungskonstitutionen selbst sind 
konzeptueller Natur, prozedural und dynamisch. Aus dieser Perspektive stellen Sätze, 
die Bedeutung stets unterspezifieren, eine Art Anleitung zur Bedeutungskonstitution 
dar, die auf der Konstruktion von komplexen temporalen konzeptuellen Domänen, 
sogenannter mentaler Räume, beruht. Sprache selbst regt – unter Bezug auf 
enzyklopädisches Welt- und Kontextwissen – zum Aufbau solcher Domänen an und 
führt auf diese Weise zu situativ bedingter Bedeutungskonstitution. Im Gegensatz zu 
analytischen und formalen Sprachphilosophien ist Bedeutung somit weder in der 
Sprache selbst noch in der externen Welt verortet, sondern entsteht dynamisch-
konzeptuell und ist stets situativ eingebunden.  
Die durch Sprache konstruierten konzeptuellen Domänen werden bei 
Fauconnier (1994, 1997) unter dem Begriff ‚mentale Räume‘ gefasst. Die im Zuge der 
Bedeutungskonstitution konstruierten mentalen Räume werden miteinander auf 
verschiedene Weise verbunden und in Beziehung gesetzt (mappings). Dieser Aspekt 
wird in der Weiterentwicklung des Modells durch Fauconnier und Turner (2002) 
genauer diskutiert. Dabei wird darauf verwiesen, dass sich aus der konzeptionellen 
Verbindung und Interaktion zweier Domänen emergente Strukturen entwickeln 
können, die blends genannt werden. Das folgende Beispiel (adaptiert von Fauconnier, 
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1997:155ff) illustriert den Prozess. Im Jahr 1993 folgt der Katamaran ‚Great America 
II’ dem Kurs, den der Klipper ‚Northern Light‘ bereits im Jahre 1853 einschlug. 
Segelzeitschriften verglichen die Törns der beiden Yachten in Äußerungen wie „Die 
Great America II liegt zur Zeit 4,5 Seemeilen vor der Northern Light.“ Obwohl 150 
Jahre zwischen den beiden Törns liegen, entsteht der Eindruck einer Regatta. In der 
‚Verschmelzung‘, dem blend, treten die Yachten gegeneinander an. Aus den beiden 
Input-Domänen (dem Szenario des Katamaran und dem des Klippers) werden 
selektiv Strukturelemente in den blend projiziert: das Jahr, die Wetterkonditionen und 
das eine Schiff werden aus der Input-Domäne des Katamarans genommen. Aus der 
Domäne des Klippers wird das zweite Schiff entnommen. Weitere Wissensstrukturen 
werden hingegen vernachlässigt. Der Vergleich wird möglich durch einen generischen 
Raum (generic space), der die Struktur, die beide Input-Domänen gemeinsam haben, 
subsumiert. Abbildung 1 zeigt eine schematische Visualisierung dieses Prozesses. 
!
Abbildung 1: Konzeptionelle Integration: Schematisches Diagram 
 
Durch die Verschmelzung ist ein direkter Vergleich der beiden Schiffe möglich. Die 
dynamische Simulation des entstandenen Regattaszenarios bringt emergierende 
Wissensstrukturen, wie beispielsweise das jeweilige Tempo der Yachten, hervor, die 
wiederum in die Input-Domänen zurückgespiegelt werden können und die jeweiligen 
Wissensstrukturen weiter anreichern.  
Die Autoren unterscheiden zwischen vier Typen von konzeptueller 
Integration, die unterschiedliche Komplexitätsstufen repräsentieren. Die sogenannten 
Simplex-Netzwerke beschreiben blends, in denen ein Input eine bekannte 
Rahmungsstruktur (wie zum Beispiel ‚Familie‘) und ein anderer die Werte (‚Peter‘, 
‚Maria‘) bereitstellt. So werden Werte mit rahmender Struktur verbunden (‚Peter ist 
Marias Vater‘). An zweiter Stelle des Integrations-Kontinuums stehen sogenannte 
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Spiegel-Netzwerke. In diesem Typ haben alle Input-Räume die gleiche 
Organisationsstruktur, die „relevante Aktivitäten, Ereignisse und Teilnehmer_innen“ 
(Fauconnier und Turner, 2002:123, Übersetzung VS) umfasst. Das oben beschriebene 
Regattabeispiel stellt ein Spiegel-Netzwerk dar. Auf der nächsthöheren 
Komplexitätsstufe verorten die Autoren sog. ‚einfach gerahmte Netzwerke‘. Im 
Gegensatz zu Simplex- und Spiegel-Netzwerken integrieren einfach gerahmte 
Netzwerke semantisch nicht kompatible Input-Domänen. Im blend selbst ist lediglich 
die Organisationsstruktur eines Inputs zu finden. Die Organisationsstruktur des 
zweiten Inputs wird fallengelassen. Das Beispiel der boxenden Firmen illustriert diesen 
Typus: Wenn ein Unternehmen einem anderen einen herben Schlag versetzt oder es 
gar k.o. schlägt, so tragen zwei widersprüchliche Wissensdomänen zum Integrations-
netzwerk bei: das Szenario der Geschäftswelt und das der Boxwelt. Doch nur die 
Ereignisstruktur der Boxwelt strukturiert den blend, da aus dem Szenario der 
Geschäftswelt lediglich die Figuren stammen. Viele konzeptionelle Metaphern folgen 
diesem Schema einer asymmetrischen, einfach gerahmten konzeptuellen Integration.  
Die komplexeste Form der konzeptuellen Integration stellen schließlich 
‚doppelt gerahmte Integrationsnetzwerke‘ dar. Wie bei einfach gerahmten 
Integrationsnetzwerken finden sich semantisch nicht kompatible Input-Räume. Bei 
der Integration dieser Domäne finden jedoch Rahmungsaspekte beider Inputs 
Eingang in den blend und resultieren in einer emergenten Struktur, die in keiner der 
beiden Inputs vorhanden ist. Als Beispiel kann die Transsubstantiation genannt 
werden, in der Brot und Wein zu Leib und Blut Jesu werden. Die Fähigkeit zur 
Konstruktion doppelt gerahmter konzeptueller Integrationsnetzwerke ist, so die 
Autoren, die Wurzel aller menschlicher Kulturleistungen. 
 
Kritische Würdigung 
Trotz der Attraktivität der Theorie finden sich einige Problemlagen philosophischer 
wie methodologischer Natur, die im Folgenden zusammengefasst werden. 
 
1. Post-hoc Analysen: In der kanonischen MSCI-Literatur wird vom ‚Produkt‘ 
ausgegangen und versucht, die Schritte, die zur einer gewissen 
Konzeptualisierung geführt haben, nachzuzeichnen. Dies kann nicht nur zu 
psychologisch zweifelhaften Ergebnissen führen, sondern auch zu einer 
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Vernachlässigung von interaktionalen Aushandlungsprozessen und der 
Kontextgebundenheit von Bedeutung. 
2. Der generische Raum: Dieser tertium comparatonis-Raum fügt dem 
konzeptuellen Integrationsnetzwerk keine weitere relevante Wissensstruktur zu 
und wird lediglich in dekontextualiserten Beispielen zur Erklärung der 
Motivation von bestimmten Ausdrücken benötigt. 
3. Generalisierungen, Terminologieprobleme und Falsifizierbarkeit: Aufgrund 
der sehr generellen und breiten Annahmen fällt es schwer, das 
Theoriegebäude empirisch zu testen. Außerdem werden die jeweiligen 
Spezifiken der untersuchten Phänomene vernachlässigt, was die Beschreibung 
dichter Bedeutung erschwert. 
4. Demarkation mentaler Räume: Die einzelnen Räume sind nur schwer 
voneinander abzugrenzen und eine einheitliche Definition des Terminus ist 
noch nicht gefunden worden. 
5. Wessen mentale Räume werden beschrieben? Wessen blends? In der MSCI-
Literatur scheint oft von einem generischen Rezipienten ausgegangen zu 
werden, der zu einer Spiegelung der kognitiven Prozesse, die den Sender zu 
einer bestimmten Äußerung bewogen haben, fähig ist. 
6. Loci und Ebenen konzeptueller Integration: Eine Unterscheidung in ‚tote’ und 
‚lebendige’ Metaphern (vgl. Ricoeur, 1975) wird nicht getroffen und, so 
scheint es, gleichartige kognitive Prozesse für die Bedeutungskonstitution in 
beiden Phänomenen angenommen.  
7. Homunculus-Problematik: MSCI unterscheidet zwischen vordergründiger 
und hintergründiger Kognition und hofft, letztere zu beschreiben. Doch wie 
sich die vordergründige von der hintergründigen Kognition unterscheidet und 
wie Bedeutung „in das Bewusstsein geliefert“ wird (ibid:57, Übersetzung VS), 
wird nicht weiter thematisiert. 
8. Konzeptuelle Integration, Kontext und Interaktion: Die situative 
Eingebundenheit und interaktionale ‚Erdung‘ von Konzeptualisierungs-
prozessen wird in der MSCI-Literatur nicht näher behanelt. Die Prozesse, die 
zu kontextualisierter (d.h. nicht ausschließlich sedimentierter) Bedeutung 
führen, werden somit nicht thematisiert. 
9. Typologie: Von den oben beschriebenen vier Typen von blends ist vor allem 
der erste, die Simplex-Netzwerke auffallend. Was ist ein mentaler Raum ohne 
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Rahmenstrukturierung? Doch auch doppelt gerahmte Integrationsnetzwerke 
erscheinen bei genauerer Betrachtung problematisch. Besonders die 
Abgrenzung von einfach gerahmten Integrationsnetzwerken zeigt sich in der 
Praxis schwierig, da die Trennlinie willkürlich gezogen werden kann. 
 
So wird deutlich, dass MSCI zwar eine durchaus einleuchtende Theorie menschlicher 
Kognition darstellt, doch auch eine Reihen von Schwächen methodischer sowie 
theoretischer Natur aufweist. Um diesen zu begegnen und somit zu einer produktiven 
Weiterentwicklung des Ansatzes beizutragen, werden in Kapitel drei erste 
Hypothesen zu einer methodologischen wie konzeptuellen Neupositionierung von 
MSCI vorgeschlagen, die eine empirische Analyse kontextualisierter blends 
ermöglichen soll. 
 
 
Kapitel 3: Vorüberlegungen zur theoretischen Positionierung und 
empirischen Validierung einer sozial-interaktionalen kognitiven Semantik 
 
 
Die Methodik der kognitiven Linguistik ist traditionell introspektiv, hat sich in den 
letzten Jahren aber zunehmend empirischen und experimentellen Zugängen geöffnet. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit folgt dabei weitgehend dem von Hougaard (2004, 2005, 2008) 
vorgeschlagenem diskursiven Ansatz, der auf Methoden der Konversationsanalyse 
zurückgreift. Dieser Ansatz wird gewählt, da mit seiner Hilfe voll kontextualisierte, 
nicht simulierte Daten berücksichtigt werden können und eine ad-hoc-Beschreibung 
von interaktionalen Bedeutungsaushandlungsprozessen möglich wird. Dieser 
interaktionale Zugang wurde nicht nur von Hougaard verfolgt, sondern führte bereits 
zu ersten Ansätzen einer Erweiterung des MSCI-Models um semio-pragmatische 
Aspekte durch Brandt und Brandt (2005), die jedoch stark auf semiotischen Theorien 
basieren und die interaktionale Aushandlung von Bedeutung nicht gebührend 
berücksichtigen. Zudem beschäftigen sich ihre Analysen nicht mit der Validität der 
Binnenstruktur des Theoriekomplexes. Dieser Aspekt, die MSCI-Typologie, wird 
jedoch von Bache (2005) und von Brandt (2010) thematisiert, die beide eine 
Neustrukturierung vorschlagen. Während Baches (2005) Modell die ursprüngliche 
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Typologie generell rafft, aber besonders die weniger komplexen Integrationstypen 
stärker differenziert, bietet Brandt (2010) eine ausdifferenzierte Typologie der 
komplexen Integrationsarten, die methodisch jedoch eher auf Introspektion als auf 
empirischer Analyse basiert. Die empirische Validität der jeweiligen Typologien wird 
somit weder bei Brandt noch bei Bache thematisiert. Aus diesem Grund schlägt die 
vorliegende Arbeit vor, die Binnenstruktur von blends mithilfe der Methoden der 
Konversationsanalyse genauer zu untersuchen. 
Die Konversationsanalyse untersucht Alltagsgespräche im Hinblick auf 
diejenigen Regeln und Verfahren, mit denen Bedeutung interaktional ausgehandelt 
wird. Dabei geht sie davon aus, dass Bedeutung in der sozialen Aktion entsteht. 
Äußerungen sind somit Aktionen, die stets in spezifischen interaktionalen und 
sequentiellen Kontexten situiert sind und methodisch produziert werden. Die 
Konversationsanalyse fragt nun nach den Mechanismen, mit deren Hilfe die 
Teilnehmer_innen gemeinsam Bedeutung konstituieren. Dies wird durch die 
mikrosoziologische Betrachtung von aufgenommenen und transkribierten 
Alltagsgesprächen erreicht.  
Einen dezidiert pragmatischen methodischen Zugang mit einer weitgehend 
mentalistischen Theorie in Verbindung zu setzen erfordert jedoch Vorüberlegungen 
zur theoretischen Konzeption der zentralen Konzepte. Diese werden im Folgenden 
zusammengefasst. 
 
1. Kognition ist ‚vordergründig‘ und nicht ‚hintergründig‘. In der interaktionalen 
Bedeutungsaushandlung werden kognitive Prozesse koordiniert und somit 
offen signalisiert, um sich der Intersubjektivität anzunähern. Beschrieben wird 
in der Analyse also Kognition, wie sie sich interaktional vordergründig zeigt, 
und nicht, wie sie hintergründig ablaufen könnte. 
2. Geteiltes Wissen und mentale Räume: Mentale Räume basieren auf 
wechselseitigen Annahmen zu geteiltem Wissen und dem jeweiligen 
Kommunikationspartner. Sie werden daher interaktional ausgehandelt und 
koordiniert, sind interaktional relevant und phänomenologisch evident. 
3. Diskursbasisraum als Kommunikationsvoraussetzung: Zur Repräsentation 
jener Elemente des geteilten Wissens, die für die lokale 
Bedeutungsaushandlung relevant sind, wird auf das von Langacker (2001) 
entworfene Model des Diskursbasisraums (Current Discourse Space) 
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zurückgegriffen. Dieser mentale Raum umfasst Wissen, das „als von 
Sprecher_in und Hörer_in geteilt angenommen wird und zu einem 
bestimmten Zeitpunkt im Diskursverlauf als Kommunikationsbasis dient“ 
(ibid:144, Übersetzung VS). Entgegen dem Modell von Brandt und Brandt 
(2005) erlaubt Langackers Diskursbasisraum die explizite Würdigung von 
geteiltem Wissen und sozialer Aktion in der Bedeutungskonstitution und wird 
ersterem daher vorgezogen. 
4. Der generische Raum wird in der Analyse nur dann berücksichtig, wenn die 
Kommunikationspartner in ihrer Interaktion explizit darauf Bezug nehmen. 
 
Bedeutung wird in der sozial-interaktionalen kognitiven Semantik, wie sie die 
vorliegende Arbeit vorschlägt, also nicht als individuelles Phänomen gefasst, sondern 
als sozial und lokal konstruiert. Zur Analyse der Prozesse, die beim Aushandeln von 
konzeptuellen Integrationsnetzwerken unterschiedlicher Komplexität zum Tragen 
kommen, konzentriert sich die Analyse auf ein interaktionales Phänomen, bei dem 
zwei klar umrissene und interaktional verhandelte semantische Szenarien als Input-
Domänen fungieren: Stimmwechsel im polyphonen Humor. Dieses Phänomen wird 
im Folgenden kurz beschrieben. In einem weiteren Schritt werden Datenlage und 
Sammlung skizziert. 
 
Forschungsgegenstand: Polyphone Stimmwechsel im interaktionalen Humor 
Basierend auf dem von Bakhtin (1963) skizzierten Konzept der polyphonen Erzählung 
werden Stimmwechsel im interaktionalen Humor (wie beispielsweise Nachäffen oder 
Parodie) als kondensierte und fragmentierte polyphone Narrative gefasst, die 
welterzeugende Funktion haben. Die Stimmwechsel sind körperlicher Natur, 
bühnenhaft (cf. Fischer-Lichte, 2002) und ähneln Karikaturen, da sie typifizieren 
(Schütz & Luckmann, 1979), Normabweichungen betonen und der Lächerlichkeit 
preisgeben. Die Stimmwechsel stellen jedoch auch eine Art soziales Spiel dar 
(Goffman (1974)), das basierend auf unterschiedlichen Humormechanismen, wie der 
Freude an Mimesis und der überraschenden Einblicke, die das Zusammenführen 
inkongruenter semantischer Szenarien mit sich bringen kann, zu einem Zelebrieren 
von Gruppenzugehörigkeit und der damit einhergehenden Differenzkonstitution 
führt. 
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Solche polyphonen Stimmwechsel stellen prototypische Integrationsnetzwerke 
dar, da eine persona durch den Körper einer anderen präsentiert wird. Durch 
Dekomprimierung wird aus der integrierten Performanz des Stimmwechsel eine 
polyphone Erzählung, die emergente Rückschlüsse auf die Input-Domänen 
ermöglicht. Abbildung 2 visualisiert diesen Gedanken. 
 
!
Abbildung 2: Polyphone Integrationsnetzwerke: Schematische Darstellung 
 
Polyphone Stimmwechsel basieren auf konzeptuellen Integrationsnetzwerken 
unterschiedlicher Komplexität. Es finden sich Spiegel-, einfach gerahmte und doppelt 
gerahmte Integrationsnetzwerke, die anhand der Faktoren ‚Diskursszenario‘ und 
‚semiotische Codes‘ unterschieden werden können. Während Stimmwechsel, in denen 
Menschen andere Menschen desselben Diskursszenarios darstellen (wie zum Beispiel 
im Falle von Nachäffen), auf Spiegelnetzwerken basieren, greifen solche 
Stimmwechsel, in denen Teilnehmer_innen Menschen in temporal, epistemisch und 
räumlich abgesetzten Diskursszenarien verkörpern, auf einfach gerahmte 
Integrationsnetzwerke zurück. Diejenigen Stimmwechsel, in denen Teilnehmer_innen 
nicht-menschliche Entitäten wie Maschinen, Tiere oder Pflanzen verkörpern, stellen 
hingegen doppelt gerahmte Integrationsnetzwerke dar. Die folgende Tabelle fasst die 
Kriterien zur Typologie der Stimmwechsel zusammen. 
Integrationskomplexität Diskursszenario Semiotischer Code  
Spiegel-Netzwerk 
(z.B. Nachäffen) 
Diskursszenario ist räumlich identisch und 
temporal nah in beiden Input-Domänen  
geringe Inkompatibilität 
‚Menschliche’ semiotische 
Codes  geringe 
Inkompatibilität 
Einfach gerahmte 
Netzwerke (z.B. 
Verkörperung einer 
historischen Figur)  
Deutlich voneinander abgesetzte 
Diskursszenarien. Diskursszenario der 
dargestellten Figur stellt Rahmenstruktur der 
Darstellung.  
‚Menschliche’ semiotische 
Codes  geringe 
Inkompatibilität 
Doppelt gerahmte 
Netzwerke (z.B. 
Verkörperung eines 
Tieres)  
Deutlich voneinander abgesetzte 
Diskursszenarien. Die Domäne der 
verkörperten Figur stellt nur Teile der 
emergenten Rahmenstruktur der 
Darstellung. 
Nicht-menschliche 
semiotische Codes werden 
mithilfe menschlicher 
Codes dargestellt   
Inkompatibilität 
Tabelle 1: Typologie polyphoner Stimmwechselnetzwerke 
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Die interaktionale Analyse polyphoner Stimmwechsel erlaubt es, der oben 
zusammengefassten Kritik an MSCI zu begegnen, da sie a) klare Kriterien zur 
Differenzierung von mentalen Räumen anbietet, b) lediglich ein Phänomen in seiner 
Situiertheit beleuchtet und somit den Ubiquitätsvorwurf berücksichtigt, c) die 
Prozesshaftigkeit von Bedeutungsaushandlung betont, und d) Bedeutung und 
Kognition als öffentliche Phänomene begreift. 
 
Datensammlung und Analyseschritte 
Die in der vorliegenden Arbeit untersuchten insgesamt 109 Stimmwechselsequenzen, 
stammen aus Aufnahmen der britischen Fernsehsendung Never Mind The Buzzcocks 
(NMTB) aus den Jahren 2006 bis 2010. NMTB ist ein wöchentlich ausgestrahltes 
Popmusik-Quiz, das vornehmlich ein junges, männliches Publikum anspricht. Zwei 
Teams treten gegeneinander an. Die Teams bestehen aus festen Teamkapitänen und 
jeweils zwei Gästen, die meist Popstars, Schauspieler_innen oder Komiker_innen 
sind. Moderiert wird das Quiz von einem Moderator. Da es keine Preise zu gewinnen 
gibt und die Punkte auch recht arbiträr vergeben werden, geht es der Sendung 
vorrangig nicht um Spannung oder die Zelebrierung von Schulwissen, sondern um 
die Präsentation (und oft Verspottung) der berühmten Gäste. NMTB ist berüchtigt für 
seinen bissigen Humor und die oft rüde Art, mit den Gästen umzuspringen. Da sich 
Moderatoren, Teamkapitäne, aber auch Gäste gerne und viel über andere lustig 
machen, ergibt sich eine hohe Dichte an polyphonen Stimmwechseln.  
Fernsehdaten sind in Studien, die der Tradition der Konversationsanalyse 
folgen, nicht unumstritten. Die vorliegende Arbeit folgt aus diesem Grund dem 
Zugang von Mondada (2006, 2009) und schlägt vor, die vorliegenden Sequenzen als 
„Rundfunkinteraktion“ zu untersuchen. Videodaten, wie sie auch 
Rundfunkinteraktion darstellen, ermöglichen nie ungetrübte Einblicke in soziale 
Interaktion, sondern sind stets „situierte Produkte von Videopraktiken“ (Mondada, 
2009:67), denen Editierungsentscheidungen, wie das Schneiden, vorangehen. 
Rundfunkinteraktion ist daher Interaktion, die bereits interpretiert wurde und aktiv 
von weiteren Teilnehmer_innen, wie Kameraleuten, Regisseur_innen und 
Cutter_innen, mitgestaltet wurde. Rundfunkinteraktion ist somit Interaktion, in der 
gewisse Aspekte von anderen Teilnehmer_innen durch Schnitt und hinzugefügten 
Tonspuren (wie Lachen) betont werden, um sie einem größeren Publikum 
verständlich zu präsentieren. 
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In der Analyse wurden in einem ersten Schritt Stimmwechselsequenzen im 
Korpus identifiziert und im Anschluss nach GAT 2 (Selting et al., 2009) transkribiert. 
In einem nächsten Schritt wurden zentrale Beispiele beschrieben und alle Sequenzen 
nach der oben beschriebenen Typologie klassifiziert. Von den 109 Sequenzen sind 23 
Spiegelnetzwerke, 62 einfach gerahmte und 24 doppelt gerahmte Netzwerke. Der 
folgende Analyseschritt beinhaltete die interaktionale Analyse zentraler Fallbeispiele 
jedes Typs und die Formulierung erster Regeln. Diese wurden im Anschluss an 
weiteren Fällen getestet, um möglichst generelle Regeln zu finden. Diese wurden in 
einem letzten Schritt mit anderen Typen verglichen. 
Im Folgenden wird exemplarisch zunächst eine Fallstudie zusammengefasst, 
die den Analyseprozess verdeutlichen soll. Im Anschluss werden die Ergebnisse des 
Typologievergleichs in Kapitel fünf präsentiert. 
 
 
Kapitel 4: Polyphone Stimmwechsel als konzeptuelle 
Integrationsnetzwerke: Fallstudie 
 
 
Die Sequenz „Der Metalldetektor“ stellt ein prototypisches doppelt gerahmtes 
Integrationsnetzwerk dar. Teilnehmer NF verkörpert einen überaus höflichen 
Metalldetektor aus Metall, der sich dafür entschuldigt, stets immer nur sich selbst 
aufzuspüren. Sowohl auf der Diskurs- als auch auf der Ebene der semiotischen Codes 
findet sich semantische Inkompatibilität. Vor dem eigentlichen Stimmwechsel wird 
eine Art ‚Vorwort‘ präsentiert, das die interaktionale Relevanz der folgenden Sequenz 
verdeutlicht und somit aufzeigt, dass Stimmwechsel stets lokal veranlasst sind und ihre 
Relation zum vorhergegangen thematischen Diskurs transparent gemacht werden 
muss. Zweitens führt dieses ‚Vorwort‘ in die Problemstellung (d.h. der sich aufgrund 
seines Materials selbst aufspürende Metalldetektor) des Szenarios der folgenden 
Sequenz ein und liefert so wichtige Informationen zur narrativen Struktur der 
fragmentierten Erzählung. Doch nicht nur die narrative Struktur wird im Vorwort 
deutlich – auch auf der Ebene der semiotischen Codes werden Erläuterungen 
gegeben. Es wird diegetisch darauf hingewiesen, dass Metalldetektoren piepen. Mit 
dieser klanglichen Dimension, mit einem Wechsel der semiotischen Codes, wird dann 
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auch der Stimmwechsel eingeleitet: NF piept zur Einleitung der Imitationssequenz. 
Gleichzeitig richtet er seine Blickrichtung geradeaus, wendet seinen Körper von den 
anderen Teilnehmer_innen ab und orientiert sich somit nicht mehr in Richtung 
seiner vorherigen Gesprächspartnerin. NF zeigt dadurch, dass seine kommunikativen 
Signale einem anderen Diskursszenario zugeordnet sind. Diese von den anderen 
Teilnehmer_innen abgewandte Position behält er während der Imitationssequenz bei. 
Die Imitation umfasst insgesamt drei kleinere Sequenzen (bestehend aus jeweils ein bis 
zwei Turnkonstruktionseinheiten (TCUs)), die jeweils mit einem Piepen eingeleitet 
werden. Zwischen den einzelnen Blocks finden sich Pausen, in denen das Publikum 
seine Wertschätzung und sein Verständnis in Form von Lachen signalisiert. Der dritte 
und letzte Block ist prosodisch als Pointe markiert. Unter Rückgriff auf die im 
‚Vorwort‘ eingeführte Problematik der eigenen Materialität fasst die Pointe das 
Problem nochmals zusammen und fungiert als prosodische wie auch pragmatische 
Endmarkierung. Nach einem abschließenden Lachen durch das Publikum und die 
anderen Teilnehmer_innen wird wieder zum thematischen Gespräch zurückgekehrt. 
Dies macht deutlich, dass solche Sequenzen tatsächlich ‚Gesprächsspiel‘ sind und als 
nicht-implikativ für den weiteren thematischen Gesprächsverlauf behandelt werden. 
Auf kognitiv-semantischer Ebene kann das aufgebaute Integrationsnetzwerk 
wie in Abbildung 3 dargestellt werden. Die emergente Struktur des blends (d.h. der 
Imitationssequenz) ist doppelt gerahmt, da einer Maschine menschliche Gefühle und 
Sprache anverwandt werden, jedoch auch Aspekte der ‚Lebens‘- und Zeichenwelt des 
Metalldetektors einbezogen werden. 
!
Abbildung 3: Konzeptuelles Integrationsnetzwerk in Der Metalldetektor 
  LANGUAGE, COGNITION, INTERACTION !
! -268-!
Aus dieser sowie den anderen in Kapitel vier verhandelten Fallstudien, lassen sich 
erste Hypothesen für die interaktionale Aushandlung von Imitationssequenzen 
ableiten. Die Stimmwechsel müssen aus der vorhergegangenen Interaktion resultieren 
und die Beziehung zum vorhergegangen Gespräch systematisch transparent machen. 
Des Weiteren kann eine prototypische Struktur von Stimmwechselsequenzen 
beobachtet werden. ‚Vorworte‘ beziehen die präsentierten Diskursszenarien auf das 
vorhergegangene thematische Gespräch (z.B. „das erinnert mich daran, als...“, 
„Genau wie damals als ...“) und präsentieren die narrative Makrostruktur des 
Diskursszenarios. Demarkationsmarker, wie ein Wechsel der Blickrichtung und der 
Körperhaltung, signalisieren den Stimmwechsel und verdeutlichen den 
Referenzwechsel von der eigenen zur fremden Stimme. Die Stimmwechselsequenzen 
selbst sind unterteilt in kleinere Subeinheiten, die aus ein bis zwei TCUs bestehen. 
Nach jeder Subeinheit wird den Rezeptionssignalen des Publikums Raum gegeben 
und das Rederecht neu verhandelt. Spezielle Methoden zur Beendigung des 
Stimmwechsels beinhalten prosodisches Design im Pointen-Format sowie die 
markierte Wiederholung von Elementen aus dem ‚Vorwort‘. Solche Wiederholungen 
verdeutlichen nochmals die Relevanz der Imitationssequenz und führen gleichzeitig 
wieder zurück in das vorangegangene thematische Gespräch. 
Im Folgenden werden diese Aspekte genauer untersucht und die Methoden, 
die zur Aushandlung von Stimmwechseln in den unterschiedlichen Netzwerktypen 
herangezogen werden, verglichen, um festzustellen, ob komplexere Netzwerke auf 
andere Methoden zurückgreifen als weniger komplexe. 
 
 
Kapitel 5: Interaktionale Organisation von polyphonen Stimmwechseln 
 
 
In diesem Abschnitt fasse ich die Ergebnisse der in Kapitel 5 der Arbeit präsentierten 
Analyse zusammen. Dabei orientiert sich die Struktur an den Ergebnissen der oben 
skizzierten Fallstudie. 
 
Lokale Anlässe und diegetische Einführung 
Spiegelnetzwerke zeigen meist sehr kurze Einführungen (‚Vorworte‘), die bereits eine 
Bewertung von vorangegangenen Aussagen anderer Teilnehmer_innen beinhalten. 
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Zudem spielt die markierte Wiederholung von Elementen dieser Aussagen eine 
zentrale Rolle. 
In einfach gerahmten Netzwerken muss die temporale, räumliche, 
epistemische und modale Differenz der Input-Domänen in den Einführungen 
verdeutlicht werden. So finden sich Simile-Konstruktionen („x ist wie y“), aber auch 
die von Schegloff (1987) beschriebene ‚Zuerst ein Witz’-Strategien, in denen ein 
Aspekt des vorangegangen Gesprächs die Teilnehmer dazu veranlasst, einen Witz 
einzuschieben, bevor das thematische Gespräch weitergeführt wird. Die ‚Vorworte’ zu 
einfach gerahmten Imitationssequenzen präsentieren somit kurze 
Zusammenfassungen des einzuführenden Diskursszenarios und beschreiben die 
Relevanz, die eine Imitation zum vorhergegangen Gespräch hat. 
Doppelt gerahmte Integrationsnetzwerke verwenden ähnliche Methoden wie 
die einfach gerahmten Netzwerke. Die ‚Vorworte‘ tendieren jedoch dazu, länger und 
detaillierter zu sein. Rhetorische Fragen sind ein gern genutztes Werkzeug, um 
Imitationen einzuführen. 
 
 Distanzmarker Verankerung im Gespräch Pragmatische Funktion 
• Abgrenzungsmarkierung 
(z.B. “Oh”) 
• Nicht vorhanden 
• Auslöser wird durch 
(rhetorische) Frage 
profiliert 
• Markierte Wiederholung 
eines Elements des 
vorangegangenen 
Gesprächs 
• Zuschreibung von 
Identitäten, Affekt 
oder hintergründigen 
Motiven  
Spiegel-
Netzwerke 
• Wiederbe- und 
Umschreibung der 
vorangegangenen 
Aktivität 
 
• Simile („ist wie“) 
• Beschreibung der 
vorhergegangene 
Aktivität 
• Bewertung 
vorangegangener 
Äußerungen anderer 
Teilnehmer_innen 
• Zuschreibung von 
Identitäten oder 
Affekt 
• Signalisierung neuer 
mentaler Räume 
(epistemisch, modal, 
räumlich und temporal 
separat) 
 
• Gesprächsobjekt wird in 
eine andere Diskurswelt 
transferiert (Auslöser 
kann durch Frage oder 
markierte Wiederholung 
gekennzeichnet werden) 
• Illustration einer 
‘zuerst ein Witz’-
Sequenz 
Einfach 
gerahmte 
Stimmwechsel 
• Wiederbeschreibung 
einer vorangegangenen 
Aktivität im Gespräch 
und Signalisierung 
neuer Räume 
 
• Simile (“ist wie”) 
 
• Beurteilung; Objekt 
des Gesprächs ins 
Lächerliche ziehen   
Doppelt 
gerahmte 
Stimmwechsel 
Wie oben Wie oben Wie oben 
Tabelle 2: Diegetische 'Vorworte' in Verkörperungssequenzen unterschiedlicher Komplexitätsstufen 
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Im Vergleich der drei Netzwerktypen (s. Tabelle 2) werden somit unterschiedliche 
Strategien deutlich, die Evidenz für die von Fauconnier & Turner (2002) 
vorgeschlagene Typologie beanspruchen könnten. Es muss jedoch berücksichtigt 
werden, dass diese Unterschiede vor allem Spiegelnetzwerke von asymmetrischen 
Netzwerken (einfach und doppelt gerahmten) unterscheiden. In Imitationssequenzen 
ermöglichen diese unterschiedlichen Netzwerktypen auch unterschiedliche soziale 
Aktionen: die Illustration eines Witzes in einem doppelt gerahmten Netzwerk muss 
sich interaktional vom Nachäffen eines Teammitgliedes unterscheiden. Der Frage, ob 
es die soziale Aktion oder die Netzwerkkomplexität ist, nach der sich die Methoden 
richten, wird aus diesem Grund in den nachfolgenden Analysen im Detail beleuchtet. 
 
Demarkationsmarkierung: Diegese vs. Mimese 
Dieser Abschnitt beschäftigt sich zum Einen mit Verben zur Einleitung von 
Redewiedergabe und zum Anderen mit dem in der Fallstudie bereits erwähnten Blick- 
und Positionswechsel zur Demarkation von diegetischen Vorwörtern und 
mimetischen Vorführungen.  
Bei den Redewiedergabeverben fällt zunächst auf, dass die meisten 
Stimmwechsel ohne ein verbum dicendi eingeleitet werden. Wenn zur Einführung von 
Stimmwechseln Redewiedergabeverben verwendet werden, so sind es meist die 
Verben go und be like, die eine hohe Toleranz für stark körperliche Stimmwechsel 
aufweisen. Werden die Funktionen, die verba dicendi in den unterschiedlichen 
Integrationstypen haben, verglichen, zeigt sich, dass der Gebrauch der Verben stark 
vom Verkörperungsgrad abhängt und zweitens von Notwendigkeiten des lokalen 
Stimmen-Managements: Sobald die Charaktere einer Verkörperungssequenz etabliert 
sind, können die Stimmen ohne die Rahmung durch Verben des Tuns und des 
Sprechens verhandelt werden. Doch auch funktional unterscheiden sich die Verben. 
Wenn angebliche hintergründige Motive mithilfe einer Verkörperungssequenz 
sichtbar gemacht werden sollen, wird generell auf ein verbum dicendi verzichtet. Die 
Verwendung der verba dicendi erlaubt daher keine Rückschlüsse auf die Validität der 
MSCI-Binnenstruktur. 
Bei der Betrachtung von Körperhaltung und Blickrichtung zeigt sich, dass in 
Spiegel-Netzwerken zwar der Blick von den bisherigen Gesprächspartner_innen 
abgewandt, die Körperhaltung jedoch beibehalten wird. In aggressiven 
Verkörperungssequenzen, in denen von der Norm abweichende Verhaltensmuster 
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anwesenden Personen eingeschrieben werden, wird der Blick wieder aufgenommen. 
In einfach gerahmten Verkörperungssequenzen wird der (Ober-)körper weiter von 
den bisherigen Gesprächspartner_innen abgewandt. Dabei zeigt sich auch, dass die 
Länge der Verkörperungssequenz Auswirkungen auf den Grad der Abwendung hat: 
Je länger eine Verkörperung andauert, desto mehr Abwendung lässt sich beobachten. 
Nochmals deutlicher wird der Grad der Abwendung in doppelt gerahmten 
Integrationsnetzwerken. Hier wird schon von Beginn an deutliche Diskontinuität 
signalisiert. Dies könnte die von Fauconnier und Turner (2002) vorgeschlagene 
Binnenstruktur unterstützen. Jedoch finden sich auch Sequenzen, in denen einfach 
und doppelt gerahmte Stimmwechsel ohne eine körperliche Abwendung stattfinden. 
Diese Stimmwechsel dienen dazu, anderen Teilnehmer_innen abweichende 
Identitäten zuzuschreiben. Zur Signalisierung der Adressat_innen werden Blick und 
Körper eingesetzt. Diejenige Person, auf die der Blick gerichtet wird, wird dargestellt. 
Kognitiv-semantische Komplexität spielt dabei keine Rolle; lediglich der 
Handlungsaspekt bestimmt, welche Blickrichtung und Körperhaltung eingenommen 
wird. Die nachfolgende Tabelle bietet einen Überblick über die sozialen Aktionen, zu 
denen die oben besprochenen Demarkationsmarker beitragen. 
 
Aktion Verbum dicendi Blick Körperpositionierung 
Identitätszuschreibung ∅ Zunächst vom 
Adressaten 
abgewandt; kann 
während der Sequenz 
wieder aufgenommen 
werden 
 
Dem Adressaten 
zugewandt 
Go: Verkörperung 
treibt Narration voran 
Be like: visuelle / 
onomatopoetische 
Illustration diegetisch 
eingeführter Narrative  
Illustrationen von 
modal, raumzeitlich und 
epistemisch 
abgegrenzten 
Diskursszenarien  
∅: Illustration 
diegetisch eingeführter 
Narrative 
Von anderen 
Teilnehmer_innen 
abgewandt 
 
Von anderen 
Teilnehmer_innen 
abgewandt  
Tabelle 3: Demarkationsmarkierung und soziale Aktion 
 
Gestaltung der Darbietung: Rederecht, Segmentalisierung und Listenphänomene 
Da sich Verkörperungssequenzen über mehrere Turns erstrecken können, wird das 
ansonsten in Alltagsgesprächen greifende Sprecherwechselsystem ausgesetzt. Um 
solche längeren ‚Projekte‘ durchzuführen, müssen Teilnehmer_innen das Rederecht 
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für eine ausgeweitete Turnsequenz erhalten. Dieser Abschnitt beschäftigt sich mit den 
Instrumenten (wie beispielsweise prosodische Markierung), mithilfe derer das 
Rederecht gesichert wird. Hierzu gehört auch eine Untersuchung der 
Segmentalisierung solcher längeren Projekte in kleine Subeinheiten, da sich daran 
besonders gut die fein abgestimmte Verhandlung des Rederechts aufzeigen lässt. In 
einem letzten Schritt wird in diesem Abschnitt ein besonders häufiges 
Verkörperungsformat, das Listenphänomen, besprochen. Hier zeigt sich, dass viele 
Stimmwechselsequenzen einem 3+1-Format folgen. Drei Subeinheiten liefern 
fragmentierte Redebeiträge der verkörperten Person. Nach einer längeren Pause wird 
im prosodisch markierten Pointen-Modus ein letzter Beitrag präsentiert, der die 
‚Vorstellung‘ beendet und zurück zum vorhergegangen thematischen Gespräch führt 
(vgl. „Der Metalldetektor“). 
Im Vergleich der drei unterschiedlichen Netzwerktypen zeigt sich, dass einfach 
gerahmte Verkörperungen den prototypischen Typ darstellen: Sie umfassen generell 
mehr TCUs als die anderen Komplexitätstypen und verfügen über längere und 
häufigere Pausen zwischen den einzelnen Subeinheiten, die verdeutlichen, dass es sich 
hier um eine etablierte kommunikative Praxis handelt. Spiegel- und doppelt gerahmte 
Netzwerke sind hingegen kürzer und verfügen über weniger Pausen zwischen den 
wenigen Subeinheiten. Es scheint daher, als sei das Verkörpern von Personen 
außerhalb der eigenen Gruppe eine etablierte kommunikative Praxis, die eigene 
Werte betont und somit verstärkt, und von der Norm abweichende Aspekte auf 
Außenseiter überträgt. Weitere Evidenz für die von Fauconnier und Turner (2002) 
vorgeschlagene Binnentypologie lässt sich in der methodischen Gestaltung von 
Stimmwechseln jedoch nicht finden. 
 
Beendigung von Verkörperungssequenzen 
Dieser Abschnitt beschäftigt sich mit den Methoden und Praktiken, mithilfe derer eine 
Verkörperungssequenz beendet und ein Übergang zum vorherigen thematischen 
Gespräch geschaffen wird. Es zeigt sich hier, dass alle Integrationstypen auf ähnliche 
Mechanismen zurückgreifen. Wiederholungen, der prosodisch markierte Pointen-
Modus, kurze Coda oder auch Lachpartikel in der letzten Turnkonstruktionseinheit 
tragen dazu bei, das Ende einer Verkörperungssequenz zu markieren. Dabei scheinen 
Spiegelverkörperungen tendenziell Wiederholungen zu bevorzugen, während sich der 
Pointen-Modus vor allem in einfach und doppelt gerahmten Verkörperungen findet. 
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Coda und Lachpartikel finden sich hingegen gleichmäßig über alle Typen verteilt. 
Um zurück zum vorigen thematischen Gespräch zu führen, wird ebenfalls 
unabhängig von der Komplexitätsstufe auf ähnliche Mechanismen zurückgegriffen. 
Beispielsweise leiten abschließende Diskursmarker wie „anyway“ über zu einer neuen 
Diskurseinheit. 
 
Aktionsbasierte Typologie von Verkörperungssequenzen 
In der Analyse zeigte sich, dass Teilnehmer_innen an Bedeutungsaus-
handlungsprozessen in polyphonen Stimmwechseln sich in der Gestaltung ihrer 
Äußerungen nicht an kognitiver Komplexität orientieren, sondern hauptsächlich an 
der sozialen Aktion. Bedeutungsaushandlung resultiert daher aus und wird geleitet 
von sich entwickelnden, rekursiven Annahmen (beliefs) über die gerade ausgehandelte 
soziale Aktion. Die Integrationskomplexität (im Sinne von Fauconniers und Turners 
Binnendifferenzierung) spielt dabei eine untergeordnete Rolle. Die Fähigkeit zur 
konzeptuellen Integration ist ein Werkzeug, das in der Bedeutungsaushandlung 
herangezogen und dann explizit signalisiert wird. Das von den Autoren 
vorgeschlagene Analysemodell kann aber keinerlei Aussagen über tatsächliche 
Bedeutungskonstitution treffen (vgl. Forschungsfrage 2). Daher wird im Folgenden 
zuerst eine aktionsbasierte Typologie von Verkörperungssequenzen vorgestellt und in 
einem nächsten Schritt ein Modell präsentiert, das die oben beschriebenen Ergebnisse 
berücksichtigt und so voll kontextualisierte Bedeutungsaushandlungsprozesse, die mit 
konzeptueller Integration einhergehen, schematisch darstellen kann. 
Polyphone Stimmwechsel im interaktionalen Humor sind soziale, gemeinsam 
verhandelte Aktivitäten, die vor allem zwei Ziele verfolgen. Zuerst tragen 
Verkörperungssequenzen zur Beurteilung von vorhergegangenen Redebeiträgen bei. 
Diese Art von Verkörperungssequenzen folgt unterschiedlichen Formaten, wie 
Abbildung 4 verdeutlicht. 
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Abbildung 4: Verkörperungssequenzen zur Wertung von Redebeiträgen 
 
Die zweite Gruppe von Verkörperungssequenzen beinhaltet narrative ‚Ein Witz 
zuerst‘-Sequenzen, die in separaten Diskursszenarien verortet sind. Abbildung 5 fasst 
die Untertypen und Strategien zusammen. 
!
Abbildung 5: Verkörperungen zur Illustration narrativer 'Zuerst ein Witz'-Sequenzen 
 
Die Methoden, mithilfe derer polyphone Verkörperungssequenzen interaktional 
ausgehandelt werden, hängen von der sozialen Aktion, die gemeinsam gestaltet wird, 
ab und nicht von den von Fauconnier und Turner vorgeschlagenen Typologie. 
Bedeutung ist eingebettet in soziale Aktion (vgl. pragmatische, gebrauchsorientierte 
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Sprachphilosophien). Damit MSCI eine allgemeine Theorie des Denkens und der 
Bedeutungsaushandlung werden kann, muss sie das kooperative, aktionsorientierte 
und zielgeleitete Wesen von kontextuell situierten Bedeutungsaushandlungsprozessen 
berücksichtigen. Im Folgenden wird ein solches Modell vorgeschlagen.  
 
 
Kapitel 6: Das Primat der Pragmatik 
 
 
Die oben zusammengefassten Analysen haben verdeutlicht, dass sowohl die 
emergente Struktur als auch die Art und Weise, wie zwei Input-Domänen in 
Verbindung gesetzt werden (mappings) von einer Suche nach interaktional relevanter 
Bedeutung geleitet wird. Fauconnier und Turner (2002) erwähnen Relevanz als eines 
der leitenden Prinzipien, die hinter einem erfolgreichen blend stehen können, widmen 
dem Phänomen jedoch nur eine Seite ihres knapp 400 Seiten umfassenden magnum 
opus und konzentrieren sich zweitens auf netzwerkimmanente Relevanz. D.h. 
pragmatische Relevanz wird nicht berücksichtigt. Die Analyse hat jedoch gezeigt, dass 
es genau diese pragmatische Relevanz ist, die auch die interne Struktur eines 
Integrationsnetzwerkes bedingt. Aus diesem Grund ist das Relevanzkonzept (vgl. dazu 
Sperber & Wilson, 1986) von zentraler Wichtigkeit im vorgeschlagenen Modell.  
Das in Abbildung 6 schematisch dargestellte Modell geht von der 
Rezipientenseite aus und betont neben Relevanz auch die grundlegende Annahme 
von Kooperativität (vgl. u.a. Davidson, 1973; Grice, 1975; Tomasello, 2008) und, 
dem untergeordnet, Intentionalität. Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass 
Teilnehmer_innen in gemeinsamen Bedeutungsaushandlungsprozessen prinzipiell in 
der Lage sind, ähnlich kognitive Operationen durchzuführen. Diese 
Bedeutungsaushandlungsprozesse werden mithilfe von Zeichen2 gestaltet und 
koordiniert. Den von den Teilnehmer_innen ausgesendeten Zeichen wird Relevanz 
unterstellt, d.h. ein Beitrag zu einer Form von Bedeutung. Aufgrund der Unmenge an 
potentiell zeichenhaften Signalen und ihrer multiplexen Relevanzen werden solche 
Signale durch einen Filter betrachtet, der Vorannahmen zu in der aktuell !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Der Zeichenbegriff sowie weitere Terminologien können in der Zusammenfassung nicht ausführlich 
dargestellt werden. Eine detaillierte Verhandlung der sich ergebenen Problemlagen findet sich in 
Kapitel 6 der vorliegenden Dissertation. 
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verhandelten Interaktion erwartbaren Zeichen bereitstellt. Zeichen, die diesen Filter 
passieren, werden zu Stimuli (vgl. Sperber & Wilson, 1986) und ermöglichen den 
interaktional koordinierten Aufbau mentaler Räume. Der ‚Inhalt‘ der mentalen 
Räume wird dabei von Annahmen über potentiell geteiltes Wissen, Wissen über die 
Gesprächstpartner_innen sowie die gemeinsame Diskursgeschichte geleitet. 
Beschränkt wird der mentale Raum durch Annahmen zum aktuell verhandelten 
Sprachspiel. Das Wittgenstein’sche (1953) Konzept des Sprachspiels wird hier 
herangezogen, da es die gleichzeitige Berücksichtigung der Konventionalität 
linguistischer Zeichen, der Regelgeleitetheit von Kommunikation und der 
intrinsischen Vernetzung von Aktion und Bedeutung ermöglicht. Diese Annahmen 
über das gerade verhandelte Sprachspiel begrenzen nicht nur den ‚Inhalt’ der 
mentalen Räume; sie leiten auch die zwischen den Räumen hergestellten 
Verbindungen (mappings). Die Bedeutung, die aus der Integration der beiden mentalen 
Räume entsteht, ist geleitet von der Suche nach Relevanz sowohl in Hinblick auf das 
gerade verhandelte Sprachspiel wie auch auf die Annahmen über geteiltes Wissen, 
Werte und Diskursgeschichte (common ground). 
 
Das hier kurz zusammengefasste Modell erlaubt es, voll kontextualisierte 
Bedeutungsaushandlung auf Basis von konzeptueller Integration zu beschreiben und 
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so die von der kognitiven Semantik propagierte Aufhebung der Unterscheidung in 
Semantik und Pragmatik  zu erreichen. Die Arbeit leistet somit einen Beitrag zur 
sozialen Wende in der kognitiven Linguistik. 
